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ABSTRACT
This work evaluates the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DoP), the document signed between the State of Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), in Washington D.C. on 13 September 1993, as a case study 
of the bilateral management of an asymmetrical national-subnational conflict within the 
context of an international conflict resolution framework. The DoP represents progress in the 
international endeavour to realise a settlement of the wider Arab-lsraeli conflict, as signalled 
by the Madrid conference of 31 October 1991. The DoP ushered in a new era in Israeli- 
Palestinian relations. It is part of a process which, in essence, is the cornerstone of a formal 
mutual recognition pact which represents a reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimacy, a 
crucial first step towards finding a broad and permanent settlement. The DoP was only 
possible due to the abandonment of long-held mutually antagonistic and intransigent 
positions. Like all political documents, it represents a compromise.
This study examines the complex nature and dynamics of the attempts at resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and reviews the DoP to investigate how it transpired, what it 
means, how it will be implemented, how far it can be used as a blueprint for future 
peacemaking, and offers an analysis of the findings in conclusion. This study also addresses 
the wider international ramifications and relationships which will be a prerequisite for the 
evaluation and analysis of the corresponding policies and responses by the major powers 
and actors from the international community within the framework of the 1991 Madrid Middle 
East Peace Conference.
Chapter one examines the definition and contextualisation of the conflict resolution 
case study. Chapter two focuses on the establishment, purpose and development of the 
DoP, incorporating a thorough examination of the development of the secret Oslo 
backchannel, concluding with an analysis of the Oslo negotiations within the official Madrid 
framework as an example of conflict resolution. Chapter three provides an analysis of the 
DoP as an example of conflict resolution and critiques the meaning and purpose of the 
document. Chapter four provides an analysis of the implementation process of the initial 
years of the life of the DoP, incorporating the actual implementation of the DoP to 31st 
August 1997, including: the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area of May 1994; the 
World Bank aid programme; influential bilateral agreements by the two with third parties; the 
Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of August 1994; the 
Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of August 1995; the Israeli- 
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the W est Bank and the Gaza Strip of September 1995; and 
the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of January 1997. The final chapter 
concludes by evaluating the attempt by the two communities to shape a common future with 
an analysis in determining the effectiveness of the DoP both as an instrument for, and as an 
example of, conflict resolution.
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Preface
What tho' on hamely fare we dine, Then let us pray that it may,
Wear hodden-gray, and a' that; As come it will for a' that;
Gie fools their silks, and knaves their wine. That sense and worth, o'er a' the earth,
A man's a man for a' that. May bear the gree, and a' that.
For a' that and a' that. For a' that and a' that,
Their tinsel show, and a' that; It's coming yet, for a' that,
The honest m an, tho' e'er sae poor. That man to man the world o'er
Is King o' men for a' that. Shall brothers be for a' that." — Robert Burns^
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indulgence and endurance. In particular I would like to thank those at the Department of International 
Relations, University of St. Andrews, who provided invaluable advice and encouragement throughout my 
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Library, the Royal Institute for International Affairs and the United Nations office, and in Brussels at the 
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research trips to the United States, Israel, Hungary, Poland, Belgium and France where I was able to 
interview politicians, special advisors, government officials and academics, many of these interviews 
provided me with invaluable information and unique insights into the understanding of Middle East peace 
making and its progress. To those I can mention, I owe special thanks to, in London, Dr John Levy; and 
in Israel, Alan Baker, Deputy Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ms. Tali Semash, Academic 
Services Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Mrs Margaret Crawford, Headmistress, Tabeetha School, 
Jaffa; Dr. Dore Gold, Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University; Dedi Zucker MK; Dr. Asher 
Susser, Moshe Dayan Centre for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University; Dr. Martin Van 
Creveld, Faculty of Humanities, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; Rageh Kadhoor, Kol Yisrael; Dr. Ahmad 
Tibi, Special Advisor for President Arafat; Dr. Samir Abdallah, economist and PLO adviser; Yana and 
Sasha Gerber. In Belgium Mr. A.V. Flynn, and in the United States particular thanks to Jenny Yamine 
and Gena Gorospe at the World Bank, Washington D.C. for all their help and kindness and Professor 
Rashid Khalidi of the University of Chicago. To many others unnamed who have assisted me in 
whatever manner, 1 extend my thanks.
I would also like to extend my gratitude to Robert Douglas and the St. Andrews University Access 
Fund, Aberdeen Endowments Fund, The Sutherland Page Trust at The Royal Bank of Scotland, The 
Bank of Scotland and to Fiona Risk and the Directors of the Buchanan Society, for their generosity in 
providing much needed financial assistance and support.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge my Indebtedness for all the generous help, support and 
encouragement given me by my parents Andrew and Catherine, my brother Gregor, and especially my 
best friend, Patricia. To Patty, whom 1 met in St. Andrews, and to our beautiful daughter Aimée, a 
captive audience in her pram during long walks along the West Sands, it is because of you St. Andrews 
will always live in my heart long after this work is complete, to you both I dedicate this work.
 ^ (For A' That And A" That), The Works of Robert Burns. (Ware, 1994), p. 328-329.
Introduction;
Theories of international relations, conflict resolution and peace studies encompass not only those 
interstate, intrastate, interpersonal,interethnic, substate and state-substate relations which ar e peaceful, 
but also those that are violent. Due to the potential for wreaking massive destmction implicit in the very 
notion of'have army, will travel', the problem of violence has become central to those who study the 
nature of disputatious international relations vis-a-vis the closeness, or remoteness of the subjects to a 
shooting war. Thus theories of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, etc., as the most conducive structure 
within wliich to resolve conflict, have found Uttle agreement among writers on the subject; examples of 
comprehensive flameworks with which to address most conflicts ar e rather limited. This study will find 
that there is no single existing firamework that can captuie the essence of inter-etlinic conflict, as the 
changing nature of the political realities force a constant realignment and reassessment of the structural 
configurations. *
Western theories of international relations, and in pailiculai* notions of conflict resolution,^ over 
the past 50 years have been primarily dominated and overshadowed by the realities of Cold War logic. 
Thus new realities and new ways of understanding our complex, changing world since the collapse of the 
bipolar model or world view have to be adapted, and new ones defined. Such an exercise takes time; in 
essence old thinking still exists and still dominates the many players on the international scene. Since 
1989-91 there has been an almost desperate attempt to make sense of the changing nature of the 
international system in light of past certainties having been subsumed and overtaken so quickly by events. 
Old enmities still exist; they will merely reconfigure and burst forth in a different guise. For scholars of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the challenge aliead is how we are to understand the peace process, 
coming as it did in the midst of epochal change, and how we are to perceive a superpower inspired and 
sponsored conflict management/conflict resolution model charged with multidisciplinary and cross- 
cultural goals.
According to one geopolitical analysis, the occupation of the of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
and Israeli control of the western part of mandatory Palestine has created a new geopolitical historical 
reaUty, with such significant dynamics that there is no way back to the pre-1967 status quo. The State 
of Israel, according to this analysis, has turned fi om a Jewish nation-state with a relatively small Arab 
minority to a bi-ethnic state, and the Arab-Israel conflict has ceased to be an inter-state conflict as it
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was in the years 1948-67, instead reverting to an inter-community conflict as it had been under the 
British mandate/ Traditionally, in this inter-communal conflict, each of the sides viewed itself as the 
sole legitimate collective in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine, seeing the ambition of the rival community as 
illegitimate.
How do these fundamental beliefs and objectives relate to the modern Palestmian-Israeh 
conflict? It has been, and wül be, pahiftil for each side to accept the consequences of its actions. The 
idealist is opposed by the heretic, the believer is opposed by the collaborator and the majority are 
trapped in the gray area caught between the prevailing winds. For the leaders, there have always been 
excuses to feed the desires for vengeance, whether for those existing in squalid refiigee camps, for 
those landless and stateless, or for those who suffered oppression at the hands of distant persecutors 
now living within range of knives and Katayushas. The spiral of rejection and counter-rejection begged 
the questions: Was it ever thus? Wliat has changed? 'When, for instance, will certain national traits or 
psychological drives find outlets in war, and when in something more peaceful?'**
No study of contemporary political processes can be fijUy comprehensive; what is excluded is 
sometimes more illuminatiug than that which is visible. Yet to have responsibility to account for all tends 
to dampen enthusiasm, particularly when so much vital infoimation is held in secret. However, we can 
still undertake a significant analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as much important and 
relevant information is already in the public domain. In order to circumvent the secretive nature of 
international diplomacy, this study will focus on the primary written document that binds the parties 
together, namely the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, or DoP. As 
the basis for the legal firamework developing Israeli-Palestinian peace, this document and subsequent 
documents stemming from it form the central authority for the peace-making initiative. Tliis document is 
the foundation stone for the peace-making process and, as such, is the most important reference in the 
peace-building initiative. By augmenting a thorough analysis of the document itself with the memoirs, 
autobiographies and biographies of principal figures involved in the political process — and combining 
these with political commentaries, interviews with key individuals, journal, newspaper articles and 
editorials — we can construct a full analysis and evaluation of the peace process. When political 
processes that involve the lives of millions of people are conducted in secret, what is publicly transmitted, 
either in the form of agreed documentation or in public statements becomes aU the more significant.
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particularly in the subsequent political effort to marshal public support for any such agreements made. 
Thus, armed with an understanding of the intent behind the peace initiative, we can assess and define the 
DoP in terms of its success or failure as a vehicle for achieving a definable 'peace' between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, and its potential in signaling the way forward for any fiiture 'peace processes' within the 
Aiab-Israeli conflict.
How inter-communal events are defined, reacted to, and ways found to adapt is the basis of 
history, and more particularly, of international relations. At the very heart of the current Israeh- 
Palestinian conflict he powerful, long-cherished and one-sided perceptions of the nature of the struggle. 
The process of understanding actions and reactions, fears and transgressions begins with the unraveling 
and re-evaluation of the prejudices of the past. Acknowledging injustices committed and tortured paths 
foUowed is concomitant with being able to measure and understand decisions made, and yet to be made. 
Any such discourse must present a formidable challenge to the pervasive influence of traditional 
liistoriography, and as a consequence evaluate and expose popular myths and common misperceptions.
If we wish to acliieve any imderstanding of the nature of the Arab-Israeh relationship, we must 
concentrate on the most contentious and yet central issue, that is, the Israeh-Palestinian conflict.
Although the Middle East peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 is an inter-state affaii', in essence, 
'the crux and the kernel of the Arab-lsraeli conflict is the Palestine problem. The crux and the kernel of 
the Palestine problem is the struggle between two national movements: on the one hand, the Zionist 
movement (and since 1948, its embodiment, Israel), and on the other, the Palestine national movement. 
The crux and the kernel of this struggle has been, and continues to this day to be, the issue of the control 
or sharing of the land of Palestine.'^
Alternatively, 'we must start with fundamentals - beyond theory, beyond ideology, even beyond 
faith. In relation to this country we call 'Eretz Israel' and they call 'Palestine', two peoples ar e in existence, 
each of them deeply conscious in their mind - and feeling in then bones - that this country is their 
country. And history cannot be amended or conected. From this terrible situation, there is one of only 
two possible results and there is no third ...One of these two peoples conquers and occupies the other 
country and deprives the other people of the right of national independence. The Arabs tried to do this in 
1948 and they lost. But since 1967 we [Israel] have done this - and this situation has brought about all 
the contemporary horrors. The domination of the state of Israel over another people can be maintained
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only by violence. The only alternative is partition. Both parties wül have to renounce a claim to the entire 
country. Partition is technically very difficult, but psychologically it's even more difficult - because both 
peoples have a very deep consciousness that this country is their country.'®
However, the conflict to date is more succinctly encapsulated, albeit somewhat cynically by a former 
Israeli MK, 'when nations are in dispute they go to the high court of nations, wliich is war. And they lost 
all the wars.'^
Thus whether the development of liistory is evolutionary, epochal or merely the propagation of 
propaganda, the antagonisms of nations or peoples is the life blood of international relations. Therefore 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not a morality play, not a conflict between good and evü. It is a conflict 
between competing claims and competing justices, aflSrmation and denial. Thus reclamation of ancient 
archetypes with the intent to create meaning for the living, whether as an attempt to explain and therefore 
make sense of traumatic events, or to use collective memory as a form of affirmation of racial identity, is 
a thread wliich can be traced through the annals of almost all races of the earth. If one perceives human 
history as a series of calamities linked by islands of blessed but albeit limited peacefulness, the power of 
collective memory in tliis sense is a form of active resistance. The history of the Jews and the Palestinians 
is not only symbolically but intuitively bound together. The most basic controversy, the epicentre of this 
unfolding drama has been the question of legitimacy. The connections both ancient and modern between 
Israelis and Palestinians are to be found not far fi“om the surface of contemporary power politics. 
Comparisons revolve around legitimacy and the ennobling of past and present suffering. Primarily 
comparisons made in the political ar ena for pur ely expedient political purposes seek to promote 
partisanship on one side and to subvert and de-legitimise on the other. The images of suffering, both 
ancient and modern, represent an intuitive hnk, locking the two communities, Israeli and Palestinian, 
together in an intimate bond of suffering. Thus the demand for the acliievernent of goals, wliich by their* 
very nature are absolute, tenders the assumption that indivisible fulfilment may be more characteristic of 
groups of people who regard themselves as injured. The achievement of the absolute goal provides the 
necessary compensation for those injured.
Radical aims and dehumanisation of one's rival effects the actions taken, so that, 'if we can 
perceive the opponent as less than human, superego controls do not operate and no guilt is felt over a 
resort to violence.'^ Such polar isation of views leaves no room for gradation, we ar e left with 'solutions
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which betray theii* totalistic nature in that the totally good may learn to be cruelly stern ad majorem Dei 
gloriam/^ Israel / Palestine is a place of causes and desir es. It has been a prize over the ages 'as well as a 
place whose very name (and the endless naming and renaming of the place) has been an issue of doctrinal 
importance'.*® Even the use of a certain term, a name, is an act of political will. Israel / Palestine is an 
interpretation, 'Palestine carries so heavy an imaginative and doctrinal freight - transmuted from a reality 
into a non-reality, from a presence into an absence.'**
Thus we have perceptions which are ideologically motivated, history viewed emotionally, 
distortion becomes reality. On one hand, there is the assertion that 'despite the turbulent history of the 
land of Palestine and the frequent foreign occupations, there has been a fundamental, uninterrupted 
continuity in the original population of the country. Wars and occupations could not drive the 
descendants of the Canaanites, the Amorites, the Jebusites and the Pliilistines from the land'.*  ^On the 
other hand is the conviction held by a former Israeli prime minister, that 'It was not as though there were 
a people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took 
their country away from them. They did not exist.'*^
The reality of the modern conflict, the relationship between the competing participants both past 
and present, may well be illustrated by means of a parable:
'A man once jumped from the top floor of a burning house in wliich many members of his 
family had already perished. He managed to save his life, but as he was falling he hit a person 
standing below and broke that person's legs and arms. The jumping man had no choice; yet to the 
man with the broken limbs he was the cause of his misfortime. If both behaved rationally, they 
would not have become enemies. The man who escaped from the blazing house, having 
recovered, would have tried to escape and console the other sufferer; and the latter might have 
realised that he was the victim of circumstances over wliich neither of them had control. But look 
what happens when these people behave irrationally. The injured man blames the other for his 
misery and swears to make him pay for it. The other, afraid of the crippled man's revenge, insults 
him, kicks him, and beats him up whenever they meet. The kicked man again swears revenge and 
is again punched and punished. The bitter enmity so fortuitous at fii'st, hai'dens and comes to 
overshadow the whole existence of both men and to poison their minds.'***
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Therefore we can establish that 'ideologies differ not only in then doctrines but also in their 
patterns of thought and behaviour about a given issue.' Thus 'when human beings assess reality, they 
perceive the possible goals, the available means, and the alternative outcomes. Ideology is a lens tlnough 
which reality is perceived, and in this way can influence policy and deeds. In other words, an ideology 
and its dominant mentality generate attitudes that influence how people shape policies.'*  ^The root of the 
Israeli-Palestinian / Aiab conflict, and thus the Middle East peace process is basically psychological.
Many learned articles and individual pronouncements have come forth detailing in almost utopian 
terms what a peaceful Middle East would be Uke. The difference between desire and the mysticism wliich 
envelops all would-be peace builders, is the lack of one very fundamental ingredient, wliich must inspire 
caution to all, and that is reality.
For any Israeli-Palestinian peace process to succeed, implemented stages, negotiated 
painstakingly, wül liave to be concluded and rigidly adhered to. This process is one of years and not one 
of months. The end result wül have to be defined in advance, otherwise the objectives wül be unclear* and 
thus open to misinterpretation and rejection. For example, the Palestinians see the negotiations as a state- 
buüding process while the Israelis see the process as leading to inter-state comprehensive peace treaties, 
with the Palestinian problem as a sub-state issue and therefore not central to the overaU process. 
Confidence building in this environment is a powerful concept but a diplomatic chimera nonetheless; each 
side cannot buÜd confidence and trust in the other when holding mutuaUy opposing fundamental beliefs 
and goals. Unless the parties to the negotiations can ask themselves two fiindamental questions, then 
there wül be no substantiaUy positive outcome to the present talks. 'Do you want war* or peace? Ar e you 
for the past with its twin demons of supremacy and indignity, or for a future of which one can orüy say: It 
will be different?'*®
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), the document 
signed between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), in Washington D.C. 
on 13 September 1993, represents progress in the multinational endeavour to realise a settlement of the 
wider Arab-lsraeli conflict, as signaUed by the Madrid conference of 31 October 1991. Although the DoP 
signed by Israel and the PLO ushered in a new era in Israeli-Palestinian relations mar king the beginning of 
the process of implementing Palestinian autonomy, wliich in itself is an historical achievement, the DoP 
also represents a climax of many years of confrontation and hostility. The DoP is part of a process which,
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in essence, is the cornerstone of the formal mutual recognition pact which represents a reciprocal 
acknowledgement of legitimacy, a crucial first step toward finding a broad and permanent settlement. The 
DoP, like all political documents, represents a compromise which must be compar ed, not with what each 
side would consider ideal, but with what would exist in the absence of the agreement.
The DoP is a first step toward a new political arrangement no one can yet fully describe. It is a 
momentous beginning, offering a glimpse of the chance to end years of hatred and bloodshed, but it is 
still only a start. It is a fairly severe test, for Israelis and Palestinians alike. The Israelis through the DoP 
have to deal with the PLO they have demonized for so long. The Palestinians through the DoP have to 
prove to the Israelis that they can govern themselves and maintain order if they hope to receive a payoff 
fi*orn the DoP in the form of more land, powers and responsibilities in the occupied territories. The DoP 
prescribes a series of incremental steps which ar e important in themselves because these steps signify that 
the old enemies are, in effect, conceding that the other has a right to exist. More importantly, Israel is 
essentially granting the Palestinians the chance to organise politically on parts of what has long been 
declared the inviolable 'Eretz Yisrael Hashlemah' in return for an agreement to contain, curtail and 
control any and all violence directed at the Israelis by Palestinian elements.*  ^ In accepting these opening 
conditions, the PLO still insists that the process must eventually lead to the creation of an independent 
Palestinian state, although this point remains open to question. Yet, by the very natur e of assuming 
responsibility for the governing of pieces of land under its control, however small, the PLO has changed 
its very raison d'être dramatically and radically.
This study aims to be the first in the English language to analyse and evaluate the DoP firom the 
point of view of whether or not it stands up to its stated goal, namely the achievement of a 'just, lasting 
and comprehensive peace settlement'*  ^'leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.'*  ^It will examine the complex nature and dynamics of the attempt at resolving 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Tliis study wül seek to review the DoP, to investigate how it transpired, 
what it means, how it wül be implemented and how far it can be used as a blueprint for future 
peacemaking. This study wül also address the wider international ramifications and relationships wliich 
will be a prerequisite for the evaluation and analysis of the corresponding policies and responses by the 
major powers and actors from the international community within the fi*amework of the 1991 Madrid 
Middle East Peace Conference. FmaUy, it wül offer an analysis of the findings in conclusion.
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Chapter One will examine the definition and contextualisation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process as a case study of the bilateral management of an asymmetrical national-subnational conflict 
witliin the context of an international conflict resolution framework. Chapter One further examines the 
nature of conflict resolution theories, paradigms, philosophies and principles and mcorporates a thorough 
hteratuie review. It questions asymmetric power relationships and explores the understanding of conflict 
resolution within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Chapter Two will focus on the 
establishment, purpose and development of the DoP, incorporating a thorough examination of the 
development of the secret Oslo backchannel, concluding with an analysis of the Oslo negotiations within 
the official Madrid framework as an example of conflict resolution. Chapter Three wïïL provide an 
analysis of the DoP as an example of conflict resolution and will critique the meaning and purpose of the 
document. Chapter Four will provide an analysis of the implementation process of the initial years of the 
life of the DoP, incorporating the actual implementation of the DoP to 31st August 1997, including: the 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area of May 1994; the World Bank aid programme; influential 
bilateral agreements by the two with third parties; the Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and 
Responsibilities of August 1994; the Protocol on Further Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities of 
August 1995; the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip of 
September 1995; and the Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron of January 1997. The final 
chapter will conclude by evaluating the attempt by the two communities to shape a common future with 
an analysis in determining the effectiveness of the DoP both as an instrument for, and as an example of, 
conflict resolution.
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Chapter One: Peace with justice, for a just peace
'And I will make tliem one nation in the land, 
upon the mountains of Israel; 
and one king shall be king over them all; 
and they shall be no longer two nations,
and no longer divided into two kingdoms.' -Ezekiel (37.22)*
1.1 Introduction
In order to evaluate the political process that developed between the Israehs and the Palestinians 
from October 1991 under the aegis of the Middle East peace process, culminating in the di afring of the 
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), it is important that the nature 
of the Israeli-Palestinian inter-relationship is understood, and frames of reference for understanding the 
process of Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution are properly contextualised and defined. Thus, rather than 
subjectively defining who is right or wi*ong and apportioning blame, we must ask less easily quantifiable 
and consequently more valuable questions. What is meant by peace? What are the rules of the game? What 
are the power relationships between participants, mediators, third parties, and co-sponsors? What are the 
criteria for measuring success or failure, and how are they evaluated? What is the parties' imderstanding of 
the 'peace process'? What ai e the basic goals and strategic objectives of the DoP? With, and within, which 
parameters do we assess and evaluate the success or failure of the DoP? What ai e the expectations raised 
by the DoP? What shall be deemed a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement? Is the DoP a device 
to contain, control, limit, manage or resolve the Israeh-Palestinian conflict? In essence, how do we grade 
the test?
The stated intention of the DoP is to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognise 
both Israeh and Palestinian mutual legitimate and pohtical rights, and strive to 'five in peaceful coexistence 
and mutual dignity and security and acliieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic 
reconciliation through the agreed pohtical process.' The aim of the Israeh-Palestinian negotiations within 
the Middle East peace process is to estabhsh an autonomous Palestinian authority within a transitional 
period which wih lead to 'a permanent settlement based on Security Coimcil Resolutions 242 and 338', and 
that the 'negotiations on the permanent status wih lead to the implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338.' Thus we can assume two fundamental conclusions: 1. the principal objective of 
the DoP is to achieve a 'just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement' leading to the resolution of the 
Israeh-Palestinian conflict via 'historic reconcihation tlirough the agreed pohtical process'; and 2. the 
foundation of the agreed pohtical process, the DoP, is built on basing the permanent settlement of the 
Israeh-Palestinian conflict on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and that negotiations on the 
permanent status wih lead to the 'implementation of Security Counch Resolutions 242 and 338'.^
To assess the DoP, a prehimnary exploration of conflict resolution theories and methods is 
necessary in order to develop a set of standards so that we may best measure the success of the DoP. Using 
the theoretical knowledge we wih gain from an assessment of conflict resolution methodology and 
practices, we wih then be in a position to analyse the pohtical process set m motion by the DoP. This set of 
standards whl be covered by what we whl cah the RICEMAN FORMULA. The RICEMAN FORMULA
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covers: (1) Resolution; (2) Institutionalisation; (3) Confidence-building; (4) Empowerment; (5) Mediation; 
(6) Administration; (7) Negotiation.
This first chapter analyses and develops the theoretical contextualisation of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process as a case study of the bilateral management of an asymmetrical national-subnational conflict 
within the context of an international conflict resolution fi-amework. Chapter One further examines the 
nature of conflict resolution theories, paradigms, philosophies and principles and incorporates a thorough 
literature review. It questions the Israeli-Palestinian asymmetric power relationship and explores the 
understanding of conflict resolution within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
1.1.1 Conflict Resolution Methodology
Before the signing of the DoP, Israel and the PLO were enemies engaged in a mainly low-intensity, 
though sometimes high-intensity, inter-ethnic, existential conflict. Neither side officially recognised the 
other, and both sought effectively to deligitimise and destroy the other. If one accepts the premise that the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the core conflict of the wider inter-state Ai ab-Israeli conflict, then the process 
of building peace in the Middle East has always been assumed in layman's terms, to have to begin with the 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The Aiab-Israeli conflict as a whole is a protracted conflict with fi*equent and intense outbreaks of 
open warfare, which prior to the signing of the DoP was regarded as fundamentally unchanged and 
unresolvable as long as the Israeh-Palestinian conflict remained unresolved.^ The Arab-Israeh conflict has 
three distinguishable phases: firstly, the mihtary/political phase, 'the unmanageable stage'; secondly, the 
conflict management phase, the reduction stage; and, thirdly, the conflict resolution phase, the peace stage.** 
Any movement by the parties, particularly as one, between any, or through ah of these phases, has been 
characteristicahy difficult to achieve, with the success that has been achieved limited to bilateral efforts and 
agreements. Prior to 1991, there existed a formal peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, formal 
disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, and an informal agreement between 
Israel and Lebanon. Of the principal Arab-lsraeli conflicts, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained, prior to 
1991, the only non-institutionalised conflict, characterised as a state- sub-state conflict, unlike the other 
principal Arab-lsraeli conflicts which were all state-state conflicts.
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, until 1988, was in essence a zero-sum conflict. Unilateral action by 
both sides failed to completely attain either sides' goals - the destruction of the other side's claim to 
legitimacy and to exist as a sovereign entity in the land of Israel/Palestine. Whilst the emphasis of Israel's 
conflict resolution relations with its neighbouis in the year s to 1987 was on a state-to-state basis, the 
Palestinian intifada, wliich erupted in Gaza in December 1987, directed the focus of Israel's attention to the 
burgeoning interethnic conflict with the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories. The intifada 
represented not only the inability of the Israelis to destroy the PLO and dismiss the Palestinian people, but 
also of the PLO's inabUity to achieve its stated goal of the destruction of Israel. The popular uprising by 
necessity demanded of the Israelis a response, and through the intifada's intensity and more so its longevity, 
elicited a measured and more thoughtful reaction fi*om Israel other than the initial one of force. Israel's 
immediate resort to violence as a means of suppressing the intifada was unsustainable in the medium to 
long term, thus the feilure to employ tecliniques requisite to contain the conflict meant that the Israelis had
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to accept more conciliatory and concessionary measures with which to manage the conflict. According to 
Y. Bai-Siman-Tov, the potential to 'sliift tliis conflict fi*om regulation to institutionalisation depends on 
definitive, accepted and recognised links between institutionalisation and resolution. The Palestinians are 
not interested in institutionalisation that wfll fr eeze their conflict behaviour without promising them a 
resolution that will end the Israeli occupation. The Israelis ...are interested in institutionalisation as a means 
towards ending the intifada, but they refuse to make their withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza 
dependent on it.'®
The Arab-lsraeli conflict, wliich at first had a 'zero-smn, protracted nature, has however changed 
over time, through effective conflict management that has made conflict reduction and even resolution 
possible.'® However the Arab-lsraeli conflict is neither a single nor a static conflict system, the differences 
between the various parties constantly change, in turn affecting the entire conflict system. The Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict has steadfastly refiised to transform from the state of regulation to resolution, precisely 
because the two parties share so different views on what constitutes resolution, and what constitutes 
merely management. The Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have constantly been affected by the Israeh 
perception that for them, what the Palestinians consider to be the necessary minimum position is the 
necessary maximum position. Sepaiate, independently concluded negotiated agreements have characterised 
the Arab-lsraeli conflict, either presuming or preventing a comprehensive agreement. Thus the complexities 
of the Arab-Israeh conflict, 'many actors and different issues' has 'hindered the development of the same 
rate and scope ...in each dyadic conflict.'^
Whilst the PLO departed from its long-standmg position of negation of the state of Israel in 1988 - 
with the recognition of Israel, the acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 242 and 338, 
the renunciation of terrorism and limiting Palestinian sovereignty aspirations to the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip - Israel on the other hand refused to concede to a mutual recognition understanding, preferring to 
ignore the PLO, continue settling the occupied territories and deny the Palestinians the courtesy of 
acknowledging their existence as a separate negotiating partner to deal with. The main result of Israel's 
refusal to deal with the PLO is that without the direct participation of the PLO in negotiations there would 
never be any real prospect of reaching an Israeli-Palestinian accommodation. That said, then those Israelis 
who professed a desfre for reaching a peacefi.il settlement with the Palestinians, but would not countenance 
negotiating with the PLO, were either disingenuous or stupid. Likewise those Palestinians who professed a 
peaceful outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but were imprepared or unwilhng to accept the 
flourishing reality of Israel's existence, were so unreasonable that their logic bordered on the absurd. Such 
rejection by significant constituencies within both sides has conspired until 1993, either thr ough external 
events or through design, to sufficiently inhibit the forces within both camps that counselled compromise 
and cooperation.
Three factors were responsible for the readiness of the various parties to the Arab-lsraeli conflict to 
accept the invitation to attend the US-USSR co-sponsored Madrid Middle East Peace Conference in 1991: 
the international realignment signalled by the second Gulf War, the disintegration of the USSR, and 
pressure applied by the US administration. Two lessons were underlined by the international realignment 
signalled by the second Gulf War*. Firstly, that due to the massive capability for destruction by
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technologically advanced weapons, particularly unconventional ballistic missile systems, the holding of 
territory was no longer the guarantor of a sound defensive posture. New conventional wisdom dictated that 
the previously held Israeli defensive reliance on the policy of strategic depth as the necessary basis upon 
which to construct the Israeli military strategic defensive doctrine no longer held true. Secondly, the 
international community led by a US administration more bullish about its perceived international role, 
'deligitimised war as a means of managing' the Arab-lsraeli conflict, forcing the various protagonists to 
conclude that the 'political costs of new war could exceed its political benefits'.^ The disintegration of the 
USSR led to the superpower temporarily orphaning its client states and organisations, in turn ensming that 
in the short term, no Arab state or actor with the desire to wage war against Israel, would have the means, 
patronage or the tacit approval needed. The pressuie applied by the US administration was by virtue of the 
fact that the US was as a result of the events of 1990-91, the last superpower standing. Thus US approval 
or disapproval became to be of greater importance than previously, therefore the implicit threat of incurring 
the wrath of the US administration had inherently more power and authority, the more so with the growing 
perception that the USSR's power was waning. By accepting these realities, the various parties to the Arab- 
lsraeli conflict were successfully corralled by a US administration riding high on its self-image and on its 
perceived dominance of the international scene.
The Arab-lsraeli conflict has evolved over many years from its intrinsic character of a long-term 
zero-sum conflict to a point now where effective conflict management has culminated in reducing tensions 
to the stage where resolving the basics of the conflict is possible. However, any notions of confidence in 
such an event happening may be overstated, as the Arab-lsraeli conflict remains a multi-faceted situation 
which continues to evade positive perceptions because progress in any one area does not necessarily mean 
progress as a whole, thus precluding a comprehensive settlement. Indeed the Arab-Israeh conflict is a series 
of linked conflicts progressing at different rates, with different emphases and differing needs thus making 
analysis and evaluation of such dynamics of each and of the whole increasingly difficult, particularly when 
assessing and measuring the conflict regime through the various phases of its life, from conflict through 
regulation to institutionahsation to resolution. Thus it is of importance to assess and define the DoP in 
terms of its success or failure as a veliicle for achieving a definable 'peace' between the Israehs and 
Palestinians and its potential in signalling the way forward for any future 'peace processes' witliin the Arab- 
Israeh conflict.
The DoP constitutes a set of mutuafly agreed general principles regarding the interim period of 
Palestinian self-rule. As such, the DoP defers those as yet unresolved permanent-status issues to a later 
schedule of negotiations, excluding them fr om the interim ar rangements but neither prejudging nor 
preempting them from such. The DoP stems fr om the Middle East peace conference larmched m October 
1991, and carried out within the structure of the Madrid framework. The 1991 Middle East peace initiative 
was convened in Madrid, co-sponsored by the US and USSR, and conceived in order to initiate direct 
peace talks between various interested parties with the aim of reassessing and reshaping the pohtical order 
of the Middle East. The Madrid framework is an integrated structure composed of three basic links: the 
Opening Conference, the Bilateral Track, and the Multilateral Track. The Opening Conference, which 
maugurated the two separate parallel negotiating tracks, the bilateral and the multilateral, was intended as a
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preliminary and preparatory occasion providing a pioneering forum for all the participants, although in itself 
having no power to impose solutions or veto agreements. The Bilateral Tracks are intended as the vehicle 
with which to "resolve the conflicts of the past", by sets of dhect negotiations between Israel and her 
immediate neighbouis; the Palestinians, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The Multilateral Track is intended as 
the medium to "build the Middle East of the future" through confidence-building measures throughout the 
region, and as such constitutes an integral element of the peace-making process.^ Formulated to include 
interested regional and international parties, the multilateral track focuses negotiations on five key issues of 
regional concern; water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development. The multilateral 
track has two interconnected objectives: to determine regional solutions to important regional problems; 
and to function as a confidence-building measure by wliich to promote and therefore extend the notion and 
practice of normalised contacts and relations among the regional and international parties to the 
negotiations.
This study is not an empirical, comparative study of conflict resolution case studies in order to test 
a set of hypotheses; it is, rather, a case study of one conflict resolution process, how that conflict resolution 
fi*amework evolved and how conflict resolution tecliniques were employed to determine a political solution 
to the protracted and deep-rooted Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, some general discussion of conflict 
resolution theory is necessary as background.
1.1.2 Theory in Conflict Resolution
Theories of international relations and peace studies encompass not only those inter-state, intra­
state, inter-personal, inter-ethnic, sub-state, and state-substate relations wliich are peacefiil but also those 
that are violent. Due to the potential for wreaking massive destruction implicit in the very notion of'have 
army, will travel', the problem of violence has become central to those who study the natui e of disputatious 
international relations vis-a-vis the closeness, or remoteness of the subjects to a shooting war. Thus 
theories of unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity, etc., as the most conducive structure within wliich to 
resolve conflict, have found little agreement among writers on the subject. Examples of comprehensive 
fi*ameworks with which to view this case study are rather limited. As we shall see this study wih find that 
there is no one firamework which will capture its essence, as the changing natui e of the political realities 
force a constant realignment and reassessment of the structuial configurations.*®
Conflict resolution as an academic discipline was stimulated by various movements, synthesising the 
study of: industrial relations; mediation and two-track international diplomacy; peacemaking; alternative 
dispute resolution; and interpersonal and intercultural disputes practices, particularly in the US, and has 
developed since the 1950s, defined as a multi and inter-disciplinaiy field grounded in Western culture and 
socio-economic traditions.** Theories of international relations, and in particular Western notions of 
conflict resolution, over the past 50 year's have been primarily dominated and overshadowed by the realities 
of Cold War logic, thus new realities and new ways of understanding our complex, changing world since 
the collapse of the bipolar model or world view have to be refined, and new ones defined. Such an exercise 
takes time, in essence old thinking still exists and still dominates the many players on the international 
scene. Since 1989-91 there has been an almost desperate attempt to make sense of the changing nature of 
the international system in light of past certainties having been subsumed and overtaken so quickly by
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events. Old enmities still exist, they will merely reconfigurate and burst forth in a different guise. The 
challenge aliead is how we are to understand the Madrid Peace Conference, coming as it did in the midst of 
epochal change, and how we are to perceive a super-power inspired and sponsored conflict 
management/conflict resolution model charged with multidisiplinary and cross-cultural goals. With this in 
mind we can now analyse and assess the ongoing operation of international relations whether within, or 
not, the context of new international systems and structures.
Conflict as encapsulated in an institutional structure that legitimates violence, i.e. occupation + 
repression = conflict, means that more than just a new arcliitecture of relationships has to be constructed. 
The causes, conditions and contexts of conflict must be determined; the parties, their milieu, their culture 
and ideologies, economic relations, all points of contact and interaction, and the very basis of the nature of 
the conflict have to be transformed so that historical conflict is not merely postponed only to be reproduced 
at a later juncture. Thus intra-party conflict has to be addressed in conjunction with the overall inter-party 
conflict, by making discord explicit in order that less threatening and violent structures may develop.
Conflict resolution theoreticians and practitioners function witliin two mainly independent cultures. 
However, both relate to each other in importait ways; theoreticians because they need practical examples 
to anchor their theories, and practitioners because they need focus with which to view their work.
If conflict analysis is a fundamental building-block of conflict resolution, then conflict theory 
'requires a mapping of the conflict, including a complete picture of the dynamics of the parties, their 
relationships and issues, and the processes being used to maintain or resolve their conflict.'*  ^ Analysis 
alone, however, 'is insufficient in conflict-resolving situations', the parties themselves 'must play an 
important role in the process if the benefits are to be realised.'*^
Both the forums and the processes of conflict resolution are usually 'biased to some degree toward 
the interests of those who create them' therefore, conflict resolution theory must meet the needs of all the 
interested parties in designing the process by which they will tiy to settle their differences. Through 
inclusion and participation many objectives are accomplished: 'ownership' of the process is encouraged, 
greater participation by parties in the process of resolving the problem influences the kind of behaviour that 
parties will use later in the problem-solving process, positive working relationships ar e built that help to 
create 'elegant options and implement the chosen solution effectively, and permits outside facilitators to 
build sufficient credibility to serve in an impartial role.'***
Conflict resolution serves as a governing mechanism to respond to changes in political, social, and 
economic variables within a community to the extent that the process drives parties to consider the deepest 
levels of individual and group interests, values and needs. The informal processes engaged to deal with 
particular conflict issues must therefore be linked closely with the community's existing traditional decision­
making processes. However, at some point, the community will need to make a collective decision on 
what level to accept the results or consequences of the conflict resolution process. The deeper the level of ' 
acceptance needed, the more change in the community's governing structure required, the more difficult 
that acceptance will become for those holding positions of leadership in the establishment, thus 'decisions 
about how much to accept ar e for the commiuiity and its decision-makers to make, after full recognition 
and consideration of the elements of the problem and their impact.'*®
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Theory offers the practitioner structure, organisation, context, preparation, education, motivation, 
standardisation, and the confidence to develop knowledge and skills, however the downside is in the over­
reliance on the theoretical framework wherein lies the possibility of shaping the parties and then conflict to 
fit the process, rather than moulding the process to suit the parties and their conflict.
An important distinction regarding conflict theory has to be made when dealing with an mter-ethnic 
conflict wliich is part of a wider international conflict, that is, the determination and utility of existing 
theoretical and methodological frameworks must be questioned. Much of conflict theory literature relates 
to interpersonal, intergroup and intercommunal conflicts which exist within existing institutional 
frameworks which include the powers of coercion, sanction, reparation and punishment. Tliis makes the 
prescription of models dealing with conflict resolution much easier, as institutional frameworks therefore 
do not have to be invented or endowed. The dynamics of international conflict, and the lack of effective 
international institutions, structures, and binding punitive measures aie such that the applicability, utility 
and effectiveness of much of the work in the field is unfortunately debatable.
According to D. J. Sandole, there are 'at least foui* paradigms relevant to conflict and conflict 
resolution at all levels, from the interpersonal to international: (1) Political Realism (Realpolitik); Political 
Idealism (Idealpolitik); (3) Marxism; and (4) ...Non-Maixist Radical Thought.'*® 'Pohtical reahsm' and 
'pohtical ideahsm' are basicafly polar opposites, the difference between 'nature vs. nurture', or constructive 
vs. destructive forces. 'Pohtical reahsm' stresses; the world is a battlegiound, that human nature is 
negatively flawed, that at the international level there is an absence of appropriate conflict resolution 
mechanisms, that survival in this inherently unstable world is dependent on the successfiil, and continued 
defence of the nation against ah threats, foreign and domestic.*^ Conflict resolution within this reahst, 
competitive environment is power-based, adversarial, confrontational, zero-smn and win-lose.*  ^ 'Pohtical 
ideahsm', however, stresses man's triumph over environment, or even the more basic image of man's 
trimnph over self, encouraging cooperative processes of conflict resolution, non-adversarial, non- 
confrontational, non-zero-sum, and win-win. Marxism and Non-Marxist Radical Thought are an 
amalgamation of the previous two. Marxism stresses the liistorical determinism of radical structmal change 
as the way to achieve behavioural change. Marxism stresses the inevitabihty of conflict. However, 
Marxism also stresses that hmnan nature is dependent on enviionment and thus able to change. Both, 
however see 'competitive processes of conflict resolution ...characterising the efforts of disenfranchised, 
disempowered, needs-violated persons and minority groups generaUy, attempting to redefine their 
relationships with resistant supporters of a status quo which benefits only the ingroup.'*  ^ Non-Marxist 
Radical Thought stresses the 'validity, power and rationality of cooperative processes (and constmctive 
outcomes) as the only way to achieve fair, long-lasting, durable solutions to problems underlying manifest 
conflict.'^ ® Thus from four different paradigms of conflict/conflict resolution, there are two methods or 
perspectives with which to manage conflict, either competitively or cooperatively.
Conflict is 'a dynamic phenomenon, ...a manifest conflict process ...comprised of phases of 
initiation, escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination/resolution.' A manifest conflict 
process is a 'situation in wliich at least two actors, or then representatives, try to pursue then perceptions 
of mutually incompatible goals by imderniining, directly or indirectly, the goal-seeking capability of one
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another.'^* Aggressive manifest conflict processes are 'situations in ivhich at least two actors, or their 
representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically damaging or 
destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another; and/or psychologically or physically 
injuring, destroying, or otherwise forcibly eliminating one another.
D. Druckman argues that conflict resolution may be viewed as a framework of interconnected 
issues; the conflict's structure^^, the conflict's processes^ **, the conflict's behavioui'^ ®, and the conflict's 
contexts.^® J.W. Burton believes that conflict resolution is a 'recent concept'.^^ Conflict resolution is 'still 
not part of any consensual understanding. Indeed, the terms disputes and conflicts are used 
interchangeably, as are settlement and resolution. In the emerging literature on conflict resolution these 
terms have distinctive meanings. Disputes involve negotiable interests, wliile 'conflicts' are concerned with 
issues that are not negotiable, issues that relate to ontological human needs that cannot be compromised. 
Accordingly, 'settlement' refers to negotiated or arbitrated outcomes of disputes, while 'resolution' refers to 
outcomes of a conflict situation that must satisfy the inherent needs of all. Hence we have dispute 
settlement and conflict resolution.
Clarifying the meanings of terms and their precise usage allows for a framework of parameters and 
indicators with which to properly understand, and more importantly, assess, the relationship between 
theoretical assumptions and real events. Among problems associated with the notions of'political reahsm' 
and 'pohtical ideahsm' are the difficulties in tracing the development of practice with thought. Therefore if 
these two concepts are accepted as opposites, then the absence of a theory of conflict must be reflected in a 
corresponding absence of a theory based on, not only explaining, conflict but also proscribing an alternative 
system. Lacking theories and explanations of terms must then leave us with subjectivity and meaningless 
sloganeering. Without an understanding of terms and concepts, words are left empty, being defined for 
whatever purpose suits, at whatever juncture, by whomsoever.
Problem-solving conflict resolution is a pohtical theory based on individuals as the unit of analysis, 
rather than institutions. By analysing parties and issues, by facihtating an iateractive situation in which 
relationships are scrutinised, and by defining the essence of the problem, then can resolution options be 
explored. Within this framework is the acknowledgement that a conflict settlement is not necessarily a 
conflict resolved, in the sense that frituie conflict is incorporated within the problem-solving analysis by the 
promotion of conditions which wih continue to provide a cooperative and creative relationship. 'In this 
sense conflict resolution is a fijndamentaUy different exercise from any settlement processes: it is concerned 
with prediction and with pohcy formation based on a political philosophy that asserts that the satisfaction 
of human needs that ar e universal must be the ultimate goal of survivable societies.' Therefore, conflict 
resolution 'is part of the field of political philosophy. It is relevant to ah systems.
The issues of conflict prevention, the promotion of conflict resolution, the institutionahsation of the 
means of dealing with conflict, and problem-solving processes are ah ideological concepts and principles 
incorporated within the Madrid peace conference and the DoP. In this sense then, we may well ask: Is the 
Madrid peace conference and/or the DoP an attempt to institutionahse a conflict resolution regime, and if 
so, what constitutes the fundamental philosophy underpinning the entire framework?
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According to J. W. Burton, conflict resolution has been a neglected subject; however, while it 'helps 
to provide insights into the nature of conflict and the conditions that stimulate conflict, by itself it does not 
deal with the problem of conflic t.T hus any theoretical hamework or explanation of conflict resolution 
must include contextual analysis, problem-solving network, prevention regime, mechanisms to isolate 
sources of conflict; arrangements to remove sources of conflict, and the promotion of creative and 
cooperative relationsliips.
According to C.R. Mitchell, it seems to be the case with international attempts at conflict 
resolution, particularly when concerned with protracted and deep-rooted conflict, that a highly 
unstructured and/or unrelated format of activities is employed, when viewed fl om a methodological and 
theoretical standpoint. Such activities that exist are designed to minirnise antagonisms, break down barriers 
and create trust, before moving on to the actualities of the conflict itself. In this environment, ambiguities 
remain, comiections between conditions, structures and processes, attitudes and behavioui" may remain just 
implied. Much of the existing literature in the field of conflict resolution takes the form of how-to - 
liandbooks or manuals with rules and instructions. It may be that when one is dealing with the complexities 
of real life, real people and real problems witliin life-and-death situations, theoretical frameworks have no, 
or miniinal practical value. With no two conflicts the same, even when between the same parties, any 
attempts to construct universally inclusive and applicable theoretical frameworks may be beyond the grasp 
of practicality as long as the international system remains the same way as it does today. In tins sense, 
either theoretical frameworks will have to be so broad as to be able to encompass all and every eventuality 
thereby being so non-specific as to be of limited value, or the international system that exists will have to be 
reconstructed or become subject to a universally adliered-to jurisdiction. One of the main limitations to any 
attempts at theorising within the discipline of conflict studies is that of not being able to test theories prior 
to their application. Plausible hypotheses are not enough when contemplating real conflict. Practitioners 
have limited time-firames to work within and pressing external pressures bear ing down, any and/or all 
theories, ideas and models may be employed, and/or discarded depending on their practical and 
constructive utility within any given fi*amework. Practice seems to demand that theoretical frameworks 
that relate to international conflict are only usefi.il if they are applicable and positive, otherwise their utility 
is redundant. What seems more certain is being able to define a situation of conflict, and a situation of 
peace, all points in between being ethereal and altogether less quantifiable, more appropriately being 
categorised as collections of situation-related 'craft knowledge.'^ \
Theorist and practitioner J. V. MontviUe stresses the healing function of accepting responsibihty, 
making acts of contrition and practising forgiveness witliin the conflict resolution process. Conflicts which 
result in painftil losses, in lives, in territory, injustice, in legitimacy, are the most resistant to traditional 
methods of diplomatic or political mediation and negotiation, and even those approaches which are 
psychologically sensitive often have limited success. MontviUe believes that reconciliation in ethnic and/or 
sectarian conflict wliich does not incorporate a process of contrition and forgiveness as part of a wider 
process of building new foundations of relationships based on mutual recognition and responsibility wiU 
falter if it fails to include an agreed analysis of a shared history, which in turn produces acknowledgements 
of past injustices, acceptances of moral responsibilities, and promises fiiture acts winch respect
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sensitivities.^^ His experiences have led him to conclude that 'superpowers and lesser states have relied on 
economic and militaiy coercive power as the ultimate 'conflict resolvers" which absolves them of the painful 
business of apportioning responsibilities and negates the notion that 'forgiveness' can be 'a key element in 
peacemaking.'^^ MontviUe beUeves the 'three main components of victimhood are a liistory of violent, 
traumatic aggression and loss; a conviction that the aggression was unjustified by any standard; and an 
often unuttered fear on the part of the victim group that the aggressor wiU strike again at some feasible 
time in the firture. To compUcate matters, many nations and gi'oups in conflict have competing, if not 
entirely symmetrical, psychologies of victimhood.
A main task of constructive communication between representatives of groups in conflict should 
incorporate the issues of changing political attitudes, or poUtical beUefs, or beUef systems, because almost 
'always deeply rooted in the belief systems of ethnic and reUgious groups with a liistory of violent conflict 
are dehumanised images of the other side.' Thus an aspect of conflict resolution provides the chaUenge of 
delegitimising negative stereotyping, and discarding beliefs and values that undermine positive positions. 
'Dialogue, the engine of relationship, promotes mutual confii mation and thereby serves a fundamental need 
of parties to a conflict to be recognised as individuals with values and unique (and valued) identities.O r 
as Thich Nhat Hanh, a Vietnamese Zen master, would have it, 'Reconciliation is to understand both sides, 
to go to one side and describe the suffering being endured by the other side, and then to the other side, and 
describe the suffering being enduied by the first side.'^^
MontviUe believes that
'the puipose of the waUc through liistory is to elicit specific grievances and wounds of the groups or 
nations in conflict which have not been acknowledged by the side responsible for inflicting them. 
Only the victims know for certain which historic events sustain the sense of victimliood and these 
become cumulatively the agenda for healing. Published histories and official government versions of 
violent events initiated by aggressors very rarely convey the unvarnished truth. The almost universal 
tendency is not to discuss or to gloss or mythologise an event or military conquest as a justified 
defence if not heroic advance for the nation or perhaps civilisation itself. That nations have used the 
traditional psychological devices of denial and avoidance to exempt themselves fiom the moral 
consequences of their behaviom* lias long been known. And the need for revising and cleaning up 
the published historical record of a conflicted intergroup or international relationship has become 
widely accepted as an essential part of the reconciliation process.'^^
In an actively facilitated problem-solving workshop organised by the American Psychiatric 
Association in 1980, Israelis and Egyptians exchanged historical views, in wliich in 'their often profound 
and emotional exchanges, the Egyptians and Israelis revealed the significant cultural gaps between the 
European-oriented Israeli eUte and Arabs in general. But the Israelis especiaUy reflected the deep sense of 
victimisation Jews had suffered before 1948 and the establishment of Israel and since in the face of Arab 
hostility. It became clear* that the major psychological means of facilitating negotiations would be tlirough 
highly developed sensitivity to the Israeli suspicion of Gentiles that is based on the Jewish historical 
experience. The underlying political assumption of most Israelis is that Gentiles, at best, are indifferent to 
Israel's survival and, at worst, actively conspire to destroy the state. Tliis is why unconditional public
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acceptance of Israel’s right to exist - which Egypt conveyed - must be seen as the minimiim Arab and 
Palestinian move necessary, for non-negotiable psychological reasons, to begin negotiations toward a 
political settlement.
The purpose and notion of contrition and forgiveness as pait of the conflict resolution process has 
not been widely discussed in the scholarly literature of clinical psychology, psychiatry, and 
psychoanalysis.^^ A senior Israeli psychoanalyst, Rafael Moses, conversant with group hurts and group 
wounds, reported on an American Psyclnatric Association Arab-Israeli workshop of the acute 
disappointment experienced by Palestinians when their need for Israeli acknowledgement of the hurts then 
community had suffered at the hands of the Israelis was not recognised'*”: Moses wrote
’The tension in the air grew palpably. The third party tried to encourage more direct and mutual 
interchanges... The most articulate and vociferous spokesman of the Palestinian group made the 
following statement: 'If you Israelis would only acknowledge that you have wionged us, that you 
have taken away our homes and our land - if you did that, we would be able to proceed without 
insisting, without needing to get them back.’ This was said somewhat wistfully. It sounded in the 
main honest, real, genuine. No such acknowledgement was made. The Israelis were ffightened of 
the consequences, of what it might imply to make such an acknowledgement.''**
1.2 An Assessment of Relevant Theoretical Conflict Resolution Literature and the Aim of the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements
The study of the concept of conflict resolution has embraced many disciplines, among them causes
of belligerency, international economic development, conflict analysis, psychology, behaviourism, stress
management, crisis management and distinctions between forms of violence. Theorists in the field
emphasise the need to scientifically analyse the structure, the protagonists and the substance of a conflict.
Thus armed with a comprehensive analysis, the conflict itself can be tackled. Within such a
conceptualisation, conflict can be compar tmentalised in terms of social organisation, structure, patterns of
interaction, modes of violence, war aims, changes in leadersliip during conflict, genesis of conflict, and thus
dealt with by tackling issues on a smaller more manageable scale.'*^  Such an analysis has generated much
discussion on whether or not conflict is subjective or objective, particularly in the difference between zero-
sum and non-zero-sum games.'*^  Within tliis fi*amework, mediation takes the form of persuading the parties
to reorder their goals albeit without compromise.'*'* Goals should be drawn firom the parties themselves
rather than being imposed, because of the danger of leaving issues unresolved which could refiare
subsequently due to the non-paiticipation of all the various levels of internal hierarchy, thus conflict
resolution solves problems and does not descend into haggling.'*  ^ However the method of'principled
negotiation' has been devised to sidestep the dangers of'position bargaining’. This method evaluates issues
separately and on theii* merits, a process designed to avoid unsatisfactory and short-lived agreements,
defined as 'one which meets the legitimate interests of each side to the extent possible, resolves conflicting
interests fahly, is durable, and takes community interests into account.’'*” In order to acliieve a positive
outcome, a working framework, intemationaUy legitimated, within wliich to structure the peace-making
initiative is of great importance. Having designed a suitable framework, the business of firrther refining the
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process can proceed, incorporating such points as, (a) separate the people from the problem, (b) focus on 
interests, not positions, (c) propose several options which will benefit all rather than going for the quick fix, 
(d) outline objective criteria to ensure a fair outcome, and (e) build in mechanisms for coping with setbacks 
and gamesmanship/^
According to J.W. McDonald, International Conference Diplomacy' refers to 'international, 
intergovernmental, multilateral conferences, organised by the secretariats of international organisations, at 
the behest of member states.'”** Bilateral and multilateral negotiations are 'each quite different and require 
different skills'. Diplomatically, 'bilateral negotiations involve representatives fr om two countries sitting 
down and talking' whereas multilateral negotiations involve 'diplomatic interaction between official 
representatives of three or more countries.'”*^ The two sides in bilateral negotiation
'usually know a great deal about each other's language, custouK, background, and history and 
have had an opportunity to get to know each other, and the issues, over a period of time. Individual 
strengths and weaknesses have been identified and assessed by both parties. These negotiations are 
usually handled quietly, informally, behind closed doors, often without an interpreter, usually 
without a specific time constraint on the negotiation process and usually away from the world's 
press. The conclusion of the negotiation may be an oral agreement or an exchange of diplomatic 
notes or even a more formal text signed by the two parties.'””
The multilateral framework is altogether a very different experience. Apart fr om the fact that there 
are hosts of official delegates, interpreters, concerned non-governmental bodies and individuals and the 
intense attention of the press, the main differences of the multilateral fi amework relate to a number of key 
features, namely: multilateral gatherings have specific and short time frames; trying to negotiate consensual, 
practical outcomes from such gatherings is virtually impossible, and multilateral negotiations almost never 
produce binding draft treaties wliich incorporate stated obligations and commitments backed with legally 
enforceable sanctions. 'The goal of all multilateral conferences is therefore to acliieve a meaningfiil 
consensus.'”*
J.W. McDonald has outlined four principles applicable to the activities of international conferences: 
principle 1. 'There is a direct correlation between the success of an international conference and the amount 
of preparation needed to make that conference successful.'; principle 2. 'The size and diplomatic level of a 
delegation to an international conference is in direct proportion to the amount of domestic political interest 
in the subject matter of the conference.'; principle 3. 'Using the conference structure wisely can be the key 
to success'; and principle 4. 'The level of competence of the conference President or the leader of the US 
delegation can often make or break a conference.'”^
It is not easy to synthesise theories of conflict resolution and diplomatic negotiating practices, 
because most diplomatic practitioners 'abstain fr om reading about conflict resolution theory', whilst many 
'academics seem to have little interest in finding ways to test then theories, in practice.' By developing a 
'greater understanding of the needs of the other, then one may well be able to expand the understanding 
necessary, not only to extend the field of knowledge available to both but also to more effectively resolve 
international conflict peacefully and eventually bring about a less conflicted world.'””
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For geopolitical theorists, the concept of diplomacy as a preventative factor in international conflict, 
is a central one. However division exists between the value of summit versus professional diplomacy and in 
the nature of the framework for problem solving. Summit diplomacy, a feature of modern international 
politics is seen by opponents as being imprecise, driven by agenda(s) other than by the matter(s) at hand, 
having media driven expectations, and is a vehicle which reduces the flexibility and effectiveness of 
movement by professional diplomats who are trained in the arts of nuance and complexity. Only through 
professional diplomacy, it is argued, can nations achieve peaceful resolution to contentious international 
issues. Such an ai'gument can be taken fui'ther in opposition to the setting up of, or working through the, 
actors of an international dimension, that is international agencies and/or a comprehensive and binding 
international legal framework.
Opposition centres on the contention that 'the function of a system of international relationships is 
not to inliibit this process of change by knposmg a legal straitjacket upon it but rather to facilitate it; to ease 
its transition; to temper the asperities to which it often leads; to isolate and moderate the conflict to which ‘ 
it gives rise, and to see that these conflicts do not assume forms too unsettling for international life in 
general.'”'* Thus opponents such as G. F. Kemian contend, to expect the United Nations (UN) to play a 
major role, particularly m the resolution of bipolar global problems is to impose an impossible bur den, and 
even to assume that international organisations can cope effectively with transnational problems, is to 
assign them tasks beyond their political competence.”” Therefore 'leading industrial and maritime nations- 
the nations wliich created the most serious problems, which had the resources to study the problem, and 
which had it in their power to remedy most of the evils in question' should play the principal role in then 
resolution.”” Strength, according to Kennan, can only be mustered by a select few on a global scale, 
therefore the ability to resolve conflict around the world can be acliieved only by power mobilised in 'those 
regions where a major industrial power, enjoying adequate access to raw materials, is combined with large 
reserves of educated and technically skilled manpower.'”^
The Madrid Peace Conference framework, conceived, inspired and empowered by the patronage of 
a super-power is an exercise of power by statesmen for the development of an international structure that 
would contribute to a peace to be so determined by either the sponsors, and/or their allies. Thus, the 
Madrid Peace Conference framework is a fusion of the nature and quality of political leadersliip, the impact 
and response of domestic political structures upon foreign policy and the relationship between diplomacy 
and military policy to a changing international system.
Henry Kissinger developed two models to fr ame Ms tliinking of international politics: firstly, a 
stable system, and secondly, a revolutionary one. Kissinger postulated that peace is acMeved not as an end 
in itself, but instead emerges as a result of a stable, as opposed to a revolutionary international system. He 
contends that stability has resulted not 'from a quest for peace, but from a general accepted legitimacy';”* 
legitimacy meaning 'no more than an international agreement about the nature of workable arrangements 
and about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy'. Thus legitimacy implies an acceptance of 
the framework of the international order by aU major powers.”” Agreement concerning the framework of 
the international order does not eliminate conflict but it does limit its scope. Kissinger defines diplomacy as 
'the adjustment of differences through negotiation,' and is only possible within the international framework
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where 'legitimacy obtains.'”” Kissinger's paradigm is that the primary motive of national actors is not the 
preservation of peace, because 'wherever peace - conceived as the avoidance of war - has been the primary 
objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most 
ruthless member of the international community,'”* thus 'whenever the international order has 
acknowledged that certain principles could not be compromised even for the sake of peace, stability based 
on an equilibrium of forces was at least conceivable.'”^  Tliis means basically that foreign policy cannot be 
conducted without an awareness of power relationships.”” Failing an agreed, and thus legitimate, 
international framework, diplomacy is problematic, if not impractical.”^  Without a structure foreign policy 
emphasis is centred around creating such a framework. 'All nations, adversaries and friends alike, must 
have a stake in preserving the international system. They must feel that their principles are being respected 
and their national interests secured. They must, in short, see positive incentive for keeping the peace, not 
just the dangers of breaking it,'”” and thus provide a 'certain equilibrium between potential adversaiies,' 
after all '[i]f history teaches anything it is that there can be no peace without equilibrium and no justice 
without restraint.'””
Conduct of effective diplomacy [by that is meant negotiated settlement] is understood to be, 
tlirough the realist perspective, almost impossible, because of the dilemma of fusing domestic politics and 
foreign policy, which if one is subject to the other either in conception and execution, through the constant 
glare of publicity, then it is argued that one cedes flexibility, and thus loses a key stratagem, however if 
negotiations are conducted in secret they have a greater potential for success.”*' Whilst diplomacy should 
'never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties', and should 'urge hmnane principles and use... 
influence to promote justice,' however, 'the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts',”* in short 
foreign policy should be based on national power and interest, rather than abstract moralistic principles or 
political crusades.”” If we accept the premise that '[a]ny attempt to conceptualise the causes of war and the 
conditions for peace that starts from individual psychology rather than an analysis of the relations between 
nation-states is of questionable relevance,'^” thus we must also accept that governmental behaviour at the 
international level cannot be subjected to the same moral standards that are applied to human behaviour: 
'Moral principles have their place in the heart of the individual in the shape of his own conduct, whether as 
a citizen or as a governmental official.' 'When the individual's behaviour passes tlii'ough the macliinery of 
political organisation and merges with that of millions of other individuals to find its expression in the 
actions of government, then it undergoes a general transformation, and the same moral concepts are no 
longer relevant to it, A government is an agent, not a principal; and no more than any other agent may it 
attempt to be the conscience of its principal.'^*
International relations theorists have been taken to task for their seeming concentration with the 
field of conflict deterrence whilst neglecting how to control, limit and terminate war once started.^^ Lacking 
an understanding of resolution leads to paralysis in planning and preparation for such a cii cumstance as it 
unfolds. Thus we are caught in
'an atmosphere of polarised immoderation - with one group calling for early termination by victory, 
whatever the escalation necessary, however great the cost, and however evil the by-product in 
domestic and world political consequences; and a second group calling for early termination.
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whatever the sacrifices of war aims necessary, however humiliating the fi*ustration and failure, and 
however disastrous the events which follow abandonment of the struggle - resolute pursuit of some 
middle way may command wholly insufficient domestic political support; it mattes not how rational 
the in-between, moderate policy may appear in cost-benefit terms. Pai'adoxically, the more urgent 
the demands for termination by groups with diametrically opposed programmes for termination, the 
less may be the chance of a policy commanding sufficient domestic support which would in fact end 
the war.'^”
As it takes two, or more, to make peace it is not easy to integrate the aims of minimising costs and 
maximising gains, thus it 'appears in the case of limited war that for the turn toward negotiated peace to 
lead to peace, enough force must still be applied to keep the military situation stable. Political control over 
the use of that force must be carefully exercised, however, to insure that the force not be used in ways 
which destroy the credibility of the peace overture.' '^* Such a strategy must involve a continuing evaluation 
and fixture casualties must not seem excessive in relation to fixture progress. It may be that the least 
possible may be required in order to entice an opponent to the negotiating table.*'”
The intensification of tensions and the difficulties inherent in controlling such volatility can be 
conceptualised in terms of an action-reaction cycle.^” Calculated steps taken have to cross a mutually 
agreed line which will determine whether or not a conflict will expand or contract. Within these limits, 
however, there can be actions of violence which produce responses yet can be mutually agreed to be 
acceptable levels of violence which do not lead to an end to comprehensive resolution negotiatior^. Within 
agreed limits, therefore, violence can surround tactical rather than stiategic advantage, pressiue coming 
firom internal radicals, external opponents, as well as fiom the more conventional tactic of upping the ante. 
Such manoeuvring is not without risk.^ *^  The comiection between subjective perceptions and objective 
factors can be most complex in tiying to acliieve level-headed consistency in the decision-making process. 
Stresses and strains on the human actors are the indeterminate valuables, 'as escalation continues, decision­
makers' subjective universes of perceptions and images become steadily narrower. The range of 
expectations tightens: fewer and fewer possibilities seem plausible...The subjective future closes in faster 
than one anticipates it should because it is closing in for psychological, not just objective reasons.'^* Efforts 
to establish limits, whilst engaged in localised violent action, can be all part of the negotiating process, 
although in this rather dangerous interplay, much depends on the overall framework witliin which both 
negotiation and violence can be contained.*^”
Just as there many causes of conflict, there aie as many panaceas aimed at resolution. Attempts to 
acliieve non-violent paths to conflict resolution have constantly confoimded the international community 
for generations; however, there have increasingly, within the present century, been more recognised fora 
which aim to settle disputes. It has been a featui'e of multilateral diplomacy since World War II, 
specifically emanating from the West, that resolution of conflicts can be best achieved through the 
establishment of a framework wliich has at its core multilateral economic negotiations, where dialogue in 
pursuit of peace is intertwined with an economic panacea.
The very ability to agree on a framework witliin which to just stait a resolution process is fraught 
with dangers, the lack of consensus on the basis, norms, and procedures plagues embryonic efforts at
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organising such a process, the rules by which to play the game are of special importance. However, '[t]he 
absolute dichotomy between the presence and absence of worldwide agreement on values is false. In the 
world community, as in national societies, there is a broad spectrum of values and of degrees of consensus 
on them. A large measure of agreement on values does, of course, strengthen the cohesiveness of a 
community and the efficacy of its legal order. But it is not a question of all or nothing. A black-and-white 
contrast between a world in wliich common ideological values prevail and in which peace rests secuiely on 
one hand, and a world in which lawlessness and naked force rule, on the other, is out of place here. These 
are but nonexistent extremes of a continuum in which, as history suggests, international law wiU play 
varying roles in different periods.'*” In the absence of existing universal values and standards in the field of 
international relations, whether political, ideological, ethical, legal or social, progress in acWeving 
consensus even on the definition of what constitutes violent conflict, or the more loaded term, 'terrorism', it 
is then hardly surprising that there also exists no agreed principles or structuie which would facilitate the 
ending of such conflict, this lack is highlighted even more acutely when non-state actors ai e a part of the 
equation, where the very act of recognition that there is a conflict implies the conferring of legitimacy.**
The United Nations has attempted since its inception to develop universal values in a range of areas: 
economic, social, education, welfare, legal, diplomatic and political. However, because of the desne of its 
many members and in particular the security council's permanent five, the UN's role in conflict has tended 
towards the field of peace keeping rather than peace enforcement or resolution. Tliis has begun to change, 
in the late 1980's, with the warming of the Cold War. Signs have indicated that the UN was developing a 
more independent and more comprehensive approach with regaid to conflicts aiound the world, for 
example, between Iran and Iraq, in Cyprus, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia.
The causes of conflict may he within, for example, the structine of the international system, the 
actions of the states and non-state actors as weU as domestic structures. Therefore it is of great importance 
to determine to what extent the causes of conflict ai e structural, institutional or environmental. Conflict 
need not merely be the opposition of hostile forces, it is also a more complex and indeterminate 
phenomenon in which antagonism and cooperation can interact witliin an adversary relationsliip.*^
1.2,1 The Dynamics of Peace-Making?
A peace treaty between Israel-Egypt, or Israel-Jordan is not institutionally-speaking that difficult to 
either negotiate or develop. However, the main difference with the Israeh-Palestinian conflict is that it is, 
at its most basic, an existential conflict. The Israel-Egypt, Israel-Jordan conflict resolution processes 
adopted a scenario of entering into normal inter-state relations, such as tourism, trade, communication link­
ups, etc. The inter-state conflict resolution scenario develops with a presumption of a high level of success 
because basically border posts merely have to be opened in order for relations to begin. However, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about conflicting legitimacy, over claim to the same land, to the same water, to 
the same air. Arriving at an agreeable interrelationship within the confines of an existential conflict has 
been, and will continue to be, most difficult.
Research into the basic hypotheses and dynamics of mutual threat perceptions by conflicting parties 
has tended to concentrate on the issues of partisan and subjective portrayals of enemies, psychological 
dynamics, distortions and misperceptions, in general presupposing parties playing on a level-power playing
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field, their balance of power being of minor significance to the overall ability to achieve a positive outcome 
to a process of conflict resolution.*” An underlying assumption of many studies is that whatever 'social 
psychological dynamics apply to one paity apply to the other as well,' so that conflicting parties engaged in 
a protracted dispute must therefore share at least a mutually antagonistic and hostile power profile.*'* 
However, conflicting parties, especially in an inter-ethnic conflict, rarely, if ever, share an equitable balance 
of power relationship, and therefore perceive threat and security in very different terms. Evaluating 
conflict resolution for parties with structural asymmetric power relationsliips has not received much 
attention in the literatur e on inter-ethnic conflict. In inter-ethnic conflicts, particularly those of a state- sub­
state nature like the Israeli-Palestinian, the examination of the parties' fears, opinions, influences and 
interpretations of such, is of great importance in determining the extent to which power-asymmetric 
assumptions define the power relationships between the parties, i.e. the way the parties assimilate their 
collective perceptions regarding their opponent in order to determine then collective responses with regard 
to their sense of collective tlireat, or their sense of collective security.
The extent of parties' understanding of then conflict, its existential natine, its intensity, its potential, 
and how such differences in real and perceived power affects strategy and actions is of great importance in 
being able to analyse such conflicts in order to determine their disposition to resolution. For example, 
within the Arab-Israeli context of the Madrid framework, the Israeli perception was one of weakness in 
relation to the Arab world. Witliin the context of the same fi*amework, the Palestinian perception was one 
of weakness in relation to Israel. Thus both parties' perceptions of the same fi*amework was one of 
weakness, wliich in turn guided and influenced the decision-making process and the relations between the 
parties during the negotiations process.
In order to understand the basis of an asymmetric power relationsliip in an inter-etlmic conflict like 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not only is the definition of the power relationship of importance, 
particularly as defined by the parties themselves, but also the criteria by wliich to measuie power relative to 
the two parties. But how do we define the 'essence of the power concept'? The impact of power on the 
processes of conflict, on the course of negotiations, on the outcome of resolution, and the concept of 
power, 'remains one of the most elusive concepts in the social sciences.' Concepts of'power, threat, and 
intensity of conflict have profoundly different meanings in conflicts that involve groups' collective well­
being, identity, and often collective existence,' which makes it 'difficult to define these variables in a way 
that refers to collective identity, competing political ideologies, and systemic structures that are usually 
involved in inter-ethnic conflicts.'*”
A coalition of definitions of power may be of use when integrated with procedm es of conflict 
resolution and with appropriate political theories.*” Thus three definitions of power may be employed: 1. 
power as operation, which alters the opponents' status or their recourse to, or control over, allies, 
resources and materiel**^ ; 2. power as potential for social influence incorporating six bases of power or 
resources, i.e., coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, expert power, referent power, 
informational power**; 3. power as dependence*”, i.e., one side's dependence is the other's power, in turn 
itifluencmg events in the course of the party's interaction, thus the characteristics of interdependence define 
each side's power. It is a salient point 'whether the perceiver and tai*get have mutual or one-sided power or
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control over each other's outcomes', which in essence means that the 'symmetry or asymmetry of 
interdependence essentially predicts who pays attention to and thinks about whom and how much the party 
does so.'”” Conceptually, power as an asymmetric interdependence within a conflict relationship, or as a 
party's source of asymmetric dependence within an interdependent relationship may best be defined by the 
'perceived control over the outcome for the other side' and/or the 'perceived control over allocation of 
resources'.”* In tliis sense, the analysis and evaluation of power-asymmetric situations should become 
central to the understanding of the dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process.
Whilst power is a dynamic factor of inter-ethnic conflict, also of importance is the sense of the 
nature and extent of threat and of security perceived by the conflicting parties. Sense of threat is defined 
by N.N. Rouhana and S.T. Fiske as the extent to 'which the party feels danger to (or security in) its 
physical existence, social and economic well-being, or its identity and values.'”^  Such perceptions can be 
measured by the way in wliich the decision-making process is influenced by such senses of thi eat and of 
security. Thus the 'strength of interdependence in the power dependence theoiy is perceived as the 
proportion of one party's outcomes that depends upon the other. Strength of interdependence is here 
predicted to contribute to the feeling of intensity of the conflict. In power-asymmetric conflict, the 
proportion of the outcomes that depends on the other party is larger for the less powerful party. Therefore, 
it is predicted that intensity of conflict is perceived differently by parties to the same conflict, with the low- 
power party attributing more intensity to the conflict than the high-power party.'””
If we consider the dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian asymmetric power dependence- 
interdependence relationship, some sui'prismg conclusions can be sui'mised depending on the factors 
reviewed. For example, institutional power, such as land ownership, economic power and military 
capabilities, is viewed by either side in different ways. The Jewish state's executive, governmental, military, 
resource, judicial and economic apparatus is more powerful than the Palestinian community, despite Israeli 
fear's of the Palestinians' ability to remain steadfast and true to their identity and their struggle for self- 
determination, and their demographic balance. Whilst the asymmetrical institutional power balance 
between the Israelis and Palestinians may seem at fir st enormously in favoirr of the Israelis, not all 'types of 
power are asymmetric,' as power asymmetry is 'better measured by referring to types of power than just 
one type of power.' The 'diagnostic and prognostic value of the perceived power distribution among ethnic 
groups in multiethnic states is of great importance if one assumes that conflict resolution requires 
addressing the needs of parties for power sharing, equality and identity.'”'* Tliis is of particular importance 
when trying to realise the vision that Israel has for the fiiture of the Palestinian occupied territories and the 
Palestinians themselves, in the sense of a long-term and permanent relationship. Since the intifada it has 
become blatantly obvious that the status quo ante for the Palestinians was not conceivable, therefore the 
Israeli civil / military administration apparatus for the occupied territories was not a viable long-term 
proposition. If the Israelis steadfastly refirse to countenance a sovereign Palestinian state contiguous to 
Israel, then some other form of administrative and jur isdictional relationsliip has to be devised. If national 
sovereignty for the Palestinians is out, and total Israeli control, involving the political annexation of the 
occupied territories is also out, then some other form or forms of relationship have to be devised, one that 
inevitably and radically alters the natur e of the Jewish and democratic characters of the state of Israel. It is
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then, in this context, that the Israeli-Palestinian asymmetric power dependence-interdependence 
relationsliip becomes of great importance in influencing the continued and fixture relations between the two.
For instance, the 'combination of more or less balanced power on the integrational power factor and 
the gross asymmetry on the institutional power factor' may 'mobilise the minority to seek more institutional 
power' which from the majority Jewish population's point of view would mean that a diminution of control 
over the institutions of power would correspond with a diminution of the Jewish identity of the state/”
Thus in this sense, while there exists a nominally superior institutional power imbalance in favour of the 
Israelis, there is not, however, a corresponding sense of security felt by the Jewish community. Israelis 
perceive threats emanating from several factors both foreign and domestic: from the Arab world, from the 
intifada, from terrorist attacks, from a history of persecution, from being a minority in the region, from 
international legitimation of the PLO, from the Israeli-Palestinian demographic imbalance, from Israeli 
Arabs joining the intifada or demanding more institutional representation and from international acceptance 
of the Palestinian Authority as an equal member of international fora. The Palestinians perceive threats 
emanating from such factors as unemployment, lack of sovereignty, expropriations of land, emigration, 
expulsions, closure of the territories, Israeli bureaucratic hassles, Israeli politicians' talk of'transfer' of 
Palestinian population, lack or erosion of democracy in both Israel and the occupied territories, IDF death 
squads and corruption.
An interesting by-product of the agreements between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories are the concomitant effects on the Israeli Arab community. Israel's two populations 
have coexisted xmequally since 1948, with the Jewish majority holding an asymmetrical control over the 
state's institutions of power, with the minority population effectively excluded from the centres of power, 
i.e., the government and the army. With Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, with a reduction in the sense of 
tlireat from the occupied territories, there is a likelihood that Israel's Arab population will feel enervated to 
be more active, politically, economically, demographicaUy and socially. With a heightened sense of security 
because of the reduction in tensions with the Palestinians, the Israeli Arabs may feel justified in demanding 
a greater role as equal participants in their state. As long as the Arab minority feels a sense of collective 
alienation from belonging to the state, of identifying with it, and of attachment to it, the sense of collective 
and shared futur e so necessary for the good health of any nation is seriously put at risk. Without common 
goals, a common identity, communal values, common justice and a shared vision of the future, the 
asymmetric institutional power imbalance in favour of the Jewish majority may become a point of serious 
conflict. For as long as the majority population in such a volatile multiethnic state such as Israel, is 
perceived as having complete control over the state's institutional power, and the minority population 
perceives itself as bemg 'excluded from the power centres, including determining the character of the state, 
distribution of political representation, and economic power' then without a 'genuine power sharing' 
agreement aimed at developing a 'meaningful shared collective identity' the more will be the clamour for 
change, particularly if fixtme Israeli-Palestinian relations are cordial, thus removing the reason for fear in 
the Jewish majority and the reason for maintaining a low profile on the Arab minority's part.”” This 
scenario, however, causes a collective sense of threat to the Jewish majority.
33
Therefore if the Israelis' controls of powers are motivated by a perceived sense of threat from the 
Arab world, to which the Palestinians are part, then management of the Israeh-Palestinian or Arab-Israeh 
conflicts may reduce the sense of tlireat. However it is not immediate that such a reduction in threat would 
lead to a corresponding increase in the feeling of Israeh security because such agreements may not address, 
or may even exacerbate, the inherent tension between any bilateral Israeh-Palestinian condominium and the 
Jewish nature of the superstructure of any friture entity, thus arguably leading to an actual increase in the 
sense of internal threat as the external threat is reduced.
In essence, what started as a seemingly incontrovertible power balance in favour of the Israehs is 
more likely to achieve a cohective sense of threat among Israehs, whereas for the Palestinians, what is 
perceived by the Israehs as a threat is a reassuring sense of security, even though in institutional power 
terms the Palestinians share a cohective sense of threat in relation to Israel's mihtary power. Thus, what 
one side construes as a sense of threat may be construed by the other as a sense of security. However, this 
does not hold issue by issue; there is no complete threat/security mirror image because what for 
Palestinians may be a sense of threat may not necessai hy translate to a sense of security for the Israehs, 
particularly if the Israehs coUectively do not put such a high premium on an issue as the Palestinians do. 
Therefore, if an 'examination of conflict dynamics is limited to power dynamics, one might miss an essential 
ingredient in the dynamics of conflict.'”^
The inclusion of a tlireat/security perception dimension within any analysis of the Israeh-Palestinian 
conflict resolution process is of great significance within the confines of the present and future relations 
between the Israehs and Palestinians. Wlihst the two communities may feel reassurance that what for them 
is a sense of security is a corresponding sense of threat for the other, the two do not share identical 
threat/security perceptions. When combined with differing senses of motivations, senses of balances of 
power, and senses of the intensity of certain issues in the conflict, the task of evaluating and analysing 
decisions and actions in the drafting of a peace treaty then becomes ah the more formidable.
1.2.2 Resolving Intercultural Conflict
Conflict resolution theory has not tackled the importance of culture sufficiently, either being 
reduced to meaning custom or ethnicity. Culture is 'more than custom: it is lens, not label.'”* Profound 
cultural differences and misunderstandings can lead to a 'dialogue of the deaf propounded by the 
"symmetrical autism' of mutual and costly noncomprehension'.”” Whilst 'meaning not only structures 
validity in human thought patterns but also defines truth', 'syhogisms are structured in the same way from 
culture to culture.' However, the 'inventory of true categorical statements varies from culture to culture.' 
Therefore it is 'possible for a vahd conclusion to foUow from a syUogism in one culture but to be false in 
another', thus 'premises are a variable of culture in the same way as attributed causes.'*””
One of the by-products of the Second Guff War was the pressure applied by systemic chahenges, 
both internal and external, to the Arab states, both individually and collectively, posed by the questions 
raised of how the Arab world had acted in the face of such aggression in terms of collective peace and 
security. The prospects for disunity such inability fermented, the effects of the failure of a proposed Arab 
solution to the crisis and the ceding of authority, both moral and political to foreign powers, created public 
disquiet.*”* Undoubtedly, among Arabs on the street, Saddam Hussein may have been wrong in his
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invasion of Kuwait but his challenge to the regional status quo based on questioning fondamental issues 
resonated powerfully. Those issues were democratic representation, political participation, economic 
disparity, cultural diversity, envii onmental degradation, poverty and the redistribution of wealth, control of 
natural resources, human rights, foreign military presence in the Middle East, the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Palestinian seff-determination. Western imposition of state borders and Islam.
The domination of political, economic, social and cultural discourse by Western precepts, concepts 
and paradigms, which endorse and justify the 'free market' and 'démocratisation', not only ignores as 
irrelevant, and does a disservice to, indigenous Middle Eastern heritage and values, but also violates the 
notion of natural justice. The imposition of any foreign paradigms merely reflects Western arrogance, 
presumption and ignorance of Middle Eastern cultiue, values, diversity and needs. Such an arrangement 
will ultimately be folly, as there is a great likelihood of rejection, because, 'any system in which local culture 
has no faith and with which the people cannot identify can be expected to fail.'*”” Without fundamental 
changes at local levels, where local people see their standard of living appreciably rise and can participate in 
a development process which is more focused on people rather than statistics of economic growth, 
continued economic disparity will foster division and resentment. Such developmental structures must 
therefore also conform to local customs, traditions and cultuie. Just as any peace process must contain 
political justice, so too must economic justice be a major part of successfril peacemaking.*”'* Examples such 
as the principles or notions of Hukm (government), Majlis es-Shura (parliament), al-mithaqa (original 
covenant), zakaat (compulsory alms tax), ijma (consensus), waqf (charitable trust, plural Awqaf), al- 
Ta'tatuf (solidarity), Al-Rahma (compassion), al-Maglifira (pardon), ar-riqa (tenderness) are universal 
values widely understood and practised.*”” The concept of redistribution of wealth is advocated by Koranic 
iiijimction (LIX:7). These aspects of local custom and spirit can easily be incorporated into socio­
economic and political structures wliich arise as a result of negotiations, whether as part of an inter­
communal, inter-national or inter-regional system.*””
Any notion of'democracy' in a Middle Eastern context must take great care to understand the 
political role of Islam. Islamic notions of democracy demand Westerners to frmdamentally and culturally 
reinterpret their understanding of political philosophy, political order, plurality and the interaction between 
religion and politics. Islam demands a different perspective regaining the political fundamentals of the 
individual, of collective identity, of group association, their rights, obligations and responsibilities. Any 
framework or structure that comes about as a result of the Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli peace 
negotiations must in some way accommodate such understandings. External concepts, experiments and 
grand designs can not really last if they attempt to graft alien hegemonic principles where there is no basis 
in history and culture.*”^
Islam purports not only to be a comprehensive way of life, but also to encompass all human 
relations, domains and jur isdictions. However, in attempting to construct a generally accepted Islamic 
value system conducive to conflict resolution, or peacemaking, it is rather difficult to find conformity on 
the very meaning of'peace'. 'Salaam' is internationally recognised as the Arabic salutation for peace, but 
there is a certain vagueness about the ability to directly translate it to have the same meaning as the 
English. 'Salaam' can mean; 'a sense of tranquillity', 'an unworldly sense of security and permanence.
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soundness, preservation/ salvation, salutation, resignation without discontentment, and freedom from 
jarring elements.'*”* The term 'suUi' means 'truce' or 'armistice' and 'denotes the ending of war.' It can also 
be argued that believers and non-believers exist in a state of latent or open war, which if accepted means 
that there is no concept of peace or peacemaking in Islam between believers and non-believers.*””
However, since the Prophet's 'sunnali' (practice) is accepted as the basis for human affafrs for all believers, 
certain values can be ascertained from the Koran which may be applied in the context of peacemaking and 
conflict resolution. Several core values can be identified from the Koran; compassion, patience, 
forgiveness, humanity, creativity, respect, and sharing.**”
Peacemaking is a structural conflict resolution approach which emphasises 'the importance of 
attitudes, sentiments, emotions and moral obligations.'*** If peace stems from the absence of direct and 
structural violence then peacemaking is a transformative act that intervenes in 'violent or potentially violent 
conflict situations'**  ^with the express 'goals of reducing violence and protecting the rights of the various 
parties to the conflict.'**” Islam, according to the Koran has a strong position on structural violence, 'And 
fight them on / Until there is no more / Tumult or oppression / And there prevail / Justice and faith in God / 
Altogether and everywhere.'**'* What is problematic in the Middle East is the concept of conflict, that is the 
concept of jihad (holy war). It is not clear from the Koran which has the greater force of commandment, to 
pursue peace with compassion and justice, or to pursue nonbelievers or those perceived as the enemies of 
Islam with extreme prejudice.
1.2.3 An assessment of Power, Diplomacy and the Peace Process
Conflict resolution diplomacy continues to be perceived given that relative bargaining strengths 
based on power variables, such as ability to be able to control or determine the application of power, are 
the basis of present practice. Richard Falk argues that, rarely in 'conflict situations ai e guiding assumptions 
about world order made explicit', an 'aspect of the realist hold on the political imagination, wliich applies 
often as much to academic discourse as to the ebb and flow of diplomacy.'**” This leads one to the 
assumption that 'peace' as it is determined by official elites, comes from above, that it is imposed, rather 
than having been determined by popular will, 'peace-from-below', reflecting majoritarian consensus and 
consciousness, i.e., democratically. In the realist perspective, strength and interest, the power to impose 
one's will, is the measure of negotiations and is the basis of bargaining. Within the terms of the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, the natuie of their asymmetrical power relationship is highlighted both substantively 
and symbolically in the manipulation of the power imbalance witliin the character and context of the 
negotiating process. In essence, 'the structui e of current world order establishes the conditions' which 
enables the higher power to exercise its power with impunity, which not only benefits it in real terms but 
also reinforces the actual power disparity of the existing power structure. Israel, as an established state 
actor, has a militaiy and political legitimacy which allows it to take advantage of the existing state-centred 
world order structur e, gaining considerable benefit at the expense of the non-state PLO actor. This model 
of international relations, termed the 'Westphalian' by Richard Falk, 'enables Israel to shape political 
discourse largely in its favour, treating its ongoing recourse to violence as part of the legitimate security 
frmction of the state while stigmatising far lower levels of Palestinian violence (and even non-violent modes 
of collective resistance) as 'terrorism'.' Such a manipulation of geopolitical realities has meant that Israel
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can, as the representative of the Israeli people, utilise more extensive violent tactics and strategies, and be 
no more mindful of'civilian innocence, international law, and the authority of the United Nations' than the 
Palestinians, and their representatives, the PLO.**” Principled moral and legal justifications and 
considerations therefore cannot be deemed to be the preserve of one side or the other. What the 
international structure and the geopolitical framework enables Israel to achieve is the opportunity to claim 
plausible deniability for any of its immoral and violent actions, thus allowing it to continue without real let 
or hindrance, in much the same way that Palestinian violence is surrounded by such self-righteous 
vituperation.
Tills control of the terms and nature of discourse has allowed Israel to achieve a 'kind of polemical 
plausibility to Israel's refusal to deal with most legitimate Palestinian representatives and political 
organisation, contending that it will not negotiate with 'terrorists", which not only allows Israel to abdicate 
itself from any moral responsibility for ensuing violence, but also effectively diminishes the Palestinians to 
such a level of weakness that through necessity.**  ^Palestinian participation in any negotiating process is 
dependent on the prior acknowledgement and acceptance of the inherent imbalance between the two as a 
result of the existing asymmetrical power structure. Such a structure by its very exclusive nature, compels 
implicitly or explicitly, from the Palestinians, an admission and an expression of the natural invalidation of 
their equitable status, and thus a concomitant depreciation of their rights. Such a power play has been a 
manifestation of Israeli-Palestinian relations since 1948, and has been of decisive importance in determining 
the nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations during the negotiating phase.
What can be constructed from tliis 'Westphalian' model of international order is that it is 
exclusionary, hegemonic, and asymmetrical in nature. The ideas and practices associated with such a 
model as embodied in the terms and conditions of the Madrid Middle East peace process reveals a 
geopolitical fr amework which accords privilege to state actors and associates 'realism' 'primarily with 
perceived power relations, including the will and interests of ascendant geopolitical elites.'*** The extent to 
which this model dominates the Middle East peace process is quite clearly shown by the 'reluctance of most 
radical critics of geopolitics to approach an ongoing conflict of this sort in other than realist terms 
...because the diplomatic participants on aU sides tend to be realists.'**” Thus the very fact that tliis 'peace 
process' does not lay paramount stress on non-violence and reconciliation, does not incorporate alternative 
negotiating success/failure guidelines based on democratic rather than power assumptions, and abandons 
morality and legality, lays it open to the chai'ge that unless peoples aie treated as equals, 'injustice is 
generated and perpetuated.' The alternative to the realist orientation, which 'seeks to translate asymmetries 
of power and influence among states (or their diplomatic equivalent) into a negotiated agreement' is to 
construct a structure based on dignity, demilitarisation, inclusion, legitimacy, morality, and democracy, 
wliich would be by its very nature symmetrical. Such an alternative would be the construction of 'a global 
civil society committed to identifying and realising human rights and democracy on behalf of the peoples 
concerned, and to evolving a practical conception of the himian interest capable of addressing wider 
regional and global concerns.' By removing fear, which seems to be an ever-present, stalking factor of the 
'Westphalian' model, the peace process may be able to deliver solutions to the generative issues 'of 
collective violence, political and religious repression, and human misery.'*^”
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The resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within the confines of a 'realist solution' would 
probably mean that Israel will deny the Palestinians: statehood on all the pre-1967 land, substantive 
authority and/or control over East Jerusalem, in whole or in part, full diplomatic status and the right to self- 
determination, and will insist on the retention by Israel of jurisdiction over, settlements, water rights, lands 
classed as 'state lands', and, security zones, and will demand permanent Palestinian demilitarisation and 
neutrality. The conference of devolved, domestic powers and responsibilities to be held over a defined 
autonomous entity, wliich will not include the entire pre-1967 land mass of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
will more than likely be the sum total of the Palestinian political entity, wrought through the tortuous 
process of negotiating, that is unless the Palestinians declare statehood in defiance of Israel and in pre­
emption of such a scenario, because of inertia and/or perceived bad faith in the negotiations on final status. 
Any other realistic orientations of resolving the conflict other than the 'realist' approach are very unlikely to 
either be tried or thought of. It is not so much that alternatives do not exist, it is more a case of, there is 
and there will be, no alternative.
As the Cold War era wound down, calls for alternative global systemic relations abounded. Noam 
Chomsky cites two contending philosophies.*^* The South Commission, chaffed by Julius Nyerere, wliich 
consisted of economists, government officials, and religious leaders firom the Tliird World, in one of the 
earliest calls for a new world order, proposed a plea for a 'new world order' based on 'justice, equity, and 
democracy in the global society'. *^  ^ World order such as it was and is, seems to confonn still to the notion 
that the conduct of international relations is little more than 'codified international piracy'*^”, with the rich 
nations having no real desffe to correct the 'moral shortcomings of foreign nations'.* '^* What a 'new world 
order' predicates is an assumption that the tenets, both intellectual and structural, of the 'old world order' 
would have to give way or have been done away with, in order that one can pronounce a 'new' world order. 
If the old order was predicated upon the notion that the 'government of the world must be entrusted to 
satisfied nations, who wished nothing more for themselves than what they had' where 'peace would be kept 
by peoples who lived m their own way and were not ambitious' in a system wliich enabled rich nations to 
derive their power over the 'hungry nations' because not to do so would result in constant 'danger' which 
would not allow rich nations to dwell 'at peace witliin their habitations'*^”, then a 'new world order' would 
have to be organised along different lines. President George Bush proposed a 'new world order' in which 
diverse nations would be 'drawn together in common cause, to achieve the universal aspirations of 
mankffid: peace and security, fi'eedom and the rule of law'*^ ”, under the protective benevolence of the USA, 
in 'a future for which America is both the gatekeeper and the model'. *^  ^ Suffice to say the US vision 
triumphed, m reflection of the realities of the interests of power, economic, political and militaiy. The 'new 
world order' then is very much like the old; there are no real fundamental changes, no 'new paradigms' to 
make sense of our world, with one notable exception - the extension and internationalisation of 
interdependent capitalism. Privilege and power and the 'basic mles of world order remain as they have 
always been: the rule of law for the weak, the rule offeree for the strong; the principles of'economic 
rationality' for the weak, state power and intervention for the strong'.*^*
Wliether the concept of international leadership relates to a; unipolar, dominant and/or hegemonic 
US world leadership, as expounded within and/or without the US foreign policy establishment, or to the
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elevation of the UN to a dominant and jurisdictional leadership, such a concept was much debated during 
1990 and 1991. If world leadership is defined as an 'activity tliat promotes action, a role that promulgates 
vision and purpose, and a force that maintains stability in the post-Co Id War- international system', then 
what faced world power relations in 1990-91, was a debate over whether the US would offer world 
leadership, supported by a great-power consensus*^”, or whether the UN would assume the role 'envisioned 
by its foimders'*””, which was: the maintenance of'international peace and security, of developing friendly 
relations among nations, ...of taking other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace' and to 
'acliieve international cooperation in solving economic, social, cultuial, and humanitarian problems, and to 
promote respect for human rights and for the fimdamental fi*eedoms for ah.'*”*
The euphoria which accompanied the Western-inspired and US-dominated victory in the Second 
Gulf War in 1991,*”^  ushered in a short period in which the hypothesis was proposed, that US global 
hegemony would protect the world, because the US with 'its unique combination of military and economic 
power, its political culture, and experience in realpolitik'*”” was 'bound to lead'.*”'* The period of 1989- 
1991, was in global terms one of structural and ideological, upheaval and transformation. New definitions 
abounded of pohtical goals, national aspirations, concepts of national and international security, the 
understanding of national security and national interest, international and inter-regional cooperation, and 
economic interdependency. Thus the concept of cooperative regional security based on a new global 
system of cohective security led by the USA proved to many to be just the redefinition of world power 
relations needed m the phase of uncertainty which accompanied the era from the cohapse of the Berlin Wah 
to the cohapse of the USSR. However this phase of optimism over the perceived triumph of both 
capitahsm and hberal democracy, defined by Fukayama as the 'end of history' was soon replaced, not only 
by the 'gloom of early 1992'*”” but also by the disinclination, both in terms of pohtical and resource 
commitment, on the pail of the US to lead, preferring instead to define the US foreign pohcy agenda in 
terms of'assertive multhaterahsm', which proved 'not to be veiy assertive' at ah. With pohtical inertia over 
Bosnia, withdrawal fi"om Somaha, and a slow, uncoordinated response to the tragedy of Rwanda, the US's 
much vaunted 'New World Order' disintegrated into 'New World Disorder' fi*om 1992 onwards, mocking 
the moral triumphahsm of the recent past, exposing the US-inspired 'New World Order' for the 
'circumstantial pohticahy expedient rhetoric that it was', and revealing a leadership 'characterised by a lack 
of vision and direction' combined with the 'seeming primacy of interests over morahty.'*””
However, just as it is easy to mock, it is just as difficult to define what we mean by such terms as 
'international leadership', 'international order', and 'new world order', US inspired or otherwise.*”^  
International Relations theory seems to lack agreed, definitive theses on the concept of leadership, either 
paradigmatically, analyticahy, structurahy or fimctionahy. Jarrod Weiner has presented a 'classification of 
leadership theories/definitions according to levels of analysis, 'macro-unilateral' and 'micro-multilateral". *”* 
Macro-unilateral analyses deal with three main processes: provision of principles and an intellectual 
framework on which to base 'international order; creation of authoritative structuies emanating from 
agreed principles; and, provision of'common weal' through a protective security system.*”” Within the 
parameters of this theoretical notion, the US has 'emerged with a military ascendancy of a monopoly 
character' harnessing its 'power and willingness' in favouring a system which stabilises the status quo and
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projects 'its own vision of order onto the international system.' Through the institutionalisation of US 
order, the UN is thus founded in order to make the 'rules that govern the manner m which states relate to 
the dominant power'. Within this explanation, US global leadership is concerned about the 'maintenance of 
a rule-oriented and norm-governed system' in which 'leadership relates to a political activity in shaping 
international structures to suit the ascendant state's interests.'*'*”
Micro-leadership 'refers to a relationship between leaders and followers witliin a well-defined 
normative order ...whereby a leader gains a followership behind its agenda tlirough persuasion, negotiation, 
and brokering the concerns of others to induce them to follow.'*"** Thus leadership is based on a 
cooperative relationsliip acquired as a result of communicative proficiency rather than the crude application 
of cajolery. In this sense, leadership can be defined as 'inducing followers to act for certain goals that 
represent the values and the motivations-the wants and the needs, the aspffations and the expectations-of 
both leaders and followers'*"*^  in order to 'fasliion acceptable deals' having brought 'willing parties 
together.'*"*”
The theory of hegemonic leadership incorporates the two analyses above, defining the bases of 
hegemony as the synthesis and control of'raw materials, sources of capital, mai'kets, competitive advantage 
in the production of higlily valued goods, finance capital, technologies, natuial resources'.*"*"* It is in tliis 
context that Charles Kindleberger argues, 'for the world economy to be stabilised, there has to be a 
stabiliser, one stabiliser ...a country which is prepared ...to set standards of conduct for other countries and 
...to take on an undue share of the burdens'.*"*” Such a notion of world regime stability, with its 
neoliberal/neorealist pretensions of'the white man's burden', does not distinguish between 'beneficent 
hegemony' and malevolent, exploitative, coercive hegemony.*"*” The theory of hegemonic leadership 
remains ambiguous in its understanding of the nature of international leadership, 'confusing governance, or 
management, with leadership', and does not clarify the crucial distinction between 'the normative or 
ideological underpinnings of a regime' and 'the legitimation of a leadersliip role'.*"**’ Wliilst the substantive 
norms of regimes constitute the 'structure of the internationalisation of political authority'*"** wliich rest, not 
on the conception of legitimacy as authorised coercion and compulsion but on mutuality, of shared benefits 
or on 'moral coercion'.*"*” Legitimacy in this sense confers moral and political obligations, both of the leader 
and the followers, based on previously accepted principles.
Therefore, wliilst we can attempt to accept various understandings of the concept of leadership, 
deficiencies persist, which means that we can not neatly pigeonhole US power, and its application, in the 
context of global order. It is easy to wiite off rhetoric, political expediency, moral turpitude and confusion, 
(Second Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda) as significant of a greater malaise, as the proof required to 
disprove the assumption of moral authority required by the US to deign to speak on behalf of all the 
world's citizens, however, we must remember that there is no globally agreed set of authoritative principles 
or moral criteria by which to judge the US, be it on the level of state interest, international interest, 
popularity or morality. In tliis sense it is instructive and illuminating that theories of, and the understanding 
of such, international leadership may well be dysfunctional and uniealistic. What then can we salvage firom 
such a discussion?
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The post-Cold War international system did not begin afresh, with a blank page. Having inherited 
the existing imperfect international order, system and functions, we can see that there existed a common 
thread dating back to President Woodrow Wilson and his 14 points which not only established the tone for 
US moral leadership with his insistence that the Covenant of the League of Nations be incorporated into 
the post-World War I peace treaties, but also set the standard by reflecting 'US political culture' in the 
promotion of'order through legislation'.*”” President Bush merely followed an established trend m US 
foreign policy in espousing a framework of principles that maintained stability, order and security through 
great-power cooperation. Wliat was new however, was the explicit notion that, although the US had been 
deeply disillusioned by what had become of the UN in its Cold War state*”*, the US was willing to re­
engage the UN on the understanding that the US would provide systemic leadership for the UN, in other 
words, in order for the UN to function properly, the US would therefore provide political leadership by 
activating the collective security apparatus of the UN in order to uphold the new power realities, that is an 
international system of law, order, and US hegemonic leadership, defined, led and motivated by US 
'enlightened self-interest'.*”^
This theoiy of hegemonic leadership does not define accui ately enough whether global leadership is 
to be based on moral, altruistic, political, resource, economic, militaiy, or other uses of power. Each, 
individually and collectively encompass assumptions of superpower status; however, we are left unclear as 
to how it relates to US power, particularly as it is effected in the Middle East. Certainly, in the US, debate 
is sometimes fierce over whether the US should be involved in foreign affairs*””, whether the US has 
overstretched its abilities through overcommitment, whether the US is alternatively shaking a 'begging 
bowl' or rumiing an international protection racket*”"*, whether the US has the resources to achieve what it 
and its allies want*””, or whether Americans have the desire to lead the 'free world'.*””
Wliat seems evident in the years since the Second Gulf War is that, despite the cosmetic public 
relations exercise aimed at convincing public opinion that the world was protected by a system of 
collectively managed international security, the US has effectively harnessed the UN in order to control it. 
Tliis means that, for example, if the US defines an issue to be in its national interests then the UN offers a 
legitimacy which can be utilised by the US in such a way that supersedes its commitments to the UN and its 
supposedly subordinate position within the UN, wliich effectively means the UN becomes 'the tool of 
vested interests'.*”^  Conversely, when American national interests are not directly affected, the UN appears 
as a convenient 'scapegoat on which to blame inertia', in fact some American politicians have criticised the 
US government for 'deferring to the UN, instead of taking a lead'*”* describing such action as an 'abdication 
of American leadership'*”” and that pursuing multilateralism 'has become a cover for US retrenchment and 
abandonment of leadership to the vagaries of international events.'*”” However we must be still mindful of 
the rather scliizophrenic natm e of chauvinistic elements witliin some sectors of the US foreign policy 
debate, who believe that the US should use the UN, not be used by it*”*, whilst at the same time feeling that 
'it is time for our friends to beai* more of the burden'.*”^
Thus we can see that the US is more concerned with creating an international order and maintaining 
such an order's stability and security than with asserting a system which sets standaids of justice and moral 
criteria as its defining functions, such as prevention of genocide, human rights abuses, hmnanitarian
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disasters, famines, etc. Thus we can see, in terms of international leadership, the US motivation to 
undertake global leadersliip merely follows from perceived national interest, particularly as it is the biggest 
benefactor in the maintenance of the status quo. At its most basic, what any theory of international 
leadership should understand, is the difference between what is practicable, i.e. collective secuiity under US 
leadership and patronage, and what is improbable, i.e., the prevention of human tragedy. Thus self-serving 
and self-righteous rhetoric apai*t, the US merely follows a long and established practice of the pragmatic 
application of power in the pursuit of its own interests.
The principle of non-alignment used to be a cornerstone of Labour Zionism, the argument being 
that too great a dependency on the US not only creates a dependency culture in Israel, but also leaves 
Israel both vulnerable to US policy sliifts and unable to act independently and pursue a contradictory 
agenda. The effects of US largesse by successive administrations in their aid policy towards Israel has been 
mixed. Enormous sums of capital have neither led to real economic growth and stability, nor have they 
been concentrated in productive sectors of the economy. Rather, US aid finances non-productive and 
politically / ideologically motivated sectors of the Israeli economy, such as settlements in the occupied 
territories, the Israeli military, and loan repayments to US institutions. Stephen Zunes ai'gues that 'annual 
military aid is in fact simply a credit line to US arms manufacturers, and actually ends up costing Israel two 
to three times that amoimt to train operators, to staff and maintain, to procure spare parts, and other 
related costs' with the overall impact being the increase in 'Israeli economic and military dependency on the 
US' thus draining 'Israel's fragile economy.'*”” According to Matti Peled, the sum of US aid is arrived at 
'out of thin ah' and is not directly related either to specific economic or militaiy requfrements. The fact that 
US aid has remained at a constant figure over a number of years does little to diminish the 'impression that 
it is little more than a US government subsidy for US arms manufacturers' with the resulting bonanza for 
US defence contractors from Aiab demands following every significant arms transfer to Israel.*”"*
In an evaluation of US Middle East policy, Stephen Zunes argues that in some aspects US policy 
toward Israel closely 'corresponds with historic anti-Jewish oppression.' By this Zunes means that, as in 
Europe in past centuries the mling elites would grant the minority Jewish community limited rights, 
privileges and cultural autonomy in return for being commissioned as the 'visible agents of the oppressive 
social order, such as tax collectors and money lenders'. This would result, in times of social disorder as the 
population rose against the ruling class, in the rulers having a convenient scapegoat in the Jews to have the 
ire of the exploited turned against.*”” Pogroms, repression and exploitation were the structure and natuie 
of diaspora that Zionism was created in order to break free from. In a direct corollary to the present US- 
Israel relationship, Israel as the embodiment of US power in the region, finds itself at the centre of a self- 
perpetuating cycle of Western self-interest, and as the convenient expedient to deflect anti-US criticism 
from angry Ai*ab governments and peoples. Zionism, and the existence of the state of Israel, and not the US 
superpower thus becomes for Arab popular perception, the root of aU Arab evils in a neat side-step by the 
US. It can be argued that this aspect of US foreign policy is a by-product of domestic US politics and/or 
anti-semitism, in that overt US government subsidies are unpopular with the US public therefore the Jewish 
lobby becomes a convenient domestic scapegoat for the typical executive distaste for taking responsibility, 
and giving explanations, for pursuing unpopular policies, particularly those involving the misappropriation
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of public resources.*”” In a rather ironic twist of the propaganda perpetuated by anti-semites such as the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion regarding the aU-pervasive nature of Jewish influence in world affairs,
A.F.K. Organski, notes that the 'belief that the Jewish lobby ...is very powerful has permitted top US 
policymakers to use 'Jewish influence' or 'domestic politics' to explain the policies ...that US leaders see as 
working to US advantage, policies they would pursue regardless of Jewish opinion on the matter. When 
Arab leaders or officials of allies protest, US officials need give only a helpless shrug, a regretful sigh, and 
explain how it is not the administration's fault, but that policy makers must operate within the constraints 
imposed by powerful domestic pressures moulding congressional decisions. Presidents, and those who 
speak in their names, have followed this strategy time and time again. Congressmen employ this same 
device.'*”^  In questioning the character, frmction and significance of US pro-Israel groups as a 'major factor 
in US foreign policy', Peled argues that if it wasn't for the Jewish lobby, 'the US government would have to 
invent them.'*”* I. Leibowitz goes further, arguing that, the 'existence of the Jewish people of 60 to 80 
generations ...was an heroic situation. We never got from the goyish world a cent. We supported ourselves. 
We maintained our own institutions. Now we have taken three million Jews, gathered fi*om here and turned 
them over to be parasites - parasites of America. And in some sense we are even the mercenaries of 
America to fight the wars of American interests, or what the ruling persons in America consider to be 
American mterests.'*””
The critique thus of US foreign policy revolves ai ound the installation of Israel as a regional 
scapegoat and target for regional ills rather than the 'broader exploitative global economic system and their 
own elites who benefit from and help perpetuate such a system.'*^” This attitude can be corroborated by ex- 
PM Shamir, in his autobiography, when he recounts a meeting with Japanese leaders: "Your people' a 
ranking nfrnister said to me (and there were others who echoed liis sentiments) 'are so fortunate with your 
unlimited access and boundless influence everywhere. You aie all-powerful. See how you hold the United 
States in the palms of youi' hands.' Never mmd how strongly I protested that, unfortunately tliis was not 
precisely the case, my hosts smiled, nodded and clearly disbelieved me.'**^ *
The US has for many yeais been obsessed with policies which dictate military solutions to political 
problems, resulting not only from misperceiving or being dismissive of populai* movements, but also from 
viewing problems in terms of containment wliich in turn lead to policies driven by unilateral initiatives and 
actions. Tliis dominant thinking within the US establishment has led over the years to the encouragement 
of the more 'chauvinistic and militaristic elements in the Israeli government, midenninmg the last vestiges of 
Labour Zionism's commitment to socialism, non-alignment, and cooperation with the Third World.'*^  ^ The 
US for many years refused to support a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestine problem, refused to 
acknowledge publicly and negotiate with the PLO, and refrised to make its enormous economic and 
military assistance programmes to Israel conditional on Israel honourmg its international commitments to 
human rights, international law, and UN Security Council Resolutions. Israel's part in the relationship is in 
supporting the US military-industrial complex, in providing assistance to US agencies attempting to subvert 
Congress, and in playing the role of regional policeman (in intelligence gathering, in pro-active covert raids, 
m maintaining a semblance of stability, as the enforcer of unpopular policies, and in non-attributable 
prejudicial actions). In short, according to none other than Henry Kissinger, Israel 'serves the purposes of
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both our countries best.'**’” Thus Israeli actions must be miderstood witliin the context of the US-Israel 
relationship, and Middle East actions must be understood witliin the context of Arab-Arab, Arab-Israeli 
and US-Arab relations. However whilst tliis argument does not imply a simplistic and sinister 'grand 
conspiracy by Western capitalists to divide and rule the Middle East', one must be aware that the policies 
pursued by the US and her Western allies have indeed 'resulted in a regional system that greatly benefits 
Western oil companies, aiins manufacturers, and national security elites at the expense of the region's 
population.'* "^* If we are to understand why acts of terrorism take place, why some people aie driven to 
extreme reactions to Western policies and what effects economic, military and diplomatic policies have on 
indigenous peoples, then it is incumbent upon any assessment of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to 
understand the shadows cast upon it by the US, and how far US rhetoric regarding its support for 
democracy, international law, justice, self-determination, demilitarisation, economic development, Arab- 
Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace, measures up to the practical application of US policies and US actions. 
In such a way we can determine whether the particular structure of the Madrid peace conference was 
calculated specifically as a form of partisan domination aimed at imposing a pax americana intended to 
perpetuate Western 'strategic, economic and ideological imperatives' through a 'divide-and-rule tactic 
designed to fiirther weaken Aiab unity and to create increased dependency on the US' or whether it is a 
process of creative peace building aimed at achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace order. *^”
Since 1945, US policy towards the Middle East has been frmdamentally contradictory. The two 
main strategic objectives of successive US administrations have been, the securing of reliable and cheap oil 
supplies, and the institution of Israel as primus inter pares in regional terms.**’” For US administrations and 
policy makers this 'headache, sometimes a nightmare' has ensured contradictions both in US actions, 
practices and tactics. *^  ^ With the widely held perception in the Arab world of a strong pro-Israel bias 
shown by the US, evidence since the Second Gulf war suggests that this has meant that not only has the 
US's image in the Islamic world suffered as a result but also the image of those moderate pro-US regimes 
who support the military, political and economic presence of the US in the Middle East.*^* The growth of 
US dependence on Middle East oil 'comes at a time when the US mhitaiy presence' in the 'region is facing a 
critical phase' because not only is the US in the difficult position of supporting conservative Arab regimes 
who face domestic challenges Jfrom radical elements and externally fr om radical Iran, but also that the US 
military presence itself fuels radical resentment because of US support for such conservative regimes and of 
course Israel.*^” Justification for a US militaiy presence in the Middle East, particularly in the Persian Gulf, 
is predicated on 'the international importance of oil and the fact that half of the world's seaborne crude 
exports must pass through the Strait of Hormuz'. However, US support for Israel has not only antagonised 
militants but has also undermined conservative pro-US elements keen to distance themselves fr om being 
too closely associated with the US.**” Popular Arab antipathy toward the US for its support for Israel, 
combined with neglectfril and inconsistent US policies towards Aiab states, has meant that US actions are 
in a sense undermining and threatening the US's twin strategic goals in the Middle East. Furthermore US 
espousal of commitments to independence, freedom and democracy are at odds with US actions and 
alliances in the Middle East, thus the growth of a hostile Islamic constituency opposed to the US presence 
in the Middle East across the region stems, in part, from the lack of respect for such principles in
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practice.*** US policy makers and decision-makers have been unable to grasp that the essence of radical 
Islam's anti-Americanism comes about as a result of widespread resentment at the performance of the 
ruling elites and govermnents wliich are supported by the US, and because of the US's unqualified and 
uncritical support of Israel Thus anti-Americanism is a 'potent instrument of mobilisation and legitimation' 
in political movements throughout the Middle East, generated further by US fears, misunderstanding, 
misperceptions, and denials of the legitimacy of popular Islamic public opinion.**  ^ Such US fears have 
created the stereotype of the 'Islamic fundamentalist' and the 'Islamic extremist' demonised by the Western 
media, 'rendering them unworthy of being taken seriously in theff criticism of US policies',**” thereby 
creating the impression of an evil international terrorist network out to destroy the US. The conclusion to 
be drawn therefore is that US resolve must be strong enough and sufficiently aggressive to withstand this 
new terrorist threat to US interests in the Middle East. Thus instead of being as responsive to public 
opinion and interest groups in the Middle East polity as they aie domestically, successive US 
administrations have not only been neglectful and ignorant of Islamic public opinion, they have persistently 
ignored such as unimportant or as of no consequence to US policy making. The continuation of injudicious 
actions merely opens up the US to fiirther problems in the Middle East, highlighting both US ignorance of, 
and lack of concern for, ordinaiy peoples' plights, which will only fiirther emphasise the limitations of US 
military power should allies or clients encounter political upheaval and overthrow. The failure of the US to 
respond to real social and political problems, or at the least, publicly encourage or criticise their allies to 
pursue reforms, opens up the possibility of more scenarios as happened m Iran, or is happening in Algeria.
1.2.4 Interdependence versus Asymmetry
Immanuel Kant believed that international conflict was less likely the more important economic 
relations between states was, the more states' executives were limited by constitutional constraint, and the 
more international relations were governed by a system of non-violent relations.**"* Kant argued that peace 
among democratic nations would be the consequence of complementary influences. Republican 
constitutions would eliminate 'autocratic caprice in waging war' and the spread of democracy would ensure 
a universal understanding and acknowledgement of the legitimate rights of all citizens and of aU 
republics.**” This creates a moral foundation for the liberal peace, upon which eventually an edifice of 
international law can be built. Lastly, economic interdependence reinforces constitutional constraints and 
liberal norms by creating transnational ties that encourage accommodation rather than conflict. Thus, 
material incentives add their force to law and morality.'**” Classical liberal philosophy contends that the 
mantra which combines laissez-faire 'fl ee trade' and the institution of'democracy' is the best weapon with 
which to fight the incidence of war.***" Economic interdependence and similar', suitable regime types, 
organised within an international structure offer the best solution to an otherwise anarchical system of 
contending ideologies, regime types and economic systems. The hypothesis that conflict may be reduced 
or resolved via the institution of an economic interdependence between rivals, and the sharing of regime- 
types rests on the notion that trade brings individuals into relationships of common interest, at the same 
time increasing prosperity and employment, thus reducing the vagaries of fortune which might compel a 
ruling elite into deciding to wage war.
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According to the Kantian theory, democratic governments have structural and normative 
constraints built in to liinder the initiation of conflict. Collective decision-making and institutional 
arrangements of checks and balances restricts the abihty and willingness to become embroiled in conflict,*** 
Thus noimatively, 'democracies value negotiation and compromise, respect the rights of others, and eschew 
violence as a result of the externalisation of domestic norms of conflict.'**” Benefits accruing from 
economic and institutional interdependence are central to the hypotheses proclaimed by functionalist and 
pliualist theoreticians*””, and of coiu’se central to the tenets of Marxist ideology, and the more liberal 
alternative of socialistic internationalism. * ” *
The theoretical challenge to such views comes from those who emphasise that 'economic ties not 
only offer the prospect of mutual gain but also may transmit economic ills and create rivaliy over the 
division of benefits.' Criticism in this context contends that interdependence, particularly when relations 
between conflicting parties are asymmetrical, can breed 'not only accommodation and harmony, but 
suspicion and incompatibility'.*”^  Thus in an unequal relationship, economic interdependence can be an 
agent of influence,*”” of coercion, wliich 'may lead to dependency, exploitation, and conflict.'*”"*
Whether analysts favour the benefits of interdependence, believe them to be of lesser importance 
than other issues, or are critical of such liberal hypotheses, is a theoretically moot point. What is of 
importance and interest to tliis analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, is how far economic 
relations are both an aid and a hindi ance to the success of the process, and to what extent is the Israeli- 
Palestinian economic relationship viewed as an integral foundation of the entire conflict resolution
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The liberal hypothesis that trade is a facilitator of conflict resolution, that economic prosperity can 
be the basis, or a major foundation, of a peace process is rooted in the proposition that, the involvement by 
conflicting parties in an integrated trading network, within an interlocking and interdependent bilateral, 
multilateral, regional and international economic structure, is such a positive influence in the inhibition of 
conflict as to have the power to reorder, renew and transform in a constructive manner previously 
disputatious relationsliips into favourable and optimistic associations.*”” For liberals, economic 
interdependence does not have to be equal to be positive. 'Liberals, functionalists, and neo-functionalists 
argue that the expansion of interstate linkages in one area stimulates further cooperation in other areas'*”^ , 
in the sense that trade facilitates and promotes, deeper relations, cooperation, convergence of interests and 
media that cope with conflicts of interest, and, the deterrence on leaders fiom initiating conflict.*”*
This is however a proposition not without its critics.*”” Critics contend that the ability of 
commercialism and mercantilism to promote an enviionment conducive to peace is qualified by the 
structure and extent of the trading relations between conflicting parties, particularly if the existing and 
proposed relations contain structural imbalances in favoiu* of one side at the expense of the other. Whilst 
liberals champion the notion that trade fosters peace, no matter existing structural inequities, critics 
contend that simple trade relations may aid a peace process only insofar as such commercialism is part of a 
symmetrically dependent relationship, and that a trading relationship alone cannot overcome manifest 
inequalities inherent within an asymmetrically dependent relationship, wliich fuither implies an inability or 
freedom by weaker parties to 'break free from undesirable trade relations.'^”” Liberals assume that trade can
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foster only positive benefits for flirthering relations; however, if the negative/positive impacts of economic 
interdependency aie evaluated in a cost-benefit analysis and found that costs outweigh benefits then it 
follows that trading relations may fiirther tension rather than lessen it. This is paiticularly true of 
asymmetrical relationships where the negative costs may well be greater and more marked. The counter­
proposition by dependency theorists and neo-marxists that asymmetrical dependence-interdependence 
relations may not necessaiily be improved by trade, and may result in the impoverishment of the weaker 
party is pursued to liiglilight a critical response to liberal claims of the universality of benefits accruing from 
trade. Thus the counter-proposition claims that 'gains from trade are enjoyed exclusively by developed 
states; trading relations between developed and developing nations retard the development process of the 
latter; trade destroys traditional political, economic, and social institutions; trade exacerbates inequalities in 
the wealth of nations; and trade relegates powerless states to a position of dependence.'^”*
In an asymmetrical relationship, interdependence may tlirough a more traditional patron-client 
relationsliip stimulate negative political consequences, political and economic exploitation, and force 
concessions. In such an environment, when 'extensive economic dependence threatens national autonomy 
and poses problems for domestic ...policy-makers, tensions may aiise among trade partners' and especially 
more pronounced in asymmetrical relationships.^”^
Although most analysts would contend that asymmetrical dependence serves as a 'source of 
leverage' in a number of policy areas, it is however 'unclear that the use of power arising fiom trading 
relationships is sufficient to create tensions that will manifest themselves in violent conflicts'. Bilateral 
relations that do not provide mutual benefits or 'impose disproportionate costs on one actor may be viewed 
as hostile relations'. Such hostilities may be suppressed when relations are of a subservient and/or 
dominant nature or when 'states perceive some aspect of the relationsliip as beneficial, and thus seek to 
preserve a sense of harmony'. However it would seem 'plausible to argue that the existence and abuse of 
unequal power within asymmetrical relations creates a predisposition for conflict that is greater than that 
found in symmetrical trade relations' and that the 'absence of net benefits in a trading relationship 
neutralises the pacifying influence of trade, assumed to exist by liberals', so that relations of unequal 
exchange may in fact 'heighten tensions in inter-state relations, making conflict more likely in such 
relationships/””
The history of colonialism and imperialism serves to illustrate just how müitaiy force may be used in 
conjunction with trading strategies to establish and maintain inequitable economic relationships, therefore, 
the expansion of trade may not just promote peace, but 'may involve increased interstate conflict, as 
powerful states vie with one another for control over finite resources and markets and use force to 
subjugate developing states to a position of dependence.'^”"*
Neoliberal triumphalism as a result of the former USSR's ideological and strategic disengagement 
from global involvement, and subsequent dissolution, rose to heights of'universalistic pretension' heralding 
a new world order in which conflict would be successfully and completely concluded. The development of 
the twin virtues of peace and democracy, with a rejuvenated role for the UN, were predicted as a result of 
the demise of the 'evil empfre' whose world mission was supposedly to foster systemic international 
violence and radicalism and subordinate democracy and mercantilism with totalitarianism and command-
47
economies. Existing and continuing conflict, systemic and otherwise, around the world is still a 
characteristic of international relations and points to a rather different appraisal wliich somewhat mocks 
earlier optimistic neo liberal pretensions.
According to Alejandro Bendana neo liberalism is an 'ideological attempt to explain in global terms 
the supposedly common forces, justifications, and objectives sustaining political change not simply with 
regard to economic policy making but also in terms of the new norms wliich are to govern the discourse 
and behaviour of socio-political acto rs,E x tend ing  market logic to the field of political behaviour 
'presupposes peacefiil competition and attainable civic harmony', thus conflict resolution and conflict 
management techniques become, in effect, 'social accords which constitute the containment of societal 
contradictions witliin a fiamework upholding neoliberal dogmas with regard to the role of the state, the 
central place of the market, fiscal responsibility, and the primacy of the private sector.
A strategic intellectual vacuum exists as a result of disillusionment with leftist ideology around the 
world. Nothing in life exists without an opposite, no positive without a negative, no right without left.^”’ 
Neoliberalism needs a counterbalancing radical, critical and coherent ideology either if it is to develop 
naturally and reinvent itself, or if it is to avoid confi'ontation fi*om more obtuse and providential sources. 
Whilst this is not the place to reinvent leftist ideology, the purpose of this point is to highlight the inlierent 
paradoxes which beset the unstoppable success of Western ideology and Western ways in permeating 
cultures. How, what, which and why Western ideology, motivations and practices are applied by Israel 
witliin the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution process are of importance as not only do 
they determine Israeli policies and strategic planning and define Israeli goals, they also elicit responses from 
the Palestinians, which is of importance in understanding the natuie, success or failure, and future of the 
conflict resolution process.
For two societies attempting to transform their fundamental interaction from deep-rooted and 
protracted conflict within an asymmetrical power relationship, the concept of peace with justice is 
paramount in the alleviation of the basis of the conflict and also for protecting the proceedings with 
goodwill. The attempted transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict fl amed within a transitional 
period will undoubtedly incur difficulties. Within this context, it is important to be awaie of the anomalies 
which will be highlighted by the changing natuie of power relationships between the two communities, 
from the individual to the governmental. In a process of change, iniquitous power relations, political 
privileges and power elites will fight for theft sui'vival and control, at the same time that the agents of 
change, those who have defied and confronted the status quo, will be asked to cuitail the intensity of 
popular agitation. In any transformation of a struggle which attempts to retain as much of the status quo at 
the expense of a liberation movement, new complexities and new relationsliips will undoubtedly ai ise 
meaning that any such process will fall short of the total demands of those pursuing change, and with it will 
bring new complexities as processes of promoting accountability, democracy and stability reveal theft 
shortcomings, in turn creating new realities and problems. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution 
process as a mechanism initiated and underwritten by the United States may be seen by cynics as an 
attempt to preserve, at the very least, a system of relations which may be seen to perpetuate economic and 
political injustice, and deny access to power, resources and opportunities, by the status quo powers and
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elites. Within the course of tins study, this analysis will evaluate and identify attempts to address such 
complaints of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution framework, both from an ethical and 
diagnostic/prognostic perspective. Strategic, tactical and organisational considerations which act as 
obstacles or as agents of empowerment will be taken into accoimt and explored. Techniques are not 
separable fr om politics,' meaning that the gamut of Israeli-Palestinian inter-relations are inseparable fr om 
politics and the political fr amework within wliich they operate, as any political analysis 'would necessarily 
take into account the stage of struggle, the balance of forces, the nature and extent of the transition, and 
the real or imaginary space that becomes available for negotiated engagement.' 'Conflict resolution, and the 
negotiations in paiticular, are a field of struggle. Battles ai e not won or lost on the basis of the cerebral use 
of teclmiques but rather on the amount of power brought to bear in a negotiating forum.’ Thus, conflict 
resolution may either be a process of reform, or of radical restructui ing and reordering principal and 
systemic relations, in which each 'nation and each period will determine its own dynamic.
Bendana believes that modern 'mediation-centred dispute resolution techniques are underpinned by 
allegiance to the basic workings of the system, including such cultural premises as the age-old Western 
liistorical elaim to universalism.' The premise that 'those who imposed war can now bring peace,' allied to 
the enticement that the Palestinian corporate body can participate as an equal member of the nation-state 
system, undermines a process of Palestinian self-determination to define its friture institutional form and its 
relations. The prospect is very real for the Palestinians of an economically and politically tied entity, 
authoritarian, unaccountable and oppressive, unable to afford the costs of cooperation and compromise, 
and constrained in its actions by the acceptance and thus legitimisation of an imposed and external value- 
system. Conflict resolution techniques, 'like most management or technical aspects of capitalism, cannot be 
assimilated or copied neutrally', simply to 'transmit them mechanically under the guise of neutrality would 
be to fall into a partisan trap, to devise another mechanism employed by an unjust system to better 
reproduce the ideological, cultural, political, and productive relations which sustain it.' Thus in the eyes of 
those who oppose this particular process of Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, believe that such 'classic 
conflict resolution techniques, or indeed many of the models developed and drawn fr om the industrialised 
world ...become means of disempowerment, neutralising conflict and coalition-building that could avoid 
violence and weaken the political cultuie of dom ination .T he existence of such processes and 
procedures in an hostile environment stimulates and activates dissent and opposition. How that opposition 
takes form and what form that opposition takes will be analysed within the body of this work.
Conflict resolution and peace-building therefore can be regarded as the means to 'attack tensions 
and contradictions among all those affected by the unjust and arbitrary application of p o w er.W h eth er 
this process of conflict resolution acts as an instrument which promotes the 'pm suit of peace with justice', 
whether this process can incorporate constant reform and correction 'utilising productive and conceptual 
structures' which address the fundamentals of the transformation of the natiue of the conflict and 
asymmetrical power relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, rather than merely being an exercise 
in the immediate transfer of power, or certain powers, will be the essence of this study. A thorough 
analysis of the dynamics of the process will thus reveal whether it is truly a conflict resolution process
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which results in a just and comprehensive peace or whether it is a conflict management exercise by the 
powerflil to anaesthetise a minor ftritant, which occasionally becomes a problem/^ ^
When assessing the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts utilising contemporaiy conflict 
resolution thinking, it most important to remember that such analysis of conflict resolution practice must 
take account of the differing cultural assumptions and mores that the Arab parties bring to the negotiating 
table. When resolving conflict with Aiab parties, the western analyst must be mindful to recognise the role 
that Islam bears, the beliefs, attitudes, customs and tradition that Aiab participants understand and live by. 
That is to say, any analysis of a conflict resolution process between the Israelis and Palestinians must be 
mindful of the fr amework and cultural anchors regarding the biases which pre-exist in the Islamic context 
and thus, if not directly determining, certainly influence the behaviour and tliinking of the Palestinian 
participants. Cultural difference exists to the extent that misperceptions of one sides' desiies or 
prioritisations may be regarded incredulously by the other; however, the root cause may have more to do 
with inherent inabilities on the part of the Palestinians to neatly engage in a Western-style conflict 
resolution process when some concepts and techniques are unable to be understood or utilised witliin a 
society with its basis in Islam.
Western conflict resolution encompasses defined levels, models and methods within certain 
boundaries, including the processes of conciliation, facilitation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration and 
problem-solving. In the West, such principles and procedures are practised in more facets of life than in the 
Middle East. Basic assumptions and procedures are not only very different as practised in either region, 
but they are also very different in their definition and implementation. Conflict resolution is practised in the 
West as a professional discipline witliin agreed legal and jurisdictional fr ameworks; in the Middle East 
traditional norms and community standing provide legitimacy for the conduct of resolving disputes. Middle 
Eastern conflict resolution processes are neither defined nor are they constructed as an academic discipline 
in the strictest Western sense. Traditional Middle Eastern methods of negotiation, mediation and 
arbitration are practised fr-om the most basic levels of society, within clans, villages, towns and cities, on an 
interpersonal, inter-community and interreligious level. Middle Eastern conflict resolution techniques aie 
so much a part of eveiyday life that they are practised and honed as a skill as an integral part of an 
individual's life, at work, at play and in the market.^
Western and Middle Eastern approaches to conflict resolution, and the perfoimance and application 
of such, are so different that applying one within the cultui e of the other would necessitate such 
redefinition and alteration to suit local conditions to make it of any worth. Basic contradictions highlight 
the differences between the two cultures. In the West, conflict is seen as positive, normal, competitive, 
confrontational and creative, and fr-om which conflict resolution can foster collaboration, resolve, 
rationality, mutuality of interest and understanding, legal formality and goal-oriented fr ameworks. In the 
Middle East, conflict is seen as negative, dangerous, destructive and disorderly. Techniques which resolve 
conflict are based on honour codes, emotion, the protection of collective identity and units of association, 
arbitration and mediation, social and cultural values rather than legal formulae, individual senses of 
dignity/shame, hierarchical and authoritarian structures, desfte for unity, and relationship-oriented 
fr'ameworks.^'^
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Cultural and historical differences which exist explain why the two societies have problems in 
effecting mutual understanding, mutual respect, dialogue and progress in theft interactions within the 
region. Western strategies, involvement, ideas and values, particularly those associated with power 
relations, ar e viewed by many in the Middle East with suspicion, distrust, humiliation, rejection, 
antagonism, and scepticism.^This comes as a direct result of past experience of Western-Middle Eastern 
interaction and forms one of the most fundamental differences in attitude between the two societies. 
Western political strategy has seen conflict resolution acting as a means with which to restore order to the 
existing status quo which not only benefits the asymmetry of the Western-Middle Eastern power 
relationship in favour of the West, but also means the preservation of repressive, brutal, and despotic 
regimes. The levels of conflict resolution in which Western powers involve themselves in the Middle East 
obstruct societal and political reform, and indeed, do little to advance justice, human rights and economic 
expectations that citizens in Western societies not only expect, but take for gianted.^’^
1.2.5 Conflict Resolution versus Adversarial Paradigms
According to S.E. Ibraliim, the Middle East is contested by foui' competing, adversarial and 
divergent geopolitical paradigmatic ideologies; a Middle Eastern, a Mediterranean, an Arab, and an Islamic, 
within which the policies of'peace, development, démocratisation, and integration' vie with the states of 
'despotism, extremism, violence, and disintegration.'^’^
The Middle Eastern par adigm, dating fi om World War I, is a strategic geopolitical policy aimed at 
Western, ostensibly British/French and latterly American domination and exploitation, through military and 
economic power, coercion and co-optation of the Middle East, North Afi'ica and the Persian Gulf.^’^  
Whether as part of the policy of containment of the USSR during the Cold War", as a preventative policy 
aimed at neutralising indigenous regimes and/or political movements, or as a device to ensure a cheap, 
steady flow of oil, the Middle East paradigm is at heart a geopolitical arrangement for the benefit of, 
primarily, the USA, but also of the USA's principal aUies (namely Israel) and those deemed friendly by the 
USA such as Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Egypt. The Second Gulf War and the end of the Cold War 
weakened those Ar ab indigenous forces committed to the ideal of a pan-Ar abist friture caused by another 
Arab-Arab war coming so closely on the heels of the 1980-88 Gulf War. This was not only because oil- 
based power had been eroded by falling prices during the 1980s and the estimated $500bn costs associated 
with the Second Guff War were economically and politically crippling, but also because internal division 
and wrangling resulted in the disintegration of any popular, cohesive and cooperative vision for the 
common Arab futur e. For those critics of the Middle East paradigm, the Madrid peace conference and the 
associated peace process is the embodiment of the articulation of a pax americana, which is the cuftnftiation 
of a US-Israeli geopolitical strategy to engage Arab and non-Arab states of the region in a mutual 
management anangement which combines bilateral and multilateral economic and security cooperation. At 
present this paradigmatic scenario dominates the international relations of the Middle East. The 
determination of peace, security and stability is rmderwritten financially and militarily by the US, with the 
aid of the World Bank and other important global NGOs, as well as by coopted Arab regimes, particularly 
the oil-producing Gulf States. For most of the region's regimes, implicit or explicit consent to this 
paradigm not only depends on individual regimes' relations with the US, but also depends on the
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willingness of regimes to deal with the effective realities of power as they presently exist. Needless to say, 
as a paradigm associated with an external power determined to see its militaiy and economic power 
accorded tribute, this particular paradigmatic vision is opposed broadly by the mass of Middle Eastern 
peoples, wherein may lie the ultimate seeds of its destruction.^’^
The Mediterranean paradigm is ar guably the oldest of the four, with its roots in the, albeit religious, 
crusading European attempts at hegemony.^Given the inherently imbalanced nature of the Middle East 
paradigm, with its economic, political and military power distribution perceived as overwhelmingly 
favouring the US and Israel, in the modern era what propels the Meditenanean scenario is not only the 
geograpliic proximity of Europe and the Middle East and North Afr ica, but also a rediscovery and 
ar-ticulation of mutual interest; i.e., economic prosperity, common security and common regional 
developmental and environmental interests. The Mediterranean initiative stems fr om northern 
Mediterranean countries believing that their security and domestic stability can be better achieved thiough 
sustainable economic development of the southern Mediterranean countries. This scenario also allows for 
greater European participation and influence in regional political and economic fr ameworks, and 
institutional and non-governmental fora. The quid pro quo for the Middle East and North Africa is in 
having a more balanced and agreeable relationship with the outside world. The World Bank claims that by 
'2010 the covmtries of the Middle East and North Africa have the potential to double their income, increase 
life expectancy by close to ten years, and cut illiteracy and infant mortality by almost half. They could also 
become frill partners in the global economy, using integration with Europe and within the region as a 
stepping stone to international competitiveness. Peace, macro-economic stability, and an attractive 
investment environment could attract billions of dollars of capital from national and foreign investors. The 
faster economic growth would reduce poverty and bring down unemployment, restoring hope to 
mi l l i ons . The  Mediterranean scenario is one which will develop, with its objectives of enhanced 
'dialogue and interaction among governmental and non-governmental actors in search for problem-solving 
and maximising cooperation between Europe and the Middle East.'^^’ This paradigm's particular appeal is 
in the development of a partnership between the Europeans, the Middle Easterners and the North Africans, 
based on mutual concerns and mutual benefits, with no one region dominating the other in a partner-client 
relationship. Another implied benefit for the Mediterranean scenaiio is the absence of the USA as a 
principal part of the equation, with the concomitant lessening of the dominating impact of Israel, and 
Israel's presence, on inter-regional relations. The Meditenanean paradigm lias been gaining momentum 
through the mid-1990s, mainly because it is the least hated of the visions of inter-regional relations.^^^
The Arab paradigm reflects the 'pan-Arab cultural-nationalist-strategic project,' responding to the 
indigenous Ar ab demands of independence, unification and anti-colonialism which has cliai acterised the 
political, intellectual and liistorical consciousness of Arab actions since the 19th century.^^  ^ The Second 
Gulf War and the end of the Cold War have been the two principal events which have reordered 
geopolitical strategic planning and policy in the Middle East in the 1990s. Whilst even though the pan- 
Arab institutional, governmental and non-governmental levels remain the most developed indigenous 
transnational network, the outcomes of these two events have conspired to undermine those Arab 
intellectuals and policymakers who still adhere to this paradigm. Within this context, then, it can be argued
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that although pan-Arabism is presently a dormant force imable to force through its primacy as a 
paradigmatic alternative, it still retains sufiScient latent emotional and political appeal to seriously 
undermine and constrain any of the other paradigms/^'’
The Islamic paradigm is the only wholly indigenous political and strategic s c e n a r i o I t  is also the 
least favoured by the status quo actors and agents because it has, at its basis, the partisan, particularistic 
and xenophobic nature which contends that Islam is a target of anniliilation, exploitation and humiliation by 
Christian powers and Jewish Zionism, and that the cause of contemporary Muslim weakness and 
vulnerability in the face of such a challenge of civilisations is due in par t to 'corrupt secular leaders, who 
have strayed far from the straight and virtuous path of the greatest of all religions.' Islam has the power to 
mobilise popular support all across the Middle East, with its message of raising religious consciousness, 
and of the perfidy of corrupt rulers and their acceptance of Western-Zionist hegemonic designs. Thus 
Muslims will become powerful and virtuous only by returning to a path of righteousness through 
revolutionaiy struggle. The Islamic paradigm neatly supersedes the older pan-Arabist paradigm, by 
realising the yearning for a strong, cultuially homogeneous, and united Islamic Middle East. Whilst few of 
the states of the Middle East have embraced the Islamic vision, there are signs that Islam represents more 
than just latent power, more than just a symbolic, spii itual and ideological commitment. Islamists from 
Algeria to Turkey to Iran are either in power, working in coalition, or undermining current secular elites. 
However, the notion that an Islamic arc of influence or power bloc stretching from the Persian Gulf 
through the Fertile Crescent to the Atlantic is as yet 'more a promise than a reality; it can break but does 
not make.’ This is because of a number of factors: the tendency for factionalism and infighting over religio- 
temporal issues; Islamist movements inspiie fear and determined resistance fiom secular elites; Islamist 
movements collaborate well with an agreed enemy, not so well without one; many non-state Islamic groups 
are manipulated and managed by Islamic states with partisan agendas; Islamist regimes have not been able 
to deal with socio-economic problems; Islamic societies are inherently conservative and rhetorical and 
therefore rather unimaginative and not very innovative; and Islam and Islamist movements have no overall 
coherent and cohesive geopolitical and socio-economic strategies which will translate into a sustainable 
political agenda.^^^
1,3 Conclusion
The intention of tliis study is not meant to be an empii'ical, compai ative study of conflict resolution 
case studies in order to test a set of hypotheses; it is, however, a case study of the attempt at a conflict 
resolution process and how it has employed a range of theoretical fr ameworks, analytical techniques and 
heuristic devices of conflict resolution to determdne a political solution to the protracted and deep-rooted 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The peace process is not a textbook case of conflict resolution principles being 
applied, but is a very fluid political process. In this first chapter we have explored a number of issues which 
affect the process, such as:
1) an exploration of conflict resolution diplomacy and of the widely held perception that relative bargaining 
strengths based on power variables, such as ability to be able to control or determine the application of 
power, are the basis of present international practice and experience,
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2) an examination of the relevant literature in the field of conflict resolution by theoreticians and 
practitioners and how they both relate to each other and how theft work relates to the case study, an 
explanation of why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not been resolved by examining why conflict 
resolution techniques previously employed or adopted to deal with it have been inadequate, such as 
mediation, shuttle diplomacy, arbitration, power bargaining, etc., have tended to institutionalise the 
conflict, leading to temporary settlements without tackling the root causes,
3) an investigation of the domination of political, social and cultural discomse by Western conflict precepts, 
concepts and paradigms over Middle Eastern conflict resolution value systems in an attempt to explore 
philosophical differences and common ground in the pursuit of a negotiated peace process,
4) an examination of the conceptualisation of the causes of belligerency, international economic 
development, conflict analysis, psychology, behaviourism, stress management, crisis management and 
distinctions between forms of violence, tlirough scientifically analysing the structure, the protagonists and 
the substance of a conflict in order to define a working fr amework, internationally legitimated, within 
which to structure the peace-making initiative,
5) an examination of conflicting parties' balance of power relationships, and the threat / secuiity 
perceptions in inter-ethnic conflict. Evaluating conflict resolution for parties with structural asymmetric 
power relationsliips has not received much attention in the literature on inter-ethnic conflict. In such 
conflicts, particularly those of a state—sub-state nature like the Israeli-Palestinian, the examination of the 
parties' fears, opinions, influences and interpretations of such, is of great importance in deteiinining the 
extent to which power-asymmetric assumptions define the power relationships between the parties, i.e. the 
way the parties assimilate their collective perceptions regarding theft opponent in order to determine theft 
collective responses with regai'd to theft sense of collective thi eat, or theft sense of collective security. The 
extent of parties' understanding of theft conflict, its existential natuie, its intensity, its potential, and how 
such differences in real and perceived power affects strategy and actions is of great importance in being 
able to analyse such conflicts in order to determine their disposition to resolution,
6) an investigation of divergent geopolitical ideologies — Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Arab and Islamic 
— and theft ability to incorporate or accommodate accepted Western conflict resolution principles.
From the evidence analysed above we can draw two principal conclusions. Firstly, the foundation 
of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DoP), that is 
a 'permanent settlement' to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is based primarily on UN Security Council 
Resolution 242 and is designed to lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242. In a 
practical sense the reality of achieving such a state is open to widely differing interpretations and therefore 
an agreed compromise will be difficult to determine. Secondly, because of the first conclusion, the 
principal objective of the DoP, a 'just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement' leading to the resolution 
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via 'historic reconciliation through the agreed political process' will be that 
much har der to accomplish.^^^
Drawn fr-om the above evidence it is important that we understand a usable, comprehensive and 
realistic definition of what we mean by conflict resolution within the current international system, in order 
that we may use it to measure not only the effectiveness of the DoP at achieving a state of resolved
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conflict, but also by which we can measure the DoP against its own stated goals. Thus for the purposes of 
evaluating the DoP as a 'peace process', conflict resolution shall be understood to be a state in which 
conflicting parties agree to cease all politically motivated and national-goal oriented hostile acts toward one 
another, and contract to coexist benignly, with mutual respect, refrain fr om malevolent acts aimed at the 
disruption of the internal afrafts to the detriment of the other party in the pursuit of national goals, and 
allow for the fr ee movement of peoples, goods, services and ideas witliin an agreed institutional framework 
based on justice and respect for human rights.
Armed with the tools to measure the intention of producing a 'just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement', that is using those covered by the RICEMAN FORMULA: (1) Resolution; (2) 
Institutionalisation; (3) Confidence-building; (4) Empowerment; (5) Mediation; (6) Administration; (7) 
Negotiation, we can evaluate the outcomes produced by the DoP. The principals in the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process only seek to utilise those conflict resolution ideas, notions, models, principles which are 
effective and politically expedient and advance their partisan notion of the process. It is because there are 
no accepted models and / or conflict resolution practices, structures and theoretical models being applied, 
only a loose amalgamation of practices being tried or discarded, that this study has tried to outline in this 
initial chapter an explanation of the theoretical construction underlying the process of finding a workable 
peace process. The intention with Chapter One is to briefly illustrate the limitations of theory in this case 
study and the inadequacy of Western conflict resolution principles being applied because of geopolitical, 
cultural and power limitations. Chapter two will focus on the establishment, purpose and development of 
the DoP, incorporating a thorough examination of the development of the secret Oslo backchannel, 
concluding with an analysis of the Oslo negotiations within the ofBcial Madrid framework as an example of 
conflict resolution. Chapter three will provide an analysis of the DoP as an example of conflict resolution 
and critiques the meaning and purpose of the document. Chapter four will provide an analysis of the 
implementation process of the initial years of the life of the DoP, incorporating the actual implementation 
of the DoP to 31st August 1997. Thus the following chapters will evaluate what this unique peace process 
is supposed to acliieve, how it has achieved it and what it has to offer beyond its own confines. As this is 
primarily a case study of a highly political process, the RICEMAN FORMULA is a newly designed device 
to attempt to measure this particular peace process and offer a wider utility to peacemaking by providing a 
set of accepted conflict resolution principles which could be applied in all cases. Subsequent to this 
chapter, the following chapters will illustrate and analyse how the peace process was built and how 
applicable the RICEMAN conflict resolution formula is to this particular conflict resolution scenario. We 
can now analyse and examine the complex political dynamics of the attempt at resolving the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, review the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements to investigate how it transpired, what it means, how it will be implemented, how fai* it can be 
used as a blueprint for future peacemaking and offer an analysis of the findings in conclusion. By so doing 
this study evaluates the historic attempt by the Israeli and Palestinian political communities to shape a 
common future with an analysis in determining the effectiveness of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements both as an instrument for, and as an example of, 
conflict resolution.
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Chapter Two; Madrid - Oslo - Washington D C.: The Oslo Backchannel
'Dat veniam coi'vis, vexat censura coluinbas' — Juvenal ’
2.1 Introduction
This chapter assesses how the secretly concluded Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- 
Government AiTangements (DoP) transpired. It provides an analysis of the secret deal-making process that 
intended to develop a sustainable preventative secuiity regime with a view to implementing an internationally 
recognised, binding and agreed legal framework setting out specific commitments and obligations, within an 
enforceable conflict prevention regime. By employing the RICEMAN FORMULA, specifically items 3 and 
7, covering confidence-building and negotiation, this chapter analyses the evolution of the DoP thiough its 
stages of conception and gestation. Confidence-building covers the provision of channels for dispute 
resolution, crisis prevention, reconciliation, conflict deterrence and reduction, foundation of political 
institutions to diffiise political instability and human rights abuses, economic uncertainty and ensure 
compliance and verification of a mutual security envii'onment. Negotiation covers systems employed to 
facilitate the deal-making process. By analysing the process thiough the lens of such conflict resolution 
processes as confidence-building and negotiation, this chapter outlines the deal-making process incorporating 
the conflict resolution prescriptions for dispute resolution, crisis prevention, reconciliation, conflict 
deterrence and reduction, the foundation of political institutions to diffuse political instability and human 
rights abuses, economic uncertainty, and ensuring compliance and verification within a mutual security 
environment.
2.2 Establishment and Purpose of Madrid Conference
Prior to the convening of a Middle East peace conference all international peace initiatives since the 
1973-4 Yom Kippur Wai* disengagement negotiations were of a bilateral or trilateral nature, aU attempts at 
convening multilateral negotiations having failed. Bilateral initiatives were pui sued for a number of reasons, 
depending on circumstances and political desire. An example of conscience-driven diplomacy was the Shulz 
Plan, devised in February 1988, tliree months after the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada. The plan called 
for the convening of an international 'event' in April 1988, with the participation of the paifies to the conflict 
and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. The opening event would be followed by 
direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians on an interim settlement involving autonomy 
for the West Bank and Gaza Strip to be implemented for a period of three years. Two months after the 
establishment of such an implementation, talks on the permanent solution would take place with the 
pai ticipation of the autonomy administration witliin the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The permanent 
solution would be based on the land for peace formula and the PLO would be able to participate on condition 
they accept UN SCRs 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations. Shamir rejected the proposal because it 
included principles rejected by the Likud - it did not pre-condition the ending of the intifada on the start of 
negotiations and it ignored the Camp David Accords. Shulz gave up in despair in April 1988.^
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Alternatively examples of the initiation of a negotiation system employed to facilitate the deal-making 
process have emanated from some of the protagonists. The Shamir-Rabin peace initiative, presented in 
Washington D.C. by PM Shamir in April 1989, was backed by the National Unity Government on May 14, 
1989 and dealt with fom* issues: 1. strengthening the peace between Israel and Egypt on the basis of the 
Camp David Accords; 2. establishing peace relations with other Arab states; 3. resolving the refrigee 
problem; 4. holding elections in the territories for nominating a representation that would conduct 
negotiations for a transitional period of self-rule and later for a permanent settlement. The proposal 
stipulated that the political process would be by means of direct negotiations with the Ai'ab representatives, 
that Israel opposed the establishment of'an additional Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area 
between Israel and Jordan', that Israel would not negotiate with the PLO and that there would be no change 
in the status of Judea, Samaiia and Gaza other than in accordance with the basic guidelines of the 
government, which meant no Israeli withdiawal from the territories.
President Mubarak of Egypt published his own ten-point programme in September 1989 for the 
implementation of the Israeli initiative, proposing that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations meet in Cairo. 
The Likud objected to the Egyptian mention of the participation of East Jerusalemite Palestinians in the 
elections and to the need for Israel to accept the principle of land for peace. Rabin, however stated that the 
Egyptian proposals accounted for Israeli sensitivities m that they did not mention the PLO, the Palestinian 
right to self-determination or a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Mubarak ten points were followed by a five-point document fr om US Secretary of State Baker 
published on 06/12/89 which dealt with the technicalities for the opening of the Israeli-Palestinian dialogue to 
be held in Cairo. In March 1990, after little progress Baker addressed the question to the Israeli government: 
'will the government of Israel be ready to agree to sit with Palestinians on a name-by-name basis who are 
residents of the West Bank and Gaza?' Though Foreign Minister Ai ens was in favour of a positive reply, PM 
Shamil’ objected. The faHiu’e of this initiative was the background for the decision by the Labour Paity to put 
forward a motion of no confidence in the government, the resultant fall of the government was the first ever 
by motion of no confidence.^
Thus we can see some of the pitfalls on the way to acliieving even an agreed fora for discussion, let 
alone actual resolution. The traditional Israeli position regaiding an international conference has always been 
that bilateral negotiations with the Arab states, or talks through an intermediary are preferable to negotiations 
within the framework of an international conference. Israel believes that in such an atmosphere it would be 
in an inferior position strategically, tactically and numerically. However, the 1973 Geneva Conference 
proved that with proper coordination with the US and with the appropriate terms of reference such a 
conference could be useful. In the 1975 Memorandum of Understanding signed between the US and Israel, 
Israel received assurances regarding the conditions for reconvening the Geneva Conference: Israel would be 
consulted about the timing; the PLO would not be invited unless it recognised Israel and UN SCRs 242 and 
338; the US would coordinate strategy regaiding the conference with Israel; the US would make every effort 
to ensure that the talks on substance would be held on a bilateral basis; the US would oppose any attempt by 
the Secui’ity Council to change the powers of the conference to Israel's detriment; and the US would act
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together with Israel to ensure progress to attain peace between Israel and its neighbours on the basis of 
negotiations.
In September 1977 Menachem Begin expressed his agreement to an international conference, but the 
peace process with Egypt followed the 'bilateral talks with the help of a mediator' model. The conference 
idea remained dormant until 1985, when King Hussein of Jordan raised the possibility of an international 
conference to act as an umbrella for direct talks with Israel. Then PM Peres mentioned this idea in his speech 
to the UN in October 1985 and expressed Israel's agreement that Palestinian representatives who are not 
members of the PLO be included in the Jordanian delegation. The London Agreement of April 11, 1987, 
reached between King Hussein and Peres concerned the convention of such a conference, but incoming PM 
Yitzliak Shamir rejected the idea as being disadvantageous to Israel. The international conference was the 
basis of both the 1988 Shultz Plan and the 1991 Baker Initiative. On Israel's insistence, the Madrid 
Conference of October 1991, was merely a ceremonial opening to direct bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations which were to follow immediately. Although the Madrid Conference was not a continuation of 
the Geneva Conference, the US abided by its assurances given Israel in the 1975 Memorandum of 
Understanding.'’
By 1991, the climate in global international relations had radically changed, whilst attempts at the 
reconciliation of long-term local and regional conflicts had had limited successes in many areas previously 
thought of as intractable, such as: Angola, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Eritrea, Namibia, Nicai agua and South 
Africa. Three major factors can be discerned in producing the fortuitous circumstances necessary to bring 
together the enemies of the Middle East to discuss issues of mutual concern. Fftstly, the decline of the 
USSR's power and interest in the Middle East. Whilst by 1991 it would still be too early to talk of the end of 
the Cold War, certainly by the end of 1991, the USSR was no longer the monolithic superpower it had 
previously appeared to the outside world, internal tmmoil was concentrating the minds of the peoples of the 
USSR. Tills allowed the US umivalled breadth of action in the Middle East - both to ally and foe alike. 
Secondly, the afl;ermath of the Second Gulf War of 1990-1 ensured respect for US power in the region, 
which although destroying Iraq militaiily, meant that two important points emerged; 1. American power, 
weaponry and desire to use it had overshadowed in a fight with a former Soviet client, Soviet weaponry, 
which meant that the anti-Israeli forces could now no longer view a military solution against Israel as viable; 
and 2. that although Israel became one of the most powerful military forces in the region, the US was still 
obliged both politically and morally to the Arab states that had agreed to produce the aura of internationalism 
and respectability, in the US-led coalition of Western states vendetta against Iraq. Western war-fever 
rhetoric had to be thus backed up by some example of moral justification for waging war for national 
strategic interests. Thirdly, and more debatably, is the proposition, that the PLO had adopted a strategic 
strategy of'open-mindedness and unilateral concessions.... in hne with the realistic objectives of the intifada'.^ 
'What then is new about the Madrid concept? asked PM Rabin in 1993 prior to the public 
announcement of the DoP. He answered that 'From 1949 to 1979, limited agreements, nothing like 
comprehensive peace treaties, were achieved tlirough negotiations with one Arab state at a time.
Such was the case, for example, during the armistice deliberations in 1949: first an agreement was 
signed with Egypt, after that with Jordan, and later still with Syiia and Lebanon. Actually, the years
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between 1949 and 1974 were considered a long drought with regard to agreements between Israel 
and her neighbom s. Neither the Sinai Campaign, nor the Six-Day Wai*, nor the War of Attrition 
concluded with a bilateral agreement, however limited. All these wars ended with a United Nations 
Secui ity Council resolution accepted by the countries involved.
Only after the Yom Kippur War was the path of negotiations used again, and then only to achieve 
limited agreements. In 1974, a separation-of-forces agreement was concluded with Egypt. Separate 
negotiations with Syria ended with a second separation-of-forces agreement signed in September, 
1975. In September 1978, the Camp David Accords were signed with Egypt, and the peace treaty 
with Egypt was concluded in March, 1979. Before Madrid, negotiations between Israel and Arab 
countries were never conducted according to the principle that aU participants would gather at one 
location at one time to negotiate accords of any kind.
The Madrid concept is two-tiered. At the bilateral level, the Israeli delegation meets with the 
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (each track separately), the Syrian delegation, and the Lebanese 
delegation. At the multilateral level, there are five committees dedicated to various subjects. The 
main object of the discussions at this level is to create mutual expectations and to illustrate, mainly to 
the Arab world, wliat can be accomplished for the good of the region, and for each individual state 
and nation, when peace is achieved.
To our regret, two principal potential partners, Syria and Lebanon, aie not participating in the 
multilateral negotiations. Is this concept good or bad? In other words, does it speed up the peace 
process or slow it down? Only time will tell. I have asked myself more than once whether I am a 
prisoner of past experience, which indicates that peace can be achieved only by negotiations with one 
Arab state or actor at one time. If so, should the present concept be altered? My conclusion is that 
any change in the present concept, irrespective of its efficacy, would be a mistake because it would 
di'aw attention fiom substance to procedure. The present concept should be kept as it is, but we 
should search for ways to change the substance, at least insofar as this depends on us. A simple 
analysis allows us to differentiate between two types of partners in the present negotiations: 'key 
partners', Syria and the Palestinians, and 'secondary partners', Jordan and Lebanon. Obviously, Jordan 
cannot conclude an agreement with us on the basis of bilateral relations alone, ignoring negotiations 
between Israel and the Palestinians in the territories and preceding any arrangement regarding the 
latter, whether it be called autonomy or anything else. It is clear that no agreement can be made with 
Lebanon without a prior understanding with Syria. Therefore, the altering of substance that I 
mentioned must focus on achieving a peace agreement with Syiia and an interim agreement with the 
Palestinians for a transitional period.'^
Undoubtedly the most significant aspect of the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference was that the 
psychological barrier of mutual recognition was broken. Israel, in Madrid, obtained the fii st essential stage 
towai'ds diplomatic recognition from sitting down with its neighboui’s. The Palestinians, 'in the eyes of 
international public opinion, established the legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations and demands'.^ The 
location of the venue was no accident, indeed the very historical symbolism and the emotional legacy 
projected was enormous. Spain represented the ground on wMch Catholicism confronted Islam and
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persecuted Judaism. With a positive outcome at Madrid it could also represent the beginning of an historic 
reconciliation between modern Islam and Judaism. However, Madrid was not the most obvious choice, the 
decision that Madrid would host the conference in the presence of US President Bush and the USSR’s 
President Gorbachev was announced by Secretary Baker and USSR Foreign Minister Pankin at a press 
conference on October 18, 1991 in Jerusalem. The co-sponsors wished to present a fait accompli to the 
various invitees, in that none of them would feel able to reject the co-sponsors, either in terms of theft 
relationships; with the superpowers, theft domestic public opinion and with international public opinion.
The US administration, in order not to damage its credibility domestically, in terms of President 
Bush's re-election prospects, and internationally, in terms of superpower dynamics, pressed ahead with the 
Madrid conference which tended to rely more heavily on form rather than substance. Secretary Baker 
concentrated on finding a procedural formula which would be acceptable to avowed enemies. Such a 
formula would have to be insubstantial and vague on points of significance in order to ensure the initial 
participation of the primary parties, as the very absence of agreement on any point of substance would be the 
very reason that they could justify attendance both domestically and diplomatically. However, the major 
drawback of such an approach meant that issues concerning procedure took on much greater importance 
than they would otherwise be expected to.
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon all agreed to participate at Madrid with the proviso that actual, as 
opposed to de facto, recognition of Israel would be withheld, this point to be included in the negotiations to 
be undertaken at Madrid. According to MassaUia, the Palestinians, 'by accepting 'autonomy' as a transitional 
stage, placed themselves in a minimalist negotiating position, thus restricting theft room for manoeuvre; they 
therefore chose a strategy which contrasted with Israel's maximalist stance of denying that the Palestinians 
had any right to theft own land.'®
As far as the other parties to the Madrid conference were concerned, the USSR and the EU, for their 
own reasons decided to follow the US strategy. The EU agreed to 'do nothing wliich might impede US 
diplomacy' and supported US efforts.^ Egyptian, Saudi and Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) 
participation was assured through the US carrot-and-stick diplomatic approach, a mixture of cajolery, bribes 
and obligation. Debt restructuring and massive arms trans-sliipments ensured these countries had over the 
previous number of yeai’s fallen well within the US sphere of influence. The UN, the EU and the Arab 
Maghreb Union participated as observers.
In accepting the US formula, all the parties concerned allowed the US and the USSR as co-sponsors 
to dictate the terms of Madrid. Israeli demands for a series of regional conferences and the European- 
Soviet-Aab demand for an international conference under the auspices of the UN, were side-stepped by 
Secretary Baker, thus ensuring that the conference was convened. This compromise formula was envisaged 
to be able to enable the UN Security Council to be drawn into endorsing future agreements and peace 
settlements.
The issues suiTounding the Israeli-Palestinian/Aab-Israeli conflict have often been attempted to be 
resolved through the media of forms of international arbitration, such like; conferences of arbitration, 
unilateral superpower promises, secret agreements. Commissions of Enquiry, White Papers, national and 
international congresses, petitions, strikes, riots and wars. Basically, to paraphiase Churchill, the Madrid
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Conference was convened because there had been too much war-war, so because of US supremacy following 
the Persian Gulf War, the US attempted to fashion, and for some impose, jaw-jaw on the states of the Middle 
East. The Second Persian Gulf War has left several legacies, not least the suspicion that apai’t from altruism 
or opportunism, the convening of the Madrid conference was an attempt by the US to facilitate its hegemony 
over the Middle East by trying to marry its competing allies, in order to secure its access to cheap oil 
resources. For many, the Madrid Conference signalled a breakthrough which broke an important 
psychological barrier - just getting the parties to the same room in order to talk peace. Real progress in the 
Middle East usually follows a war, wliich shakes things up and shatters previous rigidities. Conferences had 
been set up before, after Yom Kippur in 1974, and within the framework of Camp David in 1977/8, where 
there were provisions to discuss Palestinian issues. These proved fruitless as they failed to stimulate sufficient 
backing or political momentum.
After seven months of intensive shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East which began in Mai ch 1991, 
Secretary Baker obtained the agreement of all the parties involved in the Aab-Israeli conflict to participate in 
an international conference, which at Israel's insistence would serve as a preamble to direct bilateral and 
multilateral talks between Israel and her neighbours. This was to expose an inherent problem, how to gain 
agreement, between and with, states wliich were still teclmically at war and in some cases didn't even 
recognise the very existence of two of the main protagonists. Israeli demands that there should not be any 
pre-conditions to the talks, and that the PLO should not be a party to the negotiations, that Palestinians from 
the occupied territories, approved by Israel, should form part of the Jordanian delegation, were also 
accepted. Wliile the Bush administration worked to convene the peace conference in Madrid, Israeli PM 
Shamir continued vsdth the policy of building more housing units and settlements in the occupied territories. 
According to Shamir, the root cause of the conflict was, he insisted, not territory but the A ab refiisal to 
recognise the legitimacy of the State of Israel, hence he was not prepared to trade territory for peace. A1 he 
would offer was peace for peace. Shamir's position was basic and unchangeable. Palestinian autonomy, for a 
transitional period of five years was intended to foreclose all other options, not to be the foundation for 
fiirther negotiations and concessions.” The invitations to the conference were sent jointly by Baker and 
Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin on 18th October 1991, and wliilst none of the opening speeches were 
conciliatory, the importance of the conference was that the parties directly involved in the Aab-Israeli 
conflict were present. Furthermore, all the other A ab  states (except Iraq) were represented by observers.
The political decision for Palestinian participation at Madrid was founded on economic hardship. 
During the period, December 1987 to January 1991, encompassing the intifada and the Second Gulf War, the 
Palestinian economy suffered significant stresses placed on it, internally by the Unified National Leadership of 
the Uprismg(UNLU), externally by the Israelis and through international pressures. The GNP of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip fell 30-35% in this period. Palestinian workers were increasingly restricted access to 
Israel for employment. For example, the unofficial number of Gazans employed in Israel declined from
80,000 to 56,000, this meant a fall in pre-intifada income fiom working in Israel of approximately 35% of 
GNP and 70% of GDP. This represented a dramatic loss of income estimated at $300m, having the 
consequent effects on consumption, investment and living standaids.’^
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The intifada significantly undermined the occupied territories' economies. Israeli-imposed actions 
severely restricted the economic capacity of the temtories by, depleting financial resources, reducing 
employment opportunities and undermining the economic and physical infrastructure. UNLU-itnposed strike 
actions were designed to break the economic dependency of the occupied territories on Israel, but in practice 
only increased dependency, particularly in Gaza, where Israel represented economic survival because there 
was no real alternative employment. The economies of the occupied territories suffered significant decline 
during the first two and a half years of the intifada. Sanctions imposed by Israel: such as curfews, magnetic 
identity cards, closure of the territories; the taxation campaign; regulation tluough permits and licences; 
levies and fines, and measures imposed by the UNLU such as strikes and boycotts of Israeli products created 
extreme hardship for most Palestinians.”  During this period per capita GNP fell by 41% in Gaza - a fall of 
$700 to $1,000 - a sum well below the corresponding Israeli poverty line. This effects of tliis fall were 
multiplied due to the fact that Gazan families aie traditionally much lai’ger than West Bankers. The level of 
GNP fell because: output in all economic sectors (except agriculture) was reduced 20-30%; remittances from 
Israel dwindled; Israeli-occupied territories trade reduced as tensions increased; and Gulf remittances were 
eroded by some 70%.” In the beginning of the intifada, such losses were offset by individuals' savings, 
however this was of only limited duration before such were depleted, net real income compared to pre­
intifada income levels fell by some 40-50% for most Palestinians.” The depletion of private savings, either in 
the occupied temtories and abroad, and the acute drop in private income had a profound impact on the local 
economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, radically affecting consumption, savings and investments, 
economic activity and living standards.”  Israeli restrictions forced Palestinians to adopt austerity measuies 
and find alternative capital sources. Israeli policies in the beginning of the intifada aimed to highlight and 
strengthen Palestinian economic dependency on the Israeli economy, and to defeat the intifada through 
intense and ultimately unbearable economic hardship. Then Defence Minister Rabin revealed Israeli thinking, 
'We have to strike a balance between actions that could bring on terrible economic distress and a situation in 
which [the Palestinians] have nothing to lose, and measures which bind them to the Israeli administration and 
prevent civil disobedience'.”  Such economic hardships, whether self-imposed or Israeli-inspired over time 
began to adversely affect the populations' ability to stand fast and threatened to undermine the intifada's 
inspiration, namely the communal spiiit engendered and the attitudinal change effected in respect of rejecting 
the Israeli occupation.”  The intifada represented not just a political realignment in the occupied territories, 
which could be determined in the occupied Palestinians favour, but it also represented an economic situation, 
which has been termed de-development” , where the Palestinian economy has deteriorated to such an extent 
as to directly affect the political gams made and the political strategy of the Palestinian leadership. The 
economic effects of the intifada laid the foundations for the fiiture political accommodation with Israel, the 
political and economic fall-out from the Second Gulf War markedly accelerated this process.^®
The disastrous effects of the Second Gulf Wai* on the Palestinian economies caused severe and
3 diate economic hardsliip. Gaza was most affected as its economy was almost totally reliant on Gulf (ances, direct aid and Israeli employment. Israel imposed a general and sustained closure of the West 
Bank ^ d  Gaza, effectively closing down the territories' economy on January 16, 1991. The closure lasted 
seven weeks in some places with an estimated cost of $84m as a result of a total work stoppage and
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limitation of workers allowed into Israel/’ Whilst by May, 1 in 3 Gazans was imemployed, of those who 
were employed personal income fell sharply, savings were eaten into, many Palestinian workers were fired by 
Israeli employers without appeal, recourse or severance, and others were unable to collect monies owed, 
with the effect that for ordinary Palestinians, income fell as prices rose. Of a 1990 Gaza workforce of 
120,000, by the end of the war: 28,000 worked in Israel, down fi*om 56,000 (80,000 before the intifada);
12,000 worked for UNRWA, the civil administration and local municipalities; and 40,000 worked in other 
sectors. High employment levels in other sectors was assumed but likely, wiongly, with unemployment rates 
probably at 35-40%. The loss in wages was estimated at $1 Im per month.^  ^ The closure coincided with the 
citrus harvest, summer planting season, and the end of a severe drought, causing irrigation and insecticide 
spraying to halt and the loss of principal Guff markets (Gaza's main buyers of citrus-Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Aabia and the UAE closed their maikets) meaning much of the finit rotted on the trees. The resulting 
domestic glut, rising production costs and diminishing retiuns meant that citrus prices slumped, for example, 
lemons fell from $100 to $20 a ton, grapefruits from $100 to $50 a ton, and oranges from $150 to $50 a ton. 
Tills resulted in a cash liquidity crisis as people drew on savings and bought only necessities, as evidenced by 
the 80% fall in red meat consumption, and 70% in vegetables.^^
In economic terms the most important aspect of the Guff crisis was the loss of Palestinian remittances 
from the Guff, the termination of direct aid from the Guff states, such as Saudi Aabia and Kuwait and the 
decline in PLO transfers. Some 800,000 Palestinians sent home money from the Guff. In 1987 total 
remittances from the Guff amounted to $250m; m 1989 Guff remittances were $170m, dftect aid, $140m; 
between 1988-90 money fiom Kuwait alone amounted to $140m. Diiect aid from the Guff also terminated so 
that by April 1991 losses from remittances, exports and direct aid amounted to $350m. '^* A d from the Guff 
states to local institutions such as, financing health and educational facilities and development projects also 
terminated, so that when combined with either decline or losses from those employed in Israel and losses of 
Guff remittances, the Palestinian economy was dealt a severe blow. The PLO too lost important remittances, 
money that was sent m part to the occupied territories. According to the PLO, its annual support consisted 
of $72m from Saudi Aabia, $48m from Iraq, $24m from Kuwait, not including the PLO tax on Palestinians 
in Kuwait amounting to some $50m.^  ^ The PLO lost some $480m fiom Guff sources, and an additional 
$62.5m in PLO taxes and donations fr om Palestinians living in Kuwait and other A ab states. Saudi Aabian 
funds to the PLO amounted to 10% of the total GDP of the West Bank and Gaza, indeed between 1980-90 
the PLO is estimated to have received $10bn from Kuwait, Saudi Aabia, UAE and others which terminated 
with the Guff wai*.^ *’ The decline in PLO revenue had a devastating effect in the occupied territories as PLO 
monies funded local infr astructures, cai*ed for the elderly and infirm and contained a strong social welfare 
e lem ent .A t  this rate, by 1993 the PLO would be bankrupt.
Loss of financial standing in turn affected the PLO's political standing in the community. The inability 
of the Palestinian economies to withstand repeated closures on top of the Guff War, with the intifada 
continuing, meant that economic gloom deepened. Gaza was closed for 5 weeks between May and July 
1992, UNRWA estimated losses at $500,000 per day from wages alone based on figures from May 24-July 
5, when workers were allowed into Israel.^ ® With a series of closures, curfews, export restrictions for Gazan 
farmers and commercial strikes called by UNLU, a major indicator of the economic situation during this
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period was the number of Palestinian fanulies by June 1991 who became dependent on UNRWA food 
assistance to stave off hunger; some 120,000 refugee and non-reftigee families in Gaza and some 165,000 
families in the West Bank. This situation continued into 1992 as UNRWA distributed 430,000 family food 
parcels in Gaza and 119,000 in the West Bank.^^
An immediate effect on Israeli society of the Soviet Jewish immigration wave was the consequent 
reduction of Israeli dependence on Palestinian labour. The Second Guff War merely exacerbated the tensions 
between the Israeli and Palestinian populations, already running high due to the effects of the immigrant tidal 
wave. The Second Guff War meant that the occupied territories were shut off from Israel from mid-January 
to March 1991, on the one hand creating meaningftil hardship for the large percentage of Palestinians who 
depended on their livelihood from employment in Israel, whilst on the other hand creating opportunities for 
the immigrant job seekers which would mean the permanent replacement of the Palestinians' jobs. However, 
the structural realignment of the Israeli economy in such rapid terms had rather an immediate effect on the 
political scene. Government plans for the construction of 100,000 new housing units by the end of the year 
had to be postponed as some four-frfths of existing housing construction was idled.^° Israeli agriculture 
suffered heavily as the fruit and flower export sector had been so heavily dependent on Palestinian labom*, 
and losses of up to 50% in sales were reported by a number of liigh-tech sector companies. Foreign 
anxieties, imcertainty caused by the war and the failure of foreign suppliers to renew orders all caused 
problems for the economy.^’ Even as immigration resumed after the end of the war, and whilst more jobs 
were made available by the closure of the territories, unemployment rose to over 10% by mid-1991. The 
new immigrants rejected the types of jobs available, menial employment traditionally fiilfilled by Palestinians, 
therefore many employers even went so far as to request permission to import foreign labour. This lead to 
MKs questioning the advisability of paying unemployment insurance to immigrants whilst the agriculture and 
construction sectors were so short of labour. However these problems in the Israeli economy were 
temporary and short-lived. Of more significance for the futuie of Israeli-Palestinian relations was the effect 
of the war on the Palestinian economy, with the consequent political fall-out. The curfew imposed on the 
occupied temtories for the duration of the war was the longest known in the occupation. Most business was 
seriously curtailed, currency transfers from Palestinians working in Israel and the Guff dried up, money was 
so scarce that even internal trade was restricted by the fact that most people just did not have the means to 
purchase goods. By the end of the war and the curfew, estimates suggested that the territories were 
operating at roughly 25% of pre-war activity, the cost of the curfew alone was estimated to be between $150 
-200 million.^^
The Second Persian Guff was politically and financially ruinous for the PLO. Although the pro-Iraq 
stance taken was almost universally popular with Palestinians, especially those living in the occupied 
territories, however, the backlash suffered by the PLO made such support particularly expensive.^  ^ Saudi 
Aabia and the Guff States withdrew financial aid and the Kuwaitis pursued a repressive vendetta against the 
some 400,000 Palestinians living in Kuwait. Some 300,000 Palestinians were expelled and thus added not 
only to the population in Jordan where they sought refiige, but also added to the instability in the kingdom 
which was also suffering for its somewhat reluctant support oflraq.^'’ From the very start of the crisis many 
PLO leaders, including Aafat, declared their support for the Iraqi regime. Wliile the Palestinian leaders
71
were undoubtedly concerned about the fate of the some 400,000 Palestinian community in Kuwait, Israeli 
public opinion believed that tliis support proved that the Palestinians were disingenuous in their desire for an 
accommodation with Israel. Rather it convinced many Israelis that the Palestinians would revert to following 
the first A ab strongman who emerged thieatening to destroy Israel.^^
It was no secret that the PLO's image was suffering among many Palestinians, perturbed by financial 
corruption witliin the organisation and alienated by the ineffective institutional structures which failed to 
provide avenues for adequate participation. The PLO's support for Iraq in the Second Guff War* drew severe 
criticism fiom most quarters, including the influential Palestinian Guff community. This led to a decline in 
revenue firom Guff states retaliating by severing financial aid. However, it is also the case that Aafat could 
well have irreparably lost his domestic constituency in the territories, in the refiigee camps and in the 
diaspora, major bedrocks of PLO support, if his position had not coincided with public support for Iraq.
Thus the rather saidonic observation, 'Oui* masses are not up to the level of the revolution. Wlien the 
revolution surrenders to them it betrays itself, when it abandons them it dies.'^’’
The decline of the role of Palestinian institutions, and consequently of adequate representation and 
participation had been particularly rapid since the departuie of the PLO fi*om Beftut to Tunis in 1982, 
following the Israeli 'Operation Peace for Galilee'. Demands for power sharing and for the eradication of 
corruption, which threatened to firagment the PLO during the 1980's, prompted a centralisation of power and 
financial control in the hands of the leadership in Tunis under Aafat. Consequently, negotiations over 
reform were, more often than not, reduced to deals cut by Aafat and the factions over the distribution of 
seats in vaiious organisations and money, rather than on refomiing the decision-making processes and theft 
accountability. Consensus at Palestine National Council was attained through the division of quotas of 
representation and of money to the frétions. Aafat however was not solely responsible for such a state of 
affairs, the various factions acted more out of regar d for financial gain and power than for participating in 
substantive political debate. This situation resulted in the role of the institutions and the departments being 
overshadowed as real power lay in an ever decreasing cabal. The decline of the institutions resulted in turn 
in the alienation of many Palestinian intellectuals and activists who feared for the purity of the struggle.^® 
According to Samir Hiüeüeh, who sits on the multilateral committee for economic development, no more 
than $40 million flowed into the territories in 1992, compared with $120 million in 1990, and the 1990 figure 
was a sharp decline after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The PLO budget dropped firom $245 million to $85 
million between 1991-93.”  The consequences of the decline in economic and political fortunes combined to 
force the Palestinians to accept the invitation to attend the Madr id conference.
Many Israelis discerned a major tur n in domestic and foreign affafts as a result of the significant 
events which occurred in the Middle East and in Europe between 1989 and 1991. The exodus of Soviet 
Jews to Israel, the introspection of the USSR thus undermining its influence in Middle East affafts, the 
impact of the Second Guff War and the subsequent supremacy of American influence, conspired to raise 
hopes that the Aab-Israeli conflict, particularly the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, might finally be settled. 
However, the fear of an internationally imposed political solution at odds with the more ideologically 
motivated principles guiding the centre-right nationalist agenda existed with many in Israel, typically those
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like PM Shaniii*. Thus Israel accepted the invitation to Madrid with a mixture of institutional suspicion and 
public anticipation.
According to some, the Madrid fi-amework of 1991 is based on that envisaged by the Camp David 
Accords of 1978.'^  ^ However in 1991 the demographic map of the occupied territories reflected a Likud 
settlement strategy which was a corollary to its negotiating policy; spreading large numbers of Israelis 
throughout the territories in an attempt to prevent any sort of compromise territorial / political arrangement 
with the Palestinians. The Madrid/Camp David formula insists that autonomy be instituted throughout the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. The autonomy plan debate had reopened following the outbreak of the intifada. 
Whilst the Labour Party viewed it as an interim arrangement involving a territorially based autonomy (of 
which the Palestinians of East Jerusalem could be a part on a personal basis), Likud viewed it as a permanent 
arrangement involving a personally based autonomy (of which the Arabs of East Jerusalem would not be 
pait) The idea of an autonomy plan came up in the bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinian 
delegation following the Madrid Conference and was the background to the decision of Tzomet and Moledet 
to leave the Shamir government in January 1992.'^  ^ This formula postponed issues of border rectification and 
Israeli annexation of vital territories to the final stage, when, presumably after a successful autonomy, they 
would be far more difficult to discuss.
Following firom the end of the Cold War, the important developments which emerged in the Middle 
East are discernible as: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel; and a 
workable, if not fiiendly, détente between Syria and the West. The decline of Soviet interest in global 
politics in favour of introspection and domestic turmoil, led to a US-USSR reconciliation wliich in turn 
signalled the end of the Arab rejectionist states fiom playing the superpowers off against each other iu order 
to avoid outright domination of the region by one or other superpower. The outcome of the second Persian 
Gulf War, was seen by many as to facilitate the likelihood of a Middle East pax americana. The Madrid 
process was tangible evidence of tins new US domination, and of US aspirations in the region, namely the 
protection of its oil resources, strategic interests, and the desire to provide Israel with regional security in the 
form of a peace settlement and the normalisation of Israeli-Arab relations. The political climate in the Middle 
East following the second Persian Gulf Wai* was exploited by the US in order to press ahead with its own 
version of a Middle East settlement, the Madrid process. Each of the main Middle Eastern protagonists had 
their own agendas as to what they saw as the most pressing issues, each obviously concerned with advancing 
their own partisan although mutually incompatible causes, for example: the Syrians wanted to reoccupy the 
Golan within the context of an overall peace settlement; the Jordanians wanted stability, both in financial and 
secur ity terms; the Palestinians wanted independence and statehood; the Lebanese wanted the restoration of 
their sovereignty over their territory occupied by its neighbours; and the Israelis wanted peace with their 
neighbours albeit with the provisions that they did not want to: relinquish the Golan in its entirety prior to a 
peace treaty with Syria; withdraw fi om southern Lebanon whilst the threat of attack fi om this border 
remained; or, see the establishment of a Palestinian state. Operating with mutual suspicion, these mutually 
exclusive common interests did not however hinder the attempts of all sides to manoeuvre and negotiate for 
partisan benefits, even though the supposed referee in this ’game', the US, was intent in pursuing its own
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national interests in tandem with trying to create the right environment for a freely consented, rather than 
imposed, peace.
The perception by the Palestinians that the possible conclusion of separate Israeli-Ar ab deals which 
did not involve the Palestinians, seemed to be that such deals would disadvantage the Palestinians to the 
extent that they would no longer be able to command a central role in the process thereby undermining, 
relegating and alienating the Palestinians at a stroke. The Palestinians therefore feared that unless any 
involvement by other Arab parties in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations was contingent upon a commitment 
in the firrtherance of Palestinian aspirations then any such involvement that did not meet tlris criterion would 
be deemed to undermine Palestinian national objectives. For example, the Palestinians view the concept of 
transitional autonomy in the negotiations with Israel as laying the foundations for statehood, thus Jordanian 
involvement in the talks is seen by the Palestinians as working towards such a goal otherwise Jordanian 
involvement would be blocked. Conversely, the Israelis see Jordanian involvement in the talks as a useful 
and powerful weight to counterbalance the Palestinian nationalist aspirations, viewing Jordanian involvement 
in the talks as recognition of Jordanian interests and rights over the Palestinians, with the possibility of seeing 
transitional autonomy as leading to Palestinian integration or confederation with Jordan, or some such other 
arrangement whereby Israel, the Palestinians and Jordan shar e joint competencies. This latter scenaiio has 
powerful historic roots in Israeli strategic thinking, from the likes of Dayan, Allon and Begin. The central 
issue is the containment of Palestinian aspirations, autonomy viewed through continued Israeli military 
domination. However, Israeli thinking and practice on this vexed issue has shown rather a schizoplii'enic 
character, Jordanian domination of the Palestinians is an option wliich many Israelis do not relish, wlihst 
Israeli annexation of the occupied territories would create a bi-national state thereby diluting significantly the 
Jewish characteristic of Israel. It seems what the Israelis want is, to control the occupied territories without 
absorbing them, in peace, cheaply, and without sovereign responsibilities whilst not being prejudicial to 
Israeli military control and the establishment and maintenance of Israeli settlements. The main reason why 
the Israelis were unwilling to submit to an international conference under the auspices of the UN, is because 
to do so would be to submit Israel to the authority of the UN as final arbiter. To do this would logically 
entail Israel then being subject to enforcing, or at least acknowledging in some form the legitimacy and 
authority of the resolutions of the UN passed regarding the issues involved in the Middle East, especially as 
they relate to Israel in particular.
Those who envisage a Palestinian state 'seek a solution which would enable it to acquire regional and 
international credibility while avoiding a position of dependence on any other countiy. As a par liamentary, 
neutral democracy, such a state would be a model of moderation, stability, pluralism, tolerance and 
coexistence between the followers of the three monotheistic faiths. It would also be a haven for Christians 
freeing persecution elsewhere in the reg ion .Such  a future is one to work towards no doubt, but taking a 
brief look at history one would have to be very imprudent to view the fiituie in such glaringly optimistic 
terms. Even a policy of studied neutrality brings with it a concern for and about ones neighbour s.
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2,3 The US as Agent of Change
US Secretary of State, Janies Baker acted as principal advocate of the Bush administration's Middle 
East policy and architect of the Madrid peace conference. President Bush and Baker worked very closely on 
foreign policy objectives, both believed to have no more interest in substantive issues than the other, 
preferring process and face to face deals than geopolitical theorising. Little difference between the two was 
noticeable on Middle East policy, both reacted similarly to issues so that Baker effectively had a free hand.
Baker's Palestinian-Israeli policy reflected the administration's instincts for caution, inaction, nothing 
revolutionaiy or imaginative with a tendency to focus on the status quo.'*^  It could be argued that each new 
administration or set of officials coming new to a problem seek out new ways to define existing situations 
and problems. However, the maintenance of the status quo seems to have not only fitted Baker's personality 
but also Ins style in office so that rather than search for new policy concepts, emphases, goals and action 
plans with which to define US policy vis-a-vis the Middle East, Baker sought the very ideas and personnel 
which would reinforce his own perceptions, interpretations and prejudices rather than redirect or shatter 
them. Baker was reported to have embraced a pre-1988 presidential report by the pro-Israeli Wasliington 
Institute for Near East Policy, entitled. Building for Peace: An American Strategv for the Middle East.
(Wasliington DC, 1988). This report argued for a slow process involving confidence-building measures 
which would prepare Palestinians and Israelis for direct negotiations rather than advocating dramatic gestures 
and breakthroughs. What is even more interesting is that not only did this report gain credence but several of 
its authors gained liigh-level appointments in the Bush administration: Dennis Ross (the report's principal 
author, and a Bush campaign aide) was appointed dfrector of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, 
becoming Secretary Baker's principal aide on the USSR and the Middle East; Aaron David Miller and Daniel 
Kurtzer were appointed Ross's principal Middle East advisers.' '^^
Baker may have chosen to view the Middle East with fear, distrust, suspicion, as an ideological 
battleground or as holy soil. More likely he viewed it with apathy and disinterest. In order to determine 
policy trends, objectives and thus to explain US Middle East policy, one must try to discern from the policy­
makers, identifiable rationales for their activities. In order to explain the behaviour of the US administration 
in adopting the Madiid formula it is important to understand the speculative frameworks which served them 
as rough guides for their actions, working hypotheses for the control of international problems, even when 
the accepted world order was shaken by dramatic events. In this way can be better understood how the 
policy-makers believed they made better sense of complex issues than their rivals or enemies, and how they 
anticipated and responded to threats and opportunities as they were presented. Because the failui'e rate in 
imaginative anticipation is natuially high, international politics as practised and conducted seems irrational 
and unprincipled rather than as a coherent and logical evolutionary process. In spite of this, conventional 
wisdom regarding US policy is that it is guided by protecting its national interests. In the Middle East those 
are: 1. containment and opposition to Russian dominance in the region; 2. control of oil resouices; and, 3.
Israel's security.'*  ^ Analyses of US post-cold war options observed that with the USSR disabled, it would be 
possible to 'liberate American foreign policy from the straight jacket imposed by superpower hostility'.'”^ |
Thus emboldened the US would be able to shift NATO costs on to European competitors, take a harsher line |
with third world debt and demands for assistance, and more importantly, the decline in Russia's ability to j
75
project its power would make 'military power more useful as a United States foreign policy instrument', 
permitting the US 'greater reliance on military force in a crisis'/^ The first edition of the post cold war White 
House report to Congress on thi*eat perception and foreign policy m Maich 1990, stated that US military 
power must focus on the third world, the prime target being the Middle East, where the 'tlueats to our 
interests... could not be laid at the Kremlin's door'. With US paranoia of the perceived Russian threat 
acknowledged, the report therefore believed the US should strengthen its 'defence industrial base' and 
develop additional forward bases, counterinsurgency and low intensity conflict capabilities."^*
President Eisenhower had described the Middle East as the most 'strategically important area m the 
world', the central policy goal being to establish US control over what the US State Department described as 
'a stupendous source of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history', being 
'probably the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign investment'.'^  ^ For the US, the 
problem was not one of access to Middle East oil, but rather 'that some form of US control over world oil 
reserves was necessary ...the idea that the United States had a pre-emptive right to the world's oü resources 
[having been] well entrenched by World War II ...Thus to maintain an international environment in which 
private companies could operate with security and profit, the US government became actively involved in 
maintaining the stability of the Middle East, m containing economic nationalism, and in sanctioning and 
supporting private arrangements for controlling the world's oil'.^ ®
Furthermore, it had been a US reflex since 1947, to state that 'America's own greatest interest' in any 
negotiations in the Middle East should result in 'enhanced security for Israel and a durable regional peace', 
basically meaning the acceptance of Israel into the regional fold under US hegemony, but without too many 
questions raised about the welfare and rights of the peoples of the region, particularly the Palestinians.^^
Baker preferred to make Middle East and Arab-Israeli policy himself together with a small group of 
advisers, effectively excluding the mainstream State Department staffers, as he was more influenced by US 
political implications and repercussions, than any overwhelming deske to achieve Middle East 
rapprochement.^^ Baker was cool and businesslike towards both Israel and the Arabs. He was neither willing 
to risk confrontations with Congress by exerting pressure on Israel, nor keen to make any real efforts to 
improve relations with the Arabs by expanding the low-level US-PLO dialogue started at the end of the 
Reagan administration.^^
In December 1989, Baker had produced a five-point plan, which was a synthesis of Shamir's April 
1989 five point plan, and Mubarak's ten point plan. The plan's main points were: (i) a dialogue between an 
Israeli and Palestinian delegation would be held in Cafro; (ii) Egypt was to act as intermediary not an 
interlocutor; (iii) membership in the Palestinian delegation would have to be approved by the Israelis; (iv) 
Israel would participate in the discussions on the basis of the Shamir plan and the Palestinians would be free 
to express their views on the negotiations and on Shamir's draft election plan; (v) a tripartite meeting of the 
Israeli, Egyptian and US Foreign Ministers would be held in Wasliington D.C. in order to create the right 
conditions for a constructive Israeli-Palestinian dialogue in Cairo.
On the 9th of March 1990, the Likud partner in the Israeli national unity government replied by 
accepting only part of the Baker Plan, only agreeing to begin talks if the Palestinians of East Jerusalem and 
the PLO would be excluded. Peres, leader of the Labour Party confirmed that he would agree to the Plan
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without changes. This issue led directly to the dissolution of the national unity government and on June 
11th, Shamir formed a new government coalition of the centre-right and nationalist right with Likud as the 
major partner. The new government thus prescribed its new position for the talks vrith the Palestinians in 
Cairo: (1) negotiations to be limited to autonomy plans as described in the Camp David Accords; (2) Aiab 
countries should make a gesture to Israel before Israel would agree to negotiations with the Palestinians; (3) 
Arab-Israeli relations should precede any discussions of the Palestinian problem.
Irritated by such a stance, Baker undiplomatically repeated his telephone number to Shamii' telling 
him to call him whenever Shamii' became serious about pursuing peace. In a letter dated June 27 1990 to 
President Bush, Shamir restated his position regarding: the establishment of Israeli settlements on the 
occupied territories; liis continued refusal to deal with the PLO; and his opposition to the inclusion of 
Palestinians from East Jerusalem or from the Palestinian diaspora in any talks with the Israelis.
1990 was a yeai' of many tur ning points in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in particular the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Increased repression in the occupied territories, the failure of the ’iron fist' policy, the 
threats by extreme right elements in the Knesset to transfer the Palestinians en masse to Jordan, the arrival in 
Israel of significant numbers of Soviet Jews with the inherent possibility of thefr being settled in the occupied 
territories, all these factors combined to be viewed by politicians on both sides of the Israeli-Palestinian 
divide as a harbinger of more committed means in order to achieve national goals. Israeli-Palestinian 
relations were in stalemate during the summer of 1990, as the Palestinian leadership reviewed their options, 
when into the equation stepped Saddam Hussein. The serious situation regarding the deterioration in Israeli- 
Palestinian relations was merely exacerbated by the thieats of war* coming fi om Iraq at the stait of the 
summer. For example, at the Baghdad Arab Summit of May 28-30, 1990, Saddam Hussein denounced the 
economic threats which he believed were directed at Iraq by Kuwait and called on aU the Arab countries to 
take the military option against Israel in order to liberate holy Al-Quds in the name of Allah. As Hussein was 
not known for his religious observance, having cynically manipulated the appeal of a call to jiliad in order to 
deflect hostility towards him, the Palestinian leadership, especially the secular PLO leadership based in Tunis, 
were caught in a catch-22 position. There emerged an explosive situation in the occupied territories where 
ordinary Palestinians were fully behind Hussein's call to the green colour s, totally uncaring in what would 
happen to themselves if Saddam did make good his promise to send Iris missiles in the dir ection of 
Jerusalem.^^ The PLO leadership in particular, fighting for supremacy over the United Command Leadership 
since the beginning of the intifada were now faced with the desperate policy of either; having to commit to 
Iraq's fortunes and risk the opprobrium of the international community especially the Western powers, or 
conversely remain neutral, or support Kuwait and risk the opprobrium of the Palestinian masses. On August 
10, 1990 eight days after Iraq had invaded Kuwait, an Extraordinary Arab Summit was held in Cairo. Yasser 
Arafat put forward a plan to settle the dispute peacefiiUy by creating a Good Offices Committee, which 
would comprise five Arab heads of state to ensur e Iraq's withdrawal fr om Kuwait and that the issues that had 
heightened tensions between the two could be solved by peaceful means. The plan failed because of the 
opposition of the majority of Arab states. The Palestinians were demanded to take an unequivocal stance by 
the anti-Iraq regimes, as the Palestinian desfre to put their faith in a mediated compromise displeased both 
sides. The PLO rejected the Iraqi demand to form a Palestinian militia in Kuwait, to open a second front
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against Israel in southern Lebanon and to organise terrorist attacks around the world. However, the PLO 
reftisal to join the anti-Iraq coalition ensured that the PLO was consequently deemed hostile. In Egypt in 
particular*, ordinary Egyptians were in a war-like mood, in the sense that many of them felt the need to deal 
with Iraqi aggression against a fellow Ar ab state, yet were very conscious of the many millions of Egyptians 
who had been in Iraq since the early days of the Iran-Iraq War helping in the Iraqi war effort and who, albeit 
in lesser numbers by 1990, continued to be in Iraq.^  ^ The Egyptian press spoke of the need for an all-Arab 
resolution to tlris problem, however the call for external aid divided many ordinary populations from their 
leaders.^* In the midst of tlris war'-fever, Ar*afat decided that the PLO would abstairr from supporting the 
involvement of foreign forces in the resolution of the Iraq-Kuwait problem. Unfortunately for Arafat, whilst 
however logical for a politician to play to his peoples' overwhelming desire, the PLO stance was 
overwhelmingly construed by the other Arab states as PLO approval of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and 
therefore by implication mdicative that the PLO would approve of fur ther moves by Iraq, wlrich in the 
inrmediate hysteria following Kuwait's invasion many took to be the invasion of Saudi Arabia .The 
Palestinian response was entirely understandable in light of the years of occupation under which they suffered 
however the Palestinian refusal to join or support the anti-Iraq coalition caused a major rift between the PLO 
and the coalition members, many of whom had been major financial contributors to the PLO.^  ^ In the wake 
of Iraq's defeat in Kuwait, the PLO faced a great deal of hostility in the region, especially from the various 
governments who had stood to lose the most from an Iraqi victory, namely Kuwait itself, Turkey, Saudi 
Arabia and Syria. Such hostility proved to undermine efforts to seek a solution to the Palestinian problem, in 
the sense that previous sponsors of the Palestinians now no longer were quite so well disposed to the 
Palestinian cause. The PLO were roundly accused of taking the Iraqi side, indeed the Western response was 
encapsulated in the annual global economic and strategic report of the French Institute of International 
Relations thus, 'The PLO leadership, by choosing to side with Iraq - the Arab power which was going to 
revive the military option vis-a-vis Israel - thus suggested that it renounced its peace strategy. The PLO's 
resultant loss of credibility in Western eyes and in those of a number of Arab countries is a serious setback 
which the Palestinian authorities are anxious to put right, as a priority, so that they can recover their previous 
international diplomatic position.'^  ^ Re-ingratiating themselves into the international diplomatic mainstream 
proved to be an overriding concern for the PLO leadership following the second Gulf Wai*. This would be 
achieved by agreeing to attend the Madrid conference. Agreeing to the American terms was the price to be 
paid for acceptance back into the fold, refiisal would have meant being locked out of subsequent 
negotiations. The Palestinian leadership was well aware that compromise agreements may well have been 
worked out by Israel and her neighbouis without due regard for Palestinian aspfrations.
US President Bush feeling the new circumstances in the Middle East, in terms of the realignment of 
the balance of power in the region which enabled the US administration to press ahead with a new diplomatic 
process, sought resolution of outstanding regional problems in the wake of the new realities in the Middle 
East.^  ^ President Bush sought what some commentators have described as a pax universalis, but in reality 
was more the imposition of a pax americana.^  ^ President Bush outlined his new ideas in what he termed in 
somewhat rather grand terms as the 'new world order'. In an address to the US Congress on March 6, 1991, 
President Bush declared a Middle East peace initiative in which he stated that, 'The time has come to ptit an
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end to the Arab-Israeli conflict ...A comprehensive peace must be grounded in UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for peace ...elaborated to provide for Israel's security 
and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights.'*^ '^  Entrusting his Secretary of 
State to work for the implementation of the US initiative in order to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian / Ai ab- 
Israeli conflict. Baker toured the Middle East from March 8,1991. On March 12, Baker met ten Palestinian 
leaders, authorised by the PLO, at the US Consul-General's office in Jerusalem, the first official meeting 
between a US Secretary of State and a Palestinian delegation.
Baker embarked on his second tour on April 8, secur ing Israeli agreement to the convening of a 
regional conference, however Shamir attached a number of conditions and guarantees. IDF Radio reported 
that Shamir presented for approval to his cabinet on April 11, a series of nine points agreed upon by Shamir 
and Baker. These were: (1) the two countries accepted the principle of a regional conference, under the 
auspices of the US and the USSR, leading to dir ect negotiations between Israel and the Ar ab states; (2) the 
two countries accepted that the final aim of the peace process could not be the creation of a Palestinian state; 
(3) the composition of the delegation of Palestinian personalities from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
should be determined in agreement with Israel; (4) the US did not demand the presence in this delegation of 
Palestinians fr om East Jerusalem or of Palestinians previously expelled by Israel; (5) Israel refuses any 
dialogue with the PLO and the US would not resume its dialogue with it; (6) the two countries agreed that 
there was no single interpretation of UN security Council Resolution 242, with the US recognising Israel's 
right to have its own interpretation; (7) UN SCR 242 would be the subject of negotiations between Israel and 
its Arab counterpaits in the final phase of the process; (8) the fir st phase of negotiations would deal with the 
status of self-government in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and, at the end of three years of such a 
regime, negotiations should begin on the final status of these two regions; and (9) the USSR should re­
establish diplomatic relations with Israel and accept the principles of the peace process in order to be a party 
to the regional conference.^^
These preconditions for the holding of a regional conference which the US apparently accepted are 
strikingly similar to the terms Israel outlined to US Secretary of State Kissinger in 1975 in return for its 
withdrawal from Sinai. On April 14, Arafat rejected the convening of a regional conference on the basis that 
such a conference would reflect the new balance of power in the region, which he perceived to be in Israel's 
favour, and that such a formula was driven to the attainment of rapprochement between Israel and her Arab 
counterpoints and not between Israel and the PLO. Arafat re-stipulated the PLO's desire for an mternational 
conference, to no avail. During Baker's fifth trip to the region, between July 18-22, President Mubarak 
proposed a lifting of the Arab economic boycott of Israel in exchange for a fr eeze on Israeli settlements in 
the occupied territories, a proposal already made by the G-7 at their London summit. On July 31, a joint 
communiqué approved of by Presidents Bush and Gobachev at the US-USSR summit, declared that, 
'President Bush and President Gorbachev reaffirm their commitment to promote peace and genuine 
reconciliation among the Aiab states, Israel and the Palestinians. They believe there is an historic 
opportunity now to launch a process that can lead to a just and enduring peace and to a comprehensive 
settlement in the Middle East. They share the strong conviction that this historic opportunity must not be 
lost.'“
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Baker began his sixth tour of the Middle East on August 1, and found the Israelis amenable to the 
US-USSR communiqué, whilst the Palestinians, afraid of being seen to spurn the US initiative, agreed in 
principle but couched their reply incorporating many reservations, seeking further conditions and guarantees. 
Particulai's regai’ding the modalities of the conference, in the form of'letters of assurance' were delivered to 
the parties concerned during Baker's seventh tour of the region between September 16-20. These letters 
pledged the US to agreements with each of the various parties which did not however contradict individual 
promises. In order to not endanger the whole process from continumg, these commitments and guarantees 
had to be sufficiently vague, thus avoiding the confusion and conflict which would undoubtedly arise firom 
contradictory positions and promises.
In the letter of assurance to Israel, Baker promised Israel that the US did not wish to see the creation 
of a Palestinian state, however the US stated that it did not consent to: Israeli occupation in the Golan and in 
the occupied territories; Israeli division of Jerusalem; and that UN Security Council Resolution 242 was open 
to interpretation. The US letter of assurance to the Palestinians contained a reinforcement of President 
Bush's speech of March 6, 1991 and of the Baker Plan proposing a limited interim self-government along the 
lines of that envisaged in the Camp David Accords, yet what was omitted was of more importance to the 
Palestinians, for example, the letter did not contain a US commitment to Palestinian self-determination nor 
did it include references to Israeli settlements. The letter did however consent to the Palestinians right to 
choose their own delegates and to their right to raise any matter of interest for discussion. The US letters to 
the Syrians and the Jordanians merely included a restatement of the US policy positions regar ding these two 
countries, namely for Syria that the US did not recognise the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981, 
and for Jordan that the conference would be convened on the basis of UN SCRs 242 (1967) and 338 (1973).
2.4 The Bilateral Negotiating Rounds of the Madrid Peace Talks
US President Bush in welcoming the delegations to the Madrid conference attempted to inspire 
confidence in all parties vfith the US administration’s good intentions, good offices and balanced approach to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. He thus specified his parameters for the forthcoming negotiations, 'We believe 
territorial compromise is essential for peace ...what we envision is a process of dfrect negotiations proceeding 
along two tracks: one between Israel and the Ar ab states, the other between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.' Concerning 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. President Bush continued that these negotiations would be conducted over 
several phases and that autonomy discussions would be based on the Camp David Accords. These talks 
would initially cover interim self-government, so that 'Once agreed, interim self-government arrangements 
will last for five years; beginning the third year, negotiations will commence on permanent status.'^  ^ President 
Bush indicated that, whilst he did not know where the negotiations would lead, he hoped that the end result 
would entail the development of a situation whereby Israel and its security concerns were recognised and that 
the Palestinians would exercise control over then futur e. Whilst the bilateral negotiations were of high 
political importance, the Madrid conference also included the important multilateral issues which were of 
common regional interest, like arms control, refiigees, water and economic development.
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The first five rounds of the Washington talks were held while the Likud was still in power in Israel. 
Tins meant that the talks dealt almost exclusively with procedural issues as Israel rejected any talk of 
territorial compromise, only willing to discuss a limited autonomy plan for the Palestinians. PM Shamir 
would not accept explicitly either the resolution (242) or the principle of land for peace as a basis for 
negotiation even though the letter of invitation stated that the negotiations would proceed on the basis of UN 
242 incorporating the principle of trading land for peace. Observers believed that this was merely an opening 
gambit m a protracted bargaining process wliich would produce concessions once the substantive 
negotiations got under way. The reality however, was that Shamii* would 'not baigain about the land of 
Israel or about any interim agreement that would involve the least risk of losing control over the occupied 
territories.'^*
Although the nature of the talks improved in 1992 with the advent of the Labour government in 
Jerusalem, the only material change in the Israeli negotiating teams was the replacement of head of the team 
negotiating with Syria, Yossi Ben-Aharon with Prof. Ittamar Rabinowitz. The new government's policy was 
to agree in principle to the territorial compromise formula. The new Israeli goal was to reach interim 
agreements with the Syrians (involving a phased withdrawal fiom the Golan Heights annexed by Israel on 
December 14, 1981) and the Palestinians (involving interim self-governing airangements). The problem with 
Lebanon was that as far as the Israelis were concerned, it did not have a government capable of ensuring 
security along Israel's northern border in return for an Israeli withdrawal fiom southern Lebanon, because the 
Lebanese government was seen to be too dependent on Syr ia for its decision-making. As far as Jordan was 
concerned, King Hussein didn't want to reach an agreement with Israel before the others as Jordan was still 
very much feeling the pain of repercussions after having been seen to ally itself too closely with Iraq during 
the Gulf War of 1991.
Thus the framework for peace negotiations between Israel and the Ar ab states, under the auspices of 
the US and the USSR, took shape, with two negotiating tracks being established: a bilateral one with the 
participation of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel; and a multilateral one with the 
participation of Middle Eastern states and extraregional actors. However, after the ceremonial part of the 
conference, the talks quickly became embroiled in a public impasse, chaiacterised by ftitüe wiangling over 
procedural matters of dubious substance. The negotiating process merely mirrored external events which 
overshadowed and undermined the possibility of progress in the process itself.
2.5 Neither Washington nor Moscow, but International Facilitation
In April 1992, Teije Larsen fr om the Oslo-based Institute for Applied Social Sciences (FAFO) met 
Yossi Beilin MK to discuss a FAFO economic study on Palestinian living conditions in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. In discussion the two agreed that the Madrid process had stalemated, and that for meaningful 
progress to be achieved, direct talks between Israel and the PLO was the only realistic way forward. Larsen 
suggested talking with Faisal Husseini. However, unknown to Larsen, Yair Hfrsclifeld of Haifa University 
and Beilin had been meeting Husseini since 1989. Hirschfeld met Husseini at least once a week, Beilm met 
him every few montlis and Shimon Peres met Husseini 8-10 times.^  ^ Although having discussed the idea of 
backchannel contacts with the PLO following a Labour victory in the elections, designed to circumvent the
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Israeli ban on contacts with PLO officials and to provide a forum for discussing problems arising from the 
Israeli-Jordanian/Palestinian bilateral talks, the Norwegian backchannel was only officially mooted with 
Deputy Foreign Minister Egelund's offer of Norway's good offices on September 9, 1992 duiing an official 
visit to Israel/'^ Egeland's doctoral dissertation had focused on Norway's potential role as an intermediary in 
the resolution of bilateral disputes. Although the Norwegians tried to schedule substantive meetings either in 
Jerusalem or Oslo, none materialised. Beilin feared conducting backchannel negotiations as opposed to 
private conversations and thus court controversy, as Rabin had vetoed Peres having private meetings with 
Husseini.
For the Norwegians who 'did not have major interests in the region' and 'lacked the incentives and 
disincentives that superpowers traditionally use to change the equation of a negotiation' they offered 'a more 
modest role as facilitators rather than mediators'^^ and in the process 'invoked the experience of the European 
Community in transforming political relations by institutionalising shared economic endeavoui'.^^ The PLO 
saw in the Norwegians an opportunity for mediation on the Swedish model of the 1980s, when Swedish 
Foreign Minister (FM) Andersson had been instrumental m persuading the Palestine National Council (PNC) 
to declare its support for a two-state solution m 1988, and had initiated a dialogue between American Jewish 
peace activists and Arafat in Stockliolm. Alimad Quiai, in January 1992, and Bassam Abu Sharif, in April 
1993, informally requested Norwegian involvement on the Swedish precedent.^"  ^ However the Norwegians 
were not alone in attempting tliird-party mediation and establishing plausibly deniable conduits between the 
Israelis and PLO. For example, over four rounds, a period of 9 months, and under the guise of an academic 
conference hosted by the American Academy of Ai ts and Sciences, unofficial meetings in London and Rome 
on the security aspects of peace were being conducted between former PLO and Israeli security officials. 
Participants included: Nizar Amar, ex- Force 17; Ahmed Khalidi and Yazid Sayegh - academics; Shlomo 
Gazit, ex-head of Israeli military intelligence; Joseph Alpher and Aryeh Shalev of the Jaffee Centre for 
Strategic Studies; and Ha'aretz's Ze'ev Schiff. The meetings' purpose was to familiai'ise the two sides with 
each other's security thinking, to distribute the findings to 'thirty top members of the security and political 
establishment', and 'to engage the leadership of both sides to begin thinking about and planning security 
arrangements and security arrangements within the framework of an interim settlement.'’  ^ Such informal 
dialogues, contacts and conduits were maintained in order to solicit and elicit information in valions contexts, 
to gauge and probe each others views and positions to be used at later dates in other fora. Through such 
contacts the PLO was able to establish not only its bona fides as a negotiating partner which could be trusted 
but also in underlining its determination that the PLO could not be dismissed from an active and central role 
in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However the essence of creating backchannels was, for those who 
believed in them, that they would be useful in either aiding or circumventing the official bilateral negotiations. 
Neither the Norwegians nor Beilin, although credited with establishing the Oslo channel, were in fact its 
initiators. Hanan Aslirawi urged Hirschfeld to meet Qui'ai on December 4 1992, in London, where he was 
coordinating Palestinian participation in the multilateral steering committees. Hirsclifeld agreed and asked 
Larsen who happened to be in London to organise the meeting. At the meeting in the Cavendish Hotel, 
Hirschfeld suggested holding quiet talks in Norway. Hirshfeld then consulted Beilin, who consented to 
further talks in Norway. In a subsequent meeting at the Ritz Hotel, Hirshfeld and Quiai agreed to meet in
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Norway.’  ^ On the strength of these meetings, Beilin consulted US officials on their views of Israel-PLO 
talks. Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs Edward Djerejian and his deputy, Daniel Kurtzer, 
believed talks to be premature, feeling uneasy about getting involved in something they felt was not 
sanctioned by Rabin. Hirsclifeld informed Kmtzer on December 5, that he had met Qurai agreeing to hold 
talks in Norway.”  Egeland informed Kurtzer in November 1992, but Kurtzer said the US would not oppose 
Oslo as long as it did not involve the PLO directly.’* However, Beilin saw potential in the FAFO-disguised 
talks: participation by private Israeli citizens in an academic context would circumvent the Israeli ban on 
contacts with the PLO; academic talks could reconnoitre PLO positions without obligation or commitment; 
by conducting talks under FAFO auspices and fimding, the Israeli government avoided official sanction 
maintaining ffill official and credible deniability.
The initiation of Israeli contacts with the PLO seems to have been driven by Beilin, in spite of the law 
forbidding such contacts, Beilin’s Mashov faction organised in 1991, for the adoption of a party commitment 
to repeal the Knesset ban on private contacts with the PLO. Peres, as then party leader overrode opposition 
from Rabin and others, and ensured that the resolution was included in the party platform. After the 1992 
elections, Peres acting on Beilin’s request, called on Rabin to implement the party resolution. Rabin waited 
for the result of the US election before acting, worried about the return of a Bush administration willing to 
reopen a US-PLO dialogue. On December 1, 1992 the Knesset gave preliminary approval to lift the ban. The 
Norwegians, asked by Hirsclifeld, organised the first Oslo session for January 20,1993, the law being 
repealed the day before. Interestingly, Rabm did not attend the vote, and despite the outcome pledged there 
would be no government-PLO contacts, which may be perceived as an indication that Rabin had no strategic 
policy to initiate negotiations with the PLO. Despite the bill's passage Rabm pledged there would be no 
govermnental contacts.’^
2.5,1 Pre-Negotiations
There were five rounds of secret, exploratory 'pre-negotiations' held under the guise of an academic 
conference at Borregard estate in Sarpsborg; on January 20-22, February 11-12, March 20-21, April 30-May 
1 and May 8-9. Hirschfeld and Ron Pmidik represented the Israelis, Qurai, Malier al-Kurd, and Hassan 
Asfour represented the Palestinians. If Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin was considered the Israeli patron, 
then the Palestinian paiticipants considered Mahmoud Abbas theii* Palestinian patron. The respective parties 
were tasked initially with exploring each other's positions, their seriousness and possibly identifying areas of 
compromise, agreement and flexibility which could be used in the bilateral talks. Any such proposals were 
intended to be introduced into the bilateral talks as US-inspired.
At the outset, because Beüin believed Rabin was not willing to countenance dfrect Israel-PLO 
negotiations, the two Israelis were thus not to engage in negotiations, they were to identify common ground, 
determine sensitive issues and work out 'the mobiles and immobiles of negotiations'.*^ The Oslo ground rules 
were: total secrecy; no dwelling on the past; retractibility of all positions; and the Norwegians would fill the 
role of facilitator not mediator. The uniqueness of the Oslo talks was that the Norwegian facilitation differed 
from the US mediation which continued simultaneously in the bilateral talks. The Norwegians were able to 
foster an harmonious atmosphere, trusted by both sides to be impartial, unbiased and discrete which ensured 
the talks continued even when there were serious disagreements. Laisen and liis wife, Mona Juul together
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formed a formidable backchannel facilitation team. Larsen kept in daily contact with Jerusalem and Tunis 
between sessions, and Juul served as the Norwegian government's liaison, informing officials in Oslo of 
progress or requesting official intervention to provide pressure when necessary.
The first round of talks resulted in the Saipsborg document, an agreement on three main points:
Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; scaled economic devolution based on proven cooperation, leading to economic 
institution-building; and, an international economic assistance plan for the Palestinian entity m Gaza.**
2.5.2 Referral to Higher Authorities
Wliilst Beilin received regular* briefings and detailed minutes of the Oslo talks, Beilin needed the 
sponsorship of a senior party figure with the stature and desire to promote and foster the continuation of the 
Oslo backchannel. Beilin went to Peres, the Foreign Minister, who agreed to approach Rabin. Peres 
persuaded Rabin in early February to continue the backchannel without obligations, Pai*t of the reluctance to 
continue Oslo, for Rabin, was that Qurai was relatively unknown, therefore Rabin was doubtful of liis 
authority and connections.*^ Peres as Foreign Minister, had been sidelined by Rabin from being a central 
figure witliin the Israeli peace policymaking structure and saw in the Oslo talks an opportunity to become 
involved in the policymaking process. Rabin had appointed himself Defence Minister giving himself key 
institutional authority over the occupied territories and excluded Peres fiom the 'bilateral negotiations that 
were the centrepiece of the peace process, as well as much of US-Israel relations' relegating Peres 'to the 
multilateral talks on regional issues'. Rabin disagreed with Peres on 'tactics and the strategic principles 
underpinning Israel's negotiating positions', therefore Rabin determined that Peres would not influence, 
interfere or have competence in the negotiations process.*^
For the Palestinians, who reported to Abbas, their desire was to find out who their Israeli 
counterparts reported to. They suspected Beilin, who in turn was close to Peres. This suspicion was 
tempered by the well knovm animosity between the two senior Laboui* party figui'es.
Peres returned to the policymaking and decision making fold due to Rabin's miscalculation over the 
deportation of 415 alleged Islamic militants in December 1992, not on the strength of the Oslo case. Rabin 
needed Peres's political support through a difficult time. Rabin had calculated that mollifying Israeli public 
opinion at the same time as bolstering moderate Palestinian elements within the occupied territories would 
'allow Palestinian negotiators in Washington to be more flexible'.*'* Rabm dismissed war nings of an Arab 
negotiations boycott from Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) chief, Maj.-Gen. D. Rothschild, and Elyakmi 
Rubinstein, chief negotiator with the Jordanians/Palestinians. Peres, in Japan in December, later said that the 
deportations would never have happened if he had been in Israel.*  ^ Despite the PLO's rivalry with the 
Islamists, the PLO was compelled to support the deportees and boycotted the Washington talks. The 
interesting aspect of the boycott, was that the Palestinians showed they had the clout to ensure a total Arab 
boycott lasting until April 1993. Rabin told a cabinet meeting in early January, that the Syrians would not 
boycott. Syr ian FM al-Shar'a had called on the Palestinians to boycott the multüaterals instead. However, the 
Syrians respected the boycott rather than isolate the Palestinians.
Rabin reversed his earlier refusal and sanctioned Peres to meet Husseini. Although no agreement 
could be reached over four* secret meetings, Husseini reported to Tunis the presence of Hirschfeld and 
Pundik with Peres, thus establishing their bona fides as regards Oslo. Increasing violence in the occupied
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territories led Peres to appeal to Rabin on February 9, 1993 to conduct direct Israel-PLO negotiations, 
stating that 'as long as Arafat remained in Tunis ...he represented the 'outsiders', the Palestinian Diaspora, and 
would do his best to slow down the peace talks. I suggested that we propose to Arafat and his staff that they 
move to Gaza. Once there, they would have the right to vote and to stand in elections; and if elected, they 
would represent the Palestinians directly in the negotiations with Israel. My criticism of the Washington talks 
was that we were trying to reach a declaration of principles without any reference to specific territorial 
issues.'*  ^ Whilst Rabin rebuffed Peres's appeal he did however sanction the continuation of the Oslo 
backchannel, thus allowing Peres a foothold in the policymaking process. Peres thus embaiked on his own 
schedule, indulging in subterfuge and insubordination in efforts to circumvent Rabin. Rabin requested Peres 
delay recommencing the Oslo talks by several weeks because of an imminent visit to Israel by Secretary 
Christopher. Peres instead approved their immediate resumption. Peres believed if East Jerusalemite Faisal 
Husseini joined the Palestinian delegation in Washington it would break the boycott - it would privately 
indicate Peres's power to the Palestinians in Tunis and would publicly signal a shift in the Israeli attitude 
towards the inclusion of such a high-profile PLO figure fiom the occupied territories. Therefore Peres 
manoeuvred Rabin into adopting his negotiating strategy by raising the idea with Christopher in Washington 
on Februaiy 16. Peres suggested that Rabin would more likely accept Hussemi's participation if the US 
proposed the idea. During Rabin's first trip to the US in early March, Rabin assented to the US proposal to 
include Husseini in the talks.
The referral of information regarding the Oslo meetings to the US brought limited responses. Kurtzer 
told the Norwegians that Arafat was uni eliable and that the Oslo talks were of little value without Rabin's 
approval, Rabin had stated that US envoys should conduct peace process business only with him. Kurtzer 
impressed upon the Norwegians that whilst he did not mind some intrusion by Israeli academics, he did mind 
a foreign government intruding on the US-led peace process.*’ Norwegian FM Stoltenberg briefed 
Christopher on Oslo at NATO talks in Brussels in February 1993, saying that Oslo was not competing with 
the Washington track but was supplementary, aimed at resolving deadlocked issues. Receiving no further US 
response, Egeland and Juul contacted Kurtzer again, going to the US embassy in Oslo to speak to him on a 
secure phone several times. The Norwegians sent Kurtzer a draft declaration of principles at the end of 
March.** New Norwegian FM Holst informed CMstopher at the end of May that Israel had upgraded the 
talks to the official level. Beilin asked Holst only to tell Christopher that the talks had been upgraded, but not 
to provide names or indicate the seniority of the officials involved. In early July, prior to the arrival in Israel 
of US Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, Peres told US chargé d'affaires Brown that Israel was 
going to reach a deal with the PLO.
In US-Palestinian talks with Christopher in East Jerusalem during early August 1993, the 'Palestinian 
delegates to the Washington talks took the unusual step of rejecting US-proposed 'bridging' language for a 
declaration of principles within minutes of receiving it. During a meeting of State Department officials in the 
US consulate in East Jerusalem following the disappointing session with the Palestinians, Kuitzer opined to 
his colleagues that the Oslo channel must be delivering substantive progress because Arafat would have 
never instructed his delegates to dismiss a US draft without offering an alternative. Although the Palestinians 
subsequently gave CMstopher a counter-proposal originating in Tunis and vaguely mentioning Gaza and
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Jericho, the US peace team apparently did not realise its significance and went ahead with a scheduled 
vacation.'*^ Even as late as the end of August, Christopher paid only a courtesy call to the Foreign Ministiy 
while visiting Rabin. Former Secretary Baker said that 'The [Clinton] administration just did not take 
Shimon [Peres] seriously during Oslo'.^° The Clinton administration believed Rabin to be the principal 
decision maker on the peace process, even though Rabin had not consulted with or informed US officials of 
several unilateral security actions or foreign policy decisions, like the deportations, the closure of the 
occupied tenitories, and 'Operation Accountability'. US officials therefore dismissed the Oslo backchannel as 
a Peres vision.
To be fair to the Americans, they heard of a number of secret contacts, such as the AAAS meetings, 
those of Ephraim Sneh MK and the PLO's Nabil Shaath in Washington, and at several international symposia. 
As Holst visited the US, State Department Policy Planning cliief and former Ambassador to Israel, Samuel 
Lewis 'coincidentally convened a gathering of top US policymakers and former senior officials on May 27, 
1993, to discuss the impasse in the Washington negotiations.' Edward Djerejian, the leading US policymaker 
in charge of the Middle East peace process, recalled the scene, '1 said, 'Given the Norwegian Foreign Ministry 
channel and the two to thi ee other channels that we are aware of with the PLO, wouldn't it be konic if the 
talks in Wasliington were a facade and Israel and the PLO ar e dealing [dir ectly] with one another?' There was 
nervous laughter in the room.'^* The US had organised and founded the Madrid peace process, thus believing 
themselves to be indispensable to it. One participant was led to remark that 'When you invent the wheel, you 
believe nobody else can have a car.'^  ^Thus, despite American officials receiving regular briefings and 
information regarding Oslo, they refused to believe that progress would result from Oslo.
2.5.3 Drafting an Initial Declaration of Principles
In order that each side could understand the thinking of the other without setting precedents and 
produce an outcome from the Oslo channel to whet the appetite of thek patrons, Saipsborg III, a six-page 
document, was dmfted at the 2nd round of Oslo, on Februar y 11-12, and concluded at the 3rd round on 
March 20-21. The document contained 15 articles, with annexes on: the status of Jerusalem and Palestinian 
elections (it was agreed that Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem could both vote and stand as candidates 
in elections for a council to administer self-rule). Annex II outlined the establishment of Palestinian economic 
institutions and economic development, and Annex III asked for aid fiom the G7 and the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development to fimd kffiastructure and other regional projects and regional 
economic development. Tins accord served as the basis for the final version of the Oslo agreement. Included 
ki this document were a number of exceptions firom existing Israeli policies, namely:
(1) a complete but graduated Israeli withdrawal fi om Gaza within two yeai s under the auspices of an interim 
UN trusteeship, essentially consenting to the eventuality of Palestinian sovereignty. After the initial phase an 
undefined 'trusteeship' would be established to govern the territory. This provoked a furious response fi*om 
Israeli policymakers, particularly FM Peres, who feared it would serve as a precedent for UN involvement in 
Israeli administration of the occupied territories. The Palestinians agreed to forget the idea, fearing that 
adherence would slow an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza^ ;^
(2) an explicit undertakkig to negotiate a settlement on Jerusalem, which was a crucial departure from 
existing Israeli policy and practice. Nabil Shaath said on September 9, 1993, that until the Sarpsborg
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document, Israel had 'never accepted that the final status of Jerusalem be on the agenda of the permanent 
status negotiations. At best they were willing to accept the fact that it is a question to be raised-not an issue 
to be settled by negotiations. In a way, this calls into question the legality and finality of their annexation. 
They are admitting that their annexation is not final, that it still needs to be negotiated.' '^* The Labour 
position before Oslo was that Palestinians in Jerusalem could vote in the elections at polling stations outside 
the city, but could not stand for election as that implied a Palestinian jurisdiction in the city. Sarpsborg III 
allowed Palestinians to vote at polling stations within Jerusalem (Muslims at al-Aqsa Mosque, Christians at 
the Chui'ch of the Holy Sepulchre). Hirshfeld and Pundik believed that having polling booths at religious sites 
would set elections in the context of Palestinian religious rather than political rights to the city^ ;^
(3) an undertaking to negotiate on Israeli settlements, Palestinian sovereignty, and borders, within the aegis 
of final status negotiations on the occupied territories, however sovereignty and borders were removed fi*om 
later drafts;
(4) there was no delineation of powers of Palestinian jurisdiction, or constraints upon it in the West Bank 
including East Jerusalem, implying jurisdiction would be comprehensive and inclusive. Whilst the Palestinians 
wanted the city to be their administrative headquarters, to ensure its eventual status as a Palestinian capital, 
the document left the issue of Palestinian jurisdiction in Jerusalem vague. Self-rule would be administered by 
existing Palestinian institutions, a cryptic reference to Orient House, the headquarters for Palestinian political 
activity since the 1991 Madrid peace conference. This issue would remain the last major sticking point in the 
Oslo negotiations;
(5) departing fiom Camp David, the timetable for an interim period would be altered to commence final 
status negotiations as soon as the DoP was concluded rather than having final status talks conditional on 
elections to a self-rule authority, as opposed to having elections take place within three months, so that by 
this flexibility, it was hoped to determine final status issues, or at least minimise the risk to such, before the 
Israeli elections of 1996, in case a Likud-led coalition was elected; and,
(6) a willingness to be bound by arbitration for unresolvable disputes when negotiation and mediation had 
failed, which represented an extraordinary departure fi’om accepted policy implying that Israel would be 
bound to decisions which could cede Israeli territory and/or Israeli sovereignty, for example Article 15 
proposed an aibitration panel of Israel, the Palestinians, Russia and the US.
Israeli criticism of Sarpsborg III centres around the fact that what was included was significantly at 
odds with existing Israeli policy which meant that official Israeli negotiators had to make concessions when 
the talks were upgraded in order to withdraw fiom positions put forward by this document. Although both 
sides had agreed to the retractibility of positions, once the process was deemed worthy by its senior patrons, 
a momentum evolved which proved difficult to negate. The reason for this state of affairs lay with the 
vacuum at the top of Israeli policymaking and the infighting between the two most senior Israeli politicians. 
Political infighting allowed the original negotiators a broad latitude because being identified with Peres meant 
that few took the backchannel seriously enough to consider that it may prove successfiil. Rabin had no 
discernible strategic policy for dealing with the PLO other than in terms of security, his acceptance of the 
Oslo backchannel and its subsequent incorporation into mainstream policy highlight that despite election
87
promises to pursue peace, there exists little concrete evidence of a separate, positive and identifiably Rabin- 
inspired political policy process vis-a-vis the PLO.
2.5.4 Gaza, What Am I Bid?
A central tenet for Beilin and Peres was that they wanted to relinquish control over, and responsibility 
for, Gaza. By doing so, they not only hoped to unburden themselves from a repressive occupation but also 
entice the PLO into negotiations without having to compromise over the more politically sensitive and 
volatile issue of the friture status of the West Bank. The driving force behind the notion for 'Gaza First', for 
the Israelis seems to be, political expediency. Whilst a harsh judgement in retrospect, particulaiiy as this new 
proposal included transferring territorial and ftinctional authorities to the local Palestinians, this was the 
inference the PLO took, fearing 'Gaza First' to be 'Gaza Only' or 'Gaza Last', or 'Gaza without the PLO'. The 
PLO had previously rejected a Gaza scenario, its existence as a seething slum also being politically expedient, 
thus Rabin concluded that the PLO would not be interested in Gaza, therefore believing the Oslo channel to 
have little to offer. Peres's conclusions concurred. However acting without Rabin's explicit approval, his 
proposal of'Gaza Plus' to 'sweeten the deal', incorporated the idea of ceding Jenin or Jericho to the PLO as a 
'downpayment' on future Israeli intentions regaiding the West Bank.^  ^ Peres hoped Rabin would agree to 
Jericho on the basis that withdrawal fr om Jericho had been part of Laboui* pai ty planning (Jericho Plan) since 
the Allon Plan of 1968.”  The PLO rejected this proposal in November 1992, partly because they suspected 
an Israeli divide-and-rule tactic to separate the insiders from the outsiders, but more significantly, because 
Arafat refused to agree to a solution which did not see him with actual, personal, tangible control and 
authority. This was confirmed by Israelis at the thiid AAAS meeting, on Maich 26-27, 1993, in Rome.
There Nizar Amar told Israelis that Arafat wanted to administer self-government personally. During the last 
AAAS session, June 17-19 in Rome, Amar told the Israelis that theii* focus on security would be meaningless 
if Arafat were not included in the deal.^*
Without Rabin's knowledge or approval, Peres approached Egyptian Ambassador to Israel, 
Mohammed Bassiouny offering territorial jurisdiction to Arafat and the PLO over Gaza and Jericho. 
Bassiouny reported to President Mubarak, who approached Arafat. Arafat informed Mubarak on April 12th 
that he would accept Peres' proposal thus reversing his earlier rejection of the 'Gaza Plus' proposal, because 
this revised proposal accepted Ms return to Gaza and implied Israeli recognition of the PLO. Two days later 
at the Rabin-Mubarak summit at Ismailiya, 'Mubarak adviser Osama el-Baz showed a surprised Rabin the 
document indicating Arafat's readiness to assume control of Gaza as pail of a package deal that would 
include Jericho and control of key arteries.' Rabin claimed tMs was the fii'st time he had heard of the 'Gaza- 
Jericho' idea.^  ^ Peres claimed he informed Rabin of the idea of ceding Jericho (minus the bridges) to the 
PLO, however, Rabin had no idea that Peres had contacted the Egyptians or the PLO.***° Rabin was 
reportedly, 'intrigued', 'depressed' and so fririons that he 'jumped to Mgh heaven' by the PLO document.**** 
Rabin was intrigued by the PLO's commitment to control Gaza, but he was depressed at the security 
implications of PLO control over key bridges wMch was included in the Jericho proposals, Arafat proffered a 
map wMch outlined PLO control over the West Bank-Jordan bridges, the Rafah border crossing, and an 
'extra-territorial' road across the Negev linking Gaza with the West Bank. Rabin feared loss of Israeli control
over the flow of weapons and Palestinians into the territories, and he was furious at Peres's unilateral 
policymaking.
Peres spent months trying to convince Rabin of the need to reach a deal with the PLO. It was in 'late 
June or ear ly July,' having conflimed the bona fides of PLO's Oslo negotiators, that Rabin agreed, Rabin 
worried that Oslo did not ascertain the PLO's true position, which led him, uninformed of Peres's role, to test 
the PLO negotiators in Oslo to find out if they were acting under the full authority of the PLO leadersliip.***^  
Rabin determined that Jericho was to be excluded from the negotiations. However, Rabm finally agreed to 
include Jericho m mid-July when he became convinced that unless the PLO secured a presence in the West 
Bank then they would reject an accord. Rabin's acceptance of Jericho was conditional on the PLO's 
abandonment of their proposals for the bridges and the extra-territorial road between Gaza and Jericho.***^
2.5.5 From Washington to Oslo
Wliilst the bilateral talks in Washington resumed in April after the US brokered a series of deals over 
the deportees issue, for the Israelis, frustration with Washington centred on the fact that they began to realise 
the fiction of their hope that Faisal Husseini would assume the mantle of Palestinian spokesman for those in 
the occupied territories thus defying and excluding the PLO in Tunis and therefore splitting the Palestinian 
national movement. For progress on the bilateral fr ont between the Israelis and Palestinians, Ai'afat and the 
PLO was the only option, 'Rabin became convinced in April and May that we needed to talk to the PLO afl;er 
Faisal Husseini did not rise to the occasion and be the leader that people said he was ...His sitting out part of 
the round in Tunis symbolised the fact that the people in the territories were subordinate to Tunis.'***'* A turn 
to Oslo was a welcome relief to the stalemate in Washington, however Oslo only appeared more productive 
because of the stalemate in Washington. In Washington, the talks did not: put aside past injustices; agree to 
disagree; allow for new concessions; provide a wide negotiating latitude; or be insulated from events in the 
Middle East. According to an Israeli delegate in Washington, 'Many if not all of the Palestinian delegates had 
either been deported or jailed' by Israel. 'The PLO people sitting in Tunis did not have the trauma of someone 
such as Haider Abd al-Shafi, whom we deported in 1967. Every day he would bring up Jewish settlements 
and human rights. Those talks liardly moved.'***^  Arafat instructed the Palestinian delegation to sustain the 
Washington talks without moving them forward. Thus, progress was procedural rather than substantive. One 
Israeli delegate said progress was when 'the Palestinians agreed to hold a committee session with us, even 
though virtually no substantive changes were made.'***^  At Bk Zeit University ki Ramallah in June 1993, Saeb 
Erekat said that Palestinian strategy was to block progress m Washington ki order to prompt Rabin to deal 
dkectly with Arafat.***’ The dynamic of Oslo was what aided progress, it was evei-ything that Washkigton was 
not. The maki differences between Waslikigton and Oslo were: the Israeli position ki Washkigton was - no 
dkect negotiations or recognition of the PLO, self-rule was defined in fimctionalist terms as 'personal 
autonomy' including a quasi-territorial dimension which offered Palestinian authority within but not beyond 
municipal boundaries; at Oslo the Israelis offered, dkect PLO-Israel negotiations, recognition of the PLO, the 
retuin of Arafat and the outsiders to Gaza, real territorial as well as functional authority on a gradual scale. 
For Rabin, his electoral pledge of territorial compromise for peace would have to go beyond what was on 
offer ki Washington to include and encompass; defined territory, devolved authority, acceptance of the PLO 
and commitments to a common but separate future, or there would be no deal. In Maich 1993, militaiy
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intelligence chief Major General Uri Saguy reportedly told a closed session of the Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Organisations that attempts to promote an independent Palestinian authority 
witliin the territories had failed.**** More important, Rabin gave a similai* assessment to Chiistopher during a 
visit to Wasliington that same month. Rabin admitted that only Arafat could make a deal for the Palestinians 
because the Palestinians living in the territories were not willing to defy him. What the Palestinians were 
being offered in Washington was limited devolution, not sovereignty nor recognition of their right to self- 
determination, which they naturally dismissed. Where Oslo broke from Washington, was in the promise from 
the Israelis to the Palestinians, that territorial compromise meant a state was a real probability, in the 
intermediate as opposed to immediate friture.
However, before committing fully to Oslo, Rabin wished to survey his options, keep them open, and 
use Oslo as it had been originally intended, to supplement Washington. Washington remained officially an 
Israeli-Jordanian/Palestinian dialogue, excluding recognition and inclusion of the PLO. Before renouncing 
Washington for Oslo, Rabin wanted to ensure that no progress nor compromise was possible and also to test 
the bona fides of the Palestinians in Oslo. At the end of fourth roimd of talks April 30-May 3, the PLO 
agreed to exclude Jerusalem fr om interim self-rule and agreed to the vague Palestinian Jerusalemites 
'participation' in elections, as opposed to defining whether Palestinian Jerusalemites could be candidates and 
voters in elections for the interim self-rule authority. Rabin insisted that the continuation of Oslo was 
contingent upon; resumption of the Washington talks, Husseini's return to Washington as head of delegation, 
stopping posturing in the multilaterals, and the removal of Yusef Sayigh from one of the plenary meetings.***^  
Unaware of Oslo, strained relations between Arafat and liis Washington negotiators resulted in a challenge of 
Arafat's tactics with threats of resignation at a meeting in Tunis in August, but despite friction with Husseini 
and other Palestinian delegates, Arafat complied.****
By conceding to Rabin these points, the PLO were able to manoeuvie Rabin into pursuing Oslo more 
seriously. Wliilst the Palestinians conceded on Jerusalem in Oslo, Arafat instructed the Wasliington 
delegation to demand the inclusion of East Jerusalem as integral to an interim agreement. This 'diplomatic 
masterstroke' whereby Arafat pursued contradictory negotiating positions, 'achieved two objectives 
simultaneously', the Washington talks halted as the Israeli public feai*ed for the status of Jerusalem, which in 
turn further promoted the Oslo negotiations as an agreeable alternative.*** In retui'n for PLO compliance 
respecting Rabin's wariness, Arafat in turn demanded Israeli concessions regarding Oslo's status. Arafat 
wanted Israeli negotiators of equal stature with official status, otherwise Oslo would cease. **^
Although possibly motivated more by fear that the PLO would halt Oslo rather than stemming from a 
unilateral desfre to willingly upgrade the Oslo backchannel, Peres and Rabin agreed on May 15 on a modus 
operandi which suited, namely that Rabin retained political distance whilst Peres nominated suitable officials. 
Peres offered himself as delegation head but Rabin rejected this as too high a level of political involvement. 
Peres named Uri Savii*, director-general of the Foreign Ministry, as delegation head.* *^ The choice of Savir 
signalled to the PLO that Rabfri's imprimatur was not just benign, it represented direct decision-making 
involvement. This development was important for the PLO, knowing as they did the animosity the two 
Israelis held for each other, it represented a level of seriousness and intent hitherto only hinted at in Oslo, 
significantly registering official sanction and recognition of the PLO. Oslo in transforming to official status.
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converted from backchannel to main channel, making an 'Israeli decision to publicly recognise the PLO more 
a matter of'when' than 'if."**'* However, at tliis early stage, agreement in Oslo was still intended by the 
Israelis to supplement Washington, any agreement in Oslo was to be presented in Washington as a US 
proposal, to be concluded with Palestinians from inside the occupied territories, and as yet would not 
officially confer mutual recognition.**^
2.5.6 Red Lines
Both sides approached official negotiations from different viewpoints. The PLO thought that official 
status meant ironing out the details of the Sarpsborg HI document. Savir was mandated only to ascertain 
whether or not Israel could conclude a deal, he was not to negotiate a deal. Savir was instructed to: ensure 
the PLO continued the Washington talks; maintain total secrecy regarding Oslo; ensui'e Jerusalem was not 
part of an interim agreement; to temporarily waive Jericho; and ensure Israel's veto on referring disputes to 
arbitration. For the Palestinians, Ahmad Qurai however, proposed that the US and Russia sign any agreement 
so that the Palestinians would have leave to appeal during disputes. However the personal chemistry 
between Savir and Qurai allowed them to cut to the chase. For Savir this meant that the 'Palestinians needed 
to know that autonomy could lead to a state, while we needed to know it would bring security,' because once 
'the 'red fines' were imderstood, everything else could be negotiated. But if they were not understood, we 
could have negotiated for years without results'. For Qurai this meant an Israeli indication that an accord 
would lead to statehood and an Israeli acceptance that a Palestinian state was an 'eventuality rather than a 
distinct possibility', Qurai 'needed to know the Israeli view of whether the interim agreement [would 
determine the scope of] final status,' which was 'the most key point.'****
Although, the Israelis did not guarantee a state, their conditional inference that if an interim 
agreement was concluded wliich ensured Israeli security, maintained stability, established Palestinian 
institutions and elements of Palestinians sovereignty, finked Tunis with the occupied territories and resulted 
in economic cooperation, then the impetus would exist to go beyond an interim stage to a final status which 
would inevitably include negotiating statehood. Thus Savir and Qurai established a negotiating modus 
vivendi based on implied mutual recognition and respect for each others aspirations, namely, security and a 
state, bolstered by economic mterdependence. Agreement was reached on a security annexe, calling for a 
demilitarised Gaza, a Palestinian police force which would maintain security over the Palestinian population 
under its control, and an IDF redeployment outside Palestinian population centres. Such mutual confidence 
and respect energised the negotiators to continue talks in a convivial atmosphere and in turn ensur ed their* 
enthusiasm in evangelising wider support for their negotiations. After initial talks Savir reported to Rabin 
that a deal was possible.**’ Whilst Qurai and Asfour reported back to Abbas in Tunis that Savir was serious 
about pursuing a deal, Beilin acted on Savir's recommendation for a legal expert, bringing in lawyer Joel 
Singer. Singer's immediate impression of the Sarpsborg document was that it lacked legal precision and that 
it created some very bad precedents, for example, the UN trusteeship idea for Gaza. However his initial 
professional disdain aside, his assessment of the spirit of the backchannel was that Oslo indicated that the 
PLO was willing to compromise, despite the insistence of the Palestinian negotiators in Washington that 
dur ing the transitional interim period to Palestinian autonomy the Palestinians should have jurisdiction over 
Israeli settlements and East Jerusalem and that a declaration of independence should be made. Singer
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produced a one-page analysis and legal opinion which whilst critical of the document believed that there 
intriguing possibilities about some of the proposed ideas.*** Before continuing however, Rabin wanted 
Singer to travel to Oslo to determine if the PLO offer was real. Rabin trusted Singer’s objectivity, 
prepar ation, attention to detail, legal expertise, critical temperament and his ability to provide him with 
analytical assessments that reflected his concerns. Singer provided a perfect balance to the rest of the Israeli 
team, who were too closely identified with Peres. Singer's attention to legal detail and concerns over security 
ensured Rabin had a kindred spirit on board.* *^ With Singer's appointment, Rabin became more actively 
involved guiding the negotiating team in Oslo.
Singer's role in Oslo fi*om Jime 11 was to; interrogate the Palestinians, bring analytic clarity to the 
document drafting process, and confront previously avoided problematic issues. Singer brought not only his 
legalistic and adversar ial traits to Oslo, he brought with him Rabin's personal authority which convinced, 
Qurai, Abbas and ultimately Ar*afat as to the changed status of the backchannel,*’*
Israel's negotiating strategy was developed by an informal steering group of Savir, Singer, Hirschfeld, 
Pundik, Beilin, Gur, and Gil, who formulated option papers for Peres who in turn submitted them to 
Rabin.*’* Rabin for his part did not develop or divine independent military advice or intelligence assessments 
and dur ing the course of the Oslo negotiations excluded Iris usual cir cle of advisers, senior IDF officers, 
intelligence officials, and Arab affairs experts. Rabin apparently informed IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ehud 
Barak about the secret backchannel. Barak said that The prime minister showed me all the papers coming 
out of Oslo,' and added that the PM was 'waiting to see wliich channel would deliver results, either Oslo or', 
Rubinstein in Washington. According to Barak, Rabin made the final decision to proceed with Oslo on his 
own personal responsibility in order to avoid politicising the IDF.*”  Rabin vetted every line of the draft DoP 
personally.*’* Though Rabin became increasingly involved in the substance of the talks, he remained sceptical 
whether Oslo would produce success.*’'*
The group dynamics that evolved in Oslo saw both teams negotiating back and forth to then 
superiors, using the threat of domestic intransigence as a bargaining ploy to extract concessions. Internally 
the dynamics that developed saw Singer confront issues, Savir would reassure Qurai, Qurai and Asfour grew 
closer as equals, whilst the others took less central roles, as analysts engaging in strategy sessions. Qurai 
requested of Abbas that Maher al-Kurd be replaced. Muliammed al-Koush, an accountant but lawyer by 
training, serving on the PLO delegation at the UN in Geneva dealing with social and economic affairs, 
replaced liim.*’* When the two delegations broke to brief their respective leaders, it was Singer's role which 
proved crucial and pivotal. Singer's assessment did not only provide Rabin with the relevant evidence as to 
whether to proceed or not. Singer's presence underlined to Abbas in Tunis that Rabin was centrally involved, 
and that if Singer's analysis was positive, then the negotiations would continue until an agreement was 
concluded. Singer told Rabin that he favoured negotiating mutual recognition because it would likely be 
inevitable, therefore it could be used to extract important concessions. However Peres disagreed, instead 
favouring mutual recognition as a final resort in order to extract last minute concessions. Thus whilst Singer 
briefed Rabin that a deal could be done, he reportedly told Peres in Vienna, 'If we don't make peace with 
these people, we are idiots.'*’  ^ Rabin instructed Singer to draft a new DoP incorporating the responses he 
had elicited from liis in-depth questioning of Qurai, ir onically in Wasliington DC. From the PLO, the
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promise of Arafat controlling Islamist terrorism and ensuring that Israeli security fears were allayed proved to 
be too great a temptation for the Israelis, who may have believed what they wanted to hear on the issue of 
security. Qurai said that only Arafat had both the capability and will to end terror against Israel, that PLO 
police would enforce Arafat's will, and Ar^afat's return to Gaza would turn the public against Hamas. Singer 
said, the Palestinians 'kept saying all the time that Arafat could and would stop terrorism. We heard this from 
May 1993 to May 1994, that Arafat would make the difference.' Taking it at face value, Rabin hoped the 
PLO would handle Hamas without libertarian constraints. However, Rabin had information to the contrary; 
in January, Nablus academic Khalid Shikaki (brother of Islamic Jihad leader Fatlii Sliikaki) quoted Hamas 
leaders as vowing to continue violence against the IDF and Israeli settlers after a peace agreement. The PLO 
did not incorporate into the agreement any promise to end the intifada nor bear any responsibility for groups 
outwith PLO control.*”
Thus following the June 25-27 session the Israelis presented the Palestinians with the first formal 
written draft Israeli-PLO document on July 4th at the Gressheim session. The Gressheim DoP superseded 
Sarpsborg III. The Gressheim document contained povisions for; an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and 
Jericho (except settlements) within thi ee months of the DoP being signed; Israeli settlers, settlements, visitors 
to the territories, and military locations to be exempt from PLO juiisdiction, which was important to Rabin as 
he wanted purposeftiUy vague language so that he could claim jurisdictional exemptions during final status 
negotiations for 'security zones' (At the implementation talks of May 1994, Rabin attained a definition of 
clusters of settlements as contiguous areas or 'blocs' as opposed to individual 'islands' of Israeli authority 
isolated fiom one another in a sea of Palestinian jurisdiction*’ )^; the PLO to have functional jurisdiction, eaiiy 
empowerment, over health, education, welfare, taxation and tourism - any further Palestinian administrative 
responsibilities would requir e mutual agreement; Israel to retain responsibility for external security, Israelis in 
the occupied territories, and internal security in the Palestinian entity; and an Israeli military redeployment 
from Palestinian population centres in the West Bank on withdr awal fiom Gaza. Rabin insisted at a June 
10th meeting that redeployment be made a 'matter for Israel's sole discretion. The Declaration could include a 
requirement for 'consultation' with the Palestinians, the Prime Minister said, but not for 'agreement' with 
them. The detailed deployment of Israeli troops for strategic defence or for the protection of Israeli 
settlements and Israeli civilians would not be conditional on the other party's agreement.'*’  ^ However the 
Gressheim document was intentionally vague about redeployment proposing an initial IDF redeployment on 
the eve of Palestinian elections (without specifying from which population centres) linking further 
redeployment to Palestinian performance on security. Article XIII.(3) of the final DoP states 'Fui ther 
redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of 
responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force'. Peres stated that there 
'were various liints during the Oslo process that the elections might be deferred or might not be held at all,' as 
some senior Israeli officials hoped that cancelling the elections would be an indfrect way of effectively 
cancelling the second phase of the Oslo accord because Article XIII(l) of the DoP specifically relates interim 
redeployment to the holding of elections.****
Wliere the Gressheim document differed from Sarpsborg was on the issue of Jerusalem. The PLO 
proposed that a definition of Palestinian jurisdiction over defined institutions in East Jerusalem be
93
incorporated. However, not only was this rejected by Rabin, through the absence of permitting East 
Jerusalemites to stand for election, the Israelis attempted to simply abandon their previous agreement to 
negotiate Jerusalem in final status talks. At Palestinian insistence the Israelis 'eventually reaffirmed their 
previous commitment'.*** Whilst the Gressheim document did not explicitly commit Israel to negotiate on 
1948 refiigees in final status talks as Sarpsborg had, it echoed Camp David with the requirement in the 
interim phase for liaison and cooperation arrangements between Israel, the Palestinians, Jordan and Egypt to 
discuss persons displaced fiom the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967 (Article XII of the final DoP). Thus 
the Gressheim document represented for the Israelis, an aiTangement to cohabit rather than a plan to divorce. 
The Palestinian negotiators were initially furious with this drafl;, however after working through the draft; 
point by point, initialing and incorporating their own positions next to every point, disagreement was 
narrowed to five points: the inclusion of UN SCRs 242 and 338; the permanent status negotiations; the 
Gaza/Jericho fir st approach; elections and Jerusalem; the issue of Palestinian displaced persons fiom 1967. 
The Israelis carried the authority to sign a declaration at this point, July 3-5, to then pass the agreement on to 
the Washington track thus ending the need for the Oslo backchannel. However, as far as Qurai was 
concerned, whilst the PLO wanted a deal, the real hard bargaining had just begun.*”
Although the political patrons were keen to continue the momentum generated by negotiations in 
Norway, fi*om July 10, the backchannel began to test the participants nerves, as diplomatic games threatened 
to collapse the initiative a number of times in an orchestrated scenario of brinkmanship, of proposal and 
counter-proposal, manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre, of halting or threatening to halt negotiations. Whilst 
the Israelis were preparing to negotiate on the sticking points of the previous rounds,*”  at Halvorsbole on 
July 10 the Palestinians demanded more than 20 revisions of the Gressheim document.**"* In the same way 
that Rabin had been behind the revisions incorporated within the Gressheim document, Arafat was clearly 
behind the new Palestinian proposals being forwarded having now concentrated on aU the details put before 
him. Qurai, Abbas and Aiufat had spent time on working on then revised draft in Tunis. Arafat found 
Singer's version 'not acceptable'. The PLO asked Egyptian lawyer Taher Shash, the legal adviser to the 
Washington delegation, who had worked on Camp David, to help draft a revised document.**  ^ Qurai 
confirmed Arafat's involvement through Arafat's first dkect message to the Israelis. Whilst Ai'afat wanted a 
deal, he also wanted: the replacement of the word 'Palestinian' with 'PLO' in respect of the political body with 
whom the agreement was to be made and with whom the Israelis would be partners; control of the AUenby 
Bridge, extraterritorial roads between Gaza and Jericho (including an air corridor), with Gaza/Jericho 
crossing points 'under the responsibility of the Palestinian authorities, with international supervision and in 
cooperation with Israel'; and Palestinians fiom East Jerusalem to be eligible as candidates in elections for an 
autonomous authority.**** An air of crisis thus enveloped the Oslo channel over a number of subsequent 
weeks with both sides toughening their positions fi om the initial cordiality of the opening academic 
atmosphere.**’
The Israelis grumbled that the PLO negotiating strategy was an 'inversion of the standard model, 
wherein both sides start fiom maximalist positions and gradually move toward a compromise somewhere in 
the middle'. Singer described the PLO strategy as beginning 'with a relatively centrist position' then moving 
'backward as the opposing party moved toward them', thus they 'put forward then opening position, but then
94
instead of moving toward you, like in any other negotiation, they move beyond their opening position, so that 
you are almost at then opening position as negotiations move on.'**^
The Norwegians had to work hard to rescue the talks from crisis. Through the tireless efforts of 
Lai sen, Juul and Holst, they tried to resolve the issues which threatened deadlock. Much of the Norwegian 
effort revolved around the human dimension, that is on convincing both sides as to the real and genuine 
desire of the other to reach an agreement, rather than concentrating on purely teclinical and substantive 
points of disagreement. On July 11, FM Holst under cover of an official visit to President Ben Ali in Tunis, 
met with Arafat. Accompanied by Larsen and Juul, Holst tried to resolve the deadlock by assuring him that 
Israel was committed to reaching an agreement in Oslo. The Israelis also sought assurances from the 
Norwegians regarding the PLO's commitment to Oslo. They wanted to know whether Arafat was fully 
cognisant of the negotiations and committed to their success. More importantly, the Israelis wanted an 
authoritative judgement on whether the previous round's deadlock was negotiable. 'The Israelis asked us to 
come [to Jerusalem] because they were about to end the [Oslo] channel,' recalled Juul. Holst sent Juul and 
Larsen to Israel on July 12th with a letter assuring Peres that the negotiations were worth pursuing. 'The 
letter was partly substance, ...But it was also psychological. Holst stressed his impression that Arafat was 
very much behind the Norway talks. He was involved in the details and dedicated to the talks' success. Tins 
made an impression on the Israelis'. In addition, Larsen and Juul briefed the Israelis about their meeting with 
Arafat. On July 13 at the Laromme Hotel in Jerusalem, Peres and the Norwegians discussed the details of a 
deal. After insisting on confidentiality, Peres said that Israel would allow Arafat to come to Gaza and Jericho 
'as long as he does not call liimself'president'.' Juul and Laisen returned to Tunis with a letter fiom Peres to 
Holst seeking clarification of the Arafat's intentions. Holst passed it to Arafat, who conceded on issues of 
extraterritoriality and Rabin permitted talks to continue. 'I think [our assurances] helped keep the talks 
going,' Juul said. Peres's statement at the Laromme marked the fiist known occasion on which any Israeli 
involved in Oslo confided to a tliii'd party that Israel would allow Arafat to return to Gaza.*”
Progress thus continued warily. By mid-July, whilst 16 substantive points remained unresolved, the 
central issue of contention was that of the official link between an agreed DoP and mutual recognition, that 
is, recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security by the PLO, and of the PLO as the official, 
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by Israel. The Israelis did not want to link the DoP with 
official mutual recognition, however both Peres and Rabin knew realistically that the former would not 
happen without the latter. Rabin and Peres repeatedly rejected proposals for mutual recognition for tactical 
reasons, 'Rabin wanted the DoP to stand independently of mutual recognition, and Peres worried that by 
pursuing both objectives simultaneously, they would 'overload the wagon' and achieve neither.'*"*** However, 
it was clear from Oslo that the PLO wanted a 'package deal', the DoP for mutual recognition. Arafat's 
approval was a sine qua non for any agreement, as he believed that return to Gaza not only symbolised the 
embodiment of Palestinian nationalism, it was also important for his and the PLO's existence, the importance 
of which to Arafat was not lost on the Israelis when considering extracting concessions.*"**
Rabin and Peres accepted that mutual recognition was crucial to Arafat and the PLO, therefore if they 
wanted to do a deal with Arafat and the PLO, they would have to officially recognise who they were dealing 
with. Rabin and Peres preferred the tactic of negotiating the DoP and mutual recognition sequentially rather
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than simultaneously. However, whilst Rabin authorised Savir to mention the issue of mutual recognition in 
passing at the July 11th session, then offering more specific terms at the July 25-26 session as an unofficial 
personal initiative, by agreeing to offer terms Rabin was merely engaging in a tactical rather than strategic 
ploy. The acceptance of the principle of mutual recognition meant Rabin had already accepted, in principle, 
the PLO and Arafat as partners.*”  More significantly, mutual recognition brought with it implicit Israeli 
recognition of the PLO's political agenda, that is the Palestinians' right to self-determination and thus a 
state.*”
Dui'ing the July 25-26 session, the PLO forced the issue of mutual recognition by determinedly 
sticking to their range of demands stemming from their objections to the Gressheim document. The fririons 
refiisal by the Israelis in response to these PLO demands resulted in Qurai stating liis intention to resign.
With Qurai preparing to depart, Savir privately negotiated with him a 'combination of a package deal and a 
swap aiTangement' outlining seven pre-conditions for mutual recognition linked to 'eight for eight' 
concessions, whereby if the PLO agreed to the seven pre-conditions and yielded on eight areas of dispute, the 
PLO would receive eight Israeli substantive concessions in return. The points of contention related to; 
security, and Gaza/Jericho. For the Israelis there was a strong reluctance to compromise on the issue of 
security, knowing that on such issues as: the security of settlers, settlements, borders, redeployment, IDF 
control over internal and external security, there would be no concessions from Jerusalem. For the PLO, 
there was just as strong a reluctance to concede on such issues as: the powers and responsibilities of a 
Palestinian autonomous authority, where the council should be, the timetable of transfer of powers and 
responsibilities, the competencies being transferred and physical connections between Palestinian entities.*"*"* 
Thus the negotiations focused on an agreement which incorporated mutual recognition covering: PLO 
recognition of Israel's right to exist in peace and security; PLO commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict on the basis of UN SCRs 242 and 338; repeal of the PLO covenant's provisions calling for the 
destruction of Israel; PLO renunciation of terrorism and cooperation with Israel in countering violence; PLO 
call to stop the intifada; PLO commitment to resolve all outstanding issues with Israel peacefully; and, 
Arafat's agreement to represent himself as chairman of the PLO and not as the president of Palestine. The 
draft list of seven points that Savir handed to Qurai omitted acknowledgement that Arafat would lead a PLO- 
administered Palestinian authority in the autonomous ai*eas. Israeli officials apparently wanted to retain such 
a concession for later bargaining. Nonetheless, senior Israeli officials were concerned about Israeli public 
opinion and a deal with the PLO, preferring the Palestinian negotiators in Washington to sign the final deal, 
despite that PLO officials would be in charge of the new Palestinian entity. However Rabin believed the 
public would support a peace deal with Arafat. Pollster Kalman Geyer conducted a poU for Rabin indicating 
that the public was willing to support a deal with the PLO, saying that Rabin 'had enough information at th^t 
time...[to tell him that] the public would back him up. The Israelis wanted to get out of Gaza so much, they 
were willing to accept Arafat as long as he agreed to end the state of war and amend the [PNC] charter.'*"**
2.5.7 Syrian versus Palestinian Tracks
In attempts to outmanoeuvre each other, both sides indulged in endgame strategies that obviously 
would incur the least concessions wliilst maximising their gains. The PLO made a number of concessions in 
the first week of August, precipitated by a strong concern that Israel was possibly in the process of sliiftmg
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its focus and emphasis in negotiations from the Palestinian to the Syrian track. Israeli officials admitted later 
that they talked up the prospects of progress with Syria to give the impression that Israel was pursuing such 
an option.*"*^
Rabin's peace strategy, such as it was, whilst having a tendency to appear* reactive as opposed to 
proactive, had to fuse two realities; Israeli public opinion and what it could cope with, and what was 
pragmatic and practical in the international arena. Neither Israeli public opinion, nor the immediate 
neighbourhood, could withstand the political fallout fr om a comprehensive peace agreement incorporating in 
one fell swoop, agreement between Israel, Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians, par*ticular*ly one conducted, 
negotiated and concluded in secret. Rabin therefore sought to gain agreement bilaterally, individually and 
sequentially by operating a 'push-pull' diplomatic tactic in wliich progress on one track promoted progress on 
another thr ough iastilling fear of exclusion in each party, thus maximising liis gains, rnmirnising his 
concessions, dividing and ruling his enemies, and ensur ing that the Israeli public would not have to digest too 
much change and deal with too many concessions on several fronts concurrently. Rabin believed his primary, 
principal negotiating partners were either the Palestinians or the Syrians, Lebanon having no independent 
political authority, and Jordan being unable to conclude a peace treaty before a Palestinian or Syrian deal, 
because of its large Palestinian population and out of concern for Syrian reaction.
On the international level, Syria presented a far greater real and potential threat to Israel's security 
than the Palestinians. Syria could present an existential threat, therefore resolution of conflict with Syria 
would constitute a major breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and would allow Israel to reassess 
strategic priorities and reconfigure resources and allocations aimed at meeting the perceived future tlireat 
from Iran and Iraq. Rabin told Israel TV in January 1993 that an Israeli-Syrian agreement would not only 
'change the strategic equation of the region, bringing to an end the war of attrition against the Iranian-backed 
HezbaUah Islamic militants in the security zone along Israel's northern border with Lebanon' but also Syria's 
leader could be trusted to implement any accord. Alternatively, 'a deal with the Palestinians would merely be 
'public relations"
However, Syria's demands, frill withdrawal from the Golan Heights without a formal peace treaty 
including recognition and full diplomatic relations leading to normalisation, were not only too politically 
unacceptable, but also complete withdr awal from the Golan was less easily reversed militar ily. A Syrian 
position paper presented at Washington in July 1992 offered only the prospect of non-belligerency, 
essentially codifying the existing Israeli-Syrian truce. Important politically was the extremely sensitive issue 
within Israel of ceding control of the strategic Golan Heights. Full withdrawal requir ed the dismantling of all 
Golan settlements, politically difficult to implement due to previous Labour party policy uigmg settlement on 
the Golan. Peres said 'We did not have the [political] strength to dismantle the Golan settlements'.*"** Thus, 
wliilst Rabin may have preferred dealing with Syria for long-term strategic advantages, Israeli public opinion 
however regarded the Palestinian issue as a more immediate problem. In response to public demand, Rabin 
publicly committed himself dur ing the 1992 election to concluding an interim agreement with the Palestinians 
within six to nine months. According to Peres, 'Rabin promised the public ...there would be a deal and 
nothing happened'.*"*  ^ Deatlis of Israelis in Gaza, perceived as a political and strategic burden on Israel, 
where Israel's citizen ai*my had to deal daily in repression and occupation were not popular* with the Israeli
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public. Also influencing Rabin's negotiating strategy was the domestic political scandal surrounding Shas 
which tlireatened to bring down the coalition. The effects of the drawnout intifada and the steadfastness of 
the Palestinian population, 'had focused the Israeli public on the need to address the Palestinian issue', indeed, 
Rabin's coalition believed the Palestinian issue more important than Syria, with both Labour and Meretz 
ministers feeling the Palestinian issue to be the 'heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict.'^ ^®
Thus, the immediacy of the Palestinian problem allied to the niinimalist nature of immediate territorial 
and jurisdictional concessions necessary to conclude an interim agreement with the Palestinians convinced 
Rabin for political and strategic reasons that a deal with the Palestinians represented a better bet than 
negotiating with Syria. However, this did not preclude Rabin from pressuring the Palestinians by appearing 
to favom* the Syrian track for tactical reasons. At least twice Rabin prospected a deal with Syria prior to the 
final Oslo breakthrough. Rabin had believed the Palestinian boycott at Washington over the deportations had 
been a bluff therefore he put pressm*e on the Palestinians by playing up prospects for a deal with Syiia. 
However Israeli-Syrian prospects dimmed when Damascus tied resumption at Washington to the PLO's 
return. Thus, the Palestinians demonstrated that they had a de facto veto over Syrian unilateral movement. In 
recognition of this, the US quietly nudged Rabin back to the Palestinians. At US urging, Israel tempted the 
Palestinians back to Washington in April. Thereafter Rabin's attention remained focused on the Palestinians, 
officially upgrading the Oslo channel in May. In early August the US, disappointed by the lack of progress 
with the Palestinians in Washington began to favour shifting focus to Syria. However, Secretary 
Christopher's visit to Damascus in August achieved nothing, therefore the lack of movement from Syria 
factored into Rabin's decision to finalise Oslo. Rabin recounted 'Wlien I decided to go all the way with [the 
Palestinians, it was because the Syrians] still demanded total withdrawal [from the Golan Heights], uprooting 
of the Israeli settlements [there], and were not even ready for fiill-fledged peace'. Peres confirmed that a 
major factor in Rabin's decision to deal with the PLO was the realisation after Chiistopher's trip in August 
that there was no 'Syrian option'.
2.5.8 Getting to An Agreement
Israel's launching of'Operation Accountability' on July 26, a major IDF-Hezballah border skirmish 
which entailed the heavy bombardment of southern Lebanon, brought Secretary Christopher to the Middle 
East in eaiiy August intending to; broker an IDF-Hezballah cease-fir*e, resuscitate the Washington talks and 
initiate an indirect dialogue between Rabin and Assad. 'Operation Accountability' firlfilled two objectives for 
Rabin; he gained great 'security' kudos from public opinion for his massive action directed at Hezballah, and 
Christopher's visit to the region provided the Palestinians with the illusion that Rabin was serious about 
dealing with Syr ia, thus providing Rabin with an opportimity to pressure the PLO into reigniting the stalling 
Oslo process. To pressure Arafat, Dennis Ross suggested Christopher return to Damascus from Jerusalem, 
to create the impression of'shuttle diplomacy' and thus of movement on the Israel-Syria track. Peres wrote a 
letter to Holst to be shared with the PLO, saying that if the negotiations were not completed, 'the vacuum 
may be filled by opposing forces, or with other initiatives, including the possibility of desir ed progress 
between Israel and Syria. Secretary Christopher is at this very moment visiting our region.'^Arafet 
apparently understood the significance of what was happening, therefore he continued negotiations rmder 
cover of the Washington process in order to keep the US involved in the wider process but not involved with
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Oslo. Arafat promised Mubarak in Cairo that the Palestinian delegation to Washington would give 
Christopher a counter-proposal to a previous US proposal presented in Jerusalem. Mubaiak passed this 
information to Christopher. Arafat's counter-proposal included a vague reference to Palestinian self-rule in 
Gaza /Jericho but did not mention the PLO or other vital issues. Ai'afat insisted they transmit the proposal to 
Christopher, saying he would explain later in Tunis. Neither the delegates nor the US officials understood the 
significance of the Tunis proposal. The delegation handed Christopher Arafat's authorised draft, Ashrawi, 
Erekat and Husseini then flew to Tunis to submit theft resignations, which Arafat refused to accept. Aslirawi 
said she asked him if there was another channel besides the Washington talks, and that Arafat explained how 
he would build a Palestinian state from a Gaza-Jericho deal.^ '^*
Rabin dismissed Secretary Christopher's enquiries about the Oslo channel, giving him a letter for 
Clinton requesting more US involvement on the Syrian track, because not only did he not want US 
involvement in Oslo, he claimed that he genuinely was not sm*e whether Oslo would produce success until at 
least mid-August. Singer stated that Rabin deliberately downplayed the viability of Oslo when talking to 
Christopher.Rabin stated that by mid-August he was surprised by the growing list of PLO concessions. 
'On fom* or five major issues, they agreed to [things] I had doubted they would agree to ...First, [keeping ah 
ofl Jerusalem under Israeli control and outside the jurisdiction of the Palestinians for the entire interim 
period. Second, [retaining ah Israeh] settlements...Third, overah Israeh responsibihty for the security of 
Israehs and external security. Fourth, keeping ah options open for the negotiations on a permanent 
solution.
In the end, the stalemate in Oslo was broken with a secret exchange of letters between Rabin and 
Arafat, creating ftonicahy a 'backchannel within a backchannel', in which deadlocked issues on substantive 
positions were clarified. Without disclosing Oslo, Arafat asked Ahmed Tibi to open an independent 
communication to Rabin. Tibi met Haim Ramon on July 17 urging him to ask Rabin to correspond with the 
PLO. Tibi travelled to Tunis on July 19 with Rabin's letter, returning on August 4 with a letter fiom Arafat to 
Rabin passed via Ramon. Neither letter was addressed directly to the other party or signed by its author. 
Rabin thought he was writing to Abbas. This correspondence marked the only known exchange between the 
two leaders during the Oslo process, and one that Israeli negotiators knew nothing of.^ ^^  Rabin's letter was 
dedicated to; eliciting fiom the PLO a definition of the PLO's understanding of functional and territorial 
jurisdiction, getting clarification of the status of Jerusalem during the interim period; and, signalling that 
agreement to mutual recognition would not be dependent on being formally linked to the DoP. Rabin sought 
for Israel 'final authority on all secui ity issues in Gaza and Jericho and total fi-eedom of movement for the 
IDF in the territories, so that it could intervene either pre-emptively or in retaliation as well as maintain 'hot 
pursuit' of suspects', whilst he opposed giving the PLO unqualified jurisdiction over settlements and military 
locations in the territories beyond Gaza and Jericho, because it would have allowed the PLO to claim de 
facto sovereignty over the entfte West Bank in final status talks. Meanwhile at the Washington talks, the 
US produced a compromise on the issue of territorial jurisdiction, proposing 'early empowerment', being the 
immediate transferral of non-controversial civil responsibilities, like taxation, education, etc.
In reply, Arafat agreed to: 'Israeli control over settlements, settlers, and Israelis travelling in the 
territories, but qualified Israeli jurisdiction as being responsible for 'external' rather than (as Israel had
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insisted) 'overall' or 'comprehensive' security'; 'exclude Jerusalem from the Palestinian self-rule area,'; and, 
linked these concessions to the Israeli acceptance of mutual recognition/^^ As a result of this first 
correspondence between the two leaders, Rabin later hailed it as 'the turning point' that led to breakthrough.
However, Rabin sought to discover tlirough the same channels from the PLO, whether or not they 
would modify their position on, assuming responsibility for 'comprehensive security' and demands for control 
of territory wliich included military areas. Rabin authorised Ramon to ask Tibi to contact Abbas, however on 
August 7th the PLO replied it would not change its position. According to Tibi, 'the PLO favoured flexible 
phrasing but would not give' in on those two issues. Whilst in the background for the PLO there existed 
the threat of Israel's turning to a Syrian option, the Israelis found that the domestic political corruption 
scandal enveloping their junior coalition partner threatened the friture of the government. Therefore both 
sides felt convinced of a sense of urgency. When the Norwegians proposed an unofficial 'non-meeting' in 
Paris to provide fr esh impetus to the backchannel, not only did the PLO exhibit 'new flexibility and agreed to 
restart talks',^^  ^but also a concerned Rabin and Peres decided to formally raise the issue of mutual 
recognition. Rabin instructed that mutual recognition be formally included at the August 13-15 round of 
Oslo talks. The Paris meeting produced the desired result of resuming talks, however, substantive 
disagi'eement over important interim issues remained. What the negotiations concluded was an agreement to 
disagree whilst pressing on with reaching an agreement. At this point, it seems that the negotiators were 
intent on concluding an historic deal, with finer points of interim period disagreement, let alone final status 
issues disagreement, to be left to future, post-deal negotiations. Evidence for this conclusion comes from 
various discrepancies over aspects of: jurisdiction, security, Jerusalem, the size of the intended Jericho entity, 
and control of Jordan-West Bank passage points. Israel defined Jericho by its existing municipal boundaries, 
the PLO referred to a 'Jericho District', an area ten times larger than that demarcated by Jordan - the 
compromise agreed was to use the term 'Jericho area' leaving precise borders to be negotiated during 
implementation talks. The two were unable to agree on control mechanisms for Jordan-West Bank or Egypt- 
Gaza passage points, because Israel feared unrestricted arms smuggling and Palestinian immigration, 
therefore as Israel would not yield on the issue, the compromise agreed was to 'coordinate' arrangements. 
These issues were only finally resolved through intense and intensive negotiations in Stockholm, involving 
Singer, Gil, Peres, Lai'sen, tlirough the medium of FM Holst to Aiafat, Abbas, Quiai, Asfour, Yasir Abed- 
Rabbo and Muhsen Ibrahim in Tunis. During a previously scheduled official visit, Peres met with Holst on 
August 17th under cover of a pretext to assuage the Swedish authorities. Holst's presence was to mediate the 
final issues by telephone with the PLO leadership in Tunis. During the evening of August 18th, Holst 
engaged in a seven-houi* phone call with Aiafat and Qurai in Tunis fr om Peres's guest house. Gil and Singer 
negotiated with the PLO via Holst, whilst Peres remained in the background being woken for consultations 
on various Israeli positions three times during the night. There were precarious moments when Peres 
threatened to shift Israel to the Syrian track, or when Holst read parts of the DoP over an unsecured link, 
substituting 'bluip' for Israel'.
Jerusalem was the last major issue to be resolved. Every scenario during negotiations envisioned 
postponing the symbolic issue of Jerusalem to the end to prevent the talks from collapsing prematurely. The 
PLO compromised by dropping their initial demand that Jerusalem be included in the self-rule area, but
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during the Stockholm negotiations they insisted that the draft DoP allow for the administration of self-rule in 
Gaza and Jericho fi*om Jerusalem. Annex 11(5) states that the 'offices responsible for carrying out the powers 
and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex and Article VI of the Declaration of 
Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and Jericho ar ea pending the inauguration of the Council.' The 
PLO wanted to add 'or other places in the West Bank' after 'Jericho area.' The July 5th Gressheim document 
had allowed the Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer institutions in Jerusalem, grouped together in a 
special quar ter .Rabin  and Peres knew that Israeh pubhc opinion would have difficulty in accepting PLO 
headquarters in Jerusalem, fearing that Israelis would perceive that Jerusalem's sovereign status had either 
been provisionaUy negotiated or compromised, creating a precedent leading to Jerusalem's sovereign and 
jurisdictional division. Peres told Holst that the domestic pohtical situation involving Shas had become so 
acute that not only would the talks need to be concluded as soon as possible if a deal was to be done prior to 
any prospective domestic upheaval, but also that given the domestic pohtical climate it was imperative that to 
reach such an agreement Jerusalem's status must remain unaltered, that is as the indivisible sovereign capital 
of Israel. Peres beheved that if the PLO 'had insisted on [maintaining a presence in] Jerusalem, we might not 
have had a government or an agreement.' The Palestinians yielded, but in return Peres with Rabin's approval, 
agreed to a letter confirming that 'Palestinian institutions of East Jerusalem' were 'of great importance and' 
would 'be preserved', indeed, Peres stated that Israel would 'not hamper their activity; on the contrary, the 
fiilfilment of this important mission is to be encouraged.'^*^  ^ Peres was extremely aware of the pohtical 
sensitivity of the issue, therefore he insisted that the letter be written and dated after Knesset confirmation of 
the agreement was obtained so that he could state categoricahy that there were no secret wiitten agreements 
outstanding. Peres wrote the letter on October 11th 1993 addressing it to Holst rather than Arafat, so that no 
inference could be interpreted that Arafat, otherwise as recipient, would have some form of jurisdictional 
representation regarding Jerusalem's ftiture status, or that Jerusalem's current status was in any way 
compromised. The letter remained secret until Arafat divulged its existence in Johannesburg in May 1994, 
whereupon Likud MKs, Binyamin Begin and Dan Meridor pressed Peres to release the letter, foUowing a 
denial of its existence in the Knesset by Pohce Minister Moshe Shahal. Peres was slated for publicly denying 
there were any secret deals with the PLO in the Knesset debate on the Oslo accords, then covering up the 
letter's existence until June 1994.
The final compromise formula was based on the miderstandiugs arrived at by Rabin and Arafat 
tlirough their secret correspondence. Rabin agreed to moderate his demands for comprehensive Israeli 
responsibility for external security after an Israeh withdrawal or redeployment, and conceded to PLO 
pressuie on the issue of jmisdiction.^^^ Ai*afat agreed that Israel's powers and responsibilities would remain, 
over the settlements, and for all Israeli citizens either permanently resident or not, anywhere in the occupied 
territories including the proposed self-rule entities. Israel wanted it made clear in the accompanying Agreed 
Minutes to the DoP that 'Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territoiy, except 
for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military 
locations, and Israelis.'[Article IV(1)] Furthermore 'The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the 
agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it'[Article IV(2)] contingent with 
Article VII(5) that the 'withdi awal of the military govermnent will not prevent Israel fi'om exercising the
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powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.' The PLO wanted to keep the minutes secret, but 
at Israeli insistence they were published as part of the DoP.^^  ^ Thus the Stockholm negotiations clinched the 
deal on August 19th, so that despite minor modifications made later that day, the DoP with the agreed 
minutes was initialed in a ceremony in Oslo on August 20th. The pre-dawn ceremony at 44 Parkveftenin, 
included all the Oslo negotiators plus Holst, Peres, Larsen, Juul, Heilberg, GH, and Geir Pedersen. In the first 
known meeting between Peres and a PLO official, Savir, Qurai, Singer, and Asfour initialed the DoP, and 
then Savft, Qurai, Holst, and Lai’sen gave speeches extolling its virtue. Peres watched but did not sign the 
DoP, since negotiations with the PLO had not received cabinet approval. In a toucliing moment of historical 
significance the desk used to sign the DoP was brought in especially for the occasion, it was the same desk 
used by Cliristen Michelson to sign Norway's secession in 1905 from Swedish rule. Aware of Israeli 
sensitivities, the Norwegians asked Peres if he would mind using the desk, and he agreed. This however
did not mean that negotiations were concluded, the negotiators reconvened the next day to conclude a 
mutual recognition agreement between the PLO and Israel.
Thus the outcome of indulging in brinkmansliip was the attaimnent of agreement to negotiate on 
mutual recognition, winch was politically and psychologically, the most significant outcome of the Oslo 
backchamiel. Mutual recognition was regarded as being 'more important than the DoP', because it was the 
'centre of the conflict', turning 'the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from an existential to a political conflict.
Mutual recognition was a 'sine qua non for cooperation between Israel and the PLO', vital for Arafat 
'organisationally', and for Rabin, it meant 'abandoning Israel's historic rejection of the PLO and concomitant 
efforts to separate Palestinians inside the territories fiom those outside'.
2.5.9 Surprising the United States and Finessing the Deal
With the DoP initialed, it became imperative not only to assuage feelings but to garner support for the 
Oslo DoP, to inform various interested parties before not only media reports leaked too much detail, but also 
before it became too obvious tliat Oslo was the principal Israeli-PLO channel, and not a supplementary 
backchannel. The US had invested much political and financial power and prestige in convening the high- 
profile international Madrid initiative in order to broker a settlement in the Middle East, by which the US not 
only sought to shape the future of the Middle East, but also by which it sought to confirm its paramount 
status in the world. Surprise was the overwhelmingly constant emotion felt by most interested parties. Rabin 
had deliberately misled Elyakim Rubinstein, head of the Washington delegation, saying 'Leave it alone, it's all 
multilateral,' when Rubinstein asked him about rumours of a secret backchannel with the PLO. Rubinstein 
spent three hours with Rabin, furiously refusing to return to Washington saying that he would resign.'^' 
Jacques Neriah was taking notes at a previously scheduled meeting between Rabin and Lester Pollack and 
Malcolm Hoenlein, officials of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organisations when 
'The prime minister said he had reached an accord with the PLO and that Arafat would be coming to Gaza 
and Jericho. I almost fell off my chaft.'*^  ^During May and June, the Clinton administration had pursued its 
'equal partnership' policy, paying little regar d to events in Oslo. Thus even though the US had been briefed 
of the Oslo channel's existence, infonnation about, and knowledge of, the substantive details of the Oslo 
backchannel had been highly restricted. Therefore the reaction of the US to the specifics of a deal conducted 
without their imprint, would be crucial and would need sensitive handling in order to, present a credible
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public relations selling exercise to Israeli-Palestinian and international opinion, in receiving immediate 
political support for the deal, and for gathering financial assistance to underpin the futui e success of the deal.
On August 26th Arafat and Abbas convened a meeting of the Executive Committee of the PLO to 
break the news of the DoP to the Palestinians. Among Palestinians, many rumoui's had cir culated that Ar afat 
was to make humiliating concessions in order to do a deal with the Israelis. Two days of stormy meetings of 
the Executive Committee began the process of placating Palestinian public o p in io n .T h e  terms of Oslo 
were unpopular with those involved in the Washington talks. Hanan Ashr awi said to Abbas that it was 'clear 
that the [Palestinians] who initialed this agreement have not lived under occupation.' Ashrawi argued that the 
agreement 'postponed the settlement issue and Jerusalem without even getting guarantees that Israel would 
not continue to create facts on the ground that would preempt and prejudge the final outcome.' Concerned 
about domestic Palestinian opinion, she demanded of Abbas, 'And what about human rights? There's a 
constituency at home, a people in captivity, whose rights must be protected and whose suffering must be 
alleviated. What about all our red lines? Territorial jurisdiction and integrity are negated in substance and the 
transfer of authority is purely fimctional* Abbas replied 'All these [things] will be negotiated,' revealing PLO 
thinking about Oslo. Abbas said, 'We got strategic political gains, particularly the fact that tliis agreement is 
with the PLO and not just a Palestinian delegation and the recognition of the Palestinians as a people with 
political rights. We got...a commitment to discuss the refugee issue and Jerusalem in [subsequent 
negotiations on] permanent status. We're going to discuss boundaries and that means statehood. Could you 
have gotten more?' Ashrawi replied 'Its not who makes the agreement, but what's in it ...My main concern is 
about substance. I think this agreement has many potentially explosive areas and could be to oui* 
disadvantage ...Strategic issues are fine, but we know the Israelis and we know that they will exploit their 
power as occupiers to the hilt and by the time you get to pennanent status [negotiations], Israel will have 
permanently altered realities on the ground.Meanwhile Peres consulted with Rabin in Israel, and on 
receiving Rabin’s approval on August 27th, Peres, Holst, and theft top aides flew to southern California to 
brief Secretary Christopher and Dennis Ross about the terms of the DoP and its ramifications on US policy. 
Ross asked Peres whether the DoP was linked to mutual recognition, whilst Peres replied it was not, the 
Rabin/Arafat correspondence made clear that there could be no DoP without mutual recognition. Christopher 
enquired about the implications on US policy toward the PLO. Peres told him that a letter fiom Arafat 
renouncing terrorism was forthcoming, and therefore Israel hoped the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 
1989 (known as the Mack-Lieberman Act) would be repealed. Christopher responded that the administration 
would work with congressional leaders to repeal the ban. He indicated that support fiom the American 
Jewish community would be Important. In reviewing the text of the Mack-Lieberman Act, Ross noted that 
the law required the PLO not only to renounce terrorism but also 'evict or otherwise- discipline the 
individuals or groups taking acts in contravention of the Geneva commitments.' Therefore, he suggested that 
the PLO letter include a plirase that the PLO not only renoimced violence but would 'discipline its 
violators'. Although the Egyptians had also informed Chiistopher and Ross about the accord, the 
Americans response was favourable. They indicated they would back the deal, importantly and significantly 
agreeing to ensuie the success of the agreement, tlirough the convening of an international donors conference 
to secure sufficient funding for the Palestinian entity(conceived afterwards), in exerting US influence in
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urging a 'peace dividend' in the form of Arab recognition of Israel, with the establishment of Arab-Israeli 
diplomatic relations, and in ending the Ar ab boycott of Israel. On receiving US assurances, Rabin called a 
cabinet meeting on August 30th to inform liis colleagues of the agreement, who after discussions voted in 
favoui’. Rabin made clear that no amendments could be made. Rubinstein presented 21 objections to Oslo, 
mainly that Israel could not enter final status talks with all options open. Barak objected to the security 
provisions of the deal. As IDF Chief of Staff, although he neither liked the continuous police duties in the 
occupied territories nor favoured their annexation, he warned that, despite its political advantages, the 
interim airangement forced the IDF to protect settlers and other Israelis while relinquishing jurisdiction over 
the Palestinians. He further argued that the IDF would have to rely on Palestinian police to hand over armed 
fiigitives, and that Shin Bet would lose significant intelligence-gathering assets and the coercive leverage of 
administrative authority to elicit Palestinian cooperation and compliance. He complained the IDF could not 
guai'antee the security of the occupied territories' main roads nor provide militaiy escorts to settlers beyond 
their settlements. On how Israel would handle the chaos of a potential collapse of the Oslo agreement, Barak 
warned cabinet ministers who estimated that the IDF could retake control of Gaza in a day not to disregard 
international reaction to such a move. Finally however, Rabin received almost total approval for the accord. 
Economics Minister Shimon Slietreet of Laboui* and Deri of Shas both abstained.
The Israelis and the PLO then faced a public relations dilemma - how to present such an historic 
breakthrough which had been negotiated at the very highest level as a fait accompli, whilst officially not 
recognising each other. The conventional wisdom of those negotiating Oslo had been that once agreement 
had been reached, the deal would be presented tlirough the forum of the Washington talks. However in light 
of the comprehensiveness of the agreement, there was little realistic hope that the Washington delegations 
could be plausibly used in such a way. The Israelis were particularly sensitive to the issue of officially 
recognising the PLO whilst appearing not to have kept the Americans abreast with developments. However 
suggestions that presenting the DoP as a US-brokered, or as an Egyptian-US sponsored document not only 
unfairly undermined the central and unselfish role the Norwegians had played, they stretched credibility too 
greatly as the truth would out eventually. Thus, the idea for a dramatic public presentation of the agreement 
at a signing ceremony in Washington DC was conceived, to lend international credibility and demonstrate US 
support for the DoP. However tliis was only possible and plausible as long as the two adversaries publicly 
recognised each other, which in turn would allow for the repeal of the US law barring PLO officials fi*om the 
US. Christopher had said the US would not object to having a PLO official come to Waslimgton to sign the 
accord as long as each side recognised the other. If mutual recognition were not concluded before then, PLO 
officials had assured the Israelis that they would instruct Faisal Husseini to sign the Oslo accord without 
making any changes. Thus, the issue of mutual recognition became the cornerstone in selling the grand 
conceptual design conceived within the DoP, that is 'to strive to live in peacefi.il coexistence and mutual 
dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and liistoric 
reconciliation'.^^®
Domestic political considerations dominated the run in to the signing ceremony, as both sides sought 
to sell their own constituencies the accord. The settling of mutual recognition continued through intensive 
and delicate negotiations in Oslo as the specifics of an agreement on mutual recognition had to be worked
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out before any formal signing of the DoP. Both sides realised that mutual recognition 'meant more in 
fundamental terms than even the' DoP, as it resolved the nature of the relationsliip between the two 
adversaries for ever, no matter the future of the DoP.^’  ^ Mutual recognition represented the crossing of an 
existential barrier, wliich could not be renegotiated or renounced. In Oslo, FM Holst again mediated in 
finding mutually acceptable language. His intervention changed the previous nature of Norwegian facilitation 
fi-om one of non-active participation to one of involved problem-solving tlirough personal intervention, with 
unsuccessful results. Inconclusive talks in Norway led to another telephone negotiating session over 
September 3-4 between Paris and Tunis, with Aiufat and Peres communicating once again thiough FM 
Holst. Arafat was demanded to make: an explicit renunciation of all violence and terror; an explicit call to aU 
Palestinians to put an end to armed struggle and the intifada; an explicit aflSmiation that Israel had the right 
to exist in peace and security; and, an explicit promise to change the relevant articles of the PLO Charter 
wliich called for the destruction of Israel.*®® Peres played Tiardball’ not being in any huiiy to compromise. 
Agreement was reached on only two points. Arafat agreed to the PLO acceptance of the US-inspired 
requirement that the PLO accept responsibility for all PLO factions, Arafat had been concerned about being 
made responsible for those outwith liis control, like Hamas. Arafat's preferred pluase, 'We recognise the 
right of Israel to live in secui e and recognised boundaries', suggestive of merely acknowledging Israel's 
presence, was reworded to 'The PLO recognises the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security' 
which confirms Israel's legitimacy.*®* The respective teams returned home, having failed to complete the 
necessary agreements. On September 6th FM Holst engaged in telephone negotiations with Arafat, who was 
in Cairo in an effort to stimulate regional support for the agreement. On September 7th the Israelis returned 
to Paris ready for face to face talks. Qurai arrived in Paris the next day to begin negotiations as the two 
prepared for the endgame. Throughout the night o f September 8th, proposals for acceptable texts for the 
letters which would be exchanged forming the mutual recognition pact, were forwarded and rejected.
Wliilst Rabin's letter to Ai'afat was to be a straight forward statement of recognition, contention 
surrounded Arafat's letter to Rabin. *®^ Two main issues of contention remained, the wording of the changes 
to the PLO Charter and the question of how to reject violence and terror. The PLO wanted both sides to 
declare an end to terrorism and violence, but Israel rejected this. The PLO then offered to restate Arafat's 
1988 renunciation of terrorism and violence, however that was also rejected. The Israelis 'wanted a one-way 
letter that was clear and not shrouded by other statements'.*®  ^ Arafat therefore agreed to 'renounce the use of 
terrorism and other acts of violence' and 'assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order 
to assuie their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.'*®'* Israel had originally wanted Arafat 
to assume responsibility for the acts of all Palestinians, including those not affiliated with the PLO.
Regarding the PLO Charter, the Israelis demanded that the PLO declare the relevant provisions calling for 
the destruction of Israel 'non-operative and non-valid', whereas the PLO preferred 'not in effect'. Arafat 
consulted with the PLO Executive Committee, whose approval he needed for committing to a promise to 
change the PLO Charter, eventually affiiining 'that those ai ticles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny 
Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this 
letter are now inoperative and no longer valid'. Arafat committed to submit to the PNC for formal approval 
the necessaiy changes. However, no timetable was stipulated as amendments to the Charter required a two-
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tliirds majority which Arafat claimed he could not arrange immediately/®^ Regarding the intifada, it was 
agreed that an additional letter, from Arafat to Holst would suffice to encompass the PLO commitments for 
the people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, whilst Quiai was prepaied to accept that the people 
on the West Bank should renounce violence, expecting them to renounce terror implied they were ail 
terrorists, therefore Qurai preferred 'rejecting violence and terrorism'.*®  ^ Agreement was finally believed to 
have been concluded in the small hours of September 9th. However, Arafat called from Tunis to say that he 
did not agree to the wording on the clause committing the people of the occupied territories to 'reject 
violence and terror'.*®^  With the Israeli cabinet due to meet within the hour to approve the text, Arafat was 
piling on the pressure. With everyone in Paris believing the deal had been done, Arafat was ready to have the 
Israeli cabinet postpone its meeting m order to achieve final concessions. Israel settled for a letter from 
Arafat to Holst saying that the PLO would 'take part in the steps leading to the normalisation of life, rejecting 
violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability, and participating actively in shaping 
reconstruction, economic development, and cooperation.'*®® Qurai telephoned Arafat, and having received 
his assent to complete negotiations, informed the Israelis allowing the letters of mutual recognition to begin 
their journeys.
FM Holst flew to Tunis to pick up Aiafat's letter for Rabin, then continued on to Jerusalem delivering 
it to Rabin on September 10th. Rabin's reply was faxed to Tunis with FM Holst returning to Tunis delivering 
the actual letter in person. With the exchange of correspondence. President Clinton announced on 
September 10th that the US was resuming its dialogue with the PLO.
With the DoP initialed, with mutual recognition approved and signed, the official signing ceremony 
remained. Agreement about the nature of the event was still unresolved. The Clinton administration seemed 
keen to preside over, and be associated with, a liigh-profile ceremony, a glamorous foreign policy 
acliievement, and an act of choreographed political theatre, particularly since as a new administration its 
record in Bosnia and Somalia and on domestic issues left a lot to be desfred. Ai'afat signalled liis willingness 
to attend if Rabin were to also, however Rabin fretted over obliging the US on the one hand and being seen 
to accord Arafat the status of a head of state or government. Clinton liimself urged both leaders to attend, 
phoning Rabin personally on September 9th. The issue was resolved when Arafat let it be known liis desire to 
attend anyway, prompting Secretai'y Christopher to phone Israel to reiterate Clinton's invitation to the PM.*®® 
The US decision to resume dialogue with the PLO swayed Rabin into confirming his attendance.
With the participants in place, all was set for the culmination of the negotiated process. However, 
with four houi's to go Arafat, through Ahmed Tibi, indicated his refusal to sign unless the agreement to be 
signed included diiect references to the PLO in the text. Peres and Rabin consulted, agreeing to the change 
since they had recognised the PLO, however, Peres intimated to Tibi that as the Israeli cabinet had approved 
each word of the DoP, there was no way changes could be authorised. Tibi announced to Peres that Arafat 
was readying to leave, and with twenty minutes to the signing ceremony, Peres agreed to the inclusion of 
'PLO' in typescript, but in one place only, in the preamble, to read 'The Government of the State of Israel and 
the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the 'Palestinian 
delegation'), representing the Palestinian people agree...'*®® In the heat of the sunshine in Washington, the 
Norwegians privately calculated that whilst the US had spent billions of dollars and many years in efforts in
106
the Middle East, Norway spent roughly $500,000 in less than one year and achieved an historical
191agreement.
One of the most remarkable aspects of the Oslo DoP, was that despite the existence of extensive, 
highly organised social and political institutions, both Israeli and Palestinian, the decision making process, 
and the decision making itself, depended on, and involved, only a very small, highly personalised political 
elite. In a sense it is either testament to the cohesiveness of both Israeli and Palestinian polities that they 
could digest such political upheaval, or the DoP highlights the inherent potential for its destruction, in that as 
it was not popular ly conceived, divined and acclaimed, its birth and continued existence may reveal deeper 
schisms within both societies, not so easily apparent within the first instance of its publication. Indeed, the 
proof of the DoP's liistoric acliievement and its place as a revolutionary event, will be in its longevity and the 
trust it engenders in providing for, and overcoming the mutual exclusivity of, both communities national 
interests, be they security or self-determination,
2.6 Turn To Peace: The Evolution of the Negotiations for Peace
A key factor in 1992, a year of significant events, was undoubtedly the inertia and the uncertainty 
generated by the Israeli general election and the US presidential election. Both these elections were to have 
a considerable impact in the outcome of the negotiating process, although as far* as 1992 was concerned, little 
actual progress was achieved in the negotiations themselves, as attentions focused elsewhere.
The 1992 Israeli election has been called many things, including being a referendum on peace - 
between territorial expansionism and territorial compromise. Tliis is too simplistic an analysis of the election. 
There seem to be several reasons the 1992 Knesset elections marked the second time in Israel's political 
history that there has been a significant transfer of power from one side of the political spectrum to the other, 
a second 'hamahapach hamedini' and, as in 1977, a reordering of the country's national priorities.*®  ^ One 
such analysis suggests that this new era is based on 'a new coalition of the traditional Ashkenazic voters, 
secular Russian immigrants, and disgruntled Sephardic voters committed to a more accommodative national 
consensus.' Thus the conclusion that in 1992, Israeli voters 'chose the Westernised, secular, and progressive 
vision of Zionism' that such a government would reflect.*®'*
Israeli voters dissatisfaction with the Likud government's mismanagement of the economy was as 
important a factor in Laboui's victory as the promise to end the violence and hatred wliich had defined 
relations with Israel's neighbours, principally the Palestinians. Unemployment stood at a record 11.6%, with 
unemployment among Russian immigrants, many of whom were voting for the first time, running as high as 
40%. To a large extent the 1992 election 'represented more a vote against the Likud than a resounding vote 
for Laboui*.'*®^  Economic factors fuelled anti-incumbency. Laboui's internal paity reforms, its primai*y 
election system, its organisation of a popular party conference, developed a rejuvenated public image as a 
more self-confident party, with a renewed sense of direction, purpose, and hope. Labour was identified on 
the official electoral list and ballot as 'Laboui*, headed by Rabin.' Focusing on Rabin was a successful electoral 
strategy. Rabin made it clear that he intended to be a strong PM .*®^ Many sabras felt that the Likud 
government's commitment to its ideology, be it encouraging aliya from Russia, spending too high a 
percentage of the national budget on building settlements in the territories, or in attempting to defeat the
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intifada by enforcing the occupation through the IDF which meant having to do riot-control reserve duty in 
the territories, was misplaced when confronted with economic hardship behind the Green Line.*®^  Jobs and 
new houses in Israel were more important to the majority of voters than the dream of Greater Israel. Israeli 
newspaper Ma’ariv quoted Shamir in a post-election telephone interview as saying, 'moderation should relate 
to the tactics but not the goal...In my political activity I know how to display the tactics of moderation, 
without conceding anything of the goal, the integrity of the Land of Israel.' Shamir continued, 'I would have 
conducted negotiations on autonomy for 10 years, and in the meantime we would have reached half a million 
people in Judea and Samaria' He also stated, 'it's very painfril to me that in the next foui* years I wiH not be 
able to increase settlement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and complete the demographic revolution.'*®®
The Likud government's poor relationship with the US was emblematic of an administration bereft of 
new ideas and one that could no longer provide for its ideological programme. Shamir's failm'e to gain 
$10bn in US loan guarantees illustrated to the Israeli public the depths to which Israel's relationsliip with the 
US had fallen. Voters were acutely aware that Ariel Sharon's overzealous housing programme had forced 
the government to buy back thousands of units of empty new homes built for Russian immigrants who never 
arrived (there were enough unsold units to provide for another 35,000 settlers in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, with a reserve of 10,000 housing units). The Likud government could not provide for those Russians 
who had already emigrated, the majority of whom chose to live within the Green fine, at a time when the 
government was spending over $lbn on West Bank settlers, most of whom were Ashkenazim from America 
and Europe. The 1992 election result was primarily a domestic fight over the economy and the prioritisation 
and allocation of national resoui ces. Sephai dic voters, traditional supporters of Likud, turned to the Labour 
platform which argued for state money to be better spent in the poor neighbourhoods of greater Tel Aviv 
where so many Sephardim live than on low-cost mortgage settlers who commuted to work in Israel from the 
territories. The mood of high expectation for change, especially in employment, education and housing 
undoubtedly incorporated the desire for positive progress in the stalled peace process,*®®
During the hiatus provided by the Israeli election, a period of stocktaking was inevitable. For the 
Palestinians it was a time where the link between the PLO in Tunis and the Palestinian delegation became 
more explicit. A week after Arafat's plane crash in Libya, Ai'afat welcomed to Cairo on April 15, 1992 the 
whole delegation including its advisory committee. The institutionalising of this bond took place at the PLO 
Central Council, the 103-member decision making body of the PNC, which convened in Tunis between May 
7-10 1992 to discuss among other things, the peace process. The Council endorsed, by 57 votes to 16 
against, the continued participation of the Palestinians in the multilateral and bilateral negotiations. The 
Central Council sought to emphasise the issues concerning it. These were, the establishment of a Palestinian 
state with Jerusalem as its capital, Palestinian attachment to the principle of land for peace, international 
protection for Palestinian civilians and the holy places, the seizuie of land and the stopping of settlement 
construction, international pressure on aid to Israel, rejection of Israeli annexation of Jerusalem, the 
transitional period, Israeli intransigence, elections-both municipal and general, the confiiination of the PLO 
to form the Palestinian delegation, national unity and strengthening the intifada.^ ®® What made this meeting 
important, was not only did it mean that a Palestinian delegation, comprised of Palestinians from outside the 
territories, would participate in the multilateral working groups on refiigees and economic development, but
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also more symbolically, this meeting demonstrated the link between the PLO in Tunis and the Palestinian 
delegation, in that this was the first open and public PLO session attended by Madrid delegates. In order that 
a fait accompli be presented to the incoming Israeli govermnent, Ai'afat and other PLO officials publicly and 
formally received the Palestinian delegation in Amman on June 18, five days before the Israeli election.^ ®*
Rabin's election implied a change in the Israeli philosophy and tactics regarding the Palestinian 
delegation, particularly with reference to negotiating with the Palestinians directly rather than tlirough the 
joint delegation. The obvious inference in tliis stance as far as the Palestinians were concerned would be, the 
opening up of the negotiating process leading to direct talks between the PLO and the Israeli government, 
the inclusion of East Jerusalemites in the delegations, and with it the possibility of resolving outstanding 
issues such as the interim period, linkage between interim period and final status, and the extent of 
Palestinian central authority. New texts were drafted for presentation which would, it was hoped, lead to a 
basis for agreement in order to meet the target date of October 31, the objective for reaching agreement on 
interim self-government arrangements as proposed in the US-USSR letter of invitation.^®  ^ Expectations of 
progress surrounded the delegations as they prepared for renewed negotiations. This was particularly true 
for the Palestinians, who desired to negotiate either an interim agreement, or at least reach agreement on a 
fi?amework wliich would facilitate this process, in advance of the uncertamty of the November US 
presidential elections. However, nothing substantive was achieved.
Whilst it is obvious that 1992 did not represent an epochal political realignment, however the trends 
undercuiTent in Israeli domestic politics from early 1992 identify a strong shift in favour of practical politics 
as opposed to overt ideological politics. Since the intifada began to April 30,1994, there have been 219 
Israeli deaths (151 civilians) and 17,872 Israeli wounded (2,810 civilians), a fact which did not instil 
confidence in the Likud government’s policies. In the same period there were 1114 Palestinian deaths (plus 
922 killed by Palestinians) and 18,967 wounded.^ ®® The status quo provided for the conclusion that the 
current situation was no longer deemed an acceptable level of violence by many on both sides.^ ®'* Thus when 
discussing the impact of the 1992 Israeh election, it does seem that the differences between Likud and 
Labour were, 'quite significant, both in the realm of ideology and in the realm of practical pohcy' to the extent 
that as fai' as Israeh-Palestinian relations were concerned, 'the Labour 'vdctoi'y of Jime 1992, wliich ended a 
decade and a half of Likud hegemony, constitutes another watershed in Israel's relations with the 
Palestinians.'^®^
The new PM, Rabin, had coined the plirase, 'marching with two feet', to reflect the mihtary and the 
pohtical after the reahsation that the intifada was a pohtical problem.^®^  In a speech to the Knesset on July 
13, 1992, Rabin speUed out his government's depaituie with the past, saying 'we inherited the fiamework of 
the Madrid conference fi-om the previous government. But there is one significant change: the previous 
government created the tools, but they never intended to use them in order to achieve peace.'^ ®^  After 
winning the 1992 election, Rabin promised to divert resources to the absorption of immigrants, to social and 
economic reforms, to the wai' against unemployment and to better education.
Labour's victory in the Israeh elections had ahowed pro-Madrid Palestinians to beheve that there 
would be progress in the peace talks, because of Labour's promised peace pohcies, and the hope that the 
PLO would be included in the official diplomacy of the Madi'id fi*amework. However, the Palestinians were
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presented eai'ly on with a number of changes that did much to dispel their premature confidence in the new 
Rabin administration. On August 13 1992 James Baker was named as Wliite House Chief of Staff in order to 
organise and improve President Bush’s re-election chances, Demiis Ross, Baker’s key assistant was also 
removed fi om dftect personal supervision of the negotiations, thus making the Palestinians fear that the US 
administration was concentrating on domestic political concerns rather than trying to maintain the image of 
honest-broker in the process, balancing up Palestinian weakness relative to Israeli strength. When 
negotiations resumed in Washington DC on August 24th for round six of the büaterals, Elaykim Rubenstein, 
nominated by Shamir, remained as Israeli delegation head for the Israeli-Jordanian/ Palestinian bilateral talks. 
The Syrians presented at the sixth round their own declaration of principles for the Israeli-Syrian talks 
provoking Rabin's interest in the Syrian track, a development which the Palestinians viewed as an additional 
concern for its potential in signalling a separate Israeli-Syrian deal at Palestinian expense. Rabin pursued a 
'Syria fir st' position having started the talks fi*om a 'Syria last ' position. Having planned to concentrate on 
Palestinian autonomy first, he relegated the autonomy talks to lesser status.^ ®® During this period, all Israel 
offered was the delegation of tasks to the administration council, while the Palestinians maintained their 
insistence on a transfer of authority. The Palestinians chief complaint was the definition of territoriality, as 
geograpliical boundaries clearly delineated the limits of authority. Such a complaint has much justification 
and much precedence, e.g., wherever the king's writ runs, there is the king's power! The real problem for the 
Palestinians was that wliile the negotiations between Israel and the Arab states were intended to lead to final 
peace settlements, their talks were designed to produce only an interim solution. To get over this hurdle they 
called for a direct link between the interim self-government phase and the final status of the occupied 
territories.^®® Rabin retained the Defence Minister's portfolio, prompting memories of his previous 'iron-fist' 
tenure in 1984-90, indeed he resumed the policy of deportation, and various other repressive measures in the 
occupied territories, which in turn escalated radical opposition leading to an increase in violent attacks on 
Israelis, wliich in turn led to Rabm's decision to deport 415 Palestinians on December 17th fiom the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.
On December 18,1992 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 799, wliich condemned and 
opposed the Israeli action of deporting 415 Islamists to southern Lebanon, and which fiirther demanded that 
Israel ensure the immediate and safe return of all those deported. This resolution did not however lay down 
a timetable for the return of the deportees, nor did it outline any sanctions to be imposed on Israel for non- 
compliance. In an attempt to secure compliance of the resolution, UN General-Secretary Boutros Ghali sent 
two special envoys, James Jonah and Chinmaya Ghareklian, to Israel at the end of December and the 
beginning of January respectively, however both returned unsuccessful. In his report to the Security Council 
on January 25th 1993, the Secretary-General recommended that 'all necessary measures' be taken to ensure 
Israeli compliance with resolution 799, with a further proposal to establish a UN mechanism to monitor the 
situation in the occupied territories. The next day Ismat Abdel-Meguid, Secretary-General of the Arab 
League, responded to Israel's non-compliance with UN SCR 799, saying that it was liigh time that 'the 
Security Coimcil understood that the policy of double standards can no longer be pursued.'^ *® On January 
28th, Israel's Supreme Court unanimously rejected the appeal made on behalf of the deportees, continuing to 
rule that, whilst collective expulsion orders were illegal thus allowing each of the deportees to be heard
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individually, the individual expulsion orders issued on December 17th were valid, thus creating a legal 
precedent/** On New Year's Day a US-Israeli deal was brokered. Israel agreed that 101 deportees would 
be returned immediately with the rest having their period of exile halved to one year and humanitarian aid 
would be allowed to be provided by aft. In return the US guaranteed to veto any binding resolutions against 
Israel in international fora, to refrain from demanding any Israeli concessions, regardless of other interested 
parties or of US obligations vis-a-vis the peace process. Whilst the deal was rejected by the deportees, the 
PLO and other Arab countries who demanded compliance with UN SCR 799, Israel thus avoided a 
confrontation with the Secuiity Council at the same time as avoiding complying with the above resolution. 
Warren Christopher deemed as unnecessary further UN action, the EU followed the US lead and on February 
12th, the Security Council even endorsed the US policy as a 'step in the right direction'.^*  ^ The Arab 
countries were determined to prevent Hamas having a veto over the peace process. They did not see that an 
immediate settlement was a precondition for a resumption of the talks. However, this issue highlighted the 
fragility of the PLO's assumption of automatic political leadership. The PLO, as the principal Palestinian 
political force were concerned with not losing all credibility with theft people in the occupied territories by 
not being seen to support the deportees although they were engaged in a political battle for the hearts and 
minds of the Palestinian population with the Islamists, so they indicated that they might accept a phased 
return of the deportees over a period of six months, or alternatively an Israeli assurance that there would be 
an end to the policy of expulsions.
Bill Clinton's election as US President ensured a dramatic change in the priorities of the new US 
administration. The new Clinton Administration appear ed as one of the most openly pro-Israeli in some 
years.^ *® Clinton's campaign had focused on the domestic issues of the US economy, the budget deficit and 
health care reform. Insofar as Clinton's expressed interest in foreign policy goals, tliis was limited to how far 
international issues impacted on domestic affairs, in particular on the domestic economy. The impact of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the prospects of a trade war with Europe and Japan due 
to disagreements in the Uruguay Roimd of the GATT talks, the potential crisis of thousands of Haitian 
refugees arriving in the US following the military coup deposing President Aristide, and the slaughter in 
Bosnia, were seen as the major issues to be addressed by the incoming administration. As far as the Madrid 
peace process was concerned, the new administration tended to mouth the typical stock plnases of support 
and hope for theft continuation and prospects for peace in the future.
Sections of the pro-Israel lobby in the US had in the course of the election campaign tried to tar 
President Bush and Secretary Baker as anti-Israeli, or even anti-semitic in the wake of theft stance over the 
$10bn loan guaiantees. Clinton and his Vice-President Gore did not hide their support for Israel, either pre 
or post-election. Securing a high percentage of Jewish voters whilst polling one of the lowest percentages of 
votes cast for a winning candidate in decades, Clinton would be unlikely to change his pro-Israel stance 
regar ding the peace process, especially in light of the fact that leading Palestinian negotiators had openly 
supported Bush's re-election. The Arab participants in the peace process and the Palestinians in particular 
had expected a Republican triumph, expecting Secretary Baker to be back at the forefront of US foreign 
policy, especially returning to active duty in the peace process.
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Clinton's nominations for the vacated posts at State and the National Security Council (NSC) 
reflected his intentions, if not his debts. Warren Cliristopher was nominated to State. He was a former 
senior Carter administration official who had been closely involved in the Camp David Accords and was co- 
chaiiinan of Clinton's transition team. Senior ranks at State and the NSC were staffed with people known for 
their admiration for Israel. For example, Samuel Lewis a former US ambassador to Israel replaced Dennis 
Ross, and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake, his deputy Sandy Berger, and the principle analyst on the 
Middle East, Mai'tin Indyk, were all known for theft sympathies for Jemsalem. By these nominations,
Clinton, who expressed liis desfte to focus on domestic issues, delegated US foreign policy in the Middle 
East to people whose impartiality was somewhat circumspect. Relations between Washington and Jerusalem 
improved markedly. A visit by PM Rabin to the new president was particularly warm, with the inference that 
future US-Israeli relations would not be soured in the same vein as the previous administration's attempts, 
both to exert pressure on Israel, and to appeal- impaitial with regard to the Madrid process. US-Israeli 
strategic security cooperation agreements were renewed, and to aU intents and purposes, the US did not 
publicly oppose Israel's defiance of UN SCR resolution 799 regarding the Palestinian deportees. Repeated 
statements aimed at ending the Arab boycott of Israel and commending the new Israeli administration, 
together with a lack of pressui e on Israel regarding the deportees and settlements, aU combined to give the 
Palestinians the impression that the new US administration had repudiated even the tenuous attempt of the 
previous administration at impartiality as an honest broker.
During Christopher's Middle East tour he stressed the US's desfte to be a fiill partner in the peace 
process, and he reiterated that the US would continue Bush's policy of peace talks, promoting democracy 
and non-conventional arms control. US policy was however deemed to be somewhat hypocritical 
particularly in light of events in the former Yugoslavia where Bosnia's Muslim population was left to suffer at 
the liands of homicidal Serbs, a point not lost on the Ai ab populations. The perception therefore in the Arab 
world was then one of US disingenuousness, especially when viewed in relation to the alacrity and extent of 
the US response in aiding Kuwait. This issue pitted the PLO's continued involvement in the peace process at 
odds with general popular feeling within the occupied territories, which feared resuming discussions with an 
Israeli government that evoked Palestinian fears of a repeat of 1948 and 1967.
In Washington the 9th round of bilateral talks opened on April 27, 1993 after a hiatus of nearly five 
months due to the expulsion of Palestinian activists to Lebanon. The newly elected Clinton administration 
stepped up its involvement in the process. Reversing a 26 year-old American policy, a paper presented by 
the US accepted the Israeli claim that East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and Gaza were disputed 
and not occupied territories. For the Palestinians, tliis represented a new and alarming change in dir ection of 
the talks, something in all fairness they just could not coimtenance. The American model was a non-starter 
for the Palestinians, 'it signified and exemplified to large extent the total impasse we were in - the strictures of 
Madrid actually threw up a wall. I think one of the problems is that once the American team devised theft 
model, they developed what could be called a 'Pygmalion complex' and couldn't let go of theft Madrid 
formula.'^ *"* Thus at the end of 20 months and 10 rounds of talks: the Madrid process was not producing 
results. At this stage Rabin could be said to be faced with two alternatives: [1] deal with Syria, which would 
entail full withdr awal and the dismantling of Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights (to be preceded with a
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referendum on the Golan because of annexation in 1981-never an easy option for an incumbent government) 
or; [2] deal with the Palestinians (not necessarily the PLO) on interim self-government which did not entail 
an immediate commitment to withdraw from the West Bank, to territorial compromise, to a referendum, or 
to dismantle Jewish settlements/*^
The Oslo backchannel represented for the first time, albeit unofficially, the dir ect participation of the 
PLO, at the highest level, in the Madrid peace process. The difference with the secret Oslo channel 
negotiations was that they succeeded in accomplislrmg Israeli-PLO dialogue and agreement. The Madrid 
framework incorporated Israeli-Palestinian dialogue within the formula of a split-bilateral process, wliich in 
essence was an offshoot of the formal Israeli-Jordanian bilateral negotiations, the Palestinians being 
incorporated into the Jordanian delegation in order to sidestep the issue of a separate and official PLO- 
Palestinian representation wliich the Israelis initially refused to recognise.
The evolution of Israeli-Palestinian mutual recognition and political negotiation, for Israel, stems 
from coming to terms with three hard facts. Firstly, Israel is, and must be, 'part of the Middle East' and must 
either 'gain acceptance and legitimacy in the region or be faced with an unresolved situation'.^*® For David 
Ben-Gurion, 'Levantinisation' was as 'great a danger to Israel's society as was Aiab hostility.' Ben-Gurion 
acted on the 'premise tliat Israel must be a modern society. Western in its parliamentary pluralist politics and 
in its orientation on science and technology. He saw the surrounding countries as a morass of backwardness 
and rejected their culture en bloc. This was the root of the rift between the Labour party leaders, who 
envisioned a modern socialist society, and the traditional Jews of the Sephardi communities, who were seen 
and treated by the ruling Labour* party as backwar d children, to be tutored and encouraged, but not 
consulted.' Tliis emphasis on a secular, scientific and technologically based state formed the basis of Israel's 
dominant socialist politics and policies since statehood. This policy concentration has caused great divisions 
in Israeli society between Ashkenazim, Sephardim and Mizr acliim, between a Eur opean and a Levantitie 
outlook. The emergence of respect for the important role that the Sephardic community plays in Israeli 
society and politics has played its part in educating Israelis about Palestinians. Common cause among 
Sephardic Jews has been important in understanding Palestinian grievances.^ *^ Secondly, demography 
demands that if Israel wishes to retain control over the occupied territories, with its growing Arab 
population, Israel's democratic char acter or its Jewish identity will suffer, because
'Tire proposition that in holding the West Bank and Gaza, Israel doomed itself to giving up either its 
democratic or its Jewish character was first enimciated only a few weeks after the Six Day War. At a 
symposium at the Hebrew University, Nissan Oren explained to an overflow audience of students, 
almost all recently returned from the battlefronts, that maintaining control over the Ar abs of the West 
Bank and Gaza would inevitably involve Israel in acts of repression and in depriving the Palestinians 
of civil rights, which would erode the democratic nature of Israel's regime and society. If Israel 
annexed the territories and conferred citizenship on the Palestinians, the high bir*thrate of the latter 
would quickly bring about the loss of the Jewish majority in Israel, and though the state might be 
democratic, Israel would cease to be a Jewish and Zionist state.'^ *®
Rabin, speaking as Defence Minister in the mid-1980s, said that Israel needed the 'goodwill of friends 
like the US, which requires our being seen as morally in the right', and that Israeli repression of the intifada
113
was causing many to View us as no different than our enemies', a catastrophe, both 'for oui* soul and for the 
support we need'. Rabin believed that nothing good would come from the blunt application of force, 'real 
peace here will come only when the Ai abs move' fr om their grudging acceptance of'the fact of oui* existence' 
to an appreciation of Israel's 'right to exist. Our power can guarantee us as a fact probably forever, but who 
wants to live frke that?'^ *® Tliirdly, Israel should not feai* negotiations with any Palestinian political 
representative body that will recognise Israel's right to exist in agreed and secure boundaries as specified by 
UN SCRs 242 and 338, and will renounce politically motivated terrorism and violence. Thus Israeli public 
acceptance can be assured given that Israel should negotiate with any Palestinian faction wliich would 
recognise respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political 
independence of Israel and its right to live in peace within secure and recognised boimdaries free from tlireats 
or acts of force, as stipulated in UN SCRs 242 and 338.
The Labour alignment victoiy in the 1992 elections brought these three principles into the centre 
ground in Israeli politics. However, these points by themselves were not enough to form the basis of the 
secret Israeli-Palestinian dialogue, they merely reflected a growing acceptance by a significant proportion of 
the Israeli electorate and political establishment that the status quo-ante was unsustainable.^^® The step 
towards mutual recognition depended on a number of factors which, only when combined led to the Israeli- 
Palestinian breakthrough, factors which had the timings been different may never have influenced the 
willingness to negotiate. These factors included:
(1) The reconfiguration of the international structur e fr om a bipolar to a unipolar one. This meant that the 
Israelis and Palestinians had to reassess theft positions. The Palestinians lost the political backing and 
logistical support of theft superpower advocate, the USSR. The Israelis feared that they were no longer such 
an important strategic ally of the US, uncertain of theft friture relationship with the US, and the US's Middle 
Eastern strategic policies and economic commitments^^*;
(2) A realignment of the political relations within the Middle East. The Second Gulf War and the resurgence 
of radical Islamist movements forced a re-evaluation by many of the wealthier, conservative Arab states of 
theft priorities. The steady rise of contemporary radical Islam in Iran, Sudan, Algeria, Lebanon and political 
violence in Egypt forced many states, to be more sensitive to theft* vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and to 
consider the containment of such radicalism as theft most important priority rather than continuing 
opposition to Israel. Israel and the PLO shared similar concerns with regard to radical Islamic opponents. 
Israel had encouraged the initial efforts of Hamas in Gaza as a counter to PLO influence, however the Hamas 
movement provided the ideological and physical backbone to the intifada, being the most violent and 
inflexible movement unwilling to consider accommodation with Israel. The PLO found themselves feai'ing a 
haemorrhage in popular support to the Islamists which in turn would diminish theft position and power as 
leader of the Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories^^^; and,
(3) The demonstrable will and investitm e of authority by the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships in the pursuit 
of peace. The cut in financial aid and receipts to the PLO following the Guff conflict meant that Ai*afat's 
ability to employ the politics of patronage within the Palestinian national movement was curtailed severely. 
Compounding this was the wane of PLO external support from the USSR. Arafat therefore had to reassess 
liis options. The Madrid framework provided a positive, albeit limited opportunity, for the PLO. The
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framework initially only offered the PLO semi-legitimacy, but when the talks bogged down Arafat sought 
new channels of communication to the Israeli leadership. To up-grade the PLO's status Ar afat would have to 
accept the conditions of, recognition of Israel and the renunciation of terrorism and violence against Israel. 
Arafat was influenced and pressur ed fr om a number of dir ections. By Hamas, par ticularly in Gaza. By the 
emergence of a West Bank PLO leadership whose direct influence in determining the policies of the intifada 
brought them frequently into conflict with PLO Tunis. By mortality, he was in a plane crash at age 65.^ ^^
On assuming office, Rabin set about redefining and reordering Israel's priorities, stating to the Knesset that as 
he had once led Israel's forces to victory in 1967, he regar ded making peace as the culmination of liis 
work.^ '^* Rabin stated liis government's priorities; the exploitation of the opportunities arising from the 
collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war and the military action against Iraq, mass immigration from 
Russia, giving rise to the advancement of Israeli life in the ar eas of national and personal security, peace, the 
prevention of war, unemployment, prevention of emigration, economic growth, fortification of the 
foundations of democracy, the rule of law, equality and human rights. The government would work towards 
the creation of a new Middle East devoted to development, grounded in economic, cultural and scientific 
cooperation. Peace would be based on recognition, by the Arab states and the Palestinians, of Israel as a 
sovereign state in the region and of its right to live in peace and security. The government would advance 
the peace process with the Palestinians without preconditions, within the Madrid formula, by proposing as an 
interim arrangement, a programme for the implementation of self-administration for the Palestinians in Judea, 
Samaria and Gaza, and refrain fr om courses of action that would obstruct the proper coirduct of 
negotiations.^^^
The turn towards peace by Rabin was possible because of the acknowledgement of a number of 
factors. Israel was militarily strong with powerfril friends and not isolated and weak. In bringing the DoP to 
the Knesset for ratification, PM Rabin said that Israelis 'must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us 
m tlirall for almost half a centuiy.' Israel 'must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation, 
and cooperation that is sweeping the entire globe... lest we be the last ones to remain, all alone'.^ ^® The 
establishment of a Palestinian state, or 'state-let' would not be a mortal threat to Israel's existence. Without 
the PLO, any deal with the Palestinians would neither have the legitimacy nor the support of the majority of 
the Palestinian people thus giving greater credence to Palestinian radical elements, both temporal and secular. 
Rabin argued that liis militaiy credentials meant that he was the only man who could be trusted by the Israeh 
pubhc to dehver a peace that was in Israel's best interests. The Likud's fictitious stance at Madrid where the 
Israeh government negotiated with a Palestinian delegation, albeit formaUy part of the Jordanian delegation, 
made up of representatives of the West Bank and Gaza and not members of the PLO, highhghted to the 
Israeh pubhc the absurdity of the situation and prepared them for the more pragmatic inevitabihty of 
negotiating pubhcly with the PLO. Wliilst both Palestinians and Israehs may have agreed that a pohtical 
solution would be logical, bringing people toward peace would mean overcoming yeai s of distrust and feai*. 
The choice of Rabin as the Labour candidate for PM therefore incorporated a hard-line image of a tough, 
soldier-pohtician and respected negotiator, coupled with the constant mantra of'peace with security' in the 
election message of the Labour party.^^  ^ Rabin's election meant both the Palestinians and the Israehs had 
leaders that possessed the personal authority to negotiate a pohtical solution that could be trusted by the
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majority of their respective peoples. The Palestinian community had enjoyed enthusiasm and energy from the 
outbreak of the intifada, however, five and a half years on, weariness, economic malaise and the feeling that 
there was no end in sight combined to depress the population, A combination of factors manoeuvi ed 
Palestinian consciousness away fr om confr ontation to conciliation with Israel. Palestinians worried over, their 
childrens' fritures, curfews, closures, taxes and deprivation, the realisation that the intifada had resulted in an 
increased Israeli presence in the fonn of soldiers, settlers, and Soviet immigrants, and the spread of inter- 
Palestinian violence - fr om December 1987-December 22 1993, 964 Palestinians were killed by Palestinians 
as opposed to 1,067 killed by Israelis.^^ ® Additionally secular nationalists such as those who supported the 
PLO feared being marginalised by the rise of the militant, radical and violent Islamic opposition to Israel, 
which was a departure from the earlier collaborative mass non-violent civil protest which characterised the 
intifada. These factors proved conducive to a popular* willingness to consider a negotiated Israeli-Palestinian 
settlement. However, these conditions were, whilst necessai*y factors, not enough to guarantee successful 
negotiations. The final factor was that both Israeli and Palestinian public opinion coincided and aligned in 
their desire and readiness to achieve political accommodation, an element hitherto missing from previous 
attempts. Israeli and Palestinian public opinion although reserving final judgement on the pur ity of the peace, 
had to invest enough goodwill for the peace to be nurtured in order to grow. Public consent would also 
confer the requisite legitimacy to the process.
The intifada was just as important an Iristorical event for the Israelis as for the Palestinians. Coming 
so soon after the morass of Lebanon, the intifada stripped Israelis of the illusion that they were benevolent 
occupiers, bringing civilisation and prosperity to the Palestinians. Critical self-examination found that force 
could not make the Palestinian problem disappear. The generational change in Israel fostered a more relaxed 
and self-confident Jewish population, so allied with the pride of the recent massive Soviet and Ethiopian 
Jewish immigration, the realisation that Israel's destiny was not best served enslaving Palestinians but building 
the Jewish state encouraged many Israelis to withdiaw theft support fr'om Likud in 1992. The feeling was 
that massive immigration provided an economic opportunity for businesses, in increased demand for housing, 
consumer goods, etc. Beyond the immediate boom, many Israelis began to sense that economic prosperity 
could be deepened, widened and prolonged through the opening up of mar kets m Africa, Asia and the Middle 
East. Occupation was not only a drain on human and material resources but also a political millstone that 
denied Israelis access to economic progress.
‘Greater Land of Israel’ advocates have hoped for two demographic outcomes. Firstly, they wished 
for Jewish aliya m significant numbers. However, demographers have outlined that immigration, even in 
massive proportions, would only delay an Palestinian Arab majority by only a few years on the basis of 
approximately one year for every hundred thousand new immigrants.^^® Secondly, Arab emigration and a 
natural reduction in Arab birthrates. Ironically, Likud's settlement building programme from 1977 created an 
economic boom which not only attracted Palestinians seeking work elsewhere but also enabled Palestinians 
to eschew emigration.^^® F. Gottherl shows the out-migration balance of the West Bank dropping steadily 
from a high of 23.7 per 1000 population in 1980 to 6.1 per 1000 in 1986. Although Gottheil attempted to 
make a case against the 'demographic argument,' he noted that the drop in out-migration and the very young 
composition of the population presage a major and rapid growth of the Palestinian population.^^* With the
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intifada, brought the concept of forced 'transfer' of the Palestinian population into Israeli politics, embraced 
by Rehavam Zeevi's Moledet party, which won three seats in the 1992 elections Knesset. Among the general 
Israeli population was not only a distaste for such a policy of'transfer', there was also the realisation that the 
occupied territories chr onic problems, and the political extremism which arose as a result would not 
disappear, that Israel would liave to deal with the Palestinians in some form or other. The 1992 election 
characterised the swing from a Greater Israel policy with the emphasis on territory to parties which 
addressed the broader issues of social, economic and political well-being, concentrating on reordering social, 
economic and security priorities. The 1992 election highlighted Israeli willingness to listen to the promoters 
of coexistence and mutually profitable cooperation, reflecting the Israeli mixtur e of empathy and scepticism 
of the Palestinians that characterises volatile Israeh pubhc opinions.^^  ^ Thus it could be argued that the 
pubhc debate in both communities moved, albeit slowly and not uniformly, fr om a question of survival to a 
question of quahty of life, fr om whether security considerations were more important than finding common 
cause for bettering their cliildrens' fritures.
The DoP did not occur in a pohtical vacuum. Necessary changes to previously held personal, 
pohtical, and strategic visions were critical in producing the envir onment conducive to revolutionary and 
historic understandings. Between 1991-1993 the Israehs and Palestinians discovered some fundamental 
truths about one another.^^^
Palestinians who favoured a negotiated settlement with Israel reahsed that such a settlement would 
not be reached through improving relations with the US, rather they concluded that a settlement, negotiated 
directly with the Israehs, would lead to improved relations with the US. Israeh pubhc opinion, plrlegmatic at 
the best of times, concluded pragmaticahy in 1992 that negotiating a deal with the Palestinians, including the 
PLO, would not only hopefrihy materiaUy affect their daily hves in removing an element of fear and 
uncertainty of random violence, it would also preclude more pohtically divisive settlements such as with 
Syria. Moreover PM Rabin became increasingly convinced of President Ezer Weizman's argument, that 
miless Israel deal with the PLO, only Hamas would remain.^ '^* Many Israehs also concluded that trying to 
circumvent the PLO in any negotiated settlement with the Palestinians was merely wishful thinking - the 
reahty was that the PLO was the only credible partner. Both sides also concluded that estabhshing 
cooperation and trust tlii'ough the negotiation of an interim settlement could dramaticahy affect the 
possibihty of ever being able to determine emotionahy charged final status issues. By defusing tensions on 
tlie streets by means of an interim agreement in order to estabhsh goodwiU and build confidence, a more 
conducive enviromnent to construct new arrangements could be created, a task wliich would be almost 
impossible otherwise.
Rabm's return to pohtical power coincided with a general trend in Israeh society towards pragmatism. 
Two months before the election, Shamir was asked if he considered himself an ideologue or merely a hard 
bargainer. Shamil' said, 'Without ideology, you can't achieve anything serious.' 'Tacticians [who lack] 
ideology wih not acliieve anything. Someone with ideology has the possibihty of getting help fr om tacticians, 
but the top priority is ideology.' Shamir expressed admiration for V.I. Lenin, saying 'Lenin succeeded in 
getting events under control and directing their course as he desired, Lenin was a genius ...He orchestrated 
everything tlieoreticahy in his brain and he acted according to liis theoretical model...[T]he ideals were
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inflated and unjustified-it's a fact where they led to. But Russia is still waiting for [another] man like this.'^ ^  ^
Wliilst Rabin did not explicitly campaign on a 'land-for-peace' policy, even though Labour party policy 
explicitly proposed territorial compromise, he campaigned for increasing Palestinian self-rule in, but not over, 
the West Bank, insisting that responsibility for secuiity would remain with Israel. Rabin did not confuse 
Israelis desire for their government to explore genuine peace initiatives, either unilaterally or in response to 
overtures, with their concern for campaign commitments to wholesale territorial concessions. Rabin 
campaigned on liis strength that he was the only politician with both the will and the credibility to pursue 
peace. Rabin's depar ture from previous conventional wisdom was in his belief that Palestinian terror was not 
an existential threat to Israel, rather it was an issue of personal security, which would be resolved not by 
more conflict but through negotiations with the Palestinians. Autonomy for the Palestinians therefore meant 
personal security for Israelis, that is, no teiTorism within the Green Line. Coexistence would be achieved by 
a separation of the two peoples, religions and political entities. In a rare TV address on January 24, 1995 
following a double suicide bombing near Netanya claiming 21 Israelis - all but one young soldiers, Rabin 
returned to the theme of separation. He said Israel must continue negotiating 'to bring about a separation 
between Israelis and Palestinians, but not [along] the pre-1967 borders. Jerusalem must remain united 
forever, and the security border of Israel must be the Jordan River.
With Rabin's well known distaste for conventional politics, his political standing derived more directly 
from the electorate than from his party, therefore public opinion played a greater role in influencing his policy 
making, particularly with regard to politically motivated violence stemming from the unresolved Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict. Thus the action-reaction cycle flguied more prominently within the decision-making 
process. The deportation of 415 Islamists in December 1992, followed the killings of 8 IDF officers in a 12- 
day period, culminating with the kidnap and murder of Sgt. Nissim Toledano in central Israel. Chief of Staff 
Barak advocated the deportations to fight terrorism. Rubinstein warned that deportations would prompt an 
Arab boycott of the negotiations. Rothschild anticipated international condemnation and that the UN would 
impose sanctions, advising Rabin that newly appointed Lebanese PM Rafik Hariri's actions could not be 
predicted and could potentially embarrass Israel. No high-level official anticipated events, as Hariri refijsed to 
accept the deportees leaving them stranded in no-man's-land thus providing the Israelis with an international 
public relations disaster. Some lower-level IDF officers reportedly anticipated events, one source claiming 
that Barak received their analysis but did not pass it to the PM. Rabin later admitted that he thought Lebanon 
would accept the 415, and he blamed the IDF for poor execution of the operation.^^^ The deportations did 
not put an end to violence. In March, a wave of spontaneous, unorganised fatal stabbings by Palestinians day 
labourers, laigely within the Green Line, alarmed the Israeli public who were fed hysterical headlines during a 
viscious newspaper war between Ma'ariv and Yediot Aharonot. Such violence could not be easily interdicted 
by the GSS, therefore in order to be seen to act, Rabin, who had previously rejected calls for sealing the 
occupied territories in response to attacks, implemented a total closure despite almost universal opposition 
from the defence establishment. In order to offset the loss of work to 120,000 Palestinian day labour ers, 
Rabin initiated a large-scale public works programme increasing employment from 8,000 to 40,000. 
Unintentionally closure reinforced the notion that the reimposition of the Green Line, i.e. separation, would 
bring safety. Separation proved very popular* in Israel, 'The public just doesn't want to be knifed, ...It cares
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less about where the border is than the fact that it exists and the Arabs are on the other side.' Likud opposed 
closure and the resurrection of the Green Line, because it physically, and dramatically, reinforced political 
and ideological distance between the settlers and the rest of Israel through the feeling of separation whilst 
undermining the Greater Land of Israel ideology, and encouraged the notion of an independent Palestinian 
entity. Labour seized the political opportunity to attack Likud, 'The difference between Likud and Labom-, is 
that the Likud wants the Arabs over here, and we want them over there.
Events on Israel's northern border also helped play a part in the peace programme, albeit in a 
convoluted sense. The IDF-Hezballah cycle of retaliation escalated into a major border clash on July 25 
1993. Hezballah fired Katyushas into northern Israel in retaliation for civilian casualties fi'om IDF bombings 
of guerrilla installations in villages beyond Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon. Rabm 
warned Assad that Israel would take decisive action to end the attacks. Assad, however, insisted through US 
officials that Hezballah had the right to resist the IDF in southern Lebanon and liberate theft country. Under 
public pressure for a response, Barak laid out a complex plan to bomb the south, create a mass exodus of 
Lebanese refugees, thus forcftig PM Hariri and President Elias Hrawi to plead with Assad to call off 
Hezballah, in turn forcing Syria to turn to the US to broker a cease-fire. The cabinet approved the plan on 
July 26. The US brokered a compromise, reminiscent of the deportations issue. A cease-fii e was worked out 
within five days. Under the cease-fire, Hezballah committed to refirain fi'om hitting Israeli towns, as long as 
Israel did not bomb villages outwith the security zone unless it could determine the exact location of attacks. 
Thus Rabin scored points with Israeli public opinion. Several US officials privately held that the US had 
'bailed out Rabin and B a r a k .A l l  these actions were taken in response to public uni'est following violent 
episodes directed at Israelis. Taking such decisions to inflict great pain and suffering was predicated on 
providing an image of a leader not scared to take extreme measures on behalf of Israeli public opinion. What 
was important in these acts was not the acts per se, but the portrayal of an image of willingness to engage in 
violence either to assuage crude Israeli desires for vengeance or to offset the impression that being interested 
in pursuing accommodation with ones enemies meant being weak in extremis, thus ensuring the political 
survival of the government and founding credibility for any fiiture negotiated agreements.
Rabin well knew that whilst he and the Labour-led coalition had been elected, Israeli public opinion's 
knee-jerk response to Palestinian violence and general security matters was more akin to the Likud's. 
Therefore Eitan Haber, Rabin's speech writer told him, 'If you want to make drastic concessions on peace, 
you must show the public you can take drastic measures for security.' Thus Rabin announced that Israel 
would 'pursue peace as if there were no terrorism, and fight terrorism as if there were no peace process'.^ '*®
One of the striking featui'es of conducting Israeli-Palestinian secret diplomacy is the relatively similai*, 
highly personalised nature, of the sides' decision-making apparatus, both of the PLO and of the Israeli 
government. Within the confines of such strictures, the power of personality is of great importance. Whilst 
the PLO reflects a structure which is highly representative of guerrilla/quasi-military national liberation 
movement, the Israeli decision-making process is neither institutionalised nor is the notion of collective 
cabinet responsibility highly developed. Rabin, as PM and Defence Minister held enormous power, with 
wide-ranging authority. As most Israeli PMs are higlfiy aware of, and experienced in Israel's main foreign 
and defence issues, professional, civilian inter-agency staffs and task forces would probably only serve to
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complicate and obstruct the decision-making process. The IDF plays such a central and dominant role in 
Israeli policy making, that its remit and its competencies with regard to security surpass that of any other 
governmental agency, particularly in regard to intelligence-gathering capabilities. No other agency is deemed 
sufficiently informed to offer alternative views. What makes Oslo remarkable is the central role the Foreign 
Ministry played in the initiation, formulation, and definition of strategy and policymaking. Whilst a 
ministerial committee for national security exists (consisting the PM, a dozen senior ministers, and military 
advisers), convening weekly, its authority extends to approving military operations, having no more actual 
influence or authority than the cabinet. On the occasions of the deportations, closur es, and Operation 
Accountability, Rabin merely sought formal approval fi'om the inner cabinet and the fiiU cabinet for decisions 
already taken. Neither debated nor influenced the final outcome. With the DoP, both inner and fiill cabinets 
not only did not know of, or were kept abreast of, the existence of the Oslo channel. They were both asked 
to ratify the DoP after its conclusion, being neither allowed to demand substantive changes nor given 
sufficient time to study the document minutely. There were two exceptions to this trend, however, both of 
which related to the peace process. In October 1992, the cabinet vetoed plans to stage deep-penetration 
bombing raids into Lebanon, fearing it could lead to a repeat of the 1982 Lebanon War, and in March 1994, 
the cabinet voted for a commission of inquiry into the Hebron massacre against the wishes of Rabin, who 
feared it could only sully the IDF’s morale.
For the Israelis, the ability of legendary rivals, Peres and Rabin to cooperate so closely on such a 
politically sensitive undertaking as an Israeli-Palestinian peace was of great importance, paiticularly given 
their past animosity and their 'differing strategic visions of Israel's future, contrasting management styles and 
sharply distinctive personalities'. '^** Through in the 1990s Peres was considered the dove to Rabin's hawk, it 
was not always thus. Peres had been previously associatedwith Dayan and the hawkish Rafi faction, whereas 
Rabin had been associated witli the Ahdut Ha'avoda faction of liis mentor, Yigal Allon, who favoured 
withdi awal firom parts of the occupied territories in a condominium airangement with Jordan. Dui'ing the 
Peres-Rabin power struggle in 1974, Dayan backed Peres, Allon backed Rabin. Peres's lack of combat 
experience in a coimtry full of old soldiers has always counted against him, despite numerous highly 
important appointments witliin the defence establishment throughout his career. A senior Peres adviser 
described a key difference between theft approaches: 'Rabin takes the public position of the other side as 
beftig final, while Peres sees public pronouncements as an opening position to be modified in backroom 
negotiations'. '^*  ^ However, Peres and Rabin found common cause in pragmatism as neither was ideologically 
committed to retaining the West Bank, nor motivated to view Israel’s security in ideological terms. Rabin 
believed that whilst there are obviously limits to the practical application of military force to achieve political 
objectives, strategically speaking, diplomacy which was not backed with the implied threat of military force 
was not productive. Rabin also believed in the supremacy of a conventional military force. Peres believed 
security was relative, that secm ity was not only a state of mind, but also that security wliilst dependent on 
militaiy power was equally dependent on economic strength and well being. Thus in strategic terms, 
particularly in relation to theft attitudes to the Palestinian question, the two envisioned Israel's future well­
being in relatively similar terms, Peres dreamed of a Middle East economic and political regional 
interrelationship similar to the EU wliich worked to bury past animosities, whereas Rabin remained a sceptic
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rather than an enthusiast. To persuade Rabin to pursue Oslo, Peres focused on security issues, used third- 
party assessments to back his views, playing down the significance of controversial proposals. A Peres aide 
said, 'Sliimon may not say that the result of this down the road is a Palestinian state. Those conclusions he 
would leave for Rabin to make himself.' A senior Peres aide said 'Shimon played down the significance of 
talking with the PLO,' instead of talking about it 'as a revolutionary step, he would teh Rabin that it was 
something to try, and if it did not work, it did not work.' '^*^  Peres claimed Rabin usually instinctively rejected 
his ideas, however some believed Rabin involved Peres in negotiations to distance himself fiom them. Rabin 
ally and Agricultur e Minister Yaacov Tsui* recalled that Rabin told him, 'I have given Peres some slack, under 
certam conditions.'^ '*'*
However, despite their differences, the two managed to cooperate, conceptually, politically, secretly 
and personally over the Oslo backchannel, particularly fiom March/April 1993 onwards, when Rabin needed 
Peres's political backing in light of the deportations and closure issues. Peres was the only other senior 
member of Rabm's cabinet with the political clout and the most experience with regard to international and 
security issues. Peres also realised that the survival of the Rabm administration depended on breaking 
ground on the peace processes. Thus Rabin drew Peres into his confidence, over the course of many private 
meetings and sessions, where the two covered broad principles regarding the direction of the Israeli 
negotiating team's strategy for the Oslo channel. Unfortunately much of the content of these meetings 
remains unknown.
Regarding Oslo, Rabin eschewed civilian and military analytical advice and policy conceptualisation in 
favour of his personal experience, his analytical focus and his decision making abilities. Rabin prefeiTcd to 
receive raw IDF intelligence without conclusions so he could determine his own, so that his policy 
formulation regarding Oslo liad no alternative intellectual counterweight to that being collectively formulated 
in great detail at the Foreign Ministry under the talents of Yossi Beilin. Without Rabin's goodwill and 
authority, the DoP would have been stillborn. However without Beilin, the DoP would never have been 
initiated. Peres subsequently put his political weight to the backcharmel in March before Rabin became deeply 
involved. Beilin formulated position papers, conceived the ideas that developed the process to the highest 
political level, and played a central role in decision making throughout the process. '^*  ^ Rabin excluded the 
military, therefore the Foreign Ministry over which he had no dftect responsibility dominated policymaking, 
an astonishing denouement, particularly when Rabin was well known for his military background and 
preference for military people and their advice. Peres felt that Rabin did not involve the IDF in decision 
making because he regarded Oslo as a futile exercise. A senior Peres aide said 'I think in the beginning Rabin 
didn't want to tell Barak and a couple others because he did not tliink Oslo was serious, but as things became 
serious, he did not consult them because he did not want them to slow him down.' A senior Rabin aide said 
the generals 'would have sought more time to try to nail down details, such as the level of security 
arrangements, control of the bridges, and the size of Jericho.' Rabin did 'not believe that negotiations could 
go on too long in Oslo without leaking. He believed militaiy people would just slow tilings down, and that 
details could be dealt with in the implementation.' '^*® Whilst senior IDF officers later criticised the security 
'holes' in the DoP, no evidence suggests that any of the top three generals would have opposed a PLO take­
over of Gaza and Jericho. Yossi Ben-Aharon, director-general of the PM's bureau during the Shamir
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govermnent, said that, together with GSS head, Yaacov Peri, 'there is not a Likudnik among them.' The three 
senior IDF officers were known to favour progress with Syria to alter the region's strategic equation. Saguy 
was a 'Syria First' advocate, '^*  ^ However Shahak's views on the Palestinians were moderate. As head of 
military intelligence in 1987, he reported to the Knesset Foreign Affafts and Defence committee that the PLO 
was the only representative of the Palestinians, repeating this assertion during a verbal presentation of the 
March 1989 annual intelligence assessment to Shamir, Rabin, Peres, and Moshe Arens. Peri, who had 
operational responsibility for dealing with Palestinian violence, was known to favoui* accommodation over 
ideology. Though appoitited by Sliamii' in April 1988, aroimd October 1991, Peri issued an internal directive 
ordering Shin Bet to prepare for the prospect of protecting Israelis security during Palestinian autonomy. 
Although there is no evidence that Rabin consulted Peri about Oslo, it seems clear that Peri supported the 
general thrust. Barak also favom*ed accommodation in return for secuiity and peace, believing that Israel 
'must limit friction with the Aiabs' to mitigate longer-term regional threats. Making peace with Israel's 
immediate neighbours fits into a broader regional strategy. Barak has said 'We have no control over whether 
Iran will have non conventional nuclear capabilities in another ten years,' but 'Given this long-term 
uncertainty, it is not an exaggerated risk to attempt to relax the conflict in our immediate circle, including 
with Lebanon and Syria... as long as we do not waive oui' vital security interests.' Wliilst 'On one hand, the 
Palestinians are weak,' Barak said, 'On the other hand, they are perceived by [Israeli] citizens to be the source 
of terror and day-to-day frictions, and they legitimise pan-Arab hostility toward Israel. As long as we reduce 
[Palestinian] terror without damaging any of Israel's vital interests by smoothing relations with them, it will 
be more difficult to motivate hostile acts against us from Benghazi to Teheran.'^ '*® Other members of the IDF 
General Staff favoured Rabin's strategy of promoting secure and peaceful accommodation with neighbouring 
Arabs to allow Israel to face future threats from Iran and Iraq. Rothschild, ex-deputy head of military 
intelligence, believed negotiations with the Palestinians should be based on pragmatism rather than ideology. 
However precisely because of the politically sensitive nature of the Oslo negotiations Rabin decided not to 
consult the IDF, neither demanding strategy formulation, nor seeking IDF advice on the finer points of the 
document being negotiated. Barak defended Rabin's exclusion of the military from Oslo, saying that 'the real 
decision Rabin made, and I believe a justifiable one, was not to involve people in uniform at even the highest 
position in shaping the political decision that had to be made: whether to go into such a deal with the 
Palestinians or not.' By excluding the military, Rabin 'avoided any stigma of the politicisation of the armed 
forces.'^ '*® Wliilst Rabin informed Barak, it is not known how far Rabin consulted him, or even sought his 
advice, or even having sought his advice, took it. Thus the IDF merely provided Rabin with a number of 
option scenarios on the approach to political and security issues within negotiations, allowing Rabin to know 
where the IDF stood on various issues without having to ask for specific action-reaction policy responses to 
ongoing negotiations. Barak said that Rabin knew 'exactly what we feel are the consequences and the 
meaning of every alternative.'^^®
If Rabin's initial reluctance to believe that Oslo would produce any real rewards was tempered by the 
incompatibility of his stated desire to force the Palestinians in the occupied territories to deny their 
compatriots in the PLO in Tunis in order to promote an independent Palestinian authority and leadership in 
the occupied territories, then at least Rabin, by March 1993 had the common sense to realise that such an
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outcome was highly unlikely. Rabin had stated 'that he who stands at the head of the PLO fears, maybe 
justifiably fi*om Ins personal perspective, that if [interim self-rule] is created,...such a body will become the 
source of Palestinian identity, and then what wiU the organisation sitting in Tunis do?’ Rabm had hoped that 
the PLO's political and financial predicament would enable a deal with Palestinians in the territories rather 
than with PLO Tunis.
Rabin initially rejected the PLO as a negotiating partner because of the PLO commitment to a state in 
the West Bank and Gaza, encompassing Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, security arrangements, borders, 
and external relations. Rabin hoped that a debilitated PLO could be forced to agree to a deal made by local 
Palestinians to ease the occupation. The election of the Clinton administration confirmed the feeling that less 
pressure would be applied on Israel to make concessions to the Palestinians winch would offer Israel a great 
opportunity to take advantage of a seriously weakened PLO. Rabin believed that 'that among the leadersliip 
of the territories and outside of the territories, maybe even in [PLO headquarters in] Tunisia, there are today 
Palestinian leaders who have wised up, and they understand that they cannot repeat the mistakes of the past. 
There are many among them who understand that it is better to establish the nucleus of a Palestinian entity, 
even if it is administrative.'^^ ^ This wising up however had to be mutual. Rabin had to admit the inevitable, 
that there would be no meaningful and substantive progress in the Wasliington talks as long as Ai'afat and the 
PLO were not fijll negoatiating partners and ofiBcially recognised as such.
Thus it was Rabin's reading of the international situation, both short-term opportunities, intermediate 
possibilities and long-term considerations, which offered the diagnosis-prognosis that the resolution of the 
conflict with Israel's immediate neighbors was both possible and imperative due to:
(1) The loss of superpower conflict by proxy - compromise was more attainable than strategic parity;
(2) The radicalisation of the intifada since 1991 which if not condfronted politically, would continue to spiral 
fi*om a popular outpouring of Palestinian frustration and anger within the confines of civil disobedience to a 
more extreme form of struggle involving, aimed confi ontation, and indiscriminate suicidal terror. This 
implacable foe eschewed accommodation and assumed the mantle of existential confrontation. For all the 
talk of rising Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across the Middle East and North Africa influencing 
Palestinian fundamentalism in the occupied territories, the inescapable truth was that the appalling poverty, 
hopelessness, anger and discontent that was spreading like a malignant cancer tlnough Gaza only highlighted 
that Israeli policy in Gaza provided sustenance to Islamist radicalism. Thus whilst the secular/nationalist 
PLO haemorrhaged financially and politically, a leadership vacuum was being created in the territories which 
was being rapidly filled by Islamists such as Hamas;
(3) Israel's most obvious confrontational Arab foe with the previously perceived ability to unite the Aiab 
world in pursuit of an existential threat to Israel, Iraq, was no longer a threat. The US, Israel's ally, through 
its intervention in Kuwait had demonstrated its willingness to militarily intervene in the region in protection 
of its interests, to which Israel regarded itself as a special US ally. Rabin stated,
1 am convinced oui' deterrent capability has increased as a result of the crisis in the Gulf, if only 
indiiectly and because the United States demonstrated its readiness to act resolutely. I am not saying 
that Washington will automatically do the same for Israel; nor has Israel ever asked the United States 
to do so. But the fact that this time the United States stood fii'in and was ready to become involved
123
against an aggression in the Middle East adds somewhat to Israel's overall deterrence. It discourages 
initiation of war in the region, though I do not know for how long.'^^ ;^
(4) The analysis that the PLO's financial and political weakness could encourage flexibility and could lead to 
the conclusion that their willingness to moderate then positions in order to negotiate a deal would be greater 
than ever before. This was particularly with regard to, the PLO's continuation of violent actions and to its 
strength to negotiate on such issues as, a Palestinian state, refugees, and Jerusalem. Furthermore Israeli 
concessions were in essence pre-ordained, in that a blueprint for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations already 
existed in the form of the Camp David accords, whereas none existed for an Israeli-Syi'ian accommodation;
(5) That a Syria first option involved territorial concessions that carried too great a political sacrifice unlikely 
to be borne by Israeli public opinion without a great struggle, for debatable reward;
(6) The realisation that whilst PLO violence was decidedly low-intensity and non-threatening in existential 
terms, the Palestinian ability to repeatedly enter regional centre stage, whether being unscrupulously 
highjacked by a venal Iraq, or being able to force a boycott at the Washington talks, meant that the 
Palestinian issue was not one which could be left unresolved;
(7) International and regional circumstances offered Israel a 'window of opportunity' to resolve the 
immediacy of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which in turn could lessen intermediate f  ictions with the Arab 
world. Thus Israel, by resolving immediate dangers, would be able to prepare for long-term strategic 
existential threats, from Iran and a resurgent Iraq. Rabin argued that Israel had a seven-year 'window of 
opportunity' to resolve the core conflict and make peace with its neighbours before the Iranian threat became 
real. Rabin believed that 'Today Iran is the leading disseminator of fiindamentalist Islam in the region,' and 
that 'Iran has replaced Iraq in its megalomaniacal ambitions in empiie-building... Within seven years from 
today, this will be the threat in the Middle East. We have this time to resolve problems. I believe we will 
succeed.
2.7 Conclusion
Yitzhak Rabin stated in his inaugural speech to the Knesset as PM on 13th June 1992, that an ill- 
considered peace agieement which ultimately initiated futuie conflict was unacceptable. He said that 'Wlien 
it comes to security, we wül concede nothing. From oui' standpoint, secuiity takes preference even over 
peace.' However he continued,
'It is our duty, to ourselves and to our cliildren, to see the new world as it is now-to discern its 
dangers, explore its prospects and to do evei'ything possible so the State of Israel will fit into this 
world whose face is changing. No longer are we necessarily a 'people that dwells alone,' and no 
longer is it true that 'the whole world is against us.' We must overcome the sense of isolation that has 
held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement towards 
peace, reconciliation and cooperation that is spreading all over the entire globe these days-lest we be 
the last to remain, all alone, in the station ...A number of countries in our region have recently 
stepped up their efforts to develop and produce nuclear arms ...The possibility that nuclear 
weapons will be introduced in the Middle East in the coming years is a very giave and negative
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development from Israel’s standpoint...[T]his situation requires us to give further thought to the 
urgent need to end the Ai'ab-Israeli conflict and live in peace with our Arab neighbours.
On November 16, 1992 at a speech at Tel Aviv University, Rabin stated that, 'I believe that we are on a path 
of no return... to reach peace, even if it takes another year or two years, ...I think that the reality of the 
international situation, the regional situation, the genuine need of nations and countries, is to arrive at a 
resolution of the dispute.'^^^
By building confidence between the PLO and Israel that a deal could be negotiated, Rabin sought to 
provide a framework wliich formalised channels for reconciliation, for conflict deterrence, to ensuie a mutual 
security enviromnent and to build a mutual future. From realising that political compromise with the 
Palestinians was not possible without dealing with the PLO, it was a short journey to realising that by not 
dealing with the PLO in the immediate fiitui’e, the rise of absolutist, Islamic fundamentalism would result. 
Compromise was possible with the PLO by building confidence thi'ough negotiating a mutually perceived 
future via the Oslo backchannel. However, compromise was not an option to be considered with Hamas and 
Islamic Jiliad. Rabin believed that
'Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to awaken the world which is lying [in] 
slumber. We caU on all nations and all people to devote their attention to the great danger inherent in 
Islamic fundamentalism. That is the real and serious danger which threatens the peace of the world in 
the forthcoming years. The danger of death is at our doorstep. And just as the state of Israel was the 
first to perceive the Iraqi nuclear threat, so today we stand in the line of fire against the danger of 
fundamentalist Islam.
Israeli and PLO concern about the potential threat of extremist Islam provided both sides with a mutual 
enemy. The DoP was conceived, developed, negotiated and concluded with such a threat in mind, from both 
sets of negotiators. The Oslo backchannel provided the necessary environment in which to conceive a 
working arrangement upon which to build. The facilitation of the process was nurtured by sensitive 
intermediaries - the Norwegians. In an atmosphere of cordiality, confidence in one another could be fostered 
and developed.
The negotiating system employed, although secret, aimed to reach a deal that could be built on and 
improved. Contentious issues which could not be agreed upon were sidestepped to be dealt with in the 
future. The DoP was meant as a first important step - to break the barrier of past conflict.
Before the DoP neither side officially recognised each other. The DoP established a nominal 
agreement for a cease-fire of hostilities, instituted a mutual recognition pact, transferred specified territorial 
enclaves of Gaza and Jericho to Palestinian authority, provided for the inaugui ation of an autonomous self- 
governing Palestinian entity with the prospect of elections to such an autonomous legislative body combined 
with the devolution of additional civil powers and responsibilities, arranged for the withdrawal and 
redeployment of Israeli military forces fr om specified locations and population centres, founded a fr amework 
for the resolution of disputes and Israeli-Palestinian public order and secm ity cooperation and offered a plan 
for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in bilateral and regional economic and development programmes. It also 
prepared for further negotiations on unresolvable issues within the framework of a permanent status 
arrangement covering Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, secuiity arrangements, borders and foreign relations.
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A rolling process of considerable substantive negotiations would have to follow from the initial DoP because 
of the inlierent contradictions, ambiguities, and material differences in interpretation contained within the 
limitations of the original document. Subsequent sequential documents had to be negotiated to formulate 
fui'ther interim arrangements ready for implementation in order that the process begun by the DoP could 
proceed. The DoP as a document represents an agreement to pursue a living legacy, to undertake a process 
whose final outcome is not determined in advance. The DoP is not a symmetrical agreement outlining 
mutual obligations on a quid pro quo basis, rather it is an agreement to agree to further the basic interests of 
both sides. For the Israelis, the DoP provides a reliable, legitimate interlocutor and the ability to transfer 
responsibility for a large proportion of the Palestinian population, if not of the territory they inhabit. For the 
Palestinians, the DoP provides for the establishment of a legitimated political and moral authority with the 
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Chapter Three: The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements: An Analysis
'Wlio is the bravest hero?
He who turns his enemy into a friend.' -- Avot d'R Nathan
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the specific terms of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- 
Govemment Arrangements (DoP) within the conflict resolution parameters of items 2, 5 and 6 of the 
RICEMAN FORMULA, which pertain to institutionalisation, mediation and administration. To achieve 
the goal of an agreed, recognised and legally binding conflict resolution framework, which sets out 
specific commitments and obligations within an enforceable conflict prevention regime, a bureaucratic 
regime must be initiated to institutionalise the conduct, management, regulation and supervision of such 
a framework. Tliis chapter analyses how the terms of the DoP conform to such a conflict resolution 
framework, how they anticipate and monitor potential areas of fiiture conflict and how they allow for 
sustained support and political direction from interested third parties which aim to nurture and advance 
the peace process. This chapter will also assess the DoP's provision for procedures wliich enable 
peaceful change, mechanisms wliich allow for the review of settlement terms and the raising of 
grievances and adjustments to the settlement as new realities are created.
The DoP is regarded by some as an interpreter's nightmare, a patchwork of old Israeli and US 
drafts, incomplete proceduial suggestions, deliberate ambiguities and obfuscations.^ However the 
seventeen articles and foui' annexes of the DoP indicate that they ar e fii mly intended to lead to some 
final political settlement. The document was painstakingly drafted and covers, at least in outline, the 
most sensitive concerns of both sides. The DoP is a bilateral agreement which is an liistoric agreement 
in the sense that the Palestinians became ftiU partners, with the Israelis, in the regional quest for peace. 
The destiny for both sides is to deal with the DoP reahstically, to overcome its limitations and by 
inference overcome the weaknesses and flaws that continue to divide them. The dilemma for the 
participants is how they will move forward constrained by the limits of the DoP and by their own 
histories.
The DoP does include somewhat soaring rhetoric. The two sides have pledged to 'strive to live 
in peacefiil co-existence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace settlement and historic reconciliation.'^ However the most striking aspect of the DoP is that it 
deals with procedures and timetables for the implementation of Israeli military redeployment and 
Palestinian self-government. It is a living document wliich seeks to maximise developing confidence 
building measures. It is a studied example of a carrot and stick approach to diplomacy, the more that is 
achieved the more that can be acliieved. Yitzhak Rabin described it thus when making his annual 
speech to the Daily Newspaper Editors' Committee in Jerusalem on December 8, 1993, the 'Declaration 
of Principles is not a peace agreement. It is a huge step in the direction of peace; it is an agreement on 
estabhshing an arrangement for an interim period'"  ^ Therefore just what exactly is being agreed?
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3.2 La Cohabitation: A Textual Analysis of the Declaration of Principles
The DoP comprises the following documents:
(1) the text of the Declaration itself;
(2) foui' annexes dealing with elections, early withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ai'ea, Israeli- 
Palestinian economic cooperation and Israeli-Palestinian cooperation at the regional level; and
(3) a series of Agreed Minutes amplifying various articles in the Declaration. These Agreed Minutes 
were separately signed by the parties, and, according to Article XVII of the DoP, they constitute an 
'integral paif thereof. The DoP is supplemented by an exchange of correspondence dated on the 9th and 
10th of September 1993 /
Between them these documents set out a framework for the arrangements to apply in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip dui ing a transitional period of five years until the implementation of permanent status 
arrangements.^ The texts themselves will not alone determine the nature of self-rule, they do however 
constitute a contractual treaty between the two parties.^
The letters, taken together, constitute the agreement on mutual recognition between the PLO 
and the State of Israel. The first one is fi om PLO Chairman Arafat to Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, the 
second is fiom Arafat to Norwegian Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst, and the tliird is fiom Rabin to 
Arafat. The letters are all dated September 9th 1993, although the third was actually signed and dated 
personally by Rabin, on September 10th.® Whilst the letters of mutual recognition have great clarity 
regarding Israeli demands, they ar e frill of obscurity concerning the rights of the Palestinian people.^ For 
example, if we consider the PLO's recognition of Israel, the central plirase reads 'The PLO recognises 
the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security.'^ ® The wording of the mutual recognition 
statements was very important especially the phrasing of the recognition of Israel. Arafat had wanted 
the statement to read, "We recognise the right of Israel to live in secure and recognised boundar ies', but 
agreed to cliange the plnase 'live in secure and recognised boundar ies' to 'exist in peace and security'.
The difference between the two expressions is very significant; the former suggests the right of Jews to 
live in the area simply because they are already there, the word 'exists' in the latter confirms the 
legitimacy of the Israeli state.'  ^* What does this recognition mean in terms of substance and 
consequences? It endows a legitimacy on Israel liitherto lacking as many states witlilield recognition 
contingent on a positive resolution of the Palestinian-lsraeli conflict. The letter fails to define which 
Israel is being recognised as the only borders so far defined are the Egypt-Israel borders. The act of 
recognising the State of Israel is tantamount to recognising Israeli law, in spite of the fact that 
Palestinians used to describe these laws as 'occupier's law' and therefore devoid of any legitimacy. The 
recognition of Israeh sovereignty over territory implicit in the letter entails recognition that any 
legislation passed by a territorially sovereign state is thus legitimate. It has been argued by many who 
oppose the DoP that the prominence in the letter of the phi ase 'right to exist in peace and security' 
implies a special obligation on the part of the Palestinians in relation to this right and that Israel has the 
right to remedy any situation it deems threatening. Since the terms 'peace' and 'security' are undefined, 
they could be argued to extend to concepts such as, economic security (the boycott, normalisation, 
administrative restrictions), societal security (demograpliic composition) and technological security 
(industry, science, education).’^
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What is also rather significant in the letter is that Israel's right 'to exist in peace and security' is 
prominently mentioned yet there is no mention of Palestinian rights to peace and security, in fact there 
are no mentions of any reciprocal Palestinian rights to those being recognised for Israel. There is even 
the implied undertaking to take certain actions against the members of the PLO for any transgression 
against Israel and the peace. It seems clear from the wording that there is an undertaking by the PLO to 
police and enforce transgressions. By using this phrase the PLO has accepted the American requirement 
to assume, morally if not specifically, responsibility for all PLO factions, including those of the 
rejectionist fiont who disavow the entiie agreement. The letter renounces terrorism and other acts of 
violence, going as far as to undertake to 'discipline violators'. The affirmation that 'those articles of the 
Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist and the provisions of the Covenant which aie 
inconsistent with the commitments of this letter aie now inoperative and no longer valid' is seen by some 
to imply a renunciation of the Palestinian ai med struggle in particular, and the Palestinian struggle in 
general. In fact, Article 33 of the Palestine National Charter stipulates that any amendment must receive 
a two-thirds majority within the Palestine National Council (PNC) before action is taken, whereas 
Arafat declares that the offendmg articles 'are' no longer valid as opposed to 'will become'. This is all the 
more confusing when Ai'afat states that he thus 'undertakes to submit to the Palestine National Council 
for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant .By these 
commitments, Arafat has exceeded his authority as PLO Chairman.
What is implicit in Arafat's letter to Rabin is explicit in Ai'afaf s letter to Holst, which Israel 
considers to be an integral part of the letters of mutual recognition, when Ar afat calls upon the 
'Palestinian population in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the 
normalisation of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and 
participating actively m shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.Many 
Palestinian critics of the DoP feel that Arafat, by tliis letter not only unilaterally signalled an end to the 
intifada without consultation and as if it was within his power to unilaterally command, but also that it 
seems tliat potential economic gains are more important than the struggle for self-detennmation.^^
In return for these undertakings, what are the Palestinians to receive? In 56 words to Arafat's 
256, Israel undertakes to 'recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and 
commence negotiation with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.'’'^ ’ How the two leaders 
express themselves in the three letters is of some interest, when trying to gauge their thinking. Rabin 
writes that the Government of Israel has 'decided to recognise the PLO' because 'of the PLO 
commitments included' in Arafat's letter to Rabin, thus Rabin makes very clear that he relies on a firm 
written text containing clear commitments for his understanding of the process. On the other hand 
Arafat considers 'the signing of the Declaration Of Principles marks a new era in the history of the 
Middle East', and he continues in the same vein when he declares that 'The PLO considers that the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a liistoric event, inaugurating a new epoch of 
peaceful coexistence, fi*ee from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability.'** There is 
however a curious aspect to Rabin's letter when he decides to 'commence negotiations with the PLO' 
when the documents were the result of many months of discussions and negotiations between Israel and 
the PLO. The PLO's commitment is clearly defined, its own role in further negotiations is determined by 
the PLO declaration 'that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through
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negotiations.' Such a declaration locks in the PLO to the peace process as determined by the Madrid 
Conference.
The PLO has by these letters, recognised a sovereign, territorial state with a recognised status 
albeit with borders still to be negotiated. Israel, on the other hand has recognised the PLO as an 
organisation and negotiating partner, as the 'representative of the Palestinian people' and will 'commence 
negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process.'^* An obvious discrepancy in the 
letters is Arafat's linkage of the letters, which have more legal weight than a declaration of principles 
especially as the DoP had not been signed by the date of the letters, with the DoP. The DoP is more 
forthcoming on matters relating to Palestinian rights, legitimacy (e.g., preamble of the DoP and Article 
III (3)) and territory (e.g.. Article IV). Rabin made no mention of any of this in his letter.^^
The two references in Ai'afat's letter to Rabin of UN resolutions 242 and 338 are significant more 
for their absence fiom Rabin's letter. It seems these were added for a reason. The US has always 
stipulated, for instance, that their acknowledgement of the PLO as a partner for peace must be 
predicated by the PLO's acceptance of these resolutions prior to opening a dialogue. The letter is 
unclear' whether the acceptance of the UN resolutions is either, a condition for negotiations, or as a basis 
for them.^  ^ However, senior PLO official, Nabil Sha'ath believes that what is new in the DoP is that
'the model we have now differs in many aspects. It addresses itself to the Palestinians as a people 
- not to Palestinian residents in the territories. It names the territories as those of the West Bank 
and Gaza. It addresses the issue of [UN Security Council Resolution] 242 very clear ly as the 
basis of the entir e negotiations, but to be implemented in the permanent status stage of 
negotiations, with which there is a very clear linkage. The entire non-prejudice issue has been 
removed ...The model include accelerated withdrawal, so it has a physical basis on the groimd.
A rapid withdrawal that would leave the Palestinian government with a territorial base - 
territorial jur isdiction - with exceptions that are not defined as political or administrative, but as 
temporal, or time-related. In other words, if Jerusalem and the settlements and the return of the 
refugees are not dealt with now, and are not within the jurisdiction of the Palestinian government 
now, it is not because of any exceptions to territoriahty but because of the temporal 
requirements of the division between interim and final.
The fact that the letters of mutual recognition preceded the DoP by some four days must be 
significant. Dajani argues that it means that they must be the 'ultimate reference, it makes them the root 
to the DoP's branch'. Dajani continues that, 'more important, perhaps the time lapse allowed the 
government of Israel to bring the DoP under its wing of sovereignty. For the 'State of Israel', which 
considers itself to be the 'sole legitimate' authority, any agreement it concludes with the PLO, whose 
status Hes beneath that of a state, is an exercise of its sovereignty.' Thus, Dajani concludes that the DoP, 
'suggests a 'declaration' that has been made by the Israeli state and agreed to or endorsed by the 
Palestinians, thus focusing attention fiom the outset on the qualitative discrepancy between the two 
sides...such a declaration could have been issued unilaterally.'^  ^ There is also another angle, that 
'reacliing the agreement with the PLO really strikes against Zionist ideology: the reconciliation is made 
with the official representative of the Palestinian people, with an organisation that was created to fight 
the State of Israel and to fight its occupation and to fight its dominance. So the deal was struck with the 
organisation of struggle, the liberation movement that fought the Israelis, rather than with 'Palestinian
135
elements that live in the occupied territories."^^ However, Henry Kissinger believes that the Palestinians' 
major achievement with the signing of the accord is the de facto recognition of the PLO as the governing 
authority in the autonomous areas and the establishment of a distinct Palestinian entity. Under the terms 
of the accord, if final status negotiations do indeed lead to the establislmient of a Palestinian state, the 
accord will be the document which ensures such an establishment de jure.^^
There are also many questions fiom Israeli doubters. Such as, when the Palestinians recognised 
Israel, did they mean that they have become genuinely reconciled to its existence, or is it merely a stage 
in a continuing struggle? Is it end game or tactical ceasefiie? Although coming eight months later, 
Arafat's speech in South Africa caused consternation and controversy in Israel when he quoted the 
principle of'solli al-hodaibiya' which meant that 'an agreement can be made with the enemy and then 
broken as soon as possible'^* As the PLO leader's weakness compelled him to seek a compromise with 
Israel, his weakness will now bui'den the peace. Chaiiman Aiafat is as constrained by internal Palestinian 
politics as he is by Israeli politics. Just as PM Rabin did, and continued to, show strength in action, the 
Israelis would have to be mindful that Chairman Arafat would need to protect himself, tlirough words 
and deeds to maintain his credibility within his constituency. Indeed he had to be caieful to be seen to 
incorporate Palestinian consensus in liis pronouncements lest he be removed or become irrelevant, thus 
ambiguity and obfiiscation will no doubt remain a weapon in his arsenal. Therefore according to Henry 
Kissinger, the follow-on negotiations must continually strive to remove this ambivalence, on one liand 
stressing that there is a point beyond which Israel should not be expected to make concessions, and on 
the other hand the negotiations must seek to convince the Palestinians that their dignity will not be 
compromised and that this aspect, which is not at all nebulous, must be incorporated as an essential 
aspect of a fibiial settlement.^®
Now we will consider the principal points agreed to in the DoP. The timetable envisaged by the 
DoP for the transitional period is based on that included in the Camp David Accords and subsequently 
adopted as a basis for the Madrid peace process. In Article V, the DoP provides that a five year 'interim' 
or 'transitional' period will commence on the withdrawal of Israeli forces fi*om the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
area. By the star t of the thir d year of tliis five year* period, negotiations will commence on the final 
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The principles set down in the DoP cover a wide range of issues, which broadly fall into four 
categories:
1. Arrangements to apply thr oughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip dur ing the interim period, including 
arrangements for the holding of elections for a Palestinian Council.
2. Arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area subsequent to an early withdrawal of 
Israeli forces implementing the 'Gaza first' plan.
3. Arr angements for early empowerment, which constitutes a preparatory transfer of powers and 
responsibilities in agreed spheres to be implemented in the rest of the West Bank, concurrently with the 
early withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area.
4. Permanent status arrangements.
As its title suggests, the DoP is not a comprehensive agreement, but rather a statement of agreed 
principles. In other words, it is not a self-executing document wliich purports to set out practical 
arrangements, but rather an 'agreement to reach agreement', which leaves the details to be negotiated
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between the parties. Thus, the DoP provides that separate agreements are to be negotiated between the 
parties with respect to the special arrangements for the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ar ea (Annex II, Article 
1), the elections for the Council (Article III and Annex I), and the interim period arrangements (Article 
VII). In relation to a number of other ar eas, such as a economic and regional cooperation, the DoP 
provides that special liaison committees will be established in order to develop joint programmes, such 
as those intimated in Articles XI and XVI. Although the practical details are left to be negotiated, the 
DoP nevertheless provides significant guidelines for these arrangements. Now we will consider the main 
implications of the DoP in each of the ar eas outlined above.^*
Regarding the Interim Agreement, the DoP provides in Article VII [1] and [2], that the 
agreement on the interim period to be negotiated by the parties, that is 'the Interim Agreement' [lA], will 
'specify among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members ...the Council's 
executive authority, legislative authority ...and the independent Palestinian judicial organs'. The Interim 
Agreement would outline and deterrnine the powers and responsibilities to be transferred by Israel to the 
Council.^^
The DoP covers two stages - an interim stage and a permanent stage. The interim stage is to last 
five years, with negotiations on permanent status to begin no later than the beginning of the thii'd yeai' of 
this stage. According to the DoP, two aspects of the transfer of authority have definitely been agreed 
upon, namely the authority to assume responsibility for five spheres: education and culture, health, social 
welfare, direct taxation and tourism, and secondly, the formation of a police force. Beyond this, 
everytliing else is subject to negotiations, subject to the structui al restraints of the DoP necessitating 
constant supervision and revision in all mechanisms. According to James Baker, former US Secretary of 
State, 'ultimately I tliink there will probably be different degrees of ownersliip - sovereignty of various 
lands in the territories, depending on then nature and location. Even the DoP points toward tliree 
different types of status during the interim period: for Gaza and Jericho, for the rest of the West Bank, 
and for Israeli settlements.'^* At this point, most commentators believed that at least four separate major 
agreements would have to be negotiated during the interim phase; an interim agreement, an elections 
agreement, a withdrawal agreement and an agreement on economic matters. This would have the effect 
of tightening up all the inadequacies of the DoP, into an overall workable basis for a futur e peace 
treaty.*'*
According to Article III and Annex I, the par ties will negotiate an agreement on the exact mode 
and conditions of the elections. While the details of the elections and the Council will be negotiated in 
these agreements, the DoP sets out a number of principles to apply to these, as well as to other aspects 
of the interim period. Regarding elections, the DoP sets out the guiding principle that 'direct, free and 
general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international 
observation' (Aificle III [1]).*  ^ Among the issues of contention in tliis regard is the extent to which 
Palestinians resident in East Jerusalem will be permitted to par ticipate in the elections. Dur ing the 
negotiations, Israel agreed that such Palestinians would have the right to vote, but a Palestinian proposal 
that would have permitted these Palestinians to stand as candidates in the elections was not adopted.
The adopted text, in Annex I, Ar ticle 1, provides that: 'Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have 
the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.' Dajani 
argues that this right is conditional on the conclusion of an agreement to that effect, and that this phrase
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may have been inserted in order to preempt any early determination of the status of Jerusalem.
However, an interesting aside is the wording 'Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there'.*  ^ This seems to 
make it obvious that only those Palestinians actually living in Jerusalem at the particular time of future 
elections will be able to vote, thus denying those Jerusalemites around the world who would be eligible 
but who are considered refiigees. There is also the small matter of not defining who this refers to, 
visiting Palestinians fi-om the territories perhaps, as Jerusalem has been united, annexed and is regarded 
as Israel's eternal capital. There is also no mention of which Jerusalem this refers to. East Jerusalem? 
Israeli Palestinian citizens? There are some 100,000 plus, new Jewish inhabitants of what was once East 
Jerusalem, will they vote? Or does this mean that Palestinians who live in Jerusalem are entitled to vote 
in the elections to the Palestinian Council, operating in Gaza Strip and Jericho Area?*^
Thus the exact extent to which Palestinians fi*om East Jerusalem would be able to participate in 
the in the elections was left to be resolved by the parties in the negotiations on the election agreement.
In these negotiations Israel continued to oppose any participation of Palestinians from East Jerusalem as 
candidates in the elections. Participation in the election process does not require that Palestinians would 
be able to cast their votes in Jerusalem itself; theft votes may be cast at polling stations situated in the 
territories. Indeed during the negotiations on the DoP, a Palestinian proposal stating that Palestinians of 
East Jerusalem would cast theft votes in East Jerusalem was not adopted.**
William Quandt believes that Israelis have shown little interest in the crucial issue about what 
kind of state may emerge fi*om the carefirlly controlled transitional period, although the DoP does give 
the Israeli government room for involvement in the type of political structure to emerge in the 
autonomous areas. This stems from Israel's primary concern with its own security and widespread 
scepticism among Israelis regarding the possibility of democracy anywhere in the Arab world. Israeli 
leaders in some cases have found certain advantages in negotiating with Arab dictators who ar e not 
accountable to the vagaries of public opinion, e.g., Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977.*®
Edward Said calculates that some 50% of the Palestinian population do not even live in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, thus those refugees from 1948-67 have simply been left out of the DoP, 1967 
refugees having been deferred until the final status negotiations. For Said, one of the major aspects of 
the DoP is that, whilst the Palestinians have been recognised by Israel and the US, there has to be a 
recognition of what the disabilities of the PLO are. The PLO negotiated the DoP fti complete secrecy, in 
a language neither Arafat nor his emissaries in Oslo knew fluently, and with no recognised legal expert. 
There is even little knowledge of what constitutes the Palestinian population, a census is seen as a 
priority, not just as a bur eaucratic exercise but as the basis of enfi-anchisement and thus empowerment. 
Said argues for a worldwide census of Palestinians believing such an exercise would give the Palestinians 
too liigh a profile in countries where they are supposed to be invisible, thereby constituting, not only a 
nation and not just a collection of people, but also being an act of liistorical and political self-realisation 
outside the limitations imposed on them by the absence of sovereignty. Such a move would enliance the 
need for democratic participation which has been ostensibly curtailed by the Israelis and the PLO within 
the parameters of the DoP.'***
However for those like Henry Kissinger who are positive about the actual commencement of 
elections, he argues that after the elections in the autonomous ar eas are satisfactorily concluded, Israeli 
recognition of the Palestinian entity will be irrevocable, and in the eyes of the world community, so will
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be the redeployment and withdrawal of the IDF. Kissinger believes that 'Israeli politicians who speak 
blithely of reoccupying vacated areas are deluding themselves'.'** The international opprobrium Israel 
would be greeted with should such a circumstance transpire would prove unsustainable, though cynics 
may level the charge that some 30-plus years of occupation have not unduly hindered Israel on the world 
stage. Even if Israel were to withdraw its recognition of the Palestinian entity, the rest of the world 
would not automatically follow. Cooperative patterns between Israeli and Palestinian authorities in the 
autonomous areas wül improve with constant contact and relations will develop in a positive vein as 
both authorities share many simüar concerns. Relations with other Ar ab countries wül improve if Israel 
becomes a permanent feature at regional fora under the aegis of the multüateral taUcs, though fuÜ 
recognition of Israel, concomitant peace treaties and the abolition of the Arab boycott wül likely be 
postponed pending a resolution of the final status negotiations.
Regar ding the source of authority on the establishment of the Council, in accordance with Ar ticle 
VII [5] the Israeli Civü Administration (ICA) wül be dissolved, however the Israeli Military Government 
(IMG), on the other hand, wiU not be dissolved but wül simply withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip to Israel. In fact, the headquarters of the Regional Commanders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
are situated within Israel, whüe only district offices are currently maintained in the occupied territories.'*  ^
The dissolution of the ICA wül have no impact on the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. 
The ICA was created in 1981, as an organ of the IMG, in order to discharge the powers and 
responsibilities of the military government in civilian matters. This is according to the Israelis. However, 
Palestinians would have seen the ICA as an important stage on the road to annexation, as mihtary 
government transforms to civilian, as the territories are perceived as peaceful and therefore no longer a 
security threat. With the dissolution of the ICA, the IMG wül simply resume aU powers and 
responsibilities of the ICA not transferred to the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISGA 
or 'the Councü' as described in the DoP). In tliis context, the fact that the IMG in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip wül continue to exist is very significant. It emphasises that, notwithstanding the transfer of a 
large portion of the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel to Palestinian control, the 
status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip wül not be changed during the interim period. These areas will 
continue to be subject to mÜitaiy government. Simüarly, this fact suggests that the PISGA wül not be 
independent or sovereign in natur e, but rather will be legaUy subordinate to the authority of the IMG. In 
other words, operating within Israel, the IMG wül continue to be the source of authority for the PISGA 
and the powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This provision 
resolves one of the ambiguities left open by the Camp David Accords. In these accords, wliich spoke of 
the IMG being 'replaced' by the Palestinian self-governing authority, it was left unclear as to where the 
source of authority lay, and in whom any residual powers would vest. The provisions of the DoP ensure 
that Israel, tlnough its militaiy government, shall continue to be the source of authority and to retain any 
powers and responsibilities not specificaUy transferred to the Councü.'**
Regarding the jurisdiction of the councü. Article IV of the DoP provides that the jurisdiction of 
the PISGA to be established 'wül cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territoiy, except for issues tlmt 
WÜ1 be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as a single territorial unit.''*'* It may be inferred that 'issues' refers to territories, and thus territories 
that may eventuaUy be negotiated out of the area over which Palestinian authority wül extend. One can
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conclude this is reference to Jerusalem, although in Article V [3], Jerusalem is one of the 'remaining 
issues' to be dealt with, thus cynics may conclude that this signifies that it is not considered a territorial 
issue, or part of the West Bank/^ A list of such permanent status issues is provided in the Agreed 
Minute to Article IV, which lists: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis. Article IV's 
formulation for excluding these issues from the Palestinian jurisdiction ('except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations' was adopted because it effectively enabled the 
Palestinian delegation to agr ee to put aside their demands in relation to these issues during the 
transitional period and to claim that discussion of these issues has simply been postponed until a later 
date. In addition, the Agreed Minute to Article IV states that jurisdiction of the Coimcil 'will apply with 
regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it'.'** In other words, 
the Palestinian Authority will have no jurisdiction in relation to powers and responsibilities retained by 
Israel. In tliis context it should be noted that the wording proposed by the Palestinian side in the DoP 
negotiations, referring to the transfer to the PISGA of all the powers and responsibilities currently 
exercised by the IMG and ICA, was not adopted in the text. Instead, the DoP provides in Article VII 
that the PISGA will only have specified powers and responsibilities to be detailed in the lA. This 
provision represents, fi om Israel's point of view, an advance on the Camp David arrangements, wliich 
left open the question whether or not all of the powers and responsibilities of the IMG and ICA would 
be transferred to the Palestinians.'*®
This functional limitation is only one of the factors defining the jurisdiction of the PISGA. In 
fact, as described in the DoP, the jui isdiction of the PISGA is limited by thr ee cumulative criteria: 
territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and functional jurisdiction.
Regarding territorial jurisdiction. Article IV provides that 'the jurisdiction of the Council will 
cover the West Bank and Gaza Strip territory'.*** Significantly, by declining to adopt Palestinian 
proposals to include the word all or the before the phiase 'West Bank and Gaza Strip', the parties made 
it clear that they intended that the territorial jurisdiction of the PISGA will not necessarily cover the 
entire West Bank and Gaza Strip.** The language of Article IV thus follows the wording of UN SCR 
242 which deliberately omitted the word all before the word territories in the phrase: 'withdrawal of 
Israeli armed forces fiom territories occupied in the recent conflict' (see footnote 44) In both cases, the 
omission of the word the or all was deliberate and meant to leave for negotiation between the parties 
the extent to which the withdrawal (in the case of UN SCR 242) or the PISGA's jurisdiction (in the case 
of the DoP) would apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On the basis of this provision, dming the lA 
negotiations Israel may seek to exclude such areas as state lands or land privately owned by Jews which 
are located outside the settlements. In addition, it is clear that the jurisdiction of the PISGA will not 
cover Israeli settlements and military locations which, as noted above, are defined by the Agreed Minute 
to Article IV as permanent status issues. This list of exceptions is not necessarily exhaustive; indeed, the 
text of the Agreed Minute to Article IV suggests that they come in addition to the requirement that the 
extent of West Bank and Gaza Strip territory over which the PISGA has jurisdiction be defined through 
negotiations.*^
Regarding personal jurisdiction, the PISGA's jurisdiction shall not include Israelis, who are 
excluded fiom the jurisdiction of the PISGA m the Agreed Minute to Article IV. Thus, Israelis will not 
be subject to laws legislated by the PISGA, to arrest or detention by Palestinian police or to the
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jurisdiction of the Palestinian courts. In this regard, the DoP makes no distinction between Israeli 
civilians and soldiers, or between Israeli residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israelis visiting 
from Israel. Israelis, without distinction, shall remain under exclusive Israeli jurisdiction whether they 
are in the settlements or militaiy locations or anywhere else in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,**
Regarding functional jurisdiction, the Agreed Minute to Article IV limits the PISGA's spheres 
and authorities transferred to it. As a result, the Council's jurisdiction shall not cover any powers and 
responsibilities not transferred to it. The DoP contains a number of specific issues in tliis categoiy: 
external and internal security, public order of Israelis and foreign relations. The parties may also agree 
on other matters to be excluded from the PISGA's jurisdiction. Thus, for example, if the parties agree 
that powers and responsibilities relating to broadcasting in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shall not be 
transferred to the PISGA, then the issuing of licences to Palestinians shall continue to be an Israeli 
responsibility even though the application would relate to broadcasting stations located within the areas 
under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction. Similarly, if it is agreed that the administration of Jewish Holy 
Places or of state lands, is not to be transferred even though they may fall within Palestinian territorial 
jurisdiction, the administration of such lands will continue to be an Israeli responsibility.*'*
The DoP thus resolves one of the key issues left open by the Camp David accords, the question 
of whether, as the Palestinians claimed, their jurisdiction would be territorial, covering the entire West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, or, as Israel claimed, covering only the Palestinian residents of the territory. The 
DoP resolves this conflict by providing that the jurisdiction of the PISGA shall be limited to a specific 
territory. Within that territoiy its jurisdiction shall only extend to non-Israelis, situated outside the 
Israeli settlements and military locations, and will apply only in spheres which have been specifically 
transferred to the Councü.**
Regarding Israeli jurisdiction, on the inauguration of the PISGA, the ICA wül be dissolved and 
the IMG shaft be withdrawn (Article VII [5]). The Agreed Minute to tliis Article provides that the 
'withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and 
responsibilities not transferred to the Councü'.*** Tliis provision has three important implications:
1) It emphasises the principle that not aft of the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel 
will be transferred to the Councü.
2) It stresses that powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Councü shall be exercised by Israel. 
In this context, it renders untenable the suggestion that powers not transferred to the Councü Avift not 
necessarüy lie with Israel, but may be suspended for the duration of the interim period.
3) It indicates that Israel retains the residual powers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Thus, where no 
provision has been made in relation to any specific area of authority - that area shaft remain with Israel.*  ^
Accordingly, Israel's jurisdiction in the West Bank and Gaza Strip shaft encompass the following:
1. Israelis wherever they may be; 2. the Israeli settlements; 3. müitaiy locations; and 4. any fimctional 
issue which has not been transferred to the Palestinian Councü.*^
Regarding legislative powers, the same general principles outlined above in relation to the 
jurisdiction of the PISGA wül apply in relation to its legislative powers. Article IX provides that the 
Councü will be empowered to legislate 'within aft authorities transferred to it'. Accordingly, the Councü 
shaft not be authorised to legislate in fields which have not been transferred to its authority. Legislative 
powers in such areas will remain with Israel. Moreover, even within the spheres of authority transferred
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to the Council, the power to legislate must be exercised 'in accordance with the Interim Agreement'. 
Thus, the lA may limit the exercise of this power by, for example, requiring Israeli affirmation for 
legislation promulgated by the Council in order to enter into force,*® It should be noted that the power 
to legislate is vested in the Council itself. Israel rejected the proposal that legislative powers be vested in 
an independent legislator, to avoid the possibility that such a separation of powers might be construed as 
an attribute of independence.^** As regards existing legislation, Article IX [2] provides that laws and 
military orders in spheres not transferred to the Council, shall be reviewed jointly by the parties. The 
provision emphasises that the legislation promulgated by the IMG shall remain in force in the territories 
in relation to areas of authority that it retains, although Israel is prepared to review such legislation 
together with the Council and to consider its suggestions.***
Regarding security in the Interim Period, the secuiity principles contained in the DoP provide 
more clarity than those included in the Camp David Accords. The Camp David Accords provided only 
that the parties would negotiate an agreement including arrangements for assuring internal and external 
security and public order, but gave no indication of which party would be responsible for these spheres. 
Article VIII of the DoP establishes the foUowing principles in relation to security and public order:
1. The PISGA will be responsible, by means of a strong police force, for guai anteeing 'public 
order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip'/^ From the mandate of 
the Palestinian police force as expressed in Article VIII it is clear that it is only intended to be 
responsible for the protection of Palestinians, and not of Israelis, who will remain under Israeh 
jurisdiction. However instilling respect for law and order in the autonomous areas will be amongst the 
toughest tasks the new Palestinian administration will face. Life under Israeh occupation produced a 
distinct sub-culture with its own modus vivendi. Abuses of human rights, particularly in the Gaza Strip 
include kidnapping and torture, summary execution, extortion and attacks on women for 'moral 
coUaboration' i.e. hcentiousness, prostitution and drug abuse. Many militants regard the PLO 
autonomous administration as an extension of Israeh occupation, so that the task of maintaining control 
over the population, and respecting individuals' rights in face of such opposition wih be a daunting task. 
The Palestinian pohce force is envisioned by the DoP to be a 'strong' force and expected to keep control 
of the areas by the Israehs.^* Shlomo Gazit, former head of mihtaiy intelhgence, beheved that self­
administration would take two forms, fuU authority in Jericho and Gaza and limited authority in the rest 
of Judea and Samaria. Gazit felt that Israel 'agreed to grant &U administrative rights to the Palestinian 
authority to be estabhshed in Gaza and Jericho - rights it obstinately refiised to give until now. Even 
though there's no commitment as regaids the next stage, the broad rights indicate Israel's intentions for 
the rest of Judea and Samaria'. The 'key to success will depend on the ability of the leadership to impose 
its will on the district... The interim stage is intended to relax tensions and create conditions for 
coexistence. This process is intended to create a new psychological atmosphere, one that will make it 
possible to progress to the permanent solution while softening the more extreme positions of both 
s i d e s . I n  principle, Israel is responsible for the free movement and safety of Jewish settlers. How this 
was to work in practice was problematic, especially concerning the issues of hot pursuit and the 
harbouring in the autonomous areas of those suspected of violence against Israelis. A major concern for 
both sides was the ability and the desire of the PISGA's 'strong' Police force to apprehend offenders and 
keep the peace. However, a note of wise caution is sounded by Gazit, when he contended that, 'if they
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achieve self-government...they will not want to lose it because someone wants to knife someone m 
Jerusalem or open fire on the road.'^* Furthermore, from the Agreed Minute to Article VIII, which 
speaks of the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police force being 'accomplished 
in a phased mamier', it is evident that this police force would not receive all of its powers immediately on 
the implementation of the Interim Agreement, but rather that the transfer of powers to the force would 
take place in stages. The number of stages, the scope of powers and responsibilities to be transferred at 
each stage, and the extent of the intervals between the stages, are matters that would have to be 
negotiated and agreed upon by both parties.**^
2. Israel shall remain responsible for defence against external threats. The DoP does not place 
any restrictions on Israel's responsibility for defence against external threats, nor is the phrase 'external 
threat' limited in any way. The phrase thus covers both strategic threats and low-intensity threats such 
as terrorist infiltrations. Israel is entitled to take all necessary measures to prevent and defend against 
such hostile acts coming fi*om outside the borders of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as firom the 
sea and air. The phrase used in Article VIII that 'Israel will continue to carry...' is significant in that it 
implies a continuation of the cmrent arrangements while the words '..the responsibility' indicate that the 
responsibility is indivisible and rests with Israel alone.
3. Israel shall remain responsible for the 'overall security of Israelis for the purpose of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order'. Again in tliis context, the plirase 'Israel wül 
continue to carry...' indicates a continuation of the current arrangements.**® AdditionaUy, the word 
'overall' underlines the fact that the secuiity of Israelis is to be imderstood in the widest possible sense. 
These principles would obviously need significant amplification in the Interim Agreement. Among the 
most sensitive of the security issues wliich would need to be addressed in the Interim Agreement is the 
treatment of criminal offenders, Israeli and Palestinian, fi*om the moment of their arrest untü the 
completion of legal proceedings against them. Broadly there ai e four main scenarios:
1. An Israeli commits an offence against an Israeli.
2. A Palestinian commits an offence against a Palestinian.
3. An Israeli commits an offence against a Palestinian.
4. A Palestinian commits an offence against an Israeli.
The DoP indicates that where any criminal or security incident occurs in an Israeli settlement or military 
location, it wül faU within Israeli jurisdiction, even if both offender and victim are Palestinian. Where the 
above scenai ios take place in areas under Palestinian territorial jurisdiction some further thought is 
required. With regard to the first two scenarios, no particular difficulty arises; it seems clear that where 
an Israeli commits an offence against an Israeli, the handling of the matter wül be exclusively Israeli 
responsibüity. Simüarly, where the offence is committed by and against a Palestinian, the responsibility 
wül be exclusively that of the PISGA. The third scenario, where an Israeli commits an offence against a 
Palestinian, is more complex. The Palestinian police is responsible for the security and public order of 
Palestinians and it may therefore be argued that the incident should faü within its responsibility.
However, the DoP makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the Councü does not extend to that of Israelis, 
and therefore the handling of the matter - at least as far as the Israeli offender is concerned - remains an 
Israeli responsibility. It is worth noting however that there is no provision distinguisliing between 
normal civil and criminal activity and political activity of a natur e designed to inflame populations against
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the DoP, The fourth scenario, where a Palestinian commits an offence against an Israeli, raises the 
question whether Israel has authority, in relation to an event wliich took place in territory under 
Palestinian jui isdiction, to arrest a Palestinian offender, or investigate him or her, and bring to trial 
before an Israeli court/** The DoP would seem to indicate that, where the victim of the offence is an 
Israeli, Israel does have this authority. Israel is entrusted with responsibility in relation to the security of 
Israelis by Article VIII, which states that Israel wiU 'continue to carry... the responsibility for overall 
security of Israelis'. The phrase 'continue to carry' implies a continuation of the current arrangements in 
this regal'd, while the word 'overall' indicates that the responsibility is to be understood in the broadest 
sense. Moreover, the Agreed Minute to Article IV limits the Council's jurisdiction to those powers 
specifically transferred to it. Since responsibility for internal secur ity and public order of Israelis remains 
with Israel, the Council therefore has no jurisdiction in the matter.^*
Regar ding the redeployment of Israeli Forces, Ar ticle XIII provides that: 'after the enti'y into 
force of the Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of the elections for the Council, a 
redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will take place'. This 
redeployment is different in nature fi'om the 'withdrawal' fi'om the Gaza Strip and Jericho area referred to 
in Article XIV. Rather than requir ing a removal of any forces from the territories, redeployment is 
intended to ensure a redistribution of forces within the territories, having regard to the general principle 
stated in Article XIII [2] that 'military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas'. That the 
redeployment is not intended to involve the transfer of forces outside the occupied territories is also 
underscored by Article XIII [3] which speaks of redeployment 'to specified locations'. Locations within 
Israel would not need to be specified.^  ^ While Article XIII provides that a redeployment of forces was 
due to take place prior to the eve of elections for the Palestinian Councü, the DoP did not suggest that 
the process of redeployment be completed by that date. Rather, Article XIII [3] provides that 'ftirther 
redeployments to specified locations wül be gradually implemented commensui'ate with the assumption 
of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian poHce'.^  ^ Thus the process of 
redeployment is intended to continue through the interim period, its pace being dictated by the extent to 
which the assumption of secur ity responsibilities by the Palestinian police makes such redeployment 
possible. '^* Other than Article XIII (1, 2 & 3), Israeli withdrawal and redeployment is dealt with in 
several parts of the DoP, e.g.: Article XIV and Annex II pertaining to it. Redeployment and withdrawal 
are emotive words and have been used extensively for propaganda purposes more for their psychological 
impact. Under the terms of the DoP the IDF was intended merely to be redeploying to areas within the 
occupied territories. Yitzhak Rabin asked in a speech in Knesset session, 'what did we insist on?...We 
insisted that Jerusalem would not be included in the fi'amework of the interim agreement... Jerusalem 
remains under Israel's sovereignty and is Israel's unified capital. The settlements remain...Every 
agreement that concerns an arrangement with the Palestinians on the establishment of the transitional 
period - the interim arrangement, autonomy - is then subject to change if it is violated significantly...I 
am telling you, at this stage and in the future a partial withdrawal in Gaza is better than the evacuation of 
the Golan Heights'. Rabin also mentioned that 'I do not want, and I said as much during the election 
campaign, to annex 1.8 to 2 million Palestinians and turn the State of Israel into a binational state.'^* 
Whüe the Labour Party's 1992 election platform categoricaUy rejected the establishment of a Palestinian 
state west of the Jordan River, however, Arafat is on record as saying that the DoP constitutes 'an initial
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step that spells out the ground rules governing the interim solution, as well as the basic components of 
the final solution, which must result in the dismantlement of the occupation and the complete withdrawal 
of occupation troops fiom our land, holy places, and holy Jerusalem’. He also said that the most 
important aspect of the DoP is 'not that the Israelis will withdraw from Gaza and Jericho, but rather the 
acknowledgement that the jurisdiction of the Palestinian authority covers all occupied Palestinian 
territories'.^®
Regarding displaced persons. Article XII, dealing with arrangements for liaison and cooperation 
between Israel, the Council, Jordan and Egypt, provides that these arrangements would include the 
constitution of a 'Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of 
persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to 
prevent disruption and disorder'.^’ This wording, taken directly fiom the Camp David Accords, is 
significant in that it indicates that the modalities for the admission of displaced persons can only be 
implemented along with those measures necessary to prevent disruption and disorder/® It should also be 
noted that the Continuing Committee was only intended to deal with those persons displaced from the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, which in itself would be a contentious point not least concerning the 
actual number of bona fide refugees. For example one Jordanian assessment of the numbers of 1967 
refugees was 530,129.^® The question of the refugees arising in 1948 was not to be considered by this 
committee, but rather was designated by Article V as an issue to be included in the permanent status 
negotiations. In this context, it should be noted that Article V does not limit the issue to be discussed to 
Arab refugees, the permanent status negotiations may equally focus on the lar ge number of Jews who 
were forced to flee to Israel from neighbouring Arab states. Nor does Article V give any indication as to 
the manner in which the refiigee issue should be resolved. As with aU issues to be included in the 
permanent status negotiations, aU options remain open.
Regarding the resolution of disputes, Article XV deals with the procedur e to be followed in 
order to resolve disputes arising out of the application or implementation of agreements during the 
interim period. Article XV [1] provides that such disputes 'shall be resolved through the Joint Liaison 
Committee {JLC}'. This committee, established under Article X, was intended to 'deal with issues 
requir ing coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes'. Where the JLC is unsuccessful at 
resolving the dispute, there is no mandatory next step. Article XV [2] provides that 'disputes which 
cannot be settled by negotiation may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed between 
the parties'. The use of the phrase 'may be resolved' clearly indicates that this is a voluntary proceeding, 
while the fact that the method of reconciliation is 'to be agreed by the parties' indicates that there must be 
an agreement between the parties both as to the need for conciliation and as to the appropriate forum 
and procedures. Where conciliation fails. Article XV provides that 'the parties may agree to submit to 
arbitration' the outstanding dispute. Once again, the word 'may' indicates a voluntary proceeding. 
Similarly, from the second part of the sub-article, wliich provides for the establisliment of an Arbitration 
Committee 'upon the agreement of both parties', it is clear that there must be agreement between the 
parties both as to the need for arbitration and as to the appropriate forum and procedures.®** Finally, it 
should be noted that the mechanisms proposed by Article XV relate only to disputes 'relating to the 
interim period'. Disputes relating to the permanent status airangements shall be resolved only tlirough 
negotiations. This principle is stated in the letter of the PLO Chairman to the Israeli Prime Minister
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dated 9th September 1993 - '...all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved 
tlirough negotiations'.®* The DoP calls for the establisliment of four joint committees for the resolution 
of disputes: (1) The Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee; (2) The Israeli-Palestinian Continuing 
Committee for Economic Cooperation; (3) Continuing Committee (with Egypt and Jordan to review 
the refugee problem); (4) Joint Israeli-Palestinian Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual 
security purposes.®  ^ The most striking thing about these committees is that they seem to operate above 
the jurisdiction of the Palestinian self-governing authority. It will probably be in the hands of these 
committees where real power will lie, important decisions will be channelled through them thus 
highlighting the extent of the democratic nature of the PISGA, and the inability of the Palestinians to 
operate as equals. The PISGA will be like a municipal council, wliile real authority rests with the Israeli 
government. The DoP could be seen as having a pyramidal structure, the apex being the govermnent of 
Israel, the next level would be the joint committees, then the Palestinian authority and at the bottom 
would be the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.®^
Regarding the Gaza-Jericho arrangements it appears that the idea that separate arrangements 
should be instituted in the Gaza Str ip and Jericho area was based on the common belief that an 
agreement in these areas might be easier to reach than one which includes the rest of the West Bank.
This was so because problems relating to such issues as security, water resources, Jewish population and 
holy places in these areas are less complex. The agreement of the Palestinians to discuss a transfer of 
powers in a specified part of the territories represented a significant change fi-om theft previous stance of 
all or notliing. It seemed that they agreed to such an arrangement because Israel agreed to transfer more 
powers in these areas and transfer them more quickly, than in the rest of the territories.
Negotiations on the special arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, including 
the early withdrawal of the IDF fi-om these areas, began immediately on the entry into force of the DoP. 
As indicated in Annex II, the aim of these negotiations was to conclude and sign an agreement on the 
Gaza-Jericho arrangement within two months of the entry into force of the DoP (i.e., 13th December- 
1993), with the early withdrawal of the IDF being completed within four montlis fi'om the signing of this 
agreement (i.e., by 13th April 1994). However, the two month target for concluding an agreement was 
not accomplished, and the four- month period for completing the withdr awal therefore did not end on 
13th April 1994, but rather was intended as September 4, 1994, four months fi-om the date such an 
agreement was signed i.e., 4th May 1994.®'*
The DoP addressed the Gaza-Jericho agreement in Article XIV and in Annex II, together with 
the Agreed Minute to that Annex. Among the subjects to be covered in the Gaza-Jericho agreement are 
the following:
a) Withdrawal of Israeli Forces. Ar-ticle XIV provides that 'Israel will withdraw fi om the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho Area, as detailed in ...Annex IT. Annex II provides that the withdrawal of the IDF was 
due to commence immediately with the signing of the Gaza-Jericho agreement. Unlike the 
'redeployment' due to take place in the rest of the territories, this withdrawal would involve the removal 
of forces firom these areas, though not all of the IDF forces were to be withdrawn. Indeed, a Palestinian 
proposal to use the phrase 'withdrawal o f all Israeli military forces' in Annex II [2] was rejected.®® 
Moreover, that some Israeli forces would continue to be present in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area is 
clear from a number of other provisions of the DoP:
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1. The Agreed Minute to Annex II provides that even after the withdrawal of the IDF, 'Israel will 
continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements 
and Israehs'. It is evident therefore that those Israeli forces requir ed to ftilftl this responsibility wih 
remain in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ar ea/®
2. The Agreed Minute to Annex II also provides that 'Israeli military forces...may continue to use roads 
freely within the Gaza Strip and Jericho area'. Clearly, those military forces making use of the roads in 
these areas will not have been withdrawn.®^
3. Ar ticle XIII, dealing with the redeployment of forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip on the eve of 
elections, states that this redeployment was to take place 'in addition to withdrawal of forces carried out 
in accordance with Article XIV. Since the withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
was due to take place before the elections, it follows that the DoP envisages, tliat subsequent to the 
withdrawal, there must be some remaining forces in those areas and it is these wliich wül be redeployed. 
As noted above, the principle guiding this redeployment was not that military forces be removed from 
these areas, but rather that they 'should be redeployed outside populated areas' (Article XIII [2]).®®
b) Jericho Area. Wliüe there was little difficulty ascertaining the extent of the area known as the 
Gaza Strip, the size of the Jericho area was the subject of some controversy. In tliis context it should be 
noted that in the negotiations leading to the signing of the DoP, Jericho was always regarded by the 
parties as a limited and symbolic addition to the 'Gaza first' plan. Moreover, the reason why Jericho in 
particular was found acceptable was precisely because no Jewish settlements were located in the 
immediate vicinity of the city. In line with the above, a Palestinian suggestion to refer to the former 
Jordanian province of Jericho was rejected. In the course of the negotiations on the DoP however,
Israel agreed to consider the inclusion of two adjacent refiigee camps - Aquabat Jabber and Bin El 
Sultan - which led to the use of the term 'Jericho area' instead of 'Jericho city'.®®
c) Establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA). Annex II of the DoP provides that powers and 
responsibilities transferred by Israel in these areas would be exercised by a Palestinian authority. This 
would be an appointed body since the early withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area would take 
place before the elections. The offices of the PA were to be located in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
(Annex II, Article [5]).®° A number of limitations were placed on the scope of the powers and 
responsibilities of the PA. In particular. Article VI [1] provides that authority would be transferred to 
'authorised Palestinians' preparatory to the 'inauguration of the Councü' thus it would appear from this 
that the Palestinians authorised were to be selected by the PLO and then approved by Israel.®* Annex II, 
Article [3.b,] provides that the PA would have no powers or responsibilities in relation to 'external 
security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and mutuaUy agreed matters'. Thus the notion of 
withdrawal actuaüy amounts to a redeployment outside populated areas. Annex II [3.b.] specifies that 
these powers and responsibilities should not encompass external security or foreign relations, Israeli 
settlements or Israelis. These powers were therefore not territorial but personal, relating to Palestinians 
alone, excluding foreigners and Israelis, which is everyone else in the world except Palestinians.®  ^
Moreover, unlike the elected Councü, there is no reference in the DoP to the PA in the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area having legislative powers. In practice however Israel indicated its wülingness to transfer 
legislative powers to the PA within its jurisdiction, in order to enable it to fulfil its fonctions effectively.®® 
In exercising these functions, the jurisdiction of the PA was also to be subject to the same limitations on
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territorial, personal and functional jurisdiction as the Council, contained in the Agreed Minute to Article 
IV. This principle is explicitly stated in Section A of the Agreed Minutes, which provides: 'Any powers 
and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians....prior to the inauguration of the Council will be 
subject to the same principles pertaining to Aiticle IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.
d) Security and Public Order. In order to fulfil the Palestinian responsibility for internal security 
and public order. Annex II provides for the establishment of a Palestinian police force. At the same 
time. Annex II and the Agreed Minute to this Annex make it clear that this police force would have no 
authority in relation to external secuiity, nor in relation to internal secmity and public order of 
settlements and Israelis. All of these were to remain areas of Israeli responsibility. The withdrawal of 
Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area cannot derogate fi-om these responsibilities.^^ 
Moreover, according to Annex II [3.f] concerning the 'Emergency Fund', it is probable to deduce that 
tliis fund was in fact intended as a security fund to be funded by international donors to pay for the 
budget of the Palestinian police, its agencies, equipment and its intelligence branch. One of the most 
worrying aspects concerning the setting up of the police force, was its lack of accountability to any 
Palestinian authority, or other body, in the stage before an elected Palestinian Council emerged. In 
essence what emerged was that the police force was subordinate only to Arafat's authority and was run 
independently of any direct collective Palestinian responsibility, a trend that continued after the Council's 
election. The nature of the nascent Palestinian authority was therefore undemocratic, unaccountable, 
and ultimately unstable as this important factor was either overlooked or ignored. The existence of 
concurrent Israeli and Palestinian responsibilities would give rise to number of practical complexities. 
Thus, Annex II provides for the establishment of a joint Coordination and Cooperation Committee for 
mutual security purposes (Annex II, Article [3.e.J ). This committee was designed to coordinate the 
allocation of security responsibilities, and serve as the mechanism for cooperation in matters of mutual
97security concern.
e) Safe Passage. Annex II, Article [3.g.] provides that the Gaza-Jericho agreement would 
contain arrangements for 'a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area'. The use of the words 'safe passage', as opposed to the idea of'free passage', was 
significant in that it indicated that Israel's obligation was limited to ensui ing the secuiity of the passage. 
There is nothing in the DoP to support the suggestion that an extra-temtorial corridor was envisaged.
In fact, the phrase 'safe passage for persons and transportation' indicated that a personal rather than a 
territorial right was envisaged. In addition, it would be hard to sustain an ar gument for Palestinian 
jmisdiction when such jmisdiction, under Article IV only extends to 'West Bank and Gaza temtory'.^^ 
Indeed, Israel proposed that the implementation of its obligation to ensure safe passage be carried out 
through the use of not one, but a number of roads crossing Israel.
f) Passages between Gaza and Egypt and between Jericho and Jordan. The Gaza-Jericho 
agreement would also include arrangements for coordination regarding passages between Gaza and 
Egypt and between Jericho and Jordan, as provided for in Annex II, Article [4].*^ ® The arrangements to 
be agreed in this regard must be consistent with Israel's responsibilities for foreign relations and external 
security. Such issues as entiy of foreign nationals, visas, passports, etc. are essential aspects of foreign 
relations, while control of the border crossings is an integral part of the control of the borders, wliich, in 
turn is an integral part of external security. It would make no sense for Israel to retain control along the
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length of the borders for security reasons, while at the same time not having control over persons 
passing tlirough the border crossings. Not only was tliis an issue over the control of persons who may 
pose a threat to Israel's internal security, but it was also an issue of sovereignty. The emotive issue of 
land dr amatically affects the negotiations, as well as affectmg the perception of how fair* the process has 
been. Land and borders define status, however it should also be noted that in Article V of the DoP the 
issue of borders is listed among the issues to be included in the final status negotiations and that the issue 
was not to be determined in the interim period.
g) Status of Gaza Strip and Jericho Ai ea. During the interim period, the status of the Gaza Strip 
and Jericho Area, was to be identical to that of the West Bank. This principle is emphasised in Article 
IV, which states: 'The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a singe territorial unit, 
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.''®  ^ In addition. Annex II, Article [6] 
provides that the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ai*ea will 'continue to be an integral part of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period'. It follows that, as in the 
case of the West Bank, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area will continue to be that of areas 
subject to military government, with Israel remaining the souice of authority.(see section 1(b) above) 
Two additional important principles are ensluined in Annex II, Aiticle [6]: fii’stly, that any attempt made 
by the parties to change the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area during the interim period will have 
no effect; and secondly, any such attempt would be a clear breach of the terms of the DoP, which may 
be considered a material breach and therefore grounds for terminating the DoP.^ '^^
The principle of early empowerment was to be provided for by the implementation of special 
arrangements in the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area agreement. Article VI of the DoP provides for a 
preparatory transfer of powers and responsibilities with regard to five specific spheres in the rest of the 
West Bank. The transfer of powers and responsibilities was due to commence on the completion of the 
withdrawal fi*om the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ai'ea. In particular, Ai ticle VI [2] provides that, 
immediately after the withdrawal, authority would be transferred to the Palestinians in the spheres of 
education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. Other than these transferred 
areas of authority, the IMG and ICA will continue to fulfil aU of their existing functions pending the 
inauguration of the Council, though as Aiticle VI [2] notes, the transfer of additional powers and 
responsibilities may be negotiated between the parties.
In the complex transfer of power between the PLO and Israel and the creation of limited 
Palestinian autonomy in Gaza and Jericho, the focus of attention was mainly on the difficult and often 
violent issues wliich surround the issue of security. However, haidly noticed amid the brouhaha, there 
emerged among the supporters of the DoP a shared conventional wisdom which held that the DoP 
would be the harbinger of a high degree of economic cooperation which would be the panacea for all the 
region's ills. Close coordination and cooperation, especially between the nascent Palestinian entity and 
Israel, was universally heralded to be the touchstone which would lead to a wider regional structure of 
economic cooperation, if not integration, using the European Union as the model. This hypothesis 
assumed that close Israeli-Palestinian economic cooperation was not only the key to regional stability, 
but also the key to anchoring the DoP in the realities of economic infi astructures and to thus gain 
acceptance fi om previously sceptical populations. Widespread was the analogy of peacemaking between 
France and West Germany, where the past was buried in the rapprochement which led to the eventual
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formation of the EEC. However, European economic integration started with economies and peoples 
which were at a compai able stage of industrial and technological development and which enjoyed similai* 
political institutions and traditions. By contrast, Israel and the Palestinians are at very different stages in 
economic development. Economic standai ds and infrastructure, political traditions, institutions and civil 
society are all as widely disparate as those between France and Algeria. Economic integration between 
Israel's developed economy and the West Bank and Gaza Strip would more likely create a new mode of 
Palestinian dependency and would be a very unequal partnership. The uneven and unequal relationship 
which has existed for the past 30-plus years would be perpetuated and thus a continuation along the 
same lines, which would be both detrimental to the Israeli and Palestinian economies and to the 
emerging relationship between the two wliich was meant to be based on a desire to redirect the histoiy 
of conflict wliich previously existed.
All development for the autonomous entities was to be funnelled thiough the Palestinian 
Economic Coimcil for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) headed by someone appointed by 
Arafat and the joint Palestinian-Israeli Economic Cooperation Committee, even tliough according to the 
DoP, both sides would 'coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international 
parties to support these a i m s ' . A  study by Israeli jomnalist Asher Davidi, quoted Dov Lautman, 
president of the Israeli Manufacturers Association as saying: 'It's not important whether there will be a 
Palestinian state, autonomy, or a Palestinian-Jordanian state. The economic borders between Israel and 
the territories must remain open.'^^  ^ According to Said, Israel, with its well developed institutions, close 
relations with the US, bui'geoning relations with Asia, aggressivity and drive of its economy, would be in 
a very good position to dominate the territories economically, maybe as far as keeping them in a state of 
permanent dependency. Exploiting the new political benefits of the peace process, Israel then could 
move to exploit and dominate the Arab economies in the r eg i on . As  evidence of this theory, Dajani 
cites Annex IV, the 'Protocol on Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Concerning Regional Development 
Programmes', which relates to the reference in Article XVI concerning the promoting of a regional 
Marshall Plan. Tlie relegation of this protocol to an Annex, Dajani feels, was to mask its significance, 
for this protocol outlines that the entke process of development was contingent on joint action by the 
two sides and places development fimds in a joint framework, which may be seen as subordinating 
Palestinian development to Israeli control. The same process was evident in the protocol on Israeli- 
Palestinian economic cooperation of Annex IIII subjecting all decisions to a joint economic committee. 
Many Palestinians feared that either dangerous and/or dirty environmental industries may be located in 
Gaza as indicated in Annex III [2, 3 and 7], or that the primaiy beneficiary under joint committees, for 
such as capital earmarked for building industrial projects would be Israel.
It is a fair statement that 'Economic dependency lias political consequences.'^ Unbridled Israeli 
economic hype about an economy o f peace has made many Palestinians waiy and suspicious that their 
former enemy was going to perpetuate economic control after a phased redeployment of its' armed 
forces.**  ^ In an article in Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz, on September 19, 1993, former deputy mayor of 
Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti wrote that up to that point, Israeli exploitation, discrimination and 
domination in the Occupied Territories had been justified as necessaiy for secmity, nationalistic-political, 
or even altruistic reasons. Now a new dictionary was being compiled to justify the self-same policies 
and enrich the same elements [of society], but the arguments would be reversed: it's all for the good of
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the Palestinians, it's all for the success of peace, it's aU so that the Palestinians will finally understand 
what their fathers refused to understand - that the Zionist enterprise is here to rescue them fi*om the 
morass of hardship and backwardness - and they must be eternally grateful/'^ Benvenisti aigued that the 
'best route to a new chapter in Israeli-Palestinian relations would allow the painful process of Palestinian 
nation-building to proceed with a minimal Israeli presence. The Palestinians should be empowered to 
develop their economy and society with as few links to Israel as possible ...Palestinian development and 
reconstruction should be a joint Arab project', thus assistance would mobilise Arab public support for 
the Israeli-Palestinian accord and legitimise, not only the DoP but also the Madrid multilateral process 
ongoing in regional terms. There is much opposition in the Arab world to the Israeli-Palestinian peace, 
the process wholly depends on people being able to see tangible and significant improvements in thek 
living conditions, such as those economic assistance and investment can provide. Contmued Israeli 
economic paiamountcy in the territories may well seek to fuifher the cause of those opposed to the DoP 
by playing on the resentment of a people who know dependence, for manual work in Israel, for produce, 
for social mequality and for the kind of vulnerability brought by exposure to natural Israeli fears for 
secmity reasons but which results in the closme of the territories and curfews.*
Elsewhere, Article VII [4] provides for an admk able list of authorities to be established in order 
to promote the economic situation of the two entities, especially of Gaza, such as: electricity, a sea port, 
a bank and export promotion among other tilings. However, of the five spheres transferred to the 
PISGA, economic matters fell outside thek competency, though these aspects may have been constituted 
ata later date and placed under the jurisdiction of the joint economic committee as indicated m Annex 
III.**^  Normalisation of revenue raising structures would have to be done as the authority could not 
hope to exist as an international chai'ity case for too long, for many and obvious reasons. Questions 
therefore had to be raised regardmg the financing the self governing process. Under Article VI [2], 
dkect taxation would be one of the responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians, wliich would mean in 
practice, primarily income taxes. While income taxes constitute a heavy burden by wage earners and 
salaried workers, a burden borne almost entkely by this group, the fact is that the most important somce 
of revenue raising for any government in developing comitries is indkect taxation, such as customs fees 
and taxes on consumer goods.* There are also two main factors to be mindfiil of here that would 
constitute possible areas of fi*iction which may have led to unrest, namely: unemployment was estimated 
to be running at around 60% in the Gaza Strip, precluding the ability to raise much revenue fi'om those 
currently working, and secondly, there was the refiain the US would have known only too well, 'No 
taxation without representation'.
Keeping kidkect taxes outside the jurisdiction of the Council meant that the Israelis would 
maintain a liigh presence where such taxes were collected. Moreover, the fact that the authority for 
dkect taxation would be transferred to the Palestinians still does not preclude Israel from levymg taxes. 
Accordkig to the Agreed Minutes Article VI [2,3.]: 'Each of the [five] spheres... will continue to enjoy 
existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These 
arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments requked in order to take into account the 
taxes collected by the dkect taxation office.'**  ^ The 'dkect taxation office' referred to is, of course, 
Israeli; it is fi*om the government budget of Israel that allocations to the five spheres would come. This
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means that it is the direct taxes levied by the Council that would constitute an additional burden on the 
Palestinian taxpayer, a possible area of resentment for a burden to be endured.**^
However it is still too early to conclude that Israelis will be freely wandering Arab capitals 
setting up deals and dominating the entke Middle Eastern economy. What can be concluded was that it 
seemed to be that economic aid for Palestine was being supervised and controlled by the US, bypassing 
the UN, some of whose agencies like UNWRA and UNDP were better placed to administer aid monies. 
Also excluded from being formally incorporated m the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was the World 
Bank. The World Bank, wliich would demand strkigent accountability, is the main soui ce of financial 
aid for projects in the developing world, and which was hoped by sponsors of the peace process would 
constitute a major mvestment vehicle for the dkecting and disbursement of monies to the autonomous 
areas. However, the bank faced a potentially problematic obstacle to the actual production of assistance. 
That was, that the bank could only lend monies to projects in the territory of a member state and that 
such loans had to be guaranteed by a government. The Palestinian autonomous areas were not members 
of the bank and there was no 'Palestinian government' able to guarantee the repayment of any such 
loans. A possible solution to this hui dle was the proposal of the creation of a free-trade area comprising 
Israel, the occupied territories and Jordan, in order to promote economic cooperation as well as 
promoting stability. Eytan Gilboa, professor of international relations at Hebrew University said that 
Israel would be unable to rely simply on the generosity of the US taxpayer forever, stating that a greater 
effort would be 'requked to mobilise financial resour ces fr om the oil-rich states ki the gulf and from 
Europe and Japan.'* Israel's relatively liigh-tech economy is most attuned to European than to Middle 
Eastern markets and labour costs in Israel are consequently higher than the majority of Middle Eastern 
counterparts. Amnon Rubin, senior dkector of economic-policy issues at the Bank of Israel pointed out 
that after 14 year’s of peace with Egypt, Israel's exports to Egypt were a mere $7m in 1992.*^ ** Sounding 
a word of well-heeded caution was Sliknon Shetreet, Israeli Economic and Planning Minister, who said 
that 'Hamas thrives on poverty, distress and bad social conditions.'*^* Thus the nature of the Israeli- 
Palestinian agreement was that Arafat's PLO, in order to maintain a dialogue with the Israeli government 
would have to be given resources to invest m economic and social projects. Therefore although Europe, 
the US and Japan all had economic difficulties and other worthy commitments, one mitigating factor in 
the favour of financing the DoP was that, the populations and the geographic areas were small. There 
are 5 million Israelis and 1,5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Economies were 
therfore on a similarly modest scale, especially when one compared aid to Palestine with the aid 
necessary to revitalise the former USSR.*^^
Permanent Status Negotiations
Article V [2] of the DoP provides that permanent status negotiations were to commence 'as soon 
as possible, but not later than the beginning of the thk d year of the interkn period'. *^  ^ This was with a 
view to implementmg the permanent status ar rangements at the conclusion of the of the five year 
transitional period. This proved a very important point of contention as it meant that final status issues 
could be raised immediately. Unlike the interim arrangements, for which the DoP gives extensive 
guidelines, the DoP is conspicuously silent about the form the permanent status negotiations would take. 
The list of issues provided in Article V [3] to be included in the permanent status negotiations,
Jerusalem, refiigees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other
152
neighbours, and other issues of common interest is not inclusive. Neither the inclusion of an issue in the 
list contained in Article V [3], nor its non-inclusion, should be taken as any indication of the outcome of 
the permanent status negotiations. In fact, the principle that all options should be left open is explicitly 
stated in Article V [4], 'The two pailies agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations 
should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.'* '^* While the 
permanent status negotiations are not to be influenced by agreements for the interim period, they will be 
subject to the principles which form the basis of the cmrent peace process. Thus, Article I restates the 
fact that the permanent status settlement shall be based on UN SCR's 242 and 338 (although 242 is 
subject to differing interpretations), the preamble reflects the letter of invitation to the Madrid peace 
conference in speaking of the attempt to 'achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement.
It will at this stage be instructive to ask some questions concerning the permanent status 
negotiations. What ar e the guarantees that the series of intracommittee and extracommittee negotiations 
will lead to a final agreement, and what happens if they do not? The five-year time limit, like everything 
else pertaining to the DoP, is, in principle. Only treaties are binding, and only states can conclude 
treaties. The DoP is neither a treaty nor an international resolution supported by international 
organisations, it is simply a declaration. Ai ticle XV [1] refers to the potentiality of disputes arising, and 
refers such disputes to the establishment of mechanisms for conciliation and arbitration, e.g., the Joint 
Liaison Committee. Such recourse does not extend however beyond the interim period into the final 
status negotiations. If reconciliation cannot be achieved, according to Aiticle XV [3] 'the parties will 
establish an Arbitration Committee,' the nature and structure of which wiU be decided tluough 
negotiations.*^^ The inclusion of this provision is probably as a result of Israeli experience during its 
negotiations with Egypt over Taba, where the parties after some eight yeai’s of negotiation finally 
resolved their dispute over a single square kilometre. The Israeli lesson learned was that they lost when 
the issue spent two years at international arbitration.*^^
There is no word in the DoP about recourse to external arbitration in the event of failure of the 
negotiations, nor of penalties for failure. The DoP provides for a series of negotiations during the 
interim period, but is silent on the pai*aUel and unilateral process of Israeh legislation. Article V [4] 
provides that 'the two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be 
prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.'*^  ^ Only arrangements for the 
interim period are mentioned, there is no word about the changes which can be effected through 
legislation or by faits accomplis. The DoP contains no Israeli commitments on settlements, 
expropriations, confiscations, new link roads, demolitions, taxation, movement of individuals, etc. The 
DoP therefore makes it difficult fi*om a Palestinian point of view to challenge Israel's future legislation, 
indeed even to challenge as they did in the past Israeli laws pertaining to the violation of rights and 
liberties on the basis of the 4th Geneva Convention regarding occupying powers. No safeguard remains 
against Israeli administrative or legislative measuies that can in effect undermine the self-governing 
process. It seems that the PLO was not aware that through its unconditional recognition of Israel, it can 
be argued that the PLO actually affirmed Israel's sovereignty beyond the 1949 and 1967 borders. Thus 
Israel can claim the redefinition of her borders as they are extant, thiough the provisions of, the Rhodes 
armistice agreement - especially the agreement signed between Israel and Jordan on 3rd April 1949, UN 
Security Council Resolution's 242 and 338, and the 1974 Disengagement Agreement (though Jordan
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didn’t sign an agreement with Israel because of the Rabat decision to recognise the PLO as the sole 
legitimate representative of the PLO). Regarding UN resolution 242, in paragraph l(ii), there is a call to 
respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every 'state' in the area.*^° Tliis 
may cause the Palestinians problems from recidivist Jordanian claims on the West Bank which was 
annexed by her in April 1950. Not constituting a state means that the Israelis could claim that the 
resolution doesn't apply to the West Bank, and although the PLO may counter citing Article IV of the 
DoP which provides that the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitute a 'single territorial unit, whose 
integrity will be preserved during the interim period' this only pertains to the interim negotiations and 
does not apply to final status talks. The PLO's acceptance of resolution 242 as the basis for 
permanent negotiations (DoP Article I) could severely compromise the legal status of the West Bank 
because since 1988 the territory has ceased to be regarded or claimed as part of an existing state, which 
means legally it is almost in a kind of limbo status. Therefore it can be concluded that UN resolution 
242's applicability to the occupied territories is equivocal and vague, pertaining to a set of situations as 
they existed in 1967, indeed it is devoid of even any reference to the Palestinians, their rights, land or 
status,
3.3 Genesis-II Sera Une Progression Chaotique: Analysis of the Declaration of Principles
as an Example of Conflict Resolution
Whether or not the negotiating process is about breaking the matrix of hate remains to be seen, 
what is certain is that the fires of enmity cool slowly. The forces of liistory may cool the passions with 
bold leadership and decisive diplomacy, but in reality in the case of ingrained historic hatreds, true and 
lasting change can only come from the volition of the parties involved. When the cost of hatred is 
deemed too high then peace becomes possible. Haim Ramon, then-Israeli Minister of Health stated he 
believed that the DoP peace process was frreversible, and that through reaching agreement both sides 
had crossed the Rubicon. The nature of crossing the Rubicon is that once crossed, the distance that 
once was deemed too great becomes in retrospect quite small. The demolition of the Berlin Wall, the 
repealing of apartheid laws in South Afr ica and the relatively free and fan elections in Cambodia and in 
Eastern Eui ope are testament to the will of people to change once perceived certainties.
For many, the DoP represents the culmination of a process of reconciliation based on 
compromise, namely the acceptance by both sides, of each other and of the principles of political 
partition and territorial compromise as the basis both for the settlement of the conflict and for peaceful 
coexistence. Thus the DoP is heralded as the triumph of pragmatism.* "^* Such an opinion contends, that 
the abandonment of territorial exclusivity and partisan ideological justification for the claim to the 
patrimony, as the source of national identity, came more from the dawning realisation that both sides 
could not, for various reasons, expect the other to disappear. However, the question has oft been posed, 
'Wliat is the alternative?' To those who suffer misgivings, this is a good question if it were not asked so 
often in the rhetorical sense. Palestinian objectors demand to know if the Palestinians are to be ruled by 
predetermined agreements arrived at in secret ? To such people alternatives only appear by default, their 
having been locked out of the political process and therefore denied the coui tesy of providing their 
collective assent. The intifada highlighted the drawbacks of division, where distant leaders bereft of 
ideas and strategies, were only reinvigorated by events 1500 miles away. The principle of the intifada
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for many ordinary Palestinians was that responsibility for the Palestinian polity was to be determined 
collectively.*^^
Like any 'momentous' historic occasion, the DoP did not come out of the blue. For many it was 
a surprise, but many events previously had led to the fostering of an atmosphere which was favoui’able 
enough to provide for such an agreement. The signposts along the way also allowed the observer of the 
region to conclude that there was something happening. For example, the closure of the territories in 
March 1993 by the Israeli government intended to reinforce in the minds of the Israeli public the 
separateness of the occupied territories and to retui n Israel to the notion of the Green Line division prior 
to any announcement regarding changes to the governance of the occupied territories. The DoP 
resembles in many respects the 'Camp David Frameworks for Peace', of September 17th 1978, signed by 
Sadat and Begin and witnessed by Carter in Thurmont, Maryland, Much of the timetable and the 
objectives of the DoP closely follow that which was envisioned by tliis eailier process. *^^
The genesis of the DoP could be said to have many birthdates, but the international situation 
which prevailed in 1992/93 was certainly favourable to the DoP being concluded. What transpired from 
the DoP was not really anything new materially. What was new was the mutual desire of both sides to 
conclude a political settlement, however imperfect. The reason the DoP was signed in 1993 was 
because all the variables which had precluded progress in the past had fallen in such a way as to provide 
an opportunity for compromise. Whilst the more lyrically-minded may wax that 'where ever there is a 
clash between right and right, a value liigher than right ought to prevail, and this value is life itself ,*^  ^the 
reason it never happened before was precisely because the conditions were not ripe for progress. The 
'historic' achievement of the DoP has as much to do with the vagaries of fortune as it does design. 
Positive progress was achieved due to a series of milestones which in a sense dictated policies and 
stances taken. External and internal events suffused to create the necessary chemistiy for success.
There are three possible biithdates for the present peace process. (1) 2nd August 1990 - a date wliich 
changed the political landscape of the Middle East and eventually provided the USA with the 
unprecedented political ability to exercise pressuie over regional protagonists. (2) 14th December 1988 
- the date of Arafat's renunciation of terrorism and the implicit recognition of the State of Israel, which 
added to the political pressure on Israel following fr om the outbreak of the intifada and allowed the US 
administration under Bush to distance the USA from Israel politically. (3) 23rd June 1992 - the day 
Rabin formed a new government, changing the Israeli domestic political scene in favour of finding 
accommodation with the Palestinians. My preference for the thii'd date is due more to it being the final 
necessary precondition for progress in negotiations.
The DoP was formally begun with the mutual recognition pact symbolised with the signing and 
exchange of letters. The letter fr om the leader of the PLO recognised Israel's right to exist, renounced 
violence and declared 'inoperative and no longer valid' those articles of the Palestinian national covenant 
which pertained to territory, Jews, armed struggle, renunciation of Israel and the rejection of the 
compromise of the Charter's aims.*^ * The breakthrough in the peace process was the result less of 
altruism than of simple pragmatism. The Norway Channel produced the needed trust to impel PM Rabin 
and Arafat to take the first and most important step, mutual recognition. Tliis was the sine qua non of 
the agreement.
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One must be honest with oneself and accept that most inliabitants of Israel and the occupied 
territories will not have read and studied the fuU text of the DoP. They will have received then 
information from many diverse sources, from newspaper synopses, from television reports, from radio 
commentaires and from word of mouth. Support for the DoP will be based on instinctive reactions and 
environment, and in this milieu the importance of the politics of last outrage will play a deterniining 
factor. Peace has not been achieved with the DoP. The accord is the beginning of a process of 
negotiation between adversaires who, although have finally recognised each other’s existence, still seize 
every opportunity to proclaim that they neither like nor trust each other. The accord will follow a long 
and hard road and success will be determined in the same manner in which brought about the DoP itself, 
that it is believed to be better than the alternatives.
The agreement is based on the principle of finding the lowest common denominator which can be 
agreed upon, and from there build layer on layer consensus thi ough negotiation which has as a final 
destination a settlement which has been mutually arrived at. The Israeli-PLO agreement has the 
potential to revolutionise politics in the Middle East, but there is a degree of risk proportional to the 
expected payoff. The basic conflict of interests between Israel and the Palestinians has fai’ from been 
resolved, thus tills is not an liistorical reconciliation between two peoples, but more a shift to a struggle 
whose parameters will be defined by the DoP. Therefore the evolution of Gaza/Jericho to statehood via 
the DoP became a realistic possibility because the recognition of the PLO's role in the peace process 
gave the Palestinians the credibility needed to make a deal in the eyes of the international community.*^ ** 
Also as importantly, recognition gave credence to the Palestinian peoples' struggle and encouraged then 
support for any agreement which was made in their name. For the Israelis the issue was not just 
recognition of the PLO as an organisation. It was simply a matter of negotiating with the people who 
made the decisions, or at the very least with those who were the more palatable. It is far from certain 
that there can be a final settlement even if the PLO continues to support the DoP, however, it is 
absolutely unquestionable that there can be any Israeli-Palestinian settlement if the PLO is opposed.*"*** 
That said, those Palestinians who fought for the struggle, who rose up in the intifada and who 
gave then lives did not do it for what was achieved at Oslo. Internationally, the Palestinian position had 
deteriorated rapidly after the Persian Guff War, the USSR was no longer a major factor in the regional 
balance of power, Iraq was crushed, the PLO faced hostility from the Guff states and remittances to the 
territories dried up. As the PLO faced a budgetary crisis, sympathetic coverage in the Western media 
declined and the PLO suffered setbacks in the diplomatic arena and in the minds of Western public 
opinion. Secret talks almost undoubtedly led to a breakthrough precisely because of their secret natui e - 
initially low expectations produced high yields in contrast to the Madrid track which proceeded through 
the foiinulaic and ritualised debating process where everything had to be agreed in public and in advance 
before any announcement of a breakthiough could be made. In such an environment the obvious 
proceduie for negotiators, especially when needing to comfort volatile constituencies at home, was to 
play safe and continually refer to higher authorities for guidance before taking new and bold lines, thus 
stagnation occurred and the chances for imaginative steps receded. Thus
'right fr om the start the Norwegians recognised that secrecy was the number one requii ement for 
the kind of negotiations they were setting up. They knew the failure of the talks in Washington 
was in lai’ge part due to the increase in publicity which surrounded them. From the moment the
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Madrid peace process began ...discussions had been conducted before the cameras of the world. 
Both sides took great cai*e to choose their spokesmen and women for their media-friendly 
qualities. Every day the rituals of anivals and departures at the State Department was broken 
several times for press conferences and set-piece statements. Tliis had the effect of hardening 
each side's position. Once Israelis or Palestinians revealed what the hitches were, and defended 
their stance before a worldwide audience, it was difficult to change it or even to exhibit 
flexibility, for fear of being seen to back down. So the talks degenerated into sterile postui ing 
and formulaic insults, presented day after day on the television and in the papers. As a result, 
little or no progress was made.'*"**
Arafat is accused of having manoeuvred the Israelis into the Norway channel by deliberately stalling the 
Wasliington negotiations so he could force progress with the Israelis in Norway, by creating the 
impression for the Israelis that the Madi’id process was deadlocked and not likely to produce results. 
However, according to a Palestinian viewpoint, 'up until Oslo, we focused all our thinking on going to 
the US, which held '99 percent of the cards,* and hoping they would 'deliver' Israel. But this never 
worked ...Eventually it became clear that we Palestinians and Israelis would have to create oui- own 
dynamic. That's what happened with these 'back channel' negotiations: they began, then stopped, then 
picked up again - most of the work was actually done in the last month, between 21 July and 19 
August.'*"*^  Mutual recognition was 'something that Arafat, shut out of the Washington process, longed 
for. By accepting the PLO's right to represent the Palestinian people, Israel would also be implicitly 
accepting the PLO's political agenda - the Palestinians' right to self-determination and their own state.'*"*^  
During this process, the Palestinians were concerned there were secret negotiations between Israel and 
Syria. On August 3 1993, when Warren Christopher met with Rabin, the Palestinians feared talks were 
going to bypass them. Arafat's strategy of not wanting the Washington talks to deliver anytliing because 
he was excluded from them increased the danger of the PLO being mai ginalised in the negotiating 
process because Israel could potentially be forced to seek alternatives through frustration. All such 
complex negotiations had to be delicately handled. Both sides 'knew that other behind-the-scenes 
meetings, wliich might have borne fruit, had been blown apart once the press got to hear about them. 
Publicity also alerted special interest groups on both sides, groups wliich often been deliberately kept m 
the dark to prevent sabotage attempts. The PLO was particularly sensitive to this. It was notoriously 
faction-ridden and its attempts to establish discreet contacts had often been derisively rejected by the 
Israelis because of the near impossibility of maintaining secrecy.'*"*"*
Arafat's approval of the secret negotiations in Oslo was done without keeping Ms Washington 
negotiating team appraised of developments. Arafat acted as of old - secretively, deviously and for all 
the protestations that the PLO was a democratic organisation, autocratically. Although Arafat made 
pronouncements of moderation and was becoming more popular, especially amongst the European left, 
he was still remembered in Israel for allying himself with Saddam Hussein who had vowed to destroy 
Israel and liberate Jerusalem. In a telephoned speech to a gathering at al-Najah University, Arafat openly 
declared the DoP was nothing but the first phase of the 'plan of phases', a 1974 PLO blueprint for the 
destruction of Israel. TMs was at the same time that many witliin the PLO, or at least Arafat's 
mainstream Fatah faction, had been arguing for a transformation of the PLO, fr om a revolutionary 
organisation committed to armed struggle, to one espousing diplomacy and negotiation. However,
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Israelis recognised that the world was changing around them, bringing with it pressure on Israel for the 
need for a strategic rethink of Israel's national objectives which included a settlement of the Palestinian 
problem. Israel's leaders realised that the DoP offered terms and opportunities to reach a favourable 
agreement that Israel may never be able to better.*"*^  Prior to concluding the DoP, Rabin's government 
had been unable to determine a new post Cold War role for Israel, to protect Israeli citizens from the 
violence of the intifada, to co-opt Palestinians from the territories to cut a deal irrespective of the PLO in 
Tunis and to counter the rise of militant Islamic organisations, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad.*"***
It is instructive to consider some of the assumptions which shaped the negotiating process.
During the 1980's the PLO began to take an active interest in cultivating Israelis who were disposed to 
reconciliation, always with an eye to the influential ones, such as potential MK's. These private attempts 
reflected the exact balance of power between the two, one weak-the other strong. The balance of power 
is reflected in the rather sad example where partisan advocates of the liigher power party demanded of 
the weaker power victims of military occupation and dispossession for various moral acknowledgements 
of contrition to appease the instigators of their misfortune. It seems that some in the PLO thought of 
private encounters as a form of negotiation with the Israelis, gradually using more prominent 
personalities fr om the PLO such as, Nabil Sha'ath and notables fr om the occupied territories such as, 
Faisal Husseini and Hanan Ashrawi. There does not seem to have been any attempt by the PLO to 
coordinate such efforts internationally. A standing committee of the PLO set up to deal with the US 
never actually met and most of its members didn't even know English. Arafat seemed to be courting 
patrons in the West who would deliver a solution of sorts, a quixotic fantasy originated in the notion that 
the US was like Syria or Iraq, where getting close to someone who was close to the leader would open 
all doors which would get things done. Even Arafat and his principal lieutenants' knowledge of Israel 
was known tlirough contacts and hearsay rather than through scientific and systematic study.*"*’ Arafat 
had never seen an Israeli settlement. There are now over 200 of them. Expropriation of land is 
estimated at 55% of the total land area of the occupied territories and Israel has tapped into West Bank 
aquifers, using about 80% of the water there for settlements and for Israel proper. The Palestinian 
opposition's argument against the DoP ran therefore that it was negotiated by people who were not in 
full possession of all the facts. Opponents contended that information regaining the changing nature of 
the territories was intentionally disregarded by the PLO negotiators. The negotiators were charged with 
negotiating a 'rental agreement' especially as the DoP is ominously silent on the question of specific 
mechanisms of how to get from interim to final status.*"*^
The struggle over what is Israel/Palestine has been one of territorial sovereignty. The 
'Israelis have asserted sovereignty, built settlements and roads, expropriated land and water, and 
deployed armed forces. The tactics of the PLO have been to make general assertions, and then 
hope the concrete details will somehow miraculously fall into place. The PLO accepted the DoP 
hoping that Palestinian autonomy would lead to independence if enough rhetorical statements 
were made. When it came to negotiating the details, the PLO had neither the plans nor the facts, 
nor the discipline of detail. A general idea like 'limited autonomy' might lead to independence, or 
it might lead to continued domination. In either case, the main task for the Palestinians is to 
know and understand the overall map of the territories that the Israelis have been creating. The 
essence of the Israeli territorial domination, both in theory and in detail, is 1. effective control
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over the land within its pre-1967 boundaries; and 2. the prevention of real Palestinian autonomy 
of the Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied tenitories by maintaining an ever-expanding 
Jerusalem as the core of the web extending into the West Bank. Israeli plans for and practices in 
Jerusalem ai e therefore central to the future of how far the Palestinians will reach.
The DoP, concluded in secret, circumnavigated the process of circumspection by the 
presentation of a fait accompli, negotiated and concluded outwith the normal channels of political and 
populai' approval, thus negating the ability of opponents to seek clarification or register objection. 
However, those who concluded the DoP will have to implement it as they 'own' it - they aie its' 
architects and sponsors. Such a secret process, even if it does produce initial results, by way of 
opponents maintaining a low profile during initial phases of euphoria and acceptance, does not 
necessarily mean it whl have a benevolent passage. Many Palestinians are angry at thek leaders for 
bargaining away thek legacy, they are also waiy of any peace agreement that leaves uniesolved so many 
fundamental and crucial issues, such as the question of statehood, the divisibility of Jerusalem, provision 
for the right of return for refugees and compensation for those who lost land m 1948 and 1967. Critics 
of Arafat contend that he cut a deal in order to ensure liis own political survival, that he signed away 
thek bkthright only to become 'mayor of Jericho' responsible for collecting rubbish.*^ ** If we now turn to 
reflect on the various reactions to the DoP, we will find some fascinating insights into those players in 
tliis drama, as they justify or oppose, depending on tknkig, ckcumstance and thek relative closeness to 
the actual centre of political power.
PM Rabin, in his speech in Washington D.C. addressed liis life-long external adversaries, 'let me 
say to you, the Palestinians: We are destined to live together on the same soil in the same land ...we who 
have fought agakist you, the Palestinians, we say to you today in a loud and a clear voice: Enough of 
blood and tears, Enough!'*^* Similarly Chakmaii Arafat liit a conciliatory note, when he said
'my people are also hoping that this agreement ...maiks the beginning of the end of a chapter of 
pain and suffering that has lasted throughout this century and will usher m an age of peace, 
coexistence and equal rights ...Now as we stand on the threshold of this new historic era, let me 
address the people of Israel and thek leadership, with which we are meetmg today for the first 
time. Let me assme them that the difficult decision we reached together was one that requked 
great and exceptional courage. We will need more courage and determination to continue the 
course of building coexistence and peace between us ...Our people do not believe that exercising 
the right to self-determination could violate the rights of thek neighbours or kifiringe on thek 
security.
The DoP also meant other things too, even to the two leaders. According to Arafat,
'the Palestinian people have been put on the political map. And whoever is on the political map 
is there on the geographical map.'*^  ^ Rabin, addressing the Knesset, stated that Israelis owed it 
to themselves and thek 'children to see the new world as it is ...and do everything so that the 
State of Israel becomes part of the changing world. We must rid ourselves of the feeling of 
isolation that gripped us for almost a quarter of a century. We must joki the international march 
of peace, reconciliation and cooperation.'*^"*
Alternatively one could believe that Rabin hoped to find a partner to take responsibility for the 
internal problems of the Palestinians, and would 'deal with Gaza without problems caused by appeals to
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the High Court of Justice, without problems caused by B'tselem and without problems from all sorts of 
bleeding hearts and mothers and fathers.'*Similarly there is an identical interest among mainstream 
Palestinian nationalists in thek opposition to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. Palestinian nationalists 
would only be able to make thek case with thek own people if they represented acliievements and 
interests worth protecting, even at the price of the indefinite postponement of sovereign independence.
The ceremony at the White House lawn was made possible, according to former Secretary of 
State Kissmger, by exhaustion, material exhaustion on the part of the PLO and psychological exhaustion 
on the part of Israel. Kissinger ai’gued this was why aU truly contentious issues were set aside - borders, 
settlements, refiigees and Jerusalem, and that even the mutual recognition on which the agreement was 
based was ambiguous. This gave rise to the illusion that Israel had recognised the PLO but believed that 
it had not recognised a Palestinian state and that it could continue to choose the representatives with 
whom it was prepared to deal. Kissmger ai’gued that after Arafat was received on the White House lawn 
on an equal footing with PM Rabin, and once elections were held m the territories, a Palestinian state 
was inevitable sooner or later. PM Rabin, mterviewed in Cako declared, 'I stick to my position: no 
Palestinian state, Jerusalem must remain united under Israeli sovereignty, and be our capital 
forever...With aU due respect to Kissinger's position, I look at it differently. I believe that m any 
autonomy there is danger of an independent state...I believe we can do many things to prevent it from 
becoming inevitable...Basically I will judge it by two criteria: Fkst, security for Israelis m Israel, in the 
territories and m the Gaza Strip. Secondly, how they move in taking over the running of the life of the 
Palestinians.'*^  ^ However, Rabin was nothing if he was not a pragmatic and practical man. Although as 
Defence Minister in the National Unity Government in 1988 he vowed to defeat the intifada with 'force, 
might and beatings', he was astute enough to declare after only 3 months of the intifada in February 1988 
when he told fellow Labour Party members 'I've learned somethkig in the past 2 1/2 months: you can't 
rule by force over 1.5 million Palestinians.'*^’
The DoP meant that the Palestinians had to face two choices, to remain in the state of occupation 
wliich relegated even the very idea of Palestine to the status of faded memory or to adapt to the offer of 
what the DoP may yield. One road to dependence, the other to mdependence. Everytliing short of 
mdependence means a form of devolved power with real power remakiing in the hands of the Israelis. 
Unless the Israelis foresee the eventual outcome of the DoP process as Palestinian sovereignty, in 
whatever configuration, then the DoP will survive as a local administration charter on structural 
organisation. Thus it will go the way of all previous attempts at resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict which did not include the realisation of Palestinian sovereignty. There is an Aiab proverb wliich 
says that the journey of 1,000 miles always starts with the first step. Dr. Zehi Wanhaid of UNWRA, felt 
Arafat had no option but to accept the accord. 'Of course we have had harsh words from Amman and 
Damascus but we have to go through the neck of the bottle to save Palestkiian nationality. If we insist 
now on nationality with all the land we will finish as a minority inside a bigger Israel, deserted by the 
world. Let's have the flag and the years can take care of the rest.'*^* Similarly for Sari Nusseibeh, the 
road to Palestine must begin somewhere, 'we have the choice of continuing to dream of a palace in the 
sky or building a hut on the ground. From the hut, a palace can be built.'*Aiafat's supporters tended 
to agree with an unlikely ally, Chakn Herzog, former President of Israel, when he summarised that 'it is
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yet to be proved that tliis is one of the great moments of history. But certainly it is one of the great 
opportunities.'*^**
It is instructive to consider the reactions of various people who reflect differing shades of 
opinion. Secretary WaiTen Cliristopher hailed the DoP as a 'conceptual breakthiough'.**** Other US 
responses also tended to be upbeat, like Zbigniew Brzezinski, who concluded that 'what has happened in 
my judgement, is a fundamental political and psychological breaktlirough that has changed the mutual 
perceptions of the two parties. They no longer view each other as mortal enemies. This creates the 
basis for continued progress toward peace, even if that progress is from time to time punctuated by 
outrageous acts of terrorism or violence or even top-level assassinations. In that sense it's irreversible 
even though there may be reverses.'*^  ^ Most foreign commentators felt the desire to be confidant despite 
misgivings, particularly in the Western world which hailed the arrival of peace wliilst not fully 
imderstanding what had actually been achieved. In this respect it may be fitting to give the last word to 
Ruslan Khasbulatov, former chairman of the Russian federal parliament, who declared 'I do believe that 
a wonderful example has been set for settling conflict by peaceful nieans.'*^^
By far the most important opinions come from the two communities most affected by the 
agreement, the Israeli and Palestinian. Opinion formers and representatives of organisations considered 
the DoP through the gamut of prognoses, from the darkest to the most hopeful.
By considering the reactions from the Israeli side of the debate we will be able to determine 
whether the government had the power to steer its' policies tlii’ough to thek conclusion. One must be 
mindful here that although the Israeli political milieu is robust, there was then no history of actual open 
insurrection nor of defiance of the supremacy of the parliamentary system, despite rather questionable 
exliortations by militant individuals. Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz, whose heartfelt concerns for the 
soul of Israel, viewed the DoP as the vehicle 'to liberate the Israelis fr om this accursed domkiation 
through violence.' Labour MK Yael Dayan also felt that the DoP heralded the end of the conflict m turn 
meaning that Israelis could be comfortable in thek 'own skin.'*^ "* For Dedi Zucker MK, 'it was a 
combination of two different people who are both at the end of thek careers, and knowing that fighting 
each other would lead them nowhere. One came with imagination and vision an a belief in a better 
futuie. And the other brought a lot of scepticism and pragmatism.'*^  ^ At the time of signing, Aiafat was 
64, Rabin 71 and Peres 70. All were considered indispensable to the process. Thus there were many 
fears that, a single assassination, heart attack or parliamentary defeat could derail the process in its most 
crucial phase, the first two yeai's. However, according to Uri Savk, Dkector-General at the Foreign 
Mkiistry who led the Israeli team in Norway, 'the longer the peace process goes on, the more successful 
it win be, and the less dependent on individuals.'***^  Savk said that 'We negotiated with the PLO because 
they were [the only Palestinian group] that could deliver the goods.'*^’ Making peace 'will take a lot of 
patience', Savk believed that 'One finds ambiguous feelings among Israelis. On the one hand, there is 
extreme distrust - and there aie historical reasons for that - and on the other hand, a strong deske for 
reconciliation. I think the same ambiguities exist on the [Arab] side.'***^  Yossi Beilin, deputy Foreign 
Minister described the government's goals, 'I hope we have legitimised sometlikig that was totally 
imthinkable ...but for doves in the Labour Party was thkikable for a very long time. I hope people wül 
refer to it as a type of fait accompli. Even people who are not sui e about this agreement or think we 
went too far, believe this is kreversible.'***  ^ 'Everyone knows there will be a Palestinian state,' said a
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Labour Party official close to Peres, 'this includes Rabin. And they all agree that such a possibility is the 
most realistic one ...They don't admit it publicly for two main reasons. One is Jordan. We don't want to 
frighten or be seen as undermining the regime. The other is the Israeli public. They [Rabin and Peres] 
don't think the Israeli public is ready yet.'*’* There is evidence that Israeli negotiators at Oslo aimed at 
creating competition between Jordan and the PLO. Officials played down the machinations at Oslo, 
saying that the interim agreement was a step toward the final goal, rather than an aim in itself.
However, Rabbi Yehuda Amital, co-dean of Har Etzion yeshiva in the Alon Shvut settlement in 
Gush Etzion and head of the centrist religious party Meimad, was a cynical opponent of the DoP who 
stated that 'if we have reduced the chances o f war, and weakened the intifada, then we have achieved 
something ...There is no doubt there will be settlements that will have to be dismantled if we get to the 
final agreement. But I have serious doubts we will be able to come to a final agreement.'*’* Many Israelis 
feared that the autonomy accord would only be a fii’st step towai'd full Palestinian sovereignty. Aiiel 
Sharon regarded September 13th 1993 as 'the day on which they have established the Palestinian 
state.'*’  ^ Benyamin Netanyalw, then-leader of the largest opposition faction in the Knesset, Likud, 
accused the government of'saving the PLO fr om breaking apart and giving it a Palestinian state, wliich 
will endanger the veiy existence of Israel'.*’  ^ Netanyahu, in liis speech to the Knesset during the special 
debate on the Israel-PLO agreement demanded, 'what are the legitimate and political rights of any 
nation? A state. What are the legitimate political rights of the Israeli nation? A state. What are mutual 
political rights with the Palestinians? A state for them too.' The Likud opposition leader went on, 'the 
agreement lays the foundations for the establishment of the Palestinian state.'*’"* Those on the far right 
like Eliakim Ha'Etzni, a former Tehiya MK, believed that the accord was 'an agreement for the 
destruction of Israel'. Ha'Etzni of Kiryat Arba and an organiser for The Struggle Command Against 
Autonomy stated that 'Arab terrorism and the Jewish reaction will smash this agreement to pieces.'*’^
This scare tactic proved a rather self-fulfilling prophesy.
For a more thoughtful summary of opposition. Dore Gold, then-director of the US Foreign and 
Defence Policy Project, Jafifee Centre for Strategic Studies, believed that Rabin 'fed a society thirsting 
for international normality with the hope that peace' had 'arrived at long last.' Gold believed that Rabin, 
rather than countering 'wai -weai mess with solid new leadership,' had 'drawn on the exliaustion of the 
public to sell it the PLO accord.' Moreover Gold argued that Rabin had 'ignited a new creed of secular 
messianism that is sweeping wide sectors of Israeli society. He has left the public totally unprepared to 
face any collapse in the current process, much less to contend with any new military threat that may 
come later in the decade.'*’  ^ Thus the many Israeli opponents of the accord rail against it revealing more 
about themselves and their personal or political fears than in promoting cogent arguments rationally 
analysing the accord, not for what it is, but for what it may become. AU wül end in teai’s is the litany of 
the spoilt child who watches in the wings desperate to scream, 'I told you so', whilst at the same time 
working to see the prophesy fulfiUed. For example. Dore Gold described as a security hawk believed 
that the notion that Israel and Jordan would continue to coUaborate in the friture against unstable trends 
in Palestinian politics now appears outdated with the inti oduction of the DoP. He believed Jordan was 
being displaced as Israel's main strategic partner as Israel and the PLO hammered out an embryonic form 
of security collaboration in the implementation of the DoP.*”  President Assad's biographer Patrick 
Seale, who tends to reflect his subject's stances, asserted that Assad suspected that Israel made peace
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with an enfeebled PLO in order to isolate Syria, undermine its negotiating position and tilt the regional 
balance of power still further in Israel's favour. This argument had more to do with Assad's dislike of the 
PLO's acceptance of a territorial compromise as Assad had always been of the opinion that the 
Palestinian problem is too crucial to be left entirely in Palestinian hands as it effected wider Aiab 
interests, namely Syrian. Seale also contended that one possible meaning of the accord was that the 
PLO had chosen Israel rather than Syria as its long term political and economic partner.*”  Whilst Arafat 
continued to mollify Assad, addressing Assad from Cairo, saying 'I am confident that oui* relations will 
be strengthened in the futui’e',*”  the fact that Damascus offers sanctuaiy for the dissident Palestinian 
groups who congregate under the umbrella of rejection, and Arafat's personal experiences of Syrian 
'friendship' in Lebanon, will not have been lost on liim. Therefore, depending on your point of view 
there is an alarmist viewpoint which seeks to undermine the rapprochement between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians. The evidence points to the trend that the Israelis sought to complete bilateral agreements 
with the Palestinians because there was more that was achievable from an Israeli point of view, as the 
idea of being able to deal with more than one opponent proved logistically impractical if not impossible. 
A deal, any deal, with the Palestinians made the process of coaxing other more accommodating Arab 
governments to the table all the more easy. It would make sense for Israel to make deals with a view to 
getting the best position slowly and surely rather than be forced by external demands, by what could be 
termed, 'Salami diplomacy' - slice-by-slice.
However for many, judgement was reserved, either for not wishing to tempt providence or to be 
seen to be out of step with the initial mood of euphoria. As Foreign Minister Peres told Israeli 
newspaper Hadashot, 'people prefer remembering, rather than thinking.'*^ ** The inherent problem Israelis 
would face would be psychological. Chaim Herzog, former president of Israel, succinctly captured most 
Israelis approach to the negotiations with the PLO as 'honoui' him, but suspect liim'.*^ * This was 
reflected in the Knesset vote, where approval for the agreement was 61 to 50, with 6 members fr om 
Shas abstaining (Labour 44/ Meretz 12/ small leftist parties 5).**^  A public opinion poll conducted by 
Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot days prior to the signing ceremony showed 53% of Israelis in favour 
of the peace plan, with 45% opposing. A similar’ survey carried out in the occupied ten itories by Al- 
Nahar, an East-Jerusalem paper, showed that 52.8% backed the Gaza-Jericho plan, though the approval 
rate was significantly higher in the areas scheduled for early Israeli withdrawal - 70% in Gaza and 75% 
in Jericho.*^^
If we turn now to the Palestinians, there was a similar* pattern to the reaction to the DoP. Those 
people who were allies of Chairman Ai’afat, or who at least suppor’ted the mainstream Fatali line, tended 
to broadly favour the DoP, whether because they really thought it was in the Palestinian peoples best 
interests or because they didn't wish to appear disloyal. Such like Dr. Nabil Sha'ath a senior political 
adviser to Chairman Arafat, believed the DoP was 'not a cease-fire', neither 'an administrative 
arrangement,' nor 'even a purely interim agreement' though it was an 'interim part of a long-term 
agreement', it was 'much more than an interim agreement.' The DoP allowed that the PLO's 'goal 
remains, and legitimately remains, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state that will 
confederate itself with Jordan and that will have peace with Israel.'*^ "* Thus 'the optimism that swept 
around the world in the wake of the accord created the illusion that a single peace agreement could be a 
panacea for all ills in the region, that it could change the reality on the ground forever'.**  ^ However the
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reality was more sobering, 'the rosy terms in which the agreement is debated in the West are alien in 
Gaza, almost surreal. In Gaza, there is no peace, no peace process, no prospect of peace. What there is, 
is a pervasive sense of loss, of a past diminished and a futm*e marred, of achievements undermined and 
destroyed, of a society teetering between submission and revolt, a moving backward in time and 
thought. This regression is characterised by a number of features: the disintegration of political life and 
purpose, social corrosion and fragmentation, and economic d e c a y . I t  is instructive to consider the 
arguments and the personalities proposing opposition to the DoP, because it is they who will actively 
work to derail the process.
George Habash, leader of the PFLP, stated that 'our Palestinian programme, that of the PLO, 
includes the right ofretuin, self-determination and an independent state. The agreement makes no rule 
on these subjects.'*^’ Riyad Malki spokesman for the PFLP in the occupied territories and Professor of 
Civil Engineering at Bir Zeit University considered the DoP as a defeat, saying that it fell 'short of aU 
Palestinian expectations' and that it presented 'a real betrayal of the struggle of the Palestinian people for 
the last four decades.' Malki believed that 'The moment you accept autonomy, you compromise 
yourself. For me, this is nothing but administering the occupation'.*^® More ominous perhaps were the 
reactions of those like Mohammed Nazzal, Hamas representative in Jordan. When interviewed by 
Bahraini daily Al-Ayyam he believed that the agreement was the 'worst' that had 'been proposed as a 
solution to the Palestine Question.'*®  ^ The fimdamentalist and rejectionist line was best summed up by a 
Hamas representative thus - 'la terre de Palestine ne sera jamais une merchandise a' brader.'*^ **
For Palestinians who fled in 1948 from what became Israel, the DoP effectively signals an end to 
their dreams to return to Israeli cities like Jaffa, Haifa and Lod. Khaled al-Hasan, a founding member of 
Fatah when interviewed from Tunis, said, 'how can we accept this text? Where are we going to go, all 
those who like me are refugees from 1948?'*^ * Indeed Arafat himself is a 1948 refugee and although 
born in Cairo, maintains that Ms home is Jerusalem where Ms immediate family were from.*^  ^ Further 
evidence for tMs comes from the fact that when the PLO's executive committee voted to support the 
letter to Rabin by 8 votes to 4, with 6 not voting, all the members voting in favour were refiigees from 
1967. Among those who grudgingly supported the accord was the feeling that it was the best deal 
available, not only likely to beai* fr uit but also one that they themselves would live to see. Haidai* Abd 
al-Shafr, head of Palestiman negotiating team at Madrid talks, struck a chord stating that, 'our people 
cling to the threads of hope, no matter how thin. But the despair will be very cruel if their expectations 
are not met...I am not belittling the significance of an agreement of principles, but it remains only an 
agreement of principles, and not a peace accord. Peace will not be attained without achieving oui* fixed 
rights.'*^^
Prior to the conclusion of the DoP Arafat had often been accused of suffering from non-urgency 
perception, i.e. inattention = neglect = lack of urgency = diversion or non-deliverance of resoui ces = 
non-resolution. Palestinian eulogising about the lost Palestine has the almost miiTor image in Judaism's 
Diaspora lament, 'Next year in Jerusalem' repeated by the head of the household each Pessach 
incorporating the biblical covenant and the hope of the exiles' return to the land of milk and honey. 
Arafat was popularly perceived to be neither acMeving the PLO's stated goals, nor even being seen to be 
working towards them. Aiafat not only faced a diminution in domestic populai’ support, but he also 
faced opprobrium from former state sponsors, like Saudia Arabia. Arafat's problems did not just
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disappear with the conclusion of the DoP. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states stiU harboured a grudge 
toward the PLO over the second Gulf War, and thus only initially provided the bare minimum in 
investment aid in order to satisfy world opinion and US pressure. Even with money from the oil 
producing states, aid would be incremental and dependant on positive progress. Inside the occupied 
territories Arafaf s Fatah had been in many respects replaced by the younger battle-hardened activists, 
especially in Gaza, where the popular committees formed during the intifada had assumed control of 
much of the social, economic and political activity.*^ "* However, one positive way of looking at the 
importance of the secret nature of the Oslo Accord was that Ai'afat played a clever, dkecting and central 
role. He deliberately blocked the main channel and overrode the clamour for internal discussion and 
ratification of policy stances from the committees and members of the PLO. His strategy was to have 
PLO delegates in Washkigton impose conditions to create deadlock at the table and thereby force the 
Israelis to deal dkectly with Arafat and the PLO in Tunis, and in doing so, recognise him, the PLO and 
Palestinian national aspkations.*^^
However it is important to consider the voice of a PLO stalwart, an educated and articulate 
spokesman well versed in the ways of the Western world - Edwar d Said. Said is indicative of the type of 
moderate whose support if Arafat loses will defiiie ordkiary Palestkiians levels of commitment to the 
DoP. According to Said, in a visit in summer 1992, there was a 'magical' expectation in the occupied 
territories that President Bush would take car e of Palestinian problems and was a friend. Hope was also 
placed m Yitzhak Rabin after the elections of Jime 1992, that he was the man to deliver Palestine. Said 
believes this mass amnesia overcoming the population created unreal expectations from dubious 
quarters, and that concerted efforts by the Palestinians themselves to overcome thek own shortcomings 
was removed from the collective consciousness.***  ^ Said argues that the PLO in the 1990's acquked an 
unmistakably eccentric prominence, becoming a quasi-official Arab state organisation, resembling far- too 
much the bur eaucracies and dictatorsliips m the region. Said contends that the long battle for the 
acceptance of a Palestinian national authority was waged so much so that the nature of the organisation 
was neglected.**” The initiative of 1988 had not yielded very much for very long, Arafat and his inner 
ckcle were marooned in Tunis becoming increasmgly reclusive and forced to bear the humiliation of 
endless losses, as well as the opprobrium of its own Palestinian constituencies. The gap between reality 
and rhetoric widened, as the PLO became more bureaucratic and less determined on the goal of 
liberation.*^® The PLO became a reactive rather than proactive organisation. All number of proposals 
and plans akned at resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict originated from outside parties. The US vetoed 
no less than 29 UN Secuiity Council Resolutions censuring Israeli practices which contravened many of 
the accepted norms of international behaviour. Israel and the US took positions designed in advance to 
protect thek vision of peace - when the PNC recognised Israel (having implicitly done so in 1974), there 
was never a reciprocal demand for Israel to recognise and deal with the Palestinian nation.*^ ** Resolution 
was seen as an inter-state affak as the parties' proposals offering resolution operated at this level. 
Therefore even though the Palestinian dimension would have to be incorporated within an international 
framework, the Palestinians rejected any proposals which did not recognise the PLO as thek legitimate 
representative, thus decisions regaining thek futuie were made by those who may not have had the best 
mterests of the Palestinians at heart.^ **** Thus critics contend that Ai'afat fiddled wliile Palestkie burned, 
in that his personal ambition cost Palestinians dear.
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Edward Said attacks the DoP as a Palestinian Versailles treaty with the Palestinians cast in the 
role of the Germans. He felt that a number of times during the previous 15 years the Palestinians could 
have negotiated a better deal than a 'modified Alton Plan', Said contended that previous, similar 
overtures had been refused by the leadersliip, such as the 'Gaza-Jericho option' offered by Sadat in 
1 9 7 7  2 0 1  believed that the gains of the intifada were squandered away, and that the plaintive cries of 
the DoP supporters that 'we had no alternative' should have been rephrased as, 'we had no alternative 
because we either lost or thi ew away a lot of others, leaving us only this one.'^ **^  Said lambasted Ai'afat 
for unilaterally cancelling the intifada, for failing to coordinate his moves with the Aiab states as he had 
promised them he would and for provoking appalling disarray within the ranks of the PLO. Said claimed 
that the PLO had 'transformed itself from a national liberation movement into a kind of small-town 
government, with the same handful of people still in command.'^ **^  For the deal itself. Said had nothing 
but scorn,
'all secret deals between a very strong and a very weak partner necessarily involve concessions 
hidden in embarrassment by the latter. Yes, there are still lots of details to be negotiated, as 
there are imponderables to be made cleai', and even some hopes to be fulfilled or dashed. Still, 
the deal before us smacks of the PLO leadership's exhaustion and of Israel's shi ewdness. Many 
Palestinians are asking themselves why, after years of concessions, we should be conceding once 
again to Israel and the United States in return for promises and vague improvements in the 
occupation that won't occur until 'final status' talks tree to five yeai's hence, and perhaps not even 
then.'"''*
Said argued that Arafat's recognition of Israel's right to exist carried it with a whole series of 
renunciations, of the PLO Charter, of violence and terrorism and of all relevant UN resolutions, except 
242 and 338 which do not even mention the Palestinians by name and by implication the PLO had thus 
deferred or set aside numerous other resolutions that had granted the Palestinians refugee rights since 
1948, including compensation or repatriation. The Palestinians had also won many international 
resolutions from bodies such as the EEC (EU), Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference, the 
Arab League as well as the UN, which disallowed or censuied Israeli settlements, annexations and 
actions against the occupied population. The primai y consideration of the DoP, in Said's view, was the 
concern for Israeli security. This was despite that in Palestinian eyes, Israel is the occupying power, 
continues to control sovereignty and holds the River Jordan, Jerusalem, settlements and roads.^ **^  Said 
ai'gued that the intent of this Vichy-like collaboration was to deter Palestinians fiom denouncing the 
occupation, and that as the internal security apparatus developed, the PLO would become Israel's 
enforcer. A contrast was drawn with the South African ANC, which after winning political recognition, 
refijsed to supply the South African government with police officials until after power was shared, 
precisely in order not to appear as the wliite government's enforcer.^®^
Yacov Ben Efrat writing in Challenge questioned the essential content of the agreement, whether 
it served as 'a solid foundation for peace between the two peoples', or whether it was 'a reflection of the 
current balance of forces, world-wide and regional, which leaves the roots of the problem unsolved'. By 
'calling an end to the intifada and changing its charter, the PLO has cashed in its bargaining chips. It has 
nothing more to offer. There will be no reason for Israel to make fui*ther concessions.' Thus Gaza
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'first is also last. Interim is final The PLO gets to rule much of the Gaza Strip, but in return it 
gives up any prospect of really ruling the West Bank. Jericho becomes the 'capital' of autonomy, 
in exchange for Jerusalem, omitted fiom the agreement altogether and to remain under Israeli 
control. Where PLO 'rule' goes into effect, it will mean that Palestinians in authority will be 
required to control their population by means of a Palestinian police force. The ultimate 
sovereignty remains Israeli. Israel's security needs will dictate priorities, and the local authorities 
had better comply if they wish to stay in power. ...Israel's purpose, however, is cleai*: to wipe out 
the Palestinians' national movement and eliminate then claim to sovereignty. If it really wanted a 
true and lasting peace, Israel would have had to concede much more.'^°’
Wliile Israel 'watches fiom the sidelines, ready to enter in force whenever tilings get out of hand', Arafat 
is subject to a test, if'he succeeds in crushing the opponents of occupation and autonomy in Gaza, 
including the democratic cuirents as well as Hamas, then the second phase will come: a cosmetic 
autonomy in the West Bank.' In concluding, Ben Efrat believed Israel had 'imposed an agreement which 
makes a deal with a leadership, not peace with a people.'
3.4 Conclusion
When analysing the way in which the DoP was concluded, and the way in which it will ultimately 
be carried out, one can observe the Middle Eastern habit of negotiating - the brinkmanship, the all-or- 
nothing approach, it all seems somewhat unnerving for those used to consensus bargaining. The DoP 
was intended as just a stepping stone along the road to peace, graduality being the guiding principle of 
the agreement which would allow Gaza and Jericho to become the first experiments m peace.
The DoP recognises the Palestinians as a people, within a framework of legitimate rights and 
reciprocal political rights, but there is a clear evasion of anything relating to land, other than that relating 
to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho ai ea. The recognition of Israel, by the PLO, also implies shared 
sovereignty, on any pai*t of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, indeed the DoP assures Israeli sovereignty 
over the authority of the Palestinian Interim Self-Goveming Authority during the interim period.’**^
One of the biggest reservations that has been voiced about the agreement was tliat it offered no 
guarantees that the parties would apply it in fiiU or negotiate in good faith when postponed issues were 
raised. According to the leader of the Paletmian delegation to the Madrid talks, Haydar 'Abd Al-Shafi, 
there were several points he felt were cause for Palestinian concern. The first, and most important, was 
that the agreement failed to 'address Israel's illegal claim to the occupied territories.'^ *** Al-Shafi claimed 
that Israel had always maintained that it was not an 'occupier,' but that it was in the occupied territories 
by right. According to Al-Shafi, Israel's claim had been expressed from the beginning though its 
confiscation of land, establishment of settlements, annexation of Jerusalem and adoption of a conduct 
dedicated to implementing a political programme that considered all of Palestine as Israeli territory.^** 
Al-Shafi argued that there was nothing in the DoP that indicated that Israel had renounced any part of its 
claim over Palestine, indeed rather than confr onting the issue, the DoP evaded it. Al-Shafi claimed the 
major weakness of the DoP was that there was nothing in the agreement that indicated if settlement 
activity would stop. By not challenging or objecting to this claim, the Palestinians were in essence 
condoning it, and though Palestinian silence Israel could spuriously claim Palestinian acquiescence as an 
abandomnent of their right to an independent state over the entirety of the occupied territories. Al-Shafi
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was horrified that the status of the territories was being blurred fi*om being recognisably ’occupied’ to 
becoming 'disputed'. Al-Shafi claimed that a further flaw of the DoP was tlie 'tacit acceptance of two 
separate entities in the Palestinian territories - two separate administrations, two separate judicial 
systems - indirectly a kind of apartheid', wliich by allowing or even by deferring to this situation, the 
Palestinians were conceding something that was illegally established.^*’ Al-Shafi argued that Palestinian 
acceptance of the terms of the DoP meant that Palestinians would have no one to blame for future 
happenings but themselves, for by agreeing to be bound by the DoP the Palestinians had helped to confer 
legitimacy on thek occupation by Israel. Al-Shafi fiirther complained that while the DoP enumerates 
such issues as Jerusalem, settlements, borders, to be deferred, there is no mention in the DoP of any 
withdrawal beyond that of the interim period, indeed a complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories was never mentioned for the final status negotiations. While it is clakned that this was implied 
in the DoP's reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242, wliich includes withdrawal, Al-Shafi 
argued that when dealing with state interests there can be no reliance on things implied, especially since 
Israel had repeatedly made it very clear that it had no kitention of withdrawing outside the occupied 
territories. Al-Shafi draws this conclusion citing that the DoP is phiased in generalities that leave room 
for wide interpretations, and does not make specific provision for a complete withdrawal from the 
occupied territories, even as a final status issue. For Al-Shafi, the final confirmation that the agreement 
was, and would remain, inherently imbalanced and unjust was that Israel would always liave the 
unilateral power of veto.’*^
Despite such constraints, the Palestkiians for thek part had to come to terms with the cold new 
realities of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The dream of defeating Israel and the temptation to continue the 
struggle by inflaming the intifada had to be resisted, paiticularly while negotiating a new relationsliip 
with the Israelis. The rhetoric of traditional objectives was, and is, incompatible with the technicalities 
of brokering an agreement, especially one which is part of a process which relies so heavily on mutual 
confidence for continued life. The question many Israelis asked was, could the Palestinians with thek 
liistory of internal schisms, militant factionalism and lack of collective sovereign existence prove thek 
bona fides and earn Israeli trust and confidence in a mere five years? The bottom line of the DoP 
remains, that as the liigher power party, Israel can always dispense with the process of negotiations if 
Israeli doubts about Palestinian intentions persist. As Rabin put it at the opening of the special Knesset 
debate on the Israel-PLO agreements, 'in any event, the might of the IDF - the best army in the world - is 
available for our use.'’*"*
The ultimate challenge to the accord remains the negotiations wliich will determkie the final 
status of the two parties living arrangements. Irredentism will continue to shadow the process but above 
all, the two sides will have to guard agakist the psychological bamers which remain as an obstacle and a 
challenge to be overcome. These barriers for the Israelis will be the two extremes of previously 
accepted conventional wisdom, namely -1 , that military force and its use can solve what is essentially a 
political problem - and 2, that the incantation that a peace treaty must be the harbinger and thus the 
foimdation that will guarantee mdefinite peace, can in no way guarantee mdefinite peace. There has 
never been a peace agreement in history which takes the form of an unbroken, inviolable, eternal 
covenant. Wars generally have a habit of being between parties which were legally at peace. However, 
for the optimistic, the DoP does not underestimate the practical complexities involved in negotiating and
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implementing the arrangements it envisages, as it states in its preamble, it is predicated on the conviction 
that 'it is time to put an end to decades of confr ontation and conflict'.’*^
This chapter has analysed the terms of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DoP) within the conflict resolution parameters of items 2, 5 and 6 of the RICEMAN 
FORMULA, Le. institutionalisation, mediation and administration. Thus we can conclude, that the DoP 
has achieved the goal of agreeing a conflict resolution fr-amework, wliich sets out specific commitments 
and obligations within a conflict prevention regime. However, the inherent structuial asymmetrical 
power imbalance robs the agreement of balance and the nature of the state=non-state bilateral agreement 
ensures that the DoP's international and legal foimdations remain dubious, or at least open to wide 
interpretation. The DoP does not provide sufrfiently for an enforceable conflict prevention regime in that 
such a regime is not defined and enforcement of what constitutes a conflict prevention regime is left 
open to the interpretation of the parties, wliich in an asymmetrical structure, in practical terms means the 
higher power party. The DoP, as a bilateral agreement does not incorporate third party mediation to 
offset the iiilierent structural asymmetrical power imbalance, nor does it allow for international 
assistance which enables peaceful change, including proceduial mechanisms wliich allow for the review 
of settlement terms, the raising of giievances, for adjustments to the settlement as new realities are 
created and which anticipate and monitor potential areas of future conflict. The DoP does allow for 
international support and political direction fr*om third parties aimed at nurturing and advancing the 
peace process through economic assistance, however such an international economic assistance 
programme is based on international goodwill and the willingness of the United States to provide 
political, economic and diplomatic assistance. The international community and particularly the US may 
be morally bound to offer assistance in the building of a conflict resolution regime in the Middle East, 
but they are not legally bound by the DoP. While the DoP deals with the provisions for the 
administration of a conflict resolution fr amework, such as the procedui es and timetables for the 
implementation of Israeh mihtary redeployment and Palestinian self-government, it is a hving document 
which seeks to maximise and develop confidence building measures, and in that sense is incomplete.
The buieaucratic regime that is intended, by the DoP, to develop a conflict resolution frramework, to 
conduct, manage, regulate and supeiwise the conflict resolution institution needs further agreements to 
ensure its progress, evolution and promotion. The peace process provided for by the DoP depends for 
its continued survival on the firagUity of pubhc confidence, on developing and advancing its terms, 
conditions and provisions, and on building on its foundations. The DoP is akin to a builder's blueprints 
for developing a new community. The DoP is more than an aitist’s impression, but the practicalities of 
making real the plans means that the dynamic forging the peace process needs much more work before it 
can be deemed complete.
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Chapter Four; Implementation of the Declaration of Principles, and the Negotiation of 
Further Transitional Interim Self-Government Arrangements, in 
Preparation for Permanent Status Negotiations
'The visionary is the only true realist* — Frederico Fellini^
4.1 Introduction
The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Do?) provided a 
blueprint for the transfer and exercise of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinians and the levels of 
sovereignty to be attained by the Palestinians. The DoP prepared the establisliment of a nominal cease­
fire of hostilities agreement. The DoP instituted a mutual recognition pact. The DoP stated the parties' 
intent to transfer specified territorial enclaves to Palestinian authority. The DoP provided for the 
inauguration of an autonomous self-governing Palestinian entity with the prospect of elections to such an 
autonomous legislative body combined with the devolution of additional civil powers and 
responsibilities. The DoP arranged for the withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli military forces fi*om 
specified locations and population centres. The DoP founded a Jframework for the resolution of disputes 
and IsraeH-Palestinian public order and secuiity cooperation. The DoP offered a plan for Israeli- 
Palestinian cooperation in bilateral and regional economic and development programmes, and prepaied 
for fiirther negotiations on unresolvable issues within the framework of a permanent status arrangement 
covering: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, secuiity arrangements, borders, and foreign relations.
A rolling process of considerable substantive negotiations was intended to follow fi om the initial 
agreement because of the inlierent contradictions, ambiguities and material differences in interpretation 
contained within the limitations of the original document. Subsequent, sequential documents had to be 
negotiated to foiinulate further interim arrangements ready for implementation in order that the process 
begun by the DoP could proceed. The DoP as a document, represents an agreement to pui'sue a living 
legacy, to undertake a process whose final outcome is not determined in advance. The DoP is not a 
symmetrical agreement outlining mutual obligations on a quid pro quo basis, rather it is an agreement to 
agree to fiirther the basic interests of both sides. Further agreements were needed to provide for a 
sustainable preventative security regime involving reciprocal and cooperative rights and obligations 
based on shared goals and principles of justice, economic interdependence, collective secuiity and sense 
of shared community, in order to achieve an equitable and lasting settlement which would master the 
existing inherent asymmetrical power inequalities.
This chapter analyses and assesses the fiuther negotiated agreements which combine to prépaie 
the foundation of the interim phase of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations envisaged within the terms of the 
DoP. Incorporating items 1 and 4 of the RICEMAN FORMULA, that is resolution and empowerment, 
this chapter assesses how the further agreements allow for the transfer and exercise of powers and 
responsibilities to the Palestinians, the levels of sovereignty to be attained by the Palestinians, and how 
the further agreements provide for a sustainable preventative security regime with the goal of achieving 
an equitable, just and lasting settlement.
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4.2 Agreement On The Gaza Strip And The Jericho Area
The Israeh-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip called for in the DoP 
under Article VII was signed on September 28 1995 in Washington DC,^ However, due to the tardiness 
in achieving this agreement, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, signed in Caii'o on May 
4, 1994, served as the provisional arrangement, if not as the basis for the wider, subsequent accord. 
Article VII. 1 of the DoP specified that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations would 'negotiate an 
agreement on the interim period (the Interim Agreement').' Article VII.2 fiuther detailed that this 
interim agreement should 'specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its 
members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its 
Civil Administration to the Coimcil.' The interim agreement would 'also specify the council's executive 
authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian 
judicial organs.'^ Prior to achieving an interim agreement, the Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho 
Area effectively represented the first empowerment phase of stage one of the DoP, the interim self- 
government arrangements, to apply pending fiirther interim ar rangements and the conclusion of a 
permanent status agreement.
The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Ar ea applied to a defined area of some 65 square 
km, and in a document of some 300 pages, which included four annexes and six: maps, addressed four 
main issues - security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters and economic relations. The agreement 
followed seven montlis of intensive negotiations and primarily concentrated on the central issue of 
security airangements. The agreement covered the withdrawal of the Israeli civil administration and 
Israeli security forces, the transfer of powers and responsibilities to a Palestinian Interim Self-Governing 
Authority (PISGA or 'the Council' as referred to in the agreements), the security of Israeli settlements, 
external secur ity particularly with regard to the boimdaries and crossing points of the Palestinian entities, 
the withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli military forces fi orn Gaza and Jericho, the transfer of 
authority from the Civil Administration to a PISGA, the structure and composition of a PISGA (powers, 
responsibilities, jurisdiction), the authority and responsibilities of a Palestinian police force and fiituie 
Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The security and public order ai rangements and the scheduled withdrawal of Israeli forces were 
negotiated imder a security concept to be applied to Gaza and Jericho. These arrangements were 
regarded as being within an 'Israeli security envelope' wliich was meant to provide for security from 
external threats along the boundaries of the designated Palestinian entities. The provision for internal 
security was to be a shared responsibility, with Israel remaining responsible for Israelis and the 
settlements, while the Palestinians would assume responsibility for public order and the internal security 
of Palestinians. Annexe I, 'The Protocol Concerning Withdrawal of Israeli Military Forces and Security 
Arrangements' covered a range of issues. Article 1, 'Arrangements for Withdrawal of Israeli Militaiy 
Forces' provided for the withdrawal fiom the designated areas of Gaza and Jericho in coordination with 
a newly established Joint Israeli-Palestinian Security and Coordination and Cooperation Committee (set 
up under Article II), designed to deal with-joint security issues, to exchange information, and to provide
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guidance for the three District Coordination Offices (Khan Yunis, Gaza, Jericho), responsible for Joint 
Patrols and Joint Mobile Units. Israeli forces were redeployed to specified areas on May 18 1994, such 
as to the Militaiy Installation Area along the Egyptian border and to Israeli settlements, in order to fiilfil 
security fimctions as defined in the agreement. Aiticle III 2-7, which pertained to 'The Palestinian 
Directorate of Police Force', provided for the operation of the police force's duties and functions, its 
structure and composition, recruitment, its arms, ammunition and equipment, the introduction of arms 
and equipment and foreign assistance. Article III 7 provided for the deployment of the police force 
under the auspices of the PISGA, and outlined the force's responsibilites for the internal security and 
public order of the Palestinian entities. Article III allowed for some 9,000 policemen in an integral force, 
comprising four branches - civil police (A1 Shurta), Public Security, Intelligence, and Emergency 
Services and Rescue (A1 Difa'a A1 Madani). Articles IV and V 'Secuiity Airangements in the Gaza Strip' 
and 'Security AiTangements in the Jericho Aiea', provided for the protection of the Israeli settlements 
and settlement blocs, such as Erez and Gush Katif, the responsibilities regarding the security perimeter 
and common security fence, the Mawasi area and beach, the Egyptian border, lateral roads to the 
settlements (Kissufim-Gush Katif, Sufa-Gush Katif, Karni-Netzarim), the central north-south road (Road 
110.4), and Joint Mobile Units (located at Nissanit jmiction, Netzarim junction, Deir el-Ballah junction, 
and Sufa-Morag junction), clarification concerning the Jericho area. Joint Mobile Units (located at Auja 
jmiction, Nahal Elisha jimction), coordination and cooperation in the Jericho Aiea. Article VI 'Security 
Arrangements Concerning Planning, Building and Zoning' provided for construction limitations with 
regard to secmity requiiements. Aiticles VII, IX, X, XI, and XII, 'The Crossing Points', 'Arrangements 
for Safe Passage Between the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area', 'Passages', Security Along the Coastline 
and in the Sea of Gaza', and 'The Security of the Airspace' provide for: passage between Gaza and Israel 
(crossing points - Erez, Nahal Oz, Sufa, Kami, Kisufim, Kerem Shalom, Elei Sinai), passage to and fiom 
the Jericho area; usage of safe passage (permits), passage and mode of transit, routes; control, 
management, and arrangements for entiy and exit fiom Egypt and Jordan, of passages (border crossings 
- Allenby Bridge, Rafah); maritime activity zones, extent (zones K,L,M), general rules, maritime 
coordination and cooperation centre, Gaza port; operation of aircraft (2 VIP transport helicopters, 4 
twenty person fixed wing transport aircraft for travel between Gaza and Jericho, 2 fifty person fixed 
wing passenger crafts for travel between Gaza and Cairo). Article VIII 'Rules of Conduct in Security 
Matters' provided for the mles of engagement in response to an act or incident constituting a danger to 
life or property.'^
The understandmg that the provisions agreed upon in the Cairo Agreement^, were to be a 
stepping stone to further agreement is borne out by Article I of Annex IV, the Protocol on Economic 
Relations, signed in Paris on April 29 1994, whereby the agreement would 'begin in the Gaza Strip and 
the Jericho Area and at a later stage' would 'also apply to the rest of the West Bank, according to the 
provisions of the Interim Agreement and to any other agreed arrangements between the two sides.'  ^
However, before the interim agreement could be reached, the Cairo Agreement was meant both as a 
vehicle for progressing the process as well as being a temporary measme prior to a fuller agreement, and
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as such the Cairo Agreement represented the political achievement of progress. The importance of the 
Cairo Agreement is in its' strengths and more importantly, its weaknesses as a fomidation on which the 
legal structure of the autonomous areas was to be built. While Article IX.2 of the DoP stated that both 
parties would 'review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres,' implying 
that fiirther negotiations would yield more equitable results, the realisation of further negotiations 
resulted in Article VII.9. of the Agreement On The Gaza Strip And The Jericho Area, which stated that 
'[Ijaws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho Area prior to the signing of tliis 
Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in accordance with tins agreement.’’
Such a situation represented a continuation of the legal structure in the occupied and 
autonomous areas, that is a concoction of British mandate, Jordanian, international and Israeli military, 
laws and orders. On June 7th 1967 the military commander of the West Bank announced that 'Every 
governmental, legislative, appointive and administrative power in respect of the region or its inhabitants 
shaU henceforth be vested in me alone and shall only be exercised by me or by persons appointed by me 
for that purpose or acting on my behalf.'^ Israel has always argued that the Hague Regulations and the 
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 do not apply to the West Bank and Gaza Strip because they ar e not 
enemy territory, thus those provisions relating to belligerent occupation are not binding on Israel. Such 
a stance is based on Israel's interpretation that the legal status of the territories is sui generis based on 
the presupposition that the 'legitimate sovereign' of the occupied territory must have been displaced by 
the occupant, thus as Egypt and Jordan were not such but there as a result of illegal acts of aggression, 
therefore Israel is not requir ed to apply the humanitarian law of the Geneva Civilians Convention for the 
benefit o f the inhabitants of the occupied territories.^ Former Attorney-General Meir Shamgar has stated 
that, 'The territorial position is thus sui generis and the Israeli government tried therefore to distinguish 
between the theoretical, juridical and political problems on the one hand and the observance of the 
humanitarian provisions of the Four th Geneva Convention on the other. Accordingly, the government of 
Israel distinguishes between the legal problem of the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to 
the territories under consideration, wliich as stated does not in my opinion apply to these territories, and 
decided to act de facto in accordance with the humanitarian provisions of the Convention.'Israel has 
declared that it would observe de facto the humanitarian rules, Israeli authorities having stated that the 
relevant articles relating to belligerent occupation were being followed. Since military government 
results fiom conflict, the Israeli militaiy occupation has had no time limit 'because it reflected a factual 
situation, and, pending an alternative political or military solution, this system of government could, fiom 
the legal point of view, continue forever.' In addition it expresses 'the intention not to exclude or 
prejudge any political solution or foreclose any rights.'*  ^Thus occupation delivers the occupier territory, 
but its position is intrinsically temporary pending an alternative solution.
Whether or not occupation is indefinite, the occupant has no right under international law to treat 
the territories as its own, nor even acquire sovereignty. Indeed the notion of'belligerent occupant' has 
been introduced in international law to deligitimise the acquisition of territoiy (annexation) by force, 
either thi ough defensive or offensive action. Israel has accepted as binding on its rule of the territories,
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the IV Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and annexed Regulations/’ Israel 
has used laws like the British Mandate Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 to justify extra-judicial 
punishments such as deportations, house demolitions and administrative detention, and under Militaiy 
Order 412 the single most influential IDF officer is the one appointed officer in chai'ge of the local 
judiciary, vested with all the powers and privileges of the Minister of Justice under Jordanian law/^
Prior to the Cairo Agreement of May 4th 1994, the legal jmisdiction of West Bank civilian courts was 
deal* and was not in dispute, excluding East Jerusalem which had been annexed, but including Israeli 
settlements. Local West Bank comts had over the years heaid cases to which settler and non-settler 
Israelis had been parties, particularly in civil matters where such courts had jurisdiction, except in cases 
where the military government had a direct interest, or was a party.
Since the beginning of the occupation, Israeli military courts have shared jurisdiction with the 
local West Bank Palestinian courts in criminal matters. There have been four legislative phases in the 
occupation: 1) 1967-71, when some 200 Military Orders laid the occupation's foundation. The legal 
system was reorganised soon after occupation began and military courts jurisdiction was extended to 
civil matters traditionally in the civilian courts domain. Military Order 378 created a mhitary justice 
system with only one level of cour ts with no provision for appeal; 2) 1971-79, facilitated Jewish 
settlement in the West Bank, Military Order 783 established five Jewish Regional Councils covering the 
entire West Bank; 3) 1979-81, [a] extended Israeli law to settlers and excluded settlers fiom local courts 
jurisdiction; [b] organised settlement administration consistent with local government in Israel; [c] 
reorganised the military government in the West Bank giving some functions to the new Civil 
Administration (Military Order 947); 4) 1981-present, Military Orders covered planning laws for 
rezoning land for expropriation for settlement and for taxation, financial matters controlling the flow into 
the West Bank.
Shared jurisdiction began with Proclamation 3 and was superseded by Military Order 378 in 
1970. Military Order 378 regulates most of the military court process in the West Bank, an unnumbered 
Military Order of 1970 is the parallel for the Gaza Strip. Since then a number of further restrictions 
have been placed on the universality of West Bank Palestinian court's jurisdiction, particularly since the 
outbreak of the intifada, for example Circulai* No. 3/1244 of November 1 1987 advised West Bank 
courts could not hear complaints against Israeli identity card holders. The concomitant upheaval 
wrought on normal court business by occupation and subsequently by the intifada has meant that Israeli 
courts have assumed jurisdiction wherever there was even a tenuous link with the case and Israel, even 
though the previous formal legal juiisdiction structure remained in place. Israeli military courts have the 
relevant authority and jurisdiction to try those deemed security cases. Israeli military courts have 
concurrent authority with local, non-military criminal courts to try aU alleged criminal cases. The 
decision whether or not a case, or class of cases should be heard by either a local or militai y comt is 
determined by the militaiy authorities. The military comt legal system is based loosely on common law 
and there is no appeal court in this system. All judges are serving military officers, some of whom have 
no legal qualifications.^^
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In the Agreed Minutes to the DoP, Article IV stated that 'It is understood that: 1. Jurisdiction of 
the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in 
the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, militaiy locations and Israelis. 2. The 
Coimcil's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and 
authorities transferred to it.'^  ^ The significance of these points was that through defining jurisdiction 
under the DoP, it was an attempt to alter the previous legal set-up, however imperfect it was, and in a 
sense create new legal realities thi ough the negotiations firamework. In what amounted to a legal 
sepai ation of Israelis and Palestinians in terms of jmidical authority, the Cairo Agreement reinforced tliis 
notion of personal jurisdiction which was superimposed upon temtorial jurisdiction. Annex III Protocol 
Concerning Legal Matters Aiticle I. 1. stated that the 'criminal jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority' 
would cover 'aU offences committed in the areas mider its territorial jurisdiction' subject to the provisions 
included in tliis Article. Israel would have 'sole criniinal jurisdiction over' offences 'committed in the 
Settlements and the Military Installation Area,' and 'offences committed in the Territoiy by Israelis.' In 
exercising theii* criminal jurisdiction, each side would 'have the power, inter alia, to investigate, arrest, 
bring to trial and punish offenders,' and in addition, 'without derogating fi-om the territorial jurisdiction of 
the Palestinian Authority', Israel would have 'the power to airest and to keep in custody individuals 
suspected of having committed offences which fall within Israeli criminal jurisdiction.' The Article 
maintained that notliing in it would 'derogate from Israel's crmiiiial jurisdiction in accordance with its 
domestic laws over offences committed outside Israel (including in the Territoiy) against Israel or an 
Israeli', although the exercise of such juiisdiction would 'be subject to the provisions of tliis Annex and 
without prejudice to the criminal jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority.'*’
What aU this means in real terms is, that what is internationally recognised as a belligerent and 
temporary military occupation over a single temtorial entity, i.e. the West Bank, subject to the Hague 
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, has become tlnough negotiations a shared territory.*^
By exercising jurisdiction, whether in criminal or civil matters, and more importantly having this 
jurisdiction recognised by the various agreements between the Israelis and the PLO, the Israelis have 
successfully side-stepped continued international and Palestinian refusals to their claims in the occupied 
territories. This point is fiirther reinforced in the field of civil jui isdiction. Annex III Protocol 
Concerning Legal Matters Article III. 1. states that 'The Palestinian courts and judicial authorities have 
jurisdiction in all civil matters' however tliis is subject to this agreement, exceptions being Aiticle HI. 2. 
which states that 'any enforcement of judicial and administrative judgements and orders issued against 
Israelis and theii* property shall be effected by Israel.' Although providing exceptions, the main thrust of 
Article III.3. is that the 'Palestinian courts and judicial authorities have no jurisdiction over civil actions 
in which an Israeli is a paily'. Article III.4. goes on, stating that 'The jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
courts and judicial authorities does not cover actions against the State of Israel including its statutoiy 
entities, organs and agents.'*  ^ By exercising jmisdiction Israel is in effect exercising sovereignty. 
Negotiating the division of jurisdiction is tantamount to admitting that sovereignty over the West Bank is 
not inviolable and that it is thus open to interpretation, negotiation and by inference change. The Caiio
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Agreement in effect removes settlements, Israelis, Israeli secmity organs and East Jerusalemites from the 
legal jurisdiction of the Palestinian courts. On April 19 1994, Attorney General Ben-Yair told the 
Jerusalem Bai* Association that Israeli law did not apply in the occupied territories, 'unless the Knesset 
expressly states tliis,' and that settlers are as subject to militaiy law as Palestinians. However, Ben-Yaii* 
stated that in criminal cases 'parallel' authority applied to settlers, so that they are tried in Israeli courts 
under Israeli law, not in military comts under military law.’° Even more important is the fact that this 
agreement refers jmisdiction to negotiation, both in terms of tliis agreement and also in terms of final 
status negotiations.
On the issue of land ownership. Annex II Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs, Article II.B.22. 
states that 'All powers and responsibilities regarding land registration will be transferred to the 
Palestinian Authority, except the Settlements and the Militaiy Installation Aiea.' However in respect of 
planning and zoning, the Caiio Agreement merely reinforces the status quo in that it neither challenges 
past Israeli expropriation of occupied land (such as settlements and military bases which are illegal under 
the Fourth Geneva Convention), nor does it block friture expropriation as this issue is still open to 
negotiation. In respect of land or jmisdiction being transfen ed to the PISGA, the Cairo Agreement 
establishes certain provisos that not only do not cede full power to the PISGA but also allows for an 
Israeli veto over any PISGA legislation.’* Article II.B.32.a. states that while legislative authorities, 
powers and responsibilities would be transferred to the Palestinian Authority, except in the Settlements 
and the Military Installation Area, those powers and responsibilities would be subject to a number of 
restrictions. For example, planning schemes, bylaws and regulations in effect in the Gaza strip and the 
Jericho Area prior to the signing of the agreement would remain in force, unless amended or abrogated 
by the agreement. The agreement permiited the PISGA to amend, abrogate or promulgate planning 
schemes, and issue licenses and exemptions within its jmisdiction, provided that such acts were 
consistent with the provisions of the agieement. As pait of its procedme, the PISGA would have to 
publish planning schemes in the form of law, and if Israel considered such a plan to be inconsistent with 
the terms of the agreement Israel may bring it for consideration by a special subcommittee of the Joint 
Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee. The PISGA would then have to respect the 
recommendation of the subcommittee.”  Thiough the definition of jmisdiction witliin this agreement, the 
Palestinians are ceding both existing principles of jmidical authority and integrity, and also ceding that 
Israeli jmisdiction, both prior, present and futme is relevant and thus applicable. Article V of the Caii o 
Agreement stated that the authority of the PISGA encompassed all matters that fell witliin its territorial, 
functional and personal jurisdiction. Territorial jm isdiction covered the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area 
territory, except for Settlements and the Military Installation Area. Territorial jmisdiction included land, 
subsoil and territorial waters, in accordance with the provisions of the agreement. Functional jmisdiction 
encompassed all specified powers and responsibilities, but did not include foreign relations, internal 
secmity and the public order of Settlements, the MUitaiy Installation Aiea, Israelis and external secmity. 
Personal jurisdiction extended to 'all persons within the territorial jmisdiction referred to above, except 
for Israelis'. The most important point was however, the point that 'The Palestinian Authority has.
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within its authority, legislative, executive and judicial powers and responsibilities, as provided for in tliis 
Agreement.', the relevant point being 'provided for'. Israel would continue to exercise its authority 
through its military government, which, for that end, would continue to have the necessaiy legislative, 
judicial and executive powers and responsibilities, in accordance with international law. This provision 
would 'not derogate from Israel's applicable legislation over Israelis in personam.' However, in keeping 
with the conciliatory nature of the negotiations process, provision was made that 'Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority may negotiate frirther legal arrangements.'’^
What is remarkable about the legal aspects of the Cafro Agi eement is the appai ent laxity by the 
Palestinians in the way which they were negotiated, particularly in terms of future ramifications. 
Acceptance by Chairman Arafat of these agreements may indeed reflect his tactical and strategic thinking 
based on political assumptions that these agreements can be cast aside when friture conditions ai e more 
favomable. Chafrman Arafat issued an executive order nullifying some 2,000 Israeli military orders 
enacted since 1967. This decree reinstated pre-1967 laws in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to take 
effect from May 20 1994.’ *^ However tliis unilateral action was in contravention of Article VII of the 
Cairo Agreement, which states that 'Laws and military orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the Jericho 
Area prior to the signing of this Agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in 
accordance with this Agreement.'’^
A very strong warning must be made - the Israelis assiduity to detail and application of legality is 
impressive, it is indeed trite and unwise to believe otherwise. Chairman Ai*afat, in a speech delivered in 
English on Jerusalem to South African Muslims in Johannesbui'g on May 10 1994, let slip liis cavalier 
understanding of the legal status that was being built when he stated
"Now, after this agreement, which is the first step and nothing more than that, believe me - a lot 
remains to be done. The jihad will continue. Jerusalem is not only of the Palestinian people, but 
of the entile Islamic nation ...After this agreement you must understand that our main battle is 
not to get the maximum out of them here and there. The main battle is over Jerusalem ...I regard 
this agreement as no more than the agi eement signed between om* prophet Muhammad and the 
Quraysh in Mecca. We must remember that Caliph Umai* refused to accept this agreement and 
considered it 'an inferior peace agreement'. However, the prophet Muhammad accepted it, and 
we now accept the peace agreement, but in order to continue on the way to Jerusalem. Together 
and not alone.'’®
In a June 1st 1994 State Depaitment report on PLO compliance with the DoP commitments, Aiafat's 
remarks were interpreted thus,
'In response to a question about this statement in an interview, PLO official Zakaria al-Agha said 
he believed Arafat meant stmggle by other means, such as negotiations. PLO negotiator Nabil 
Shaath said that jihad' for Jerusalem meant 'struggle for the sake of insistence on presenting what 
we demand' ...Arafat himself, in a press conference, said that in speaking of'jihad' he intended a 
religious, nonviolent struggle.' In the same speech 'Aiafat likened the agreement with the Israelis 
to an agreement Muhammad made with the Qui aysh tribe in Mecca. This agreement, signed in
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627AD, called for a ten-yeai* truce between Muliammad and the Qureish tribe. Two years after 
the agreement (the 'Hudaybay Suhf or 'reconciliation') was signed, Muliammad said that the 
Qureish tribe violated tlie agreement; Muliammad's followers then conquered Mecca.'”
In the Palestinians’ defence however may well be the vaiious provisions they negotiated 
affording protection towaid anticipating final status negotiations in the agreement. Article IV of the 
DoP states 'The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose 
integrity will be preserved during the interim period.'’® Furthermore, Article XXIII.5 of the Cairo 
Agreement states that 'Nothing in tliis Agreement shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of the 
negotiations on the interim agreement or on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the 
Declaration of Principles. Neither Party shall be deemed, by viitue of having entered into tliis 
Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or positions.' Article XXIII.6. 
states 'The two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity of 
which win be preserved during the interim period', and Article XXni.7. states 'The Gaza Strip and the 
Jericho Area shall continue to be an integral pail of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and their status 
shall not be changed for the period of this Agreement. Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to 
change this status.'’  ^ Despite these best efforts, we can see that in the key legal and administrative 
functions, pre-existing arrangements have either been preserved, and/or enhanced. The Palestinians by 
this second, further agreement have not only conferred legitimacy on their occupation but they have also 
confirmed that future occupation, over part or whole and in whatever foim, is conditional both on 
Palestinian good behavioiu* and the strength of Israeli negotiating skills.
In anticipation of a Palestinian transitional authority, the PLO commissioned a draft 
constitutional document, first made public in December 1993, but amended in January 1994. The new 
draft was debated at 'Challenges Facing Palestine Society during tlie Transition', held in Jerusalem by the 
Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre on February 4-5 1994. A tliii’d diaft incorporating the 
conference criticisms was then made available in April 1994.’* The draft constitution was both 
conditional and temporary. Features of a normal constitution, for example the definition of powers and 
authorities of the executive, legislature and judiciary were not present, because it was not a document 
dealing with a sovereign entity. The DoP dictated the character both of the Palestinian entity and the 
powers and responsibilities any constitution may determine. According to one of the principal architects 
of the DoP, Joel Singer, the DoP ensured that the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would 'not be 
changed during the interim period'. These aieas would 'continue to be subject to military government.' 
Similarly, this fact suggested that the PISGA would 'not be independent or sovereign in nature', but 
rather would be 'legally subordinate to the authority of the military government.' In other words, 
operating within Israel, the military government would 'continue to be the source of authority for the 
Palestinian Council and the powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip.’’* In order to exercise sovereignty, land and people are essential ingredients, however whilst the 
PISGA's Draft Basic Law asserts the rights of the 'Palestinian people', in reality these tenus relate to 
those people and lands diiectly for whom powers and responsibilities have been ceded by the militaiy
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government to the PISGA. Chapter One, General Provisions - Article 1 stated that The Palestinian 
people are the source of all authority which shall be exercised, during the transitional period, through the 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities in the manner provided for in this Basic Law' and termed 
PISGA territory, 'Palestine' with Aiticle 5 stating that 'Jerusalem shall be the capital of Palestine.' Aiticle 
2 stated that the government of Palestine would 'be based on parliamentary democracy', and Article 6 
stated that 'Sovereignty over the national resources in Palestine' would be 'vested in the Palestinian 
people,' and would 'be exploited and disposed of in the interests of the Palestinian people according to 
law.'”  It must be conceded that the provisional nature of the draft constitution means that the theoiy, 
principles, and practice of constitutional enactment will continue to be evolutionary until such time as 
final status negotiations are concluded. It is interesting to note the drafting process was carefully 
controlled, with a limited consultation process and did not follow fiom popular participation, 
deliberation and ratification. The December and January documents were titled, ‘Law', not 'Draft Basic 
Law' implying at least a more serious acceptance of the principle of popular sovereignty through public 
criticism, thereby effecting significant concessions in the April document.”  For all its faults and 
limitations, the Draft Basic Law was an important fir st step toward a definitive constitution and all that 
implies, i.e. the creation of constitutional and political arrangements, interests and institutions. The 
relationship between the branches of the PISGA, executive, legislative, judicial were imdefined. Article 
VII.9. of the Cairo Agreement stated that all '[Ijaws and militaiy orders in effect in the Gaza Strip or the 
Jericho Area prior to the signing of this agreement shall remain in force, unless amended or abrogated in 
accordance with tliis Agreement.' Therefore everything regarding the legal structure and order would 
continue to be subject to the overriding authority of the Israelis, meaning that the Israelis retained the 
power of veto and thus control.’'* Thus it is both an inspiration and an aspiration that the Draft Basic 
Law reflects, despite the limitations imposed within the transitional phase.
Despite the many praiseworthy features of the Draft Basic Law, it merely reflected the 
fundamental realities of the day. The draft constitution enabled the PLO to remain as the sole 
interlocutor, representative and aibiter of the Palestinian people, in effect neutralising any internal 
Palestinian dynamic. Article 103 of the Draft Basic Law for the National Authority in the Transitional 
Period, stated 'The Basic Law shall apply duiing the transitional period, but shall not affect the powers 
and duties of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and its organs including its powers to represent the 
Palestinian people in foreign and international relations and relations with foreign governments and 
international organisations.'”  It must be noted that the entire peace process was not geaied specifically 
to enshrining the fundamental rights and fi eedoms of the Palestinian people, the primary consideration of 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was to end the bloodshed between the parties and to establish a 
mutually agreed modus vivendi. It is within this context that PM Rabin stated 'I prefer the Palestinians 
to cope with the problem of enforcing order in the Gaza Strip. The Palestinians will be better at it than 
we were because they will allow no appeals to the Supreme Couif and will prevent the Association for 
Civil Rights fi-om criticising the conditions there by denying it access to the area. They will rule by their
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own methods, freeing, and this is most important, the Israeli ai*my soldiers from having to do what they 
will do.’”
The PLO is recognised in the United Nations as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian 
people, and as such maintains diplomatic relations with more than 100 countries. The DoP and the 
Cairo Agreement both prohibit the PISGA from conducting foreign relations, yet the Draft basic Law 
recognises that the PLO represents the Palestinian people in foreign relations, and as such places its 
decisions above those of the PISGA.”  The dynamism and the potency of the provisional Basic Law 
were put in question by the DoP and the Caiio Agreement. The DoP and the Cairo Agreement ensured 
that the PISGA could not enact legislation consistent with the Draft Basic Law's provisions. The PISGA 
was constrained within its agreed jurisdiction, by its veiy nature constrained both by Israeli limits and by 
the limits mutually agreed.’® Indeed the PISGA's independence even within its own jurisdiction was 
constrained by the extra-territoriality of the PLO, a fact wliich places the PLO above and outside the 
jurisdiction, of the PISGA, and therefore the Draft Basic Law for the National Authority in the 
Transitional Period.’^
4.3. The Proceeds of Peace Will Underwrite the Process of Peace: The Paris Protocol and
International Aid
In order to market the political dimension of the Israeli-Palestinian accommodation, the main 
support and guarantee for this political structure was economic prosperity tlirough regional 
interdependency. Thus the intended thiust of the peace process was to achieve an understanding which 
mutually reinforced both peace and prosperity. This was the stated intention of the preamble of the 
Protocol on Economic Relations, '[t]he two parties view the economic domain as one of the cornerstone 
in their mutual relations with a view to enhance their interest in the acliievement of a just, lasting and 
comprehensive peace.'”** The foimdation of the Israeli-Palestinian economic accommodation was the 
Israel-PLO Protocol on Economic Relations, signed in Paris on April 29th 1994. The Paiis Protocol 
provided for the framework which would determine the Palestinian economy and its economic relations 
in the interim period, and covered the spheres of monetaiy and financial issues, direct taxation, import 
taxes and import policy, indirect taxes on local production, labour, agricultuie, industry, insurance 
issues, and touiism. The protocol established 'the contractual agreement' that would govern the 
'economic relations between the two sides' and would 'cover the West Bank and the Gaza Strip during 
the interim period.'”** The implementation of the protocol was to be followed up by the Joint Economic 
Committee (JEC) which would decide on related problems and would serve as the continuing committee 
for economic cooperation as envisaged in Annex III of the DoP.”
However, unlike the other developing bilateral relations with the Arab world that Israel had been 
prospecting as a result of the Madrid process, Israeli-Palestinian economic foundations already existed, 
having developed under Israeli occupation over a period of 30 years. Following the 1967 war, the
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previous economic relationships enjoyed by the West Bank and Gaza with adjoining regions were either 
completely severed or greatly weakened. For example, post-war relationships with Jordan were 
redefined by Israeli policies and decisions towaids the West Bank, and Gaza was isolated fiom Egypt 
and administered by the Israeli miHtaiy government. Both territories gradually developed new economic 
links with Israel through trade, labour and other economic relationships. Prior to 1967, the Gazan 
economy was weak and imderdeveloped being liighly dependent on external sources of income, the 
economic infi*astructui*e was immatui e and markets were not integrated. In 1966, the West Bank and 
Gaza's total GNP equalled only 2.6% of Israel's GNP, Gaza's GNP totalled 20% of the West Bank's with 
a per capita income of less than half the West Bank's. Between 1967 and 1987 Gazans crossing into 
Israel for work rose fi*om 0% to 45% of the total labour force.”*’ By 1987 the combined GNP of the 
occupied territories had only reached 6.7% of Israel's GNP, Gaza's economy equalled only 1.6% of 
Israel’s GNP, dropping to 1% by 1992.”*”* Limitations imposed on the occupied territories during these 
years by Israel precluded any significant economic development, indeed true economic development was 
not favoured, either because for reasons of ensuring no competition for Israeli industries, or because 
creating a strong Palestinian economic infr astructure would threaten Israeli control.”*’ A main element of 
the intifada was the attempt to address the state of underdevelopment and subordination of the 
Palestinian economy by boycotting Israeli goods, resisting tax payments and encouraging local 
production and consumption. From 1981 onwards, Israel-which dominated the Palestinian economy, 
and the Gulf States-wliich provided employment opportunities and remittances for Palestinians, 
simultaneously suffered recession, Palestinians unemployed in Israel and the Gulf States could not hope 
to be incorporated by a West Bank economy which could not generate jobs in industry, agriculture or 
services. Employment opportunities in the Arab world for educated Palestinians had long been a means 
of lessening economic and political tensions at home. In 1984, for the first time since the 1950s, 
numbers entering exceeded those leaving the West Bank, 4,000 graduates per annum were now entering 
a job market that had no hope of accommodating them. Israel required Palestinians under age 21 remain 
no less than 6 months on every trip outside the West Bank, and Jordan required that they return within 
one month-young Palestinians were therefore placed in an impossible economic situation, and even more 
so since the intifada and the Gulf Wai*, as Palestinian employment reflected political fortunes. An 
example of a political rationale for the intifada was set out in a 14-point document issued in the name of 
'Palestinian nationalist institutions and personalities from the West Bank and Gaza' on January 14th 
1988, among the demands were, cease all settlement and land confiscation, cancel VAT and other direct 
Israeli taxes, release to Palestinian unions almost $lbn in mandatory deductions made since 1970 from 
the paycheques of Palestinian workers in Israel, removal of restrictions on building permits and on 
industrial and agricultural projects, and end trade discrimination in Israel against Palestinian 
manufacturers and produce.”*® Leaflets of the intifada show that it was characterised by decentralised 
activity that emphasised local action, as a major objective of the vaiious organisations was to erode the 
Israeli ruling apparatus in the territories. However economic considerations were not ignored. Financial 
aid was given to those haimed by Israeli activities, families with dead, wounded, houses demolished, etc.
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Steps were taken to reduce economic hardships, for example, commercial strikes were partial, and the 
boycott of Israeli products and working in Israel was selective. Many leaflets were at pains to ensure 
that the burden was being shaied equally, property owners were called on not to raise rents and to defer 
rent from those unable to pay, wliilst those with means were urged to pay on time, doctors and lawyers 
were urged not to increase fees.”
Israel's policy regarding the occupied territories in the aftermath of the Second Gulf war aimed at 
increasing employment and boosting the local economy in an attempt to refocus Palestinian energies 
away fr om the intifada,”*® Tliis policy was intended to have a twofold benefit, reduce the economic 
burden on Israel of policing the occupied territories, and redirect Palestinian violence into economic 
enterprise thereby further decreasing Israel's security considerations. Tax incentives and the 
strengthening of local banking operations were meant to stimulate new investment and production, 
though the basic subservient and subcontracted role of the Palestinian economy to the Israeli one would 
remain.”*^ Israel's policy aimed at enlarging the Palestinian economy's productive base, especially in 
Gaza, so that Palestinian dependence on Israel for employment would be reduced, by encouraging 
increased consumption capacity. Tliis objective was balanced by the desfre not to encourage the 
development of a competitor. In a sense the DoP, at least m the short term, could be seen as a 
modification of this policy.
The DoP made extensive provision for economic arrangements and relations, either by jointly 
operated bilateral and multilateral economic and development programmes, or thiough transferring 
powers and responsibilities to the PISGA. While the PISGA was intended to assume power and 
responsibility in certain spheres by the DoP, Israel expected to retain control of strategic resources, such 
as water, energy and international aid. In such a way, Israel would divest itself of the heavy financial 
burden of some governing functions without relinquishing overall control of macro-economic 
development. The DoP could then be used to link Palestinian economic development to the fostering of 
regional economic development programmes which would involve Israel, and thereby Israel would use 
Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement to integrate Israel into the surrounding regional economic system and 
thus side-step the Arab economic boycott of Israel, without the need for the resolution of a 
comprehensive regional peace. Thus by transferring certain powers and responsibilities to the PISGA, 
with the promise of more to come, Israel would not only continue to determine the extent of the 
occupation but would also receive due recognition of its peacemaking by gaining access to markets and 
investments long denied to it.
For many Palestinians, the success or failui'e of the DoP was based on its ability to deliver rapid 
economic improvements in thefr lives. While economic development was not the primary impetus for 
the DoP, in many ways the political success of the DoP and the PISGA would depend on the health of 
the Palestinian economy, worn down over many years by occupation, the intifada and the fall-out fr om 
the Gulf war. The DoP recognised the importance to its maintenance, of economic issues, particularly in 
warding off political opposition to make it work. Tangible international economic support for the DoP 
was solicited, in the foim of some $2.4bn worth of commitments of loans and grant aid moneys fr om
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over 40 countries at a World Bank-sponsored international donors' consultative group meeting in Paris 
in December 1993. Pledges were initially meant to frmd the Emergency Assistance Programme for the 
Occupied Territories (EAP) worked out between the World Bank and Palestinian representatives, based 
on the assumption that the PISGA would frmd ordinaiy day-to-day operations from tax revenues. The 
EAP was designed to channel project aid into the occupied territories, and balance long-term 
development needs with more immediate employment concerns. Thus the Palestinian Economic Council 
for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR) was established to channel funds and cooperate with 
the bank in both allocation and accountability.
PECDAR was created by PISGA decree on October 31st 1993, to be the central institution for 
managing the process of reconstruction and development in the occupied territories in the interim period. 
PECDAR's chairman was Faruq Qaddumi, with Ahmad Quiai appointed as Director General. PECDAR 
was governed by a 14-member Boar d of Governors, wliich appointed a Managing Director, Office 
Directors, provided overall policy guidance for PECDAR activities, set general programme priorities, 
established personnel and administrative policies (including procedures for procurement, accounting and 
auditing), and approved PECDAR's budget and individual EAP projects. PECDAR's basic regulations 
were laid down by bylaws, developed with donor assistance and approved by the Board of Governors on 
January 11th 1994 and ratified by the PISGA. The Managing Director, formulated proposals, submitted 
PECDAR's budget to the Board, presented individual projects to the Boat'd, was generally responsible 
for PECDAR's management, and had an internal auditor, legal advisor, procurement advisor attached to 
his office. PECDAR, with a staff of about 100, was headquaitered in the West Bank with a branch 
office in Gaza to monitor Gazan operations. PECDAR was set up with an administration office and five 
fimctional offices. The office of Economic Policy Formulation and Project Review (EPFPR) was 
charged with economic analysis and macroeconomic forecasting, formulation of economic policy 
options, sector strategies, public expenditure programming, and project evaluation and review. EPFPR 
acts in close cooperation with the Palestinian Development Institute and the Palestinian Bureau of 
Statistics. The office of Aid Coordination and Facilitation was the focal point for donor relations 
regarding programming and monitoring of official aid, except that given dfrectly to NGOs. The office of 
Technical Assistance And Funding was given responsibility for managing non-project teclinical 
assistance, reviewing training needs, screening proposals and disseminating information. The office of 
NGOs and Special Programmes was provisionally charged with developing framework agreements for 
dealing with NGOs and UN agencies, with additional responsibilities for directing special programmes 
and activities such as detainee rehabilitation, and formulating policies to encourage private sector 
development). The office of Progi'amme Management and Monitoring was responsible for investment 
programme implementation and monitoring.’*
The Paris Protocol formally established the new Israeli-Palestinian economic relationsliip.
Taking trade as representative of this new ai rangement, Israel demanded that the Palestinians 'harmonise 
their tax and customs regime with the high levels in force in Israel'.’* The Palestinians argued that such a 
policy would make Palestinian products too expensive both for domestic consumption and export, and
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that any advantages accruing from a cheaper workforce and less regulated business environment would 
therefore be lost. The Palestinians fuither argued that they would be unable to act as a conduit for 
passing thir d country imports into the Israeli market, wliich would have the political effect of making 
fiirther autonomy dependent on Israeli diktat, and/or making the Palestinians more dependent on Jordan 
economically and politically, thereby restricting fiirther independent Palestinian development and/or 
sovereignty. Palestinian arguments stressed the need for a free-trade agreement between the occupied 
territories and Israel, with the Palestinians deciding the rates of trade tariffs and customs duties. This 
represented a major point of disagieement between the two sides. Israel had been undergoing an 
extensive programme of economic liberalisation aimed at dismantling its heavily protectionist and 
subsidised economy, and as this had not been an easy transformation, the Paris Protocol detailed Israel's 
desired trade regime.”  The Israelis wanted the trade regime to follow Israeli import tai'iffs, trade taxes, 
import licensing regulations and trading standards. Even though Israel accepted unlimited access for 
Palestinian products into Israel, Israeli concerns centred on the possibility of the PISGA areas becoming 
a channel for cheap third coimtry imports into Israel. Due to the underdeveloped nature of the 
Palestinian economy, Palestinians, however, had little to export to Israel apait from agricultural 
products, therefore it would only be thiough low import duties that Palestinians would be able to gain a 
competitive advantage in the Israeli economy. Political pressure was applied on the Israeli government 
from concerned sectors of the Israeli economy, fearflil of cheaper Palestinian competition. The 
subsidised Israeli agriculture industry voiced their grave concern and insisted on protection within the 
terms of the protocol. Under Article VIII. 10. of the Gaza-Jericho agreement, 6 items were subject to 
quantitative restrictions on their import to Israel until 1998, poultry, eggs, potatoes, cucumbers, 
tomatoes, melons. Milk production by each would be for domestic consumption. Israeli feai's estimated 
some 5,000 Israeli job losses as a result of Palestinian competition, and also that Israeli markets would 
be swamped by cheap imports fiom Egypt and Jordan imported via the PISGA aieas. Ai'ticle VIII. 12 
Annex IV Protocol on Economic Relations stated that the two sides would 'refrain from importing 
agricultural products from third parties which may adversely affect the interests of each other's 
farmers'.”
The Pai'is Protocol allowed for the establishment by the PISGA, of its own import policy and 
tariff structure for certain commodities from Egypt and Jordan, and to fix customs duties and taxes for 
imported goods for their own economic development programme on vehicle imports and petroleum 
products, tliis was conditional on petrol prices being no more than 15% less than in Israel. The benefits 
of the Pai'is Protocol to the Palestinians were deemed to be, guaranteed access to the Israeli market, the 
opportunity to diversify trade, to import some goods at the cheapest price and to raise revenues on 
imports. The drawbacks were that, the PISGA had no independence in making economic decisions, 
imports fi om third countries were restricted (imports were determined by the Joint Economic 
Committee, and even then they could only originate in Egypt or Jordan), Palestinian competitiveness was 
hampered by subsidies and protection for some Israeli products and by a PISGA VAT rate 1% lower 
than Israel's. The PISGA was also denied unrestricted access to critical resouices, such as water and
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land, as Israel had declared 70% of the West Bank state land, though actual appropriation was 60% of 
the West Bank, 40% of the Gaza Strip.’”*
In order to determine financial development, the Palestinians argued for the establisliment of an 
independent central bank which would issue currency, control commercial bank licences and reserves, 
and direct monetary policy. However, although this was opposed by Israel as an obvious and therefore 
unacceptable symbol of sovereignty, Israel did accede to the establishment of a Palestinian Monetary 
Authority (PMA) wliich would control, monitor and licence the banking system and financial sector.”  
Therefore the protocol provided for, the establishment of a central Financial Management 
Administration to manage fiscal policy with overall responsibility for public expenditure and revenue, a 
central budget office to supervise the budgets of local authorities and prepare an annual budget in 
cooperation with UNRWA, NGOs and aid agencies, and a central treasuiy office which together with 
other offices and PECDAR would manage taxation and budgeting. Article IV. 1. stated that the PISGA 
would establish a Monetary Authority (PMA) in the Areas, with powers and responsibilities for the 
regulation and implementation of the monetaiy policies within the functions.’® The PMA is an 
interesting body, empowered in a number of fiscal ai eas, to act as, the PISGA's official economic and 
financial advisor (IV.2), the PISGA's and the public sector's sole financial agent, locally and 
internationally (IV.3), the manager of all the PISGA's, and all public sector entities' deposited foreign 
currency reserves (including gold) (IV.4), the lender of last resort for the banking system in the areas 
(IV. 5), the authoriser of foreign exchange dealers, and the regulator and supervisor over foreign 
exchange transactions (IV.6), the banking supervisory body, responsible for the proper functioning, 
stability, solvency and liquidity of the banks in the areas (IV.7), and the re-licenser of each of the five 
branches of Israeli banks operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (IV. 8). However the protocol did 
not allow the PISGA to issue its own currency which would assume the obvious symbolism of 
sovereignty. These institutions would all be subject to the oversight of the Joint Economic Committee 
as Article IV.lO.b. did allow that both sides would 'continue to discuss, through the JEC, the possibility 
of introducing mutually agreed Palestinian currency or temporary alternative currency arr angements for 
the Palestinian Authority.'”  Israel refiised the PISGA's application to issue an ECU-style currency for 
issuing income generating bonds, the official legal tender was to remain the shekel (NIS), although the 
Jordanian dinar and the US dollar could still be used, thus the Palestinian economy would be linked to 
prevailing economic conditions in Israel, and to a lesser extent in Jordan, as Article IV.lO.a stated the 
NIS would 'legally serve there as a means of payment for all pur poses including official transactions'.’® 
Although the Palestinian economy could not realistically hope to support a convertible cunency, the 
protocol ensured that the PISGA would be unable to make monetary policy, in particular control interest 
rates, make strategic interventions, or determine currency values.
The PISGA faced two immediate problems. The PISGA lacked a trained and experienced 
administrative corps. The breadth of the tax base was such that it could not cope with financing the 
PISGA's start-up costs, with the result that the PISGA was forced to use external development 
assistance to make good budget deficits as there was no capacity for the PISGA to borrow domestically,
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which ill tui'ii proved destabalising as domestic payments arrears spiralled. However, a positive outcome 
of the protocol was that foreign and Palestinian banks opened in the occupied territories, giving more 
generous terms to borrowers than Israeli banks. It was hoped that with Saudi Aiabian, Egyptian, 
Jordanian and Palestinian diaspora capital available for investment credit, public confidence in the 
financial system could be restored. Israel too, hoped to play a part in developing the financial system 
tlirough joint ventures and links with foreign, including Arab, capital flows.
One of the major burdens that the nascent financial system would have to cope with was the 
dreadfiilly high levels of imemployment in the West Bank and Gaza. The PISGA's inability to create 
sufficient numbers of jobs meant that, at least for the early life of the DoP, Palestinian jobs in Israel 
assumed major importance as a vital source of income, thus the protocol committed Israel to resist from 
denying Palestinian access, both physically and institutionally, to employment in Israel. However, 
closures of the territories preventing workers travelling, and restrictions on the numbers allowed access, 
to Israel, meant a steady decline in income derived from Israel. This problem was further exacerbated by 
PM Rabin, who stated that his intention was 'to reduce dramatically the number of Palestinians working 
in Israel'. From March 1994, 70,000 workers fiom Eastern Eui'ope, Turkey and the Fai* East were 
imported to Israel, and the government subsidised Israeli immigrants $13-per day to encourage them to 
replace Palestinian workers.’^
Although the Cairo Agreement afiBimed the Paris Protocol as an integral part thereof establishing 
the contractual agreement that would govern the economic relations between the two sides, covering the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip during the interim period, Israeli redeployment fiom the occupied territories 
made slow progress, schedules were broken or postponed, elections did not materialise between 
September 1993 and January 1996, and constant Israeli closures of the territories seriously undermined a 
major soui ce of income for the Palestinian population. International and bilateral aid came slowly, 
meaning living standards were either barely being maintained or di'opped, resulting in sections of the 
Palestinian public losing faith with the peace process. Of a total of $760m pledged for FY1994, only 
$140m had actually been disbursed by November 1994.®** Emergency aid, released piecemeal, was used 
to cover the costs of running the police force but donors were reluctant to releases funds for 
development flmding. Non-security services like health and education were spheres transferred to the 
PISGA which had to be financed by PISGA tax revenue generated fi'om the population. Tax revenue 
projections made in early summer 1995 were for a deficit of some $150m, as a direct result of not being 
able to collect such moneys, either due to the moneys just not being there or through endemic tax 
evasion fostered under militaiy occupation.®* The problems inlierent in operating in a severe crisis 
management mode were well demonstrated by two US disbursements in 1994 - one of $5m in May, the 
second of $4m in October - together these payments were not sufficient to cover the electricity bill owed 
by the Gaza municipality to the Israel Electric Corporation, which was tlireatening to cut off supply. In 
this way, foreign assistance-led development carried a number of risks, funds did not always appear on 
the promised dates, fimds were not limitless, and funds were likely to be reduced as nations reordered 
their priorities thiough changing circumstances. In order to use foreign assistance most effectively, the
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PISGA economy had to be as flexible as possible to be able to cope with the vagaries of financial 
fortune, tliis meant that it had to develop its own revenue sources and not become too dependent on 
foreign assistance for its' economy's sui'vival. In essence, aid should have been complementaiy rather 
than an integral component of the domestic economy. The trouble with the situation in the Gaza Strip, 
in particular the high levels of unemployment, was that a politically fluid situation existed regarding the 
final status, therefore for politically expedient short term reasons there was undoubtedly an opportunity, 
if not desire, for the PISGA's ruling elite to restrict the effects of domestic direct taxation on the 
community by utilising aid money for unaccountable political patronage and for limiting the hai'sh effects 
of a struggling economy.
In the early stages of the PISGA's life, donor nations were rather worried about the nascent 
PISGA's ability to resist the temptations of political favom’S, therefore they restricted the disbiusement 
levels, being reluctant to merely underwrite the then-unelected Palestinian leadersMp and provide short­
term poverty relief. Arafat alienated many Palestinian economists and politicians by his insistence of 
taking direct personal control of expenditure at all levels and arbitrarily bypassing PECDAR. However, 
with typical hypocrisy, foreign donor nations' companies sought contracts in such a system, 
independently of and in competition with each other.®’ The difficulty for the donor nations lay with the 
constant delay in announcing elections for a fiiUy accountable PISGA Council, thus aid money became 
inseparable fi-om the progress of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, economically and politically. The 
election issue became a weapon used by aU sides to advance their positions. With high levels of 
Palestinian unemployment, restriction of access to Israel by Palestinian workers, aid discrimination 
between Israel and the PISGA institutionalised within the negotiated agreements, and land expropriation, 
features of the Israeli-Palestinian economic relationship, no amount of foreign aid could sustain the 
Palestinian economy for veiy long or be used to its full potential. The cynical interpretation thus would 
be that foreign aid was not really intended to actually deliver sustainable economic development, but 
rather was intended as a bandage to contain the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and merely sustain the 
political process as determined by the actors involved at the expense of real economic and political 
development. The spheres which were transferred to the PISGA, i.e. health, education, social welfare 
for example, were not income generators but rather expenditure consumers, and other spheres which 
were later transferred or remained under Israeli authority tended to be of more strategic value, i.e. 
resources, which therefore hampered Palestinian economic development.®’
Article III outlined the PISGA's powers and responsibilities in the sphere of import and customs 
policy. The PISGA's import policy included independently determining and changing if necessary the 
rates of customs, purchase tax, levies, excises and other charges, the regulation of licensing requirements 
and procedures and of standard requirements.®”* Imports fiom Israel would remain as before under the 
customs union effectively established by the occupation, but how Israeli economic policy would effect 
intra-Israeli-Palestinian trade was not covered by tliis agreement. However the protocol listed, 'Goods 
on List AT, 'Goods on List A2', 'goods on List B' as determining the types and categories of goods that 
Palestinian could import fiom places other than Israel. List A1 covered locally-produced items in Jordan
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and Egypt particularly, and from other agreed Arab countries. List A2 covered Arab, Islamic and other 
agreed countries. List B covered basic food items and other goods for the Palestinian economic 
development programme.®’ Lists A1 and A2 included foodstuffs, live animals, agricultuial products, 
construction materials, fertilisers, electrical equipment and household electric appliances.®® Customs 
valuations would be based on the 1994 GATT agreement, entering into force as of the date it was 
introduced in Israel, and until then was based on the Brussels Definition of Valuation (BDV) system, the 
classification of goods being based on the principles of'the Harmonised Commodity Description and 
Coding System'.®’ Items imported fr om Jordan or Egypt, or other Arab and Islamic countries would 
have to comply with rules of origin determined by a joint sub-committee, for example locally produced 
goods will conform if: they liave been wholly grown, produced or manufactured in that coimtry; they 
have been imported directly; the value of the costs of the materials produced in that country plus the 
direct processing costs are not less than 30% of the export value.®® List B included, capital equipment 
for economic development, equipment for the textile industry; industrial equipment, pharmaceutical 
products, farm machinery and heavy plant machinery. However List B did not include all capital 
investment equipment such as computers and pesticides. Capital equipment items subject to the existing 
customs regime, pailicularly agricultur al items such as pesticides had seen prices fluctuate whilst output 
had remained constant. The price index of pesticides rose by approximately 50% between 1986-1992, 
wliile the price of West Bank vegetables rose 25%, Gaza's by less than 10%.®^  List B items carried no 
tariff, origin or quantity restrictions as they were considered essential for Palestinian economic 
development. Goods and quantities not fixed by the JEC or those not on these lists were subject to the 
existing customs regime, tariff rates, purchase taxes, levies and any other charges prevailing in Israel, 
although the PISGA was allowed to levy VAT at one rate for both local products and imports at a level 
between 15-16% - Israel's rate was 17%.’® What these powers and responsibilities meant in real terms, 
was that import taxes and customs levies on all goods specifically designated for consumption under 
PISGA jurisdiction, would accrue to the PISGA even if they were imported via an Israeli medium, 
revenues accrued in this way were conservatively estimated by the World Bank at 8% of PISGA GNP.’* 
For List B items, the dfrect saving was 21%, being the value of Israeli tai iffs on capital investment 
goods.”  However, the ability to collect revenues would be dependent on Israeli goodwill and on how 
quickly the PISGA would be able to establish an efficient customs control network.
For goods going in the opposite way. Article VIII. 11 stated that the Palestinians would 'have the 
right to export their agiicultural produce to external maikets without restrictions', while Article IX.6. 
stated that the Palestinians would 'have the right to export their industrial produce to external markets 
without restrictions', both 'on the basis of certificates of origin issued by the Palestinian Authority.'”
Any evaluation of the extent to which the protocol was meant as a stimulus for Palestinian agriculture 
and industry would have to be based on the growth of both the manufacturing base and the agricultuial 
sector. Sectoral growth under the protocol would have to be a policy objective of both sides because of 
the obvious limitations on the PISGA, thus the Israelis would have to see the growth of the Palestinian 
economy as an integral aspect of thefr Israeli-Palestinian peace strategy. However sectoral restrictions
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placed on production limits, quota limits, one-sided credit and concessionary teims would have the 
impact of severely affecting Palestinian efficiency and competitiveness. For example, Ai'ticle VIII. 10 
stated agricultural restrictions. Israeli quotas imposed on Palestinian agricultuial produce viiluaUy 
negated the advantages of the protocol, with only 25% of Palestinian vegetable produce allowed 
unrestricted access to Israeli maikets. According to some estimates, quotas on some produce were 
actually below previous levels. For example, cucumber exports between 1990-2 averaged 19,000 tons 
p.a., whereas tlie protocol put a limit of 15,000 tons p.a.; potato exports were 17,000 in 1990-2, but the 
protocol limited tliis to 15,000 tons p.a. Egg production in the West Bank and Gaza outstripped 
consumption and quota limits, for example, in 1992 production ran about 180m eggs whereas the 
protocol's export quota for 1994 was 30m eggs, the projected quota for 1998 was still only 60m eggs. 
Switching from egg to poultry (meat) production would not solve the problem as there was a quota 
system on poultry too. Israel has complex and favoured trading links and status with international 
markets, like the EU and US markets. Israeli imports from the EU and US amounted to 68% and 20.5% 
of total imports, exports to botli amounted to 37.1% and 33.1% of Israel's total exports, and Israel 
subsidises its agricultuial and industrial sectors in terms of, concessionary credit terms, production 
factors like water and land, export finances and minimum price levels for certain products. Support for 
Palestinian industry and agriculture in this environment would need heavy investment and protection just 
to survive let alone compete.”  Economic integration in regional terms would have met the objective of 
opening up the Palestinian markets, giving the opportunity to strengthen the Palestinian economy 
through trade links, however the restrictions imposed thiough the protocol had both an economic and a 
political overtone.”  For example, while Egypt and Jordan would be, for geographical reasons, the most 
important markets for the Palestinians, the political benefit would be the moderating political influence 
offered to the PISGA, thus the Israelis saw the opportunity to constrain the PISGA through the promise 
of favoui'able trading concessions with Jordan and Egypt. In tliis sense inter-Ai'ab trade could not be 
seen by the Palestinians as a way of counter-balancing the Israelis economic advantages, particularly not 
in the short and medium term, so that for the foreseeable future the PISGA's economy would inexorably 
be linked with the Israeli one. Inter-Arab trade amounted to less than 5% of total Ai ab trade. Jordan 
which was well integrated economically in the Arab region, imported 75% of its total imports from non- 
Arab sources. Inter-Arab trade is not comprehensive, neither is it a major political factor, largely due to 
the non-complimentary nature of the individual markets, the diverse industrial structures and frequent 
inter-Arab political quarrels.
On May 2nd 1994, two days prior to the signing of the Caii o Agreement, donor nations pledged 
some $1.2bn over three years in financial support and assistance, and the World Bank unveiled a $1.2bn 
three yeai' emergency aid programme (prepared by 35 World Bank experts, 150 Palestinian experts, and 
representatives of 40 donor countries) to create institutions and rebuild infrastructuie on territory Israel 
would turn over to the PISGA. According to the World Bank report, 'Emergency Assistance 
Programme for the Occupied Territories', a three year programme was seen as an opportunity to jump- 
stai't the Palestinian economy aimed at bringing social and economic benefits to a lai ge part of the
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Palestinian population, to focus the international community's attention on the economic and social 
needs of the Palestinians, and rebuild the infrastructure of the territories in order to stimulate economic 
growth by attracting private investment. Ciao Koch-Weser, World Bank VP for the Middle East and 
North Africa wanted to see an immediate improvement in living conditions, with $570m being made 
available for the first year with the rest solidly pledged. The plan hoped to provide what would amount 
to $200 per person in aid, with project fimding and implementation to be administered by the newly 
organised Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction together with some UN 
and private agencies already operating in the occupied territories. Of the $1.2bn total, $600m would 
finance public investments ($366m for the West Bank, $234m for Gaza), $225 was earmarked for non­
governmental agencies, $111 for water supply and waste water treatment (the World Bank predicted 
that the beginning of sewer construction and increased solid waste handling would begin by the end of 
1994, most sewage in the territories was being discharged untreated), $300m would support private 
sector investments in telecommunications, housing, agriculture and industiy, $900m would support 
public sector investments in transportation, water and sewage, electric power, municipal services, 
education and health, and $300m would provide technical support and help construct a central 
Palestinian administration. The plan also contained fimds for upgrading roads, power and 
telecommunications systems, building houses and improving agricultural practices. The World Bank, 
while donating $50m for emergency assistance, said the plan was designed to ensuie the Palestinians 
manage their own affairs. While the Palestinians fai'e economically better than most of theii' neighbouis 
according to per capita GDP comparisons (PISGA=$l,275p.a. in 1992 - Jordan=$l,150p.a., 
Egypt=$630p.a.), the power, water and telephone systems were comparable with the least developed 
countries (2.9 telephones per 100 inhabitants). The EAP budgeted $100m for the installation of 57,500 
new telephones, with another $100m (80% to come from the private sector) to be used for housing 
(rouglily 50% of Gazans live in refugee camps, 10% of West Bankers), and about $10m over thi*ee yeai's 
would be directed toward upgrading the worst refugee camp housing. The EU, as the largest donor, 
pledged $600m, one quarter of the $2.4bn pledged as a result of the October 1st 1993 donor conference, 
the US donated $500m, Japan $200m, Norway $150m, Saudi Arabia $100m, Italy $80m and Israel 
$75m.”  The puipose of these funds fr om the international community was to generate support for the 
peace process by, stimulating Palestinian economic and social development, developing and enhancing 
the local administrative infrastructure, ensuring political stability through the offices of the PISGA, and 
creating immediate and real economic benefits in terms of raised living standards for the Palestinian 
population. The structures that grew fr om tliis international effort did not developed smootlily.
Promised commitments outweighed actual financial delivery, and the dynamics of the assistance effort, 
such as multilateral and bilateral economic development, slow and inappropriate donor efforts, 
ineffective PISGA institutions and the adverse effects of Israeli policies ensui ed that progress in the aid 
programme was dependent on progress in the broader negotiating peace process.
The major aid donors were the Euiopean Union (EU), the United States, Japan, and Saudi 
Arabia. The bulk of US aid was disbursed tlirough the US Agency for International Development
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(USAID) with the rest allocated in the form of private sector guarantees administered by the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The breakdown was USAID $375m, OPIC $125m. Likewise, 
the emphasis of the EU's multilateral assistance was in the form of loans and guarantees to be distributed 
through the European Investment Bank (EIB). From the signing of the DoP, the EIB had been closely 
involved in the preparation of the 'Emergency Assistance Programme', developed by the international 
donor community for Gaza and the West Bank, to supplement the EU's substantial grant aid programme, 
the EU being one of the most significant donors. The EU Commission's grant assistance programme 
was providing some ECUlOOmp.a. by 1995 in grants for housing, education, police, as well as finance 
for water and sanitation projects. The EIB estimated that the EU (Commission and member states) 
committed some ECU400m in grants in 1994, over half the total foreign aid for Gaza and the West Bank 
committed in 1994. The EIB started its contribution by providing financial assistance and logistical 
support to the World Bank-based Donors Secretaiiat, which coordinates the overall international aid 
effort. The EIB finances out of its general budget resources, temporary Palestinian staff assistance for 
the Secretariat. The EIB has been requested to make available up to ECU250m in loans firom its own 
resources for projects in Gaza and the West Bank when satisfactoiy operational conditions aie in place, 
and sound investment projects, capable of beai'ing loan servicing charges have been prepared. The EIB 
maintains close contact with the PISGA, hoping to make its first loan operation in support of small and 
medium-sized enterprises in the productive sector in late 1995. Other investment schemes, mainly in the 
area of infi-astructure and private sector development aie being studied for EIB loan finance. Due to the 
nature of the Palestinian economy, a main priority of the PISGA would be to draw on the substantial 
concessional funding assistance offered by the international community for the most pressing needs.”  
Japan (initial pledges for 1994-$ 100m, 1995-$ 100m) and Saudi Arabia (pledge for 1995-$ 100m) 
indicated in late 1995 that they may repeat then annual contributions for the period 1996-98, which 
would bring the total pledges to date to more than $4bn.’® Pledges were consistently more forthcoming 
then actual disbursements, indeed one major complaint of the aid process was made concerning the 
slowness in actual aid deliveiy, aid pledges were not always committed to specific projects and actual aid 
distribution in the West Bank and Gaza was even slower, paiticulaily in 1994 although this seemed to 
improve in 1995. Rouglily one thii d of pledged aid was made up by grants, the remainder being 
concessional loans or guarantees, and by the end of 1995 roughly half of all aid was directed at budget 
support and technical assistance, the remainder at investment projects.
The concept of international financial assistance as an instrument of peace and the process of 
actual aid deliveiy within the context of ongoing negotiations wliich would determine the futuie shape, 
scope and limits of a final peace settlement was a challenging one for the donors and the recipient 
involved. The first year of assistance was fi'aught with complaints regarding the tardiness and targeting 
of the aid, so as a result of these complaints the aid structui e was modified in order that the targeting, 
pace, delivery, effectiveness and coordination of the progi ammes was improved.”
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The Aid Structure
Two major structures were established to provide strategic external command, control and 
direction to the donor aid programme, the Consultative Group (CG) and the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee 
(AHLC). The CG was typical of the mechanisms the World Bank uses to coordinate aid progi ammes, 
that is incorporating aid officials and teclinical experts, though in the Palestinian case the CG was 
generally used to win support and funding for detailed assistance plans. The AHCL consisted of 
interested out-of-region parties specific to the Madrid peace process, the US, Russia, the EU, Japan, 
Canada, Saudi Arabia and Norway. The PISGA, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and the UN participated 
as associate members as they either were conduits, beneficiaries or recipients of the aid programmes.
The AHCL met less fi'equently although tended to have a higher level of political representation. The 
AHCL acted as a de facto political steering committee, even though technically it reported to the 
steering committee of the multilateral track of the peace process which was responsible for establishing 
broad guidelines and policies for the aid process. With Norway as AHLC chan and the World Bank as 
secretariat, all decisions were reached by consensus. Much of the real work of both structures was done 
informally at meetings of the major members in between the formal meetings. The US, EU, and the 
World Bank played the most influential roles, with Israel and the PISGA the most interested paifies. 
Within tliis fi amework, to facilitate day-to-day implementation of policies, substructui es were created. 
For example, during the implementation of the Caii o Agreement in May 1994, a Coordinating 
Committee for Assistance to the Palestinian Police (COPP) was formed to secuie and coordinate donor 
pledges of police funds and equipment. And in November 1994, the AHLC established the Local Aid 
Coordination Committee (LACC) to facilitate coordination on the ground among the major aid agencies, 
the PISGA and the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC). The LACC was co-chaired by; Norway, the World 
Bank, and the UN. It met at least once a month fi-om January 1995 with roughly 30 local donor 
representatives attending. The LACC, in tuin, established twelve core Sectoral Working Groups, each 
group with one or more PISGA ministry as gavel holder, a donor as shepherd and a UN agency as 
secretariat.®® The JLC consisted of the PISGA (gavel holder), Israel, US, EU, UN, the World Bank 
(secretariat), and Norway (shepherd) to deal with significant obstacles in the way of the prompt and 
effective delivei-y of assistance, as well as to review PISGA budgetary performance, revenue-generation 
and priorities for technical assistance. The JLC met at least once a month fi-om May 1995.
The JLC was the forum within wliich implementation of the Tripartite Action Plan for the 
Palestinian Authority (TAP) was monitored. The AHLC was responsible for a perfoiinance review 
process to oversee the implementation of the TAP. The AHLC asked the International Monetaiy Fund 
(IMF) to monitor the Palestinian budget, and appointed the AHLC Secretariat to follow up on donor 
contributions and the implementation of the public sector investment programme. The AHLC used the 
LACC and the JLC to oversee on a continuing basis the implementation of the TAP by the PISGA,
Israel and the donors. On behalf and under the instruction of the AHLC, the LACC and the JLC 
reviewed the quarterly reports prepaied by the PISGA in conjunction with the IMF, together with 
information provided by the AHLC Secretariat on steps taken to implement the TAP. The JLC was 'the
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primary forum for working out problems related to the overall assistance effort'. The AHLC met to 
monitor situations at the request of the Chan upon the recommendation of any of its members. For 
example, on May 2nd 1995 in Paris, a meeting was called to meet the $136m shortfall in the PISGA's 
start-up and running costs. The AHLC met in Paris on May 27-28 1995 to consider the new 
requirements concerning PISGA self-goveming financing. Discussion at the meeting focused on how 
donors could assist the PISGA in financing its budget deficit for the period May Ist-December 31st 
1995. The discussions, which led to the TAP took place in accordance with the existing agreements 
between the PLO and Israel, i.e., the DoP, the Cairo Agreement and the Erez Checkpoint Agreement of 
August 29 1994. The discussion also noted the Oslo Declaration of September 13 1994 and the 
'Understanding on Revenues, Expenditures and Donor Funding for the Palestinian Authority October 1st
1994-March 31st 1995' signed in Brussels on November 30 1994. The TAP was between the PISGA, 
Israel and Norway (as AHLC chaii’).®*
The Tripartite Action Plan for the Palestinian Authority contained specific commitments by the 
parties in the spheres of tax, fiscal expenditure and donor budgetary support. Palestinian requirements 
and responsibilities desperately necessitated a functional tax collection system tlnoughout Gaza and the 
West Bank in order to deal with a number of pressing issues. To implement IMF recommendations on 
improving its tax adrninistrative and expenditure management. To improve the operation of the tax 
system. To fireeze salaries and hii'ing at budgeted levels. To centralise all fiscal revenues, fiscal 
expenditui es and the payment process within the Ministry of Finance's direct control. To establish a 
binding budget forecast for all public expenditure. To establish a comprehensive taxation plan for FY
1995-6. To make best efforts so that donor support for start-up costs would not be required beyond 
December 31st 1996. To prepare for donors a document outlining fimctional diagrams, policy 
responsibilities and contacts of PECDAR, Ministries of Economy and Trade, International Planning and 
Cooperation, Finance and the Palestinian Monetary Authority. To unify commercial and investment 
codes, and develop import-export procedures for Gaza/Jericho. To decentralise project implementation, 
design and execution through PECDAR utilising municipalities, village coimcils, NGOs, ministries and 
UN agencies. To finalise with Israel a joint concept paper on industrial zones, and to work towar d the 
establishment of an appropriate regulatory fr amework for the mobilisation for private sector investment.
Israeli requirements and responsibilities obligated cooperation with the PISGA to ensure a 
fimctioning tax operation in the West Bank. To expedite transfer to the PISGA of all taxes due. To 
cooperate with the PISGA in supporting the new tax structure in Gaza/Jericho, to reestablish the 
computer connection for the tax system and to ensur e the monthly transfers of taxes. To resolve 
outstanding May-December 1994 VAT clearances and outstanding issues related to tax clearances. To 
cooperate with the PISGA to provide training for Palestinian tax advisers. To ensme that agreed taxes 
related to Gaza and the West Bank economic activity would accrue to the PISGA. To ease the transfer 
of goods between Israel-Gaza/Jericho, West Bank-Gaza, West Bank-Jordan, Gaza-Egypt and to ensure 
the swift inspection and passage of goods destined for Gaza and the West Bank development projects.
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To take all contingency measures to maintain maximum economic activity whenever security measures 
were applied.
Donor requirements and responsibilities obligated their best efforts to addi*ess the PISGA 
financing gap and provide required funds. To expedite release of outstanding pledges for start-up costs. 
To gain agreement to extend through to December 31st 1995, the operation of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development's Holst Fimd and UN police disbursement mechanisms. To 
continue to seek to raise necessary resources for quick disbursing job creation projects, offering 
preferential trade access to Palestinian goods, incentives and guarantees for private investment in Gaza 
and the West Bank, and stressed that donor efforts would be contingent on Israeli-Palestinian 
implementation performance.*^
The World Bank was of central importance in the international aid effort. As Secretaiiat for the 
AHLC, it facilitated meetings and helped track donor assistance. It also acted as chah for the CG and 
assumed a major role in assessing economic conditions and in developing packages for projects for 
donor support in association with the PISGA. The first instrument of aid, the EAP, was presented by 
the World Bank to the first CG meeting in December 1993. The $1.2bn EAP was based on the earlier 
World Bank six-volume report, 'Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace', 
published in September 1993. This study was undertaken at the request of the Madrid sponsors. The 
World Bank supported the work of the Multilateral Working Group on Economic Development by 
providing analyses of the key economic issues and developmental challenges. At the Working Group's 
second meeting in Paris in October 1992, the Bank was requested to make an assessment of the 
development needs and prospects of the economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Officials, 
comprising five teams, visited the occupied territories between January 21st-February 24th 1993, and 
focused on. Agriculture, Human Resources, Infrastructure, Macroeconomics and Private Sector 
Development.*^ While the EAP identified sectoral needs and priorities tlu’ough 1994-6, the World Bank 
prepared its own aid programme, the $128m Emergency Rehabilitation Programme (ERP), which 
involved 117 smaller projects tliroughout the West Bank and Gaza. Initially, $88m was pledged to the 
ERP, with $30m from the World Bank-associated aid agency the International Development 
Association, and Saudi Arabia, Switzerland and Denmaik provided some of the rest. Other than the 
ERP, support for private sector investment would come through loans from the World Bank-afifiliated 
International Finance Corporation (IFC). The World Bank was responsible for the Teclinical Assistance 
Trust Fund(TATF) which aimed to finance technical assistance, training and feasibility studies over the 
initial 12-18 months. The TATF, which was part of the overall EAP, consisted of about 100 priority 
activities for the period 1993-6 and had an estimated aggregate cost of $75m.*'  ^ However, only a portion 
of these activities were financed by the TATF. Projects were chosen for TATF support only if they 
helped create a coherent framework of sectoral strategies and policies and institutional development 
witliin wliich other technical assistance activities, flinded directly by donors, could be anchored. Due to 
the mass of work and the imperative for implementation, it was deemed necessary to tap the existing 
donor system, i.e. UN agencies, NGOs and universities, to help carry out specific teclinical assistance
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projects under the umbrella of PECDAR, which prioritised projects and had overall responsibility for the 
EAP. Due to political and economic uncertainty and the limitation of resources, the technical assistance 
programme had to develop flexibly as a rolling plan, subject to review and adjustment to accommodate 
evolving priorities.*^ PECDAR issued a statement to the Palestinian people in response to local and 
foreign press reports regarding the size of financial assistance fi*om the World Bank and donor countries 
to the Palestinian economy because they felt these reports were causing confiision in regar d to the 
possibility of huge commitments to programmes and of amounts allocated. PECDAR released 
information on aU available projects, moneys pledged and actual amoimts allocated. For example, the 
PECDAR-World Bank supervised Emergency Rehabilitation Programme invested $128m in water, 
sewage, roads and education - 50% for Gaza, 50% for the West Bank. The PECDAR-donors 
administered Emergency Investment Programme invested $ 150m in infiastructuie and manpower 
sectors, 40% for Gaza, 60% for the West Bank. The PECDAR-World Bank administered Teclinical 
Assistance Trust Fund supported training sectors and implemented technical programmes - $3 5m was 
needed, but only $31.6m was committed. The World Bank was also responsible for managing the Johan 
Jurgen Holst Fund, used to support the PISGA's stait-up and recuirent costs. The Holst Fund, valued at 
$123m with $19m committed as of June 1994, supported the deficit assistance programme, which 
included supporting the establishment of the Palestinian police force, the rehabilitation of detainees, 
public works and unemployment.*^ As of November 1995, the Holst Fund had disbursed some $157ni 
to the PISGA, the largest contributors being the US, which had provided $40m and Kuwait with 
$21m.*’ The Holst Fund played a pivotal role in staving off PISGA administrative collapse, pai ticulai ly 
with regard to paying civil service salaries and administrative costs, which had forced the World Bank 
and Norway into fr equent emergency frmd-raising. The PISGA's draft budget for FYI996 projected 
recurrent expendituie at $629m (civil employees salaries-$250m, 27,000 police o£ficers-$147m), with 
revenues of $554m, leaving a FY1996 cuiTent expenditure shortfall of $75m, which would be made up 
by the Holst Fund. The budget also expected a capital expendituie of $273m, which was to be entirely 
financed by donor development assistance.**
The UN also played a significant role in providing assistance to the PISGA, channelling upwai'ds 
of $ 100m in funds committed in 1994, tlirough several UN agencies, such as the UNDP, UNRWA, 
UNICEF, WHO, UNESCO and others. The most important of the UN agencies was the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), wliich operated as a channel and implementing agency for a number 
of aid projects. However the UN agency with the most developed infrastructuie and operating history in 
the occupied territories, particularly in Gaza, was the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The 
International Monetary Fund monitored and fostered PISGA fiscal management and best practices. The 
United Nations Special Coordinator OfiSce (UNSCO) operated as the coordinator and facilitator for 
cooperation between the UN, PISGA, Israel and the donors. Norwegian academic Teije Rod Lai*sen, 
who was instrumental in setting up the Oslo process was appointed to head UNSCO by the Secretaiy- 
General in 1994.
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The Palestinian equivalent of the World Bank was the Palestinian Economic Council for 
Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR). PECDAR was created to be the central institution for 
managing the process of reconstruction and development in the occupied territories in the interim period. 
The recipients and managers of PISGA aid moneys via PECDAR, were the Ministry of Planning and 
International Cooperation, headed by Nabil Shaath, the Ministry of Finance, headed by Mohammed 
Zulidi al-Nashashibi, the Ministry of Economy, headed by Ahmed Qurai, fimctional ministries depending 
on the particular aid project, existing municipal government and the ofhce of the president. In October 
1995 the World Bank and the UN in conjunction with the PISGA, presented to the donor community at 
the CG meeting, a seven volume study entitled, 'Putting Peace to Work'. This study presented, a list of 
16 priority projects totalling $552m, development strategies and $450m in UN project proposals. The 
study was drawn from lessons learned from the EAP and incorporated the Palestinian Public Investment 
Programme (PPIP), a $1.3bn investment and development fr amework for Financial Yeai's 1995-98. The 
PPIP proposed a number of major projects, such as water-sewage and drainage, electricity-supply and 
distribution, roads upgrading, a coastal parkway for Gaza, a Gaza liarbom*, municipal infr astructure 
improvements, housing development, school improvements, health infrastiucture, cross border industrial 
estates, private sector regulation assistance, the establishment of a Palestinian Monetaiy Authority, trust 
funds for NGOs and for expatriate Palestinian experts as well as some unfunded projects from the 
EAP.*  ^ A special ministerial-level donors' conference was scheduled for December 1995, to generate 
support for the package of project initiatives and to endorse a revised TAP. However the conference 
had to be postponed due to ministerial obligations aiising fr om the Bosnian peace process.
International Aid and the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority
The PISGA and the international donor community viewed donor aid to the occupied territories 
as an integral element of the peace process. Some $2.5bn was pledged for F Y 1994-98 as the practical 
application of building and nurturing the Israeli-Palestinian peace tlu*ough an international aid effort. A 
persistent criticism of the donor programme was of the delays in receiving pledged moneys, which in 
turn resulted in the tardiness of the PISGA applying such moneys to projects. Throughout 1994, the 
PISGA complained that the international community was 'moving very, very slowly' and charged that the 
delays were a form of political pressui e. For example, dui'ing the fri st deployment of PISGA secui ity 
forces in May 1994, Nabil Shaath was obliged to arrange private financing to cover the costs.^^
The major criticism of the donor aid programme surrounded the issue of pledged moneys being 
actually disbursed. In 1994, $807m was pledged by donors with $773m committed to projects, but only 
$407m was actually disbursed, with much of it only received in the final quarter of the yeai*.^  ^ Aid 
money was slow to find its way to the PISGA for a number of reasons. This was not least caused by the 
caution and reluctance displayed by the donors themselves to become responsible for the day-to-day 
PISGA administrative costs or make-work programmes. Many donors believed that such a 
responsibility was the PISGA's, to be funded through taxation, and not thiough the donor assistance 
programme, which had altogether different priorities. Donors viewed the PISGA's daily running costs as 
a drain on finite donor resoui’ces, and at odds with the free market pliilosophy of the assistance
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programme. Although small amounts of aid did flow quickly tlirough discretionary embassy accounts, 
larger aid projects were subject to lengthy bureaucratic planning, proposal, assessment, and procurement 
procedures as well as evaluations in terms of donor priorities concerning the envir onment, gender, and 
private sector development. This inlierent disagreement about the envisioned future laid bare the 
process of delivering international assistance. The PISGA faced politico-economic realities which 
necessitated rapid delivery of assistance for short-term goals, both to strengthen its own position with 
the Palestinian population and to appear as a credible alternative to the Israeli military government. 
Unanticipated heightened Israeli secur ity measur es in response to bomb attacks resulted in long term 
closures of the occupied territories, Palestinians criticised Israeli security measures, political expediency 
and inappropriate Western aid, in the form of funding commitments for long term development 
programmes, as unsuitable responses to easing the reality of immediate Palestinian economic conditions.
There is no doubt that initial donor agency assumptions and considerations often underestimated 
political and economic difBculties. During 1994 strains appeared between Palestinian foreign ministry 
and international aid officials over the commitment to sustainable development. For example US State 
Department officials complained about the slow delivery of US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) progiammes. In response USAID officials complained they were being diverted from 
meaningful development by political pressure to donate to the Holst Fund, which they regarded as an 
inefficient development mechanism because it supported the unproductive, recurrent costs of PISGA 
administration. Palestinian foreign ministry officials saw receipt of moneys from the Holst Fund as a 
political imperative.^^ Further complications regai ning the delivery of international assistance included in 
almost aU cases, some form of domestic legislative restriction binding donors' freedom of action. For 
example, US legislation required State Department certification ofPLO compliance with the Oslo 
agreement, prohibited direct US assistance to the PISGA and mandated USAID support for the 
establishment of cross-border industrial paiks, despite a pre-existing legislative ban on USAID projects 
potentially competitive with US manufactmers. This ensured that the USAID budget was a 
congressional battleground for those critical of foreign aid and the peace process. Senator D'Amato and 
Representative Forbes introduced di aft legislation in June 1995 to place greater restrictions on aid to the 
Palestinians, and in autumn 1995, aid was hostage to unrelated issues ranging fr om abortion to State 
Department reorganisation. Japan was bound by domestic legislation that limited its assistance to 
international organisations and recognised states, thus excluding the PISGA. Despite the peace 
process's intention of providing for a preventive security regime, domestic legal restrictions prevented 
almost aft donors and most aid agencies fr om providing direct assistance to the Palestinian police.^^
As aid programmes expanded from c.$200m per annum to c.$800m p.a., between 1990 and 
1994, further problems arose fr om international agencies' institutional inability to cope with such rapidly 
expanding aid programmes and the reordering of economic and employment priorities. Early aid 
programmes were heavily dependent on small NGO projects and were rrot easily upgraded or rethought 
as new priorities and new projects were identified. Pre-Oslo US aid was mainly tiansmitted through 
Private Voluntaiy Organisations (PVOs) rather than administered by US institutions directly. Thus
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USAID had to rapidly expand its infrastructure in order to effect its mission, which also involved internal 
bureaucratic and political struggles over issues like staffing levels, location (East Jerusalem or Tel Aviv), 
and line authority. '^  ^ Political competition between the donors also caused problems. Factors such as 
individual national priorities, the maximisation of national visibility, commercial competition for long 
term benefit projects, procurement guidelines mandating supplier preferences, tied aid allocated in the 
form of loans, risk insurance, or export and investment guai'antees, conservative international bank 
standards and EU-USA geo-political competitiveness, aU tended to shape donor assistance tlirough 
1993-94. 1994 saw a significant discordance in PISGA/World Bank-EAP-identitified sectoral goals and 
the actual distribution of donor aid funds. The EU allocated half of its assistance through the EIB, and 
the EU presidency committed itself to accelerating the disbursement of EIB funds. The US allocated 
$125m to OPIC, although by December 1995 only one project, a Gaza concrete factory, had been 
financed which led to criticism of OPIC by State Department and USAID officials. The US Trade 
Development Agency supported 6 major feasibility and other studies and $70m was allocated through 
the IFC. By October 1995 only c.10% ($67m) of pledged loan and guarantee funding had been 
committed.^^ PISGA criticism of the international assistance programme was also influenced by its 
desire to divert criticism away from its own incompetence and press for fmlher disbuisements, as much 
of 1994's expeditious donor assistance had been rendered through the Holst Fund as the engineering 
aspects of investment and rehabilitation projects could only be altered so much.
By the end of 1994, the multilateral and bilateral assistance programmes had to be revised to take 
account of the serious economic situation in the occupied territories as a result of repeated Israeli 
closures and slow and badly targeted donor assistance. Bilateral donors adapted their efforts taking 
account of changing requirements, the nature of the donor and the restrictions on assistance. UN 
agencies were better used, particulaiJy UNRWA because of its well-developed organisation. Japanese 
assistance went tln ough UN agencies because of domestic restrictions on direct aid. Germany used 
commodity donations to support recurrent administrative costs. However, there were a number of 
problems with commodity donations. For example, the Palestinian police received large numbers of 
veliicles, but continued donor restrictions prevented handguns and riot-control equipment being 
obtained, thus the police had to resort to assault rifles for policing and crowd control. Donated 
communications equipment worked on incompatible frequencies not cleared for PISGA use. Police 
salaries were frmded tlirough UNRWA, wliile UNSCO helped coordinate teclinical assistance and 
equipment donations. The EU channelled much of its aid at the PISGA and Palestinian municipalities to 
support nascent Palestinian administration. In late 1994, USAID's programme was restructured because 
of State Department and White House pressure. Previous support for PVOs and long-term institution- 
building projects in health and housing were cut greatly. US support refocused on more rapid job- 
creation projects in municipal public works, micro-enterprises and a Gaza waste/storm water project. 
USAID assistance refocused on the most politically effective projects and project processes were 
speeded up.^ *’ The World Bank moved its decision-making authority to its resident representative, Odin 
Knudsen, to facilitate aid delivery, expedite response times, facilitate contacts with the PISGA, Israel,
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and local donor missions and play a more pro-active role in resolving disputes. The UN mandated 
UNSCO to provide UN coordination and 'good offices' diplomatic mediation.Recognising the political 
importance of focusing on employment creation and donor coordination, the AHCL set up a high-level, 
locally-based Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) to resolve inter-donor differences, endorsed a Local Aid 
Coordination Committee (LACC) expediting donor coordination on the ground in November 1994 and 
focused local LACC sectoral working groups on labour intensive projects.^* Despite the restmcturing 
of the international aid effort, iionically it was the Holst Fund that continued to deliver the most effective 
short term donor assistance, being mostly used to bolster and build up the public employment sector - 
the PISGA employed some 25,000 police and some 45,000 civil servants sustaining roughly 420,000 
Palestinians (average household=6).^^
4.4 Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (Early 
Empowerment)
It is imderstandable that two sides who have been locked in bitter conflict have to tread a long 
and tortuous route to acliieve, trust, understanding and agreement. Israel's cautious and liiglily legalistic 
approach to solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be balanced by the Palestinian's desire to speed 
the empowerment process along with scant regal'd for legal niceties in order to attend to immediate and 
pressing problems. However, what is clearly disturbing are the actions of the primary co-sponsor, the 
US, in attempting to determine the course of negotiations for the benefit of one of the protagonists, 
namely Israel. Then-US Ambassador to the UN Albright, wiote to all ambassadors to the UN that, 'the 
General Assembly's approach to Arab-Israeli issues' should
'accord with today's realities. The UN General Assembly should reinforce the peace process by 
promoting reconciliation, supporting agreements between the paities, and fostering economic 
development. Adopting a positive resolution welcoming progress in the peace process, as we did 
in 1993, will test the UN's new realistic approach. At the same time, contentious resolutions that 
accentuate political differences without promoting solutions should be consolidated (the various 
UNRWA resolutions), improved (the Golan resolution) or eliminated (the Israeli nuclear 
armament resolution and the self-determination resolution). We also believe that resolution 
language referring to 'final status' issues should be dropped, since these issues aie now under 
negotiation by the parties themselves. These include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty 
and the status of Jerusalem.
By underlining the primacy of the Israeli-Palestinian agreements as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict resolution, the US was in effect emphasising that these agreements constituted the main legal 
obligations between the two, at the expense of all others, particularly UN resolutions. Therefore the 
point that the legal structure being negotiated within the vaiious agreements wais most important was all 
the more resonant.
The 'Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank', signed on August 24 
1994, was the fourth principal Israeli-Palestinian agreement. It followed the May 4 1994 'Agreement on
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the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area', and was referred to as the 'early empowerment accord', defining the 
shape and powers of the spheres to be transferred 'from the Israeli military government and its Civil 
Administration in the West Bank', pending further agreements, namely; education and cultine, health, 
social wehai'e, tourism, direct taxation, and Value Added Tax on local production.*®  ^ Thus the military 
government and the Civil Administration continued to exercise power and responsibility in the West 
Bank apart from in those spheres transfeiTed under the new agreement. The Civil Administration in the 
Gaza Strip was dissolved by Military Proclamation No.4, entitled 'Proclamation Regai'ding the 
Implementation of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement', issued by Gaza's IDF Commander Mitan Vilnai after 
the Cairo Agreement's signing. A similarly numbered military proclamation was issued in the West Bank 
on May 13 1994, transferring to the PISGA powers and responsibilities regarding the Jericho Area, 
signed by 'the commander of the Israeli army in the area of Judea and Samai ia'. Clause 3 declared 'the 
ai'ea commander and the head of the Civil Administration have transferred to the Palestinian Authority 
the powers and responsibilities regarding the Jericho area held by them or by those who were authorised 
by them or appointed in their stead'. The authority to delegate powers was acquired by Proclamation 
No.2 (June 7 1967) and further by Military Order 130, the Interpretation Order. Militaiy Order 130 
Article 18 clai'ified that the IDF commander may delegate any of his powers to individuals or authorities 
who will exercise powers in his name. By Military Order 947 of November 8 1981 establishing the Civil 
Authority, the military commander's appointee exercised all powers and responsibilities in the West 
Bank. Clause 5 of Proclamation No.4 stated that 'the area commander, and all those appointed by him 
or acting on Ins behalf, shall continue to be in the Jericho area and shall enjoy all the powers and 
responsibilities, including legislative, executive and judicial powers, over Israelis and all matters 
regarding external security, and the security and public order of Israelis as well as any other powers and 
responsibilities specified in the Agreement. Clause 6 stated that 'all regulations and security legislation in 
the Jericho ai ea in force at the date of the agr eement shall remam in force as long as it has not been 
annulled or amended or suspended by virtue of the Agreement.'*®  ^ Indeed in the West Bank, the military 
government and civil administration's authority in all spheres not transferred was fully retained, and even 
in the spheres transferred. Article VI. 5. stated Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the continued 
authority of the nnlitaiy government and its Civil Administration to exercise then powers and 
responsibilities with regard to security and public order'. *®^ The scope of the spheres transferred was in 
the main, pre-existing 1967 laws, and post-1967 Israeli militaiy orders.
The importance of secuiity considerations greatly constrains independent Palestinian political 
development, particulaiiy the fi eedoms of assembly, association and Palestinian independent control 
within the spheres transferred. The August agreement obligated the PISGA to, 'prevent any activities 
with a military orientation witliin each of the Spheres and will do its utmost to maintain decorum and 
discipline and to avoid disruption', notify and coordinate with the Israelis 'regarding any planned public 
large-scale events and mass gatherings within the Spheres', inform the Civil Administration 'of biilhs or 
deaths', inform the Israel Police in the West Bank of'any person wounded by any kind of weapon or 
explosive who is treated or hospitalised' upon liis or her admission, and of'any death fr om unnatural
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causes', make 'available for transfer the corpse of any deceased from unnatural causes, for an autopsy in 
the Institute of Forensic Medicine, immediately upon request by the militaiy commander' with the 
PISGA having ensured that 'no prior autopsy of the corpse so transferred' would be conducted.*®'* The 
importance of security considerations was fuither underlined with the provisions that except as 
specifically provided in the agreement, 'all powers and responsibilities regarding law enforcement, 
including investigation, judicial proceedings and imprisonment,' would 'continue to be under the 
responsibility of the existing authorities in the West Bank', and also that the 'transfer of powers and 
responsibilities to the' PISGA would 'not affect the authority of Israel and of the Israeli militaiy 
government in the West Bank to exercise its powers and responsibilities in criminal matters'.*®^
With regard to powers to legislate under the August 1995 agreement, the PISGA 'may 
promulgate secondary legislation regarding the powers and responsibilities transferred to it.' All 
legislation enacted by the PISGA has then to be submitted to Israel, wliich has then 30 days to register 
opposition. In the event of opposition, the PISGA may 'submit a new draft or request a review by the 
Legislation Subcommittee established under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement' If the Legislation 
Subcommittee is unable to reach a decision vdthin 30 days, then the PISGA is entitled to refer the matter 
to the Joint Liaison Committee, for consideration and deliberation witliin 30 days.*®® These stages 
amounted to an effective Israeli veto over all PISGA legislation in the spheres transferred imder the 
August agreement.
Under the terms of the August agreement, Israel was exempted fi'om 'all related rights, liabilities 
and obligations aiising with regai'd to acts or omissions' committed prior to the transfer. 'Israel and the 
Civil Adrninistration' would 'cease to bear any financial responsibility regarding such acts or omissions 
and the Palestinian Authority will bear all financial responsibility for its own functioning' Furthermore, 
any 'financial claim made in this regard against Israel or the Civil Administration will be referred' to the 
PISGA. In the event that 'an award is made against Israel or the Civil Administration by any couit or 
tribunal in respect of such a claim' the PISGA 'shall, once the award has been paid by Israel, reimburse 
Israel the full amount of the awaid.' In addition, 'Israel shall provide the' PISGA 'with the information it 
has regarding pending and anticipated claims brought before any court or tribunal against Israel or the 
Civil Administration', and 'Israel may, pui suant to agreement witliin' the Legal Subcommittee of the Joint 
Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee 'request an Israeli couit or tribunal to dismiss a 
claim brought before it and, with regard to a pending claim, dismiss the claim and transfer the 
proceedings to a local court or tribunal.'*®^  Whilst denying responsibility for claims against Israel, 
however the opposite is not the case, it must be assumed that these provisions cover not only claims 
made in Israel but also awards made through Israeli courts. It must be remembered that under the 
various agreements the PISGA has no jurisdiction regarding, among others, Israelis, the military 
administration aiea, settlements, Jerusalem and expropriated lands. This rather makes a nonsense of 
claims made against Israelis, and the Israeli militaiy occupation.*®* Tliis all seemed to amount to Israel 
denying any responsibility for actions committed by it on the Palestinian population dui*mg the years of
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military occupation, and through this agreement made the Palestinians themselves, embodied in the 
PISGA, liable for those actions.
The principle of empowering the Palestinian population in either the tenitories transferred or 
spheres transferred, to determine the budget for the transferred spheres was not part of the August 
agreement. This amounted to taxation without representation. Schedule 1 outlined a six-month budget 
for the spheres, but as to expenditure beyond this period, Article XE.8. stated that the PISGA sould 
'assume full responsibility for any additional expendituies beyond the agieed budget' as well as for 'any 
shortfall in tax collection' that was 'not covered by the donor countries.' Tliis in effect consigned the 
PISGA to fiscal insecurity whilst Israel retained effective power over budgetary requirements for the 
entire West Bank - Israel as the occupying power is responsible for aU aspects of the Palestinian 
population's welfare under international law. Israel was required under Aiticle XI. 1. to provide the 
PISGA with full information concerning the budget of each sphere yet Israel maintained a position of 
providing limited access to public information from the beginning of negotiations. The Palestinians 
continually requested foil access to information concerning the budgets of the Civil Administration of the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip, wliich the Israelis refused to provide, insisting on releasing only that 
information which pertains specifically to the spheres to be transferred.*®  ^The PISGA may assume the 
'powers and responsibilities of the Civil Administration in the sphere of direct taxation regarding income 
accrued or derived in the West Bank', and the PISGA 'will levy and collect income tax on Palestinians in 
respect of income accrued or derived in the West Bank outside the settlements and the militaiy 
locations', however, powers and 'responsibilities regarding property tax will continue to be exercised by 
the Civil Administration', the 'Civil Administration will levy and collect income tax on Israelis in respect 
of income accrued or derived in the West Bank', until the 'Interim Agreement enters into force, Israel 
will transfer to the Palestinian Authority a sum equal to 75% of the income taxes collected by Israel from 
Palestinians employed in the settlements and military locations and in Israel', aU '[wjithout derogating 
from the principle of territoriality in taxation, i.e., the right of each tax administration to levy the income 
tax on income generated by economic activity in its area'.**® The strength of any direct taxation powers 
transferred were in the powers of enforcement. Accordingly, the PISGA had no power, 'in relation to 
criminal offences', were not to 'be authorised to take any enforcement measuies against Israelis' and were 
not to 'have the power to exercise enforcement measures affecting, directly or indirectly, the military 
government or its Civil Administration.' The two sides were still to agree upon the 'mode and procedures 
regarding enforcement measures that requfre the cooperation of the military government and its Civil 
Administration, with a view to assisting the Palestinian Authority in carrying out its enforcement 
measures' The mode and procedures were subject to considerations of security and public order, and the 
use of force required for the exercise of tax enforcement measures was to be effected only by the Israeli 
authorities.*** Wliilst the PISGA was entitled to 'establish a tax couil in the West Bank for the puipose 
of hearing appeals with regard to assessments and bookkeeping', the details of tliis tax court had to be 
agreed by the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee, and until such was 
established, appeals would 'continue to be heai d by the local coui ts', wliich of course had only limited
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jurisdiction. Article X refers to the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination and Cooperation Committee 
established in accordance with the Caii o Agreement which was to 'deal with all issues of mutual concern' 
regarding this agreement.**  ^ This may be interpreted as amoimting to an Israeli veto.
Any imbalance in the eai'ly empowerment agreement, came more as a result from the Madrid 
framework/Oslo frame of reference than from complete Palestinian negotiating incompetence. Both 
sides view the final status outcome in opposite terms, as autonomy versus sovereignty. Thus the path to 
achieve final status is fr aught not just over means but also over ends and means. So many anomalies 
exist witliin the eaiJy empowerment agreement that one can be forgiven for tliinking that empowerment 
does not mean empowering. When Israeli security considerations subordinate all the transferred 
competencies without exception, the letter of the agi eements becomes more important than the spirit, in 
fact the importance stressed by Israeli security considerations gives the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities a hollow ring. As an example of PISGA authority. Annex I of the eaily empowerment 
agreement deals with the transfer of Education and Culture. On September 10, 1995 in Hebron, Jewish 
settlers forced their way into the grounds of Kortoba Elementaiy girls school, to remove and burn 
Palestinian flags, legally flown since September 13th 1993, and in the ensuing fr acas they beat the 
headmistress and five little gfrls, aged between 6-10. The five little girls needed hospitalisation and when 
the IDF allowed two ambulances through their roadblock to them, the settlers tried to steal the 
ambulances' keys and applauded as the five girls were carried unconscious from the school. Although 
these attacks occurred one block from an IDF checkpoint, the soldiers did viitually nothing.**  ^ Under 
the eai'ly empowerment agreement, PISGA restraint of violent settlers is forbidden. In another example, 
the 350 Gazan students at Bir Zeit University (tvvinned with Glasgow University) effectively require four 
permits to study, a magnetic ID card to leave the Gaza Strip, a 1-2 day permit to cross to the West 
Bank, a 3-month West Bank residency permit and a month renewal permit for the 4-month academic 
term. Additional stress comes fr om potential revocation of any of the permits, ai bitrary confiscation of 
permits by soldiers at checkpoints and blanket cancellations of existing permits after security incidents or 
administrative problems, leaving students vulnerable to arrest.**'* The question then springs to mind, if 
the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinians is in order to 'move decisively on the path 
of dialogue, understanding and cooperation' to offer 'help in making Gaza prosper and Jericho 
blossom'**®, 'to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in affinity, as 
human beings, as free men'**®, to stop the heart of the cancer that afflicts both communities, namely the 
military occupation, then by enshrining the military occupation within the structur e of the Israeli- 
Palestinian agreements, sur ely this serves to continue the very crux of the conflict between the Israelis 
and Palestinians, namely occupation versus sovereignty? Article XIII.4. and 5. of the August agreement, 
stated that the 'two Parties view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit' and that 
the 'Gaza Strip and the Jericho Ar ea shall continue to be an integral par t of the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. The status of the West Bank shall not be changed for the period of tliis Agreement.'* *^ Tliis is a 
reiteration of Article IV of the DoP and Article XXIII. 6. of the Cairo Agreement. This is not the case in 
practice.
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The status of the West Bank is effectively changed, or in a sense consolidated, if not challenged, 
by the various agreements. Not only is there territorial separation between Gaza and the West Bank, but 
there is territorial separ ation between the Jericho Area and the West Bank. IDF General Zohar', head of 
the Civil Administration stated that '[w]e are transferring the control of issues but not of territory'.***
The transfer of powers and responsibilities in the five spheres does not mean that the scope of the 
PISGA's authority is universal. It is worth noting that Gaza and Jericho do not have the same laws, 
thereby complicating the consolidation and monitoring of the legal structur e witliin the PISGA's 
authority. There is not even a basic imderstanding about where and when laws apply. There are some 
British Mandate laws that apply in both areas, Jordanian laws in the West Bank, Egyptian laws in the 
Gaza Strip, Israeli military orders in both, Israeli domestic laws for East Jerusalem, and even a criminal 
code brought by the PLO fi'om Lebanon. With no elected Council, there was no clear* delineation of 
authority and responsibility.**  ^ Not only did separate entities exist but also separate legal structures 
existed, and within the separate legal structures, separate categories existed. The separate entities were, 
Gaza, Jericho and the West Bank. The separate legal structures were, Israeli, Jordanian, British, 
Egyptian and PISGA. The separate categories were, settlements, militar y administration area, Jerusalem 
and Israelis.*^ ® The danger for the Palestinians witliin this set up was that as separation continued, the 
longer de facto control was ceded to the Israelis for land for settlements, military installations, etc., the 
more difficult it would be in the future to wrest authority for large tracts of West Bank land fr om the 
Israelis. Inevitably the conclusion may be drawn that the PISGA in effect conceded that to manage 
some territor*y immediately was better than none at all, and the price to be paid was that the West Bank, 
as it was occupied in 1967 would not be transferred to PISGA control entirely in that form. After all the 
West Bank in its 1967 form was merely an arbitrary delineation due to war*, demarcation and 
negotiation.
4.5 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip signed on 
September* 28th 1995, also known colloquially as Oslo II, details the mechanisms and limitations of the 
extension of Palestinian self-rule beyond the Gaza Strip and Jericho areas alr eady dealt with under* the 
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (the Cairo Agreement) of May 4th 1994. The main text 
of the Interim Agreement is twenty-nine pages long and is accompanied by seven annexes with 
appendices and nine detailed maps, totalling over 300 pages. The Interim Agreement is also 
accompanied by an exchange of letters. The Interim Agreement deals with, redeployment and secur ity 
arrangements, elections, civil affairs, legal matters, economic relations, Israeli-Palestmian cooperation 
programmes and the release of Palestinian prisoners and detainees.*^* The agreement aimed to establish 
a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority for* a transitional period not to exceed five years fi*om 
May 4 1994, the date of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The agreement was intended to settle all the 
issues of the interim period, none being deferred to the agenda of the permanent status negotiations.
The Interim Agreement was the final agreement of the empowerment stage of the conflict management
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phase aimed at reducing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the point where the conflict resolution phase 
can be prepared for, negotiated and implemented.
The most striking aspects of this agreement ai e, that it effectively marks the beginning of the end 
of Israel's martial occupation of parts of the West Bank, and that it amounts to a paitial rejection of the 
Greater Israel policy of past governments, whether in religious or strategic-military terms within the 
framework of military occupation and/or annexation. The Interim Agreement states that the 'two sides 
view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will 
be preserved during the interim period.' Tliis point is further emphasised as the 'two sides agree that 
West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be 
completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council.'*^  ^ However, the main 
feature of the agreement is the provision for the division of the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, 
into 3 zones or areas, each with a different delineation of Israeli and Palestinian responsibility.
Area A comprises roughly 1% of the West Bank and consists of the seven major Palestinian 
cities; Jenin, Qalqilyeh, Tulkarm, Nablus, Ramallah, Bethlehem and H e b r o n . I n  Hebron, a 3.5 sq.-km. 
area inhabited by 400 settlers and 20,000 Palestinians, the transfer of authority was to be phased over six 
months from the signing of the Interim Agreement, however, one area would not be redeployed from 
remaining under Israeli control. Hebron was divided into Areas H-1 and H-2. Article VII.2.a., b. and d. 
stated that the Palestinian Police would 'assume responsibilities m Area H-1 similar to those m other 
cities in the West Bank', that aU civil powers and responsibilities would 'be transferred to the Council in 
the City of Hebron as in other cities in the West Bank' and that the Palestinian Police would be able to 
'operate freely in Area H-T.*^ '* However, Israel would 'continue to cariy the responsibility for overall 
security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding thefr internal security and public order' so that in 'the 
area of the city of Hebron from which Israeli military forces will not redeploy', that is Aiea H-2, Israel 
would 'retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order.'*^ ® In security terms, 
upon completion of Israeli military redeployment, the Palestinian Council would assume the powers and 
responsibilities for internal security and public order.
Aiea B comprises all other main Palestinian population centres, except some reftigee camps and 
totals roughly 27% of the West Bank.*^  ^ The Palestinian Council would assume responsibility during the 
first phase of redeployment for, land 'in populated areas (Aieas A and B), including government land and 
Al-Waqf land' and all 'civil powers and responsibilities, including planning and zoning, in Areas A and 
B'.*^ * What this means in secuiity terms, is that according to Article XIII.2.a. there would 'be a complete 
redeployment of Israeli military areas from Area B,' and that in Area B the Palestinian Police would 
'assume the responsibility for public order for Palestinians' and would 'be deployed in order to 
accommodate the Palestinian needs and requirements.' However, whilst the Palestinian Council would 
'assume responsibility for public order for Palestinians,' Israeli concerns were protected by the caveat 
that, 'Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and 
confronting the tlireat of terrorism.
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Area C comprises 72% of the West Bank and includes all Israeli settlements, military bases, and 
state land. Area C refers to the transfer of'civil powers and responsibilities not relating to territory.'*®® 
'Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility to the Palestinian 
Police in Areas B and C will be cairied out in thiee phases' witliin an eighteen month period after the 
inauguration of the Palestinian Coimcil, 'except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of 
Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.'*®*
Negotiations on the permanent status were to start no later than May 4th 1996, leading to the 
implementation of UN resolutions 242 and 338*®^ , and would deal with the remaining issues, Jerusalem, 
refiigees, settlements, secuiity arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation vrith other neighbours 
and other issues of common interest.*®® The main objective of the Interim Agreement was to set down 
future Israeli-Palestinian relations prior to final status talks by broadening Palestinian self-government in 
the West Bank by means of an elected self-governing authority, the Palestinian Council, which was 
intended, for the Palestinians to conduct their own internal affairs, to reduce points of Israeli-Palestinian 
friction, to usher in a new era based on cooperation, co-existence and common interest and to protect 
Israel's vital interests, paiticularly its' security concerns both external and personal. All prior Israeli- 
Palestinian agreements ai e superseded by the provisions of the Interim Agreement. The Interim 
Agreement contains five chapters, dealing with, the Council, redeployment and security arrangements, 
legal affairs, cooperation and miscellaneous provisions.
The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of the Executive Authority, to be established following 
elections (diiectly and simultaneously elected to the 82-member Council, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years from May 4th 1994)*®'*, will assume powers and responsibilities in various spheres, 
such as; executive, legislative and judicial*®®; security(Article XIII. 1, however, Aiticle XIII.2.a. states 
that 'Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of protecting Israelis and 
confronting the tlueat of terrorism.' )*®®; and civil affafrs (agricultme; aichaeology; assessments; banking 
and monetary issues; civil administration employees; commerce and industry; comptrol; direct taxation; 
education and cultuie; electricity; employment; environmental protection; fisheries, forests; gas, fuel and 
petroleum; government and absentee land and immovables; health; indirect taxation; insurance; interior 
affairs; laboui*; land registration; legal administration; local government; nature reserves; parks; planning 
and zoning; population registry and documentation; postal services; public works and housing; quarries 
and mines; religious sites; social welfare; statistics; surveying; telecommunications; tourism; 
transportation; treasury; and water and sewage),*®^
Under the terms of transfer of authority, the new Coimcil would assume specified powers and 
responsibilities, and aU rights, liabilities and obligations from the military government and its civil 
administration, apart from those powers and responsibilities not transferred. Article XVII. 1. states that 
whilst in 'accordance with the DoP, the jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip 
territory as a single territorial unit, except for: a. issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status 
negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refrigees, borders, foreign 
relations and Israelis; and b. powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.' Furthermore,
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2.a. states that 'territorial and functional jurisdiction of the Council will apply to all persons, except for 
Israelis' and that 4.a. and b. states that 'Israel, tlirough its military government, has the authority over 
areas that ai e not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Council, powers and responsibilities not 
transferred to the Council and Israelis, b. To this end, the Israeli military government shall retain the 
necessary legislative, judicial and executive powers and responsibilities'.*®* With the establishment of the 
new Council the civil adrninistration was to be dissolved in the West Bank and the military government 
withdrawn, however the militaiy government would still exercise powers and responsibilities not 
transferred to the Council according to Article I.l. and 1.5.*®^  The Palestinian Council and the Ra'ees of 
the Executive Authority of the Council constitute the Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, 
elected by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem (Aiticle VI of Annex II for Election 
Arrangements Concerning Jerusalem)*'*® and the Gaza Strip (Article III.l. ).*'** The council will possess 
both legislative and executive power, in accordance with Aiticle VII and IX of the DoP and shall caiiy 
out and be responsible for aU the legislative and executive powers and responsibilities transferred to it 
under the interim agreement. Legislation 'shall mean any primary and secondary legislation, including 
basic laws, laws, regulations and other legislative acts.'*'*^
The Council was to be a diiectly elected body, and Article II Elections, and Annex II Protocol 
Concerning Elections of the Interim Agreement, addressed the modalities of the electoral process. 
Elections to the Council were to be general, personal and by district, with a separate but simultaneous 
election for Ra'ees of the Executive Authority. All the stages of the election process were monitored by 
international observers, and at the request of the parties, the EU agreed to coordinate the electoral 
observation delegation, comprising representatives from: the EU, UN, USA, Russia, Canada, Egypt, 
Japan, Jordan, Norway, South Africa, Non-Aligned Nations, OAU and ICO.*'*®
Regarding security and redeployment, the IDF was to redeploy in the West Bank according to 
the timetable as set out in Chapter 2-Redeployment and Secuiity Ai rangements, Aiiicles X-XVI of the 
Interim Agreement and in Annex I-Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements. In 
addition to the redeployments envisaged prior to the elections for the Council, the Interim Agreement 
provides for a number of further redeployments to take place at six-monthly intervals following the 
inauguration of the Council. In the course of these redeployments, the Council would assume additional 
territorial jurisdiction so that by the completion of the redeployment phase, the Council will enjoy 
territorial juiisdiction over all West Bank territory, except for the areas where jurisdiction is to be 
determined by the final status negotiations, i.e. Jerusalem, settlements and müitaiy locations according to 
Annex I, Article 1.9.*'*'* Aiticle II of Annex I, on 'Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and 
Violence', outlines Palestinian security obligations, and is a powerful indicator of Israeli security 
thinking, i.e.: the 'Palestinian Police is the only Palestinian security authority'; the 'Palestinian Police will 
act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror', and the 'Palestinian Police will anest 
and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence and terror'. Both sides 
agreed to carry out the following security fimctions, to 'actively prevent incitement to violence, including 
violence against the other side or persons under the authority of the other side' to 'apprehend, investigate
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and prosecute perpetrators and all other persons directly or indirectly involved in acts of terrorism, 
violence and incitement' and to 'prevent and deal with any attempt to cause harm to infrastructure 
serving the other side'.*'*®
In order to develop a renewed programme of development assistance to the occupied territories, 
following from the signing of the Interim Agreement, representatives of Israel, the World Bank, the 
PISGA, 10 international organisations and 29 donor nations met inPaiis between 18-19/10/95.*'*®
Similar meetings: on October 1st 1993 had followed the signing of the DoP, at which donor nations 
pledged some $2.1 bn over five yeai'S in financial support and assistance of Palestinian self-government. 
Delegates from 43 countries met imder US and Russian auspices to coordinate economic support for the 
DoP, pledging $2.1bn. The Conference brought together overlapping bodies and agencies: the 
Multilateral Steering Group; the gavel holders of the Multilateral Working Groups (EU, Japan, Canada, 
US), G-7 countries; Norway; major donor nations; Israel; Arab representatives including the GCC; the 
World Bank; and the UN. The Palestinians sought: to organise mechanisms to promote economic 
development and make effective use of external assistance; and to cooperate with the Israelis in fostering 
economic development. The paiticipants agreed to support the critical first phase: announcing pledges 
totalling $600m for the first year; Slbn for the first two years; formal indications of planned support of 
$5bn for the five year interim period; future additional pledges were expected. The State Department 
expected $2.4bn of five year external assistance would be met. The donor community agreed to support: 
urgent relief efforts; short term needs including rehabilitation of existing infi astructui e; the establisliment 
of an appropriate PISGA legal fr amework to enable a smooth implementation of external assistance 
(UNRWA, non-governmental organisations, EU, other bilateral donors are active in these areas); efforts 
to be directed at building the capacity of the PISGA to organise and manage political, economic and 
social affairs; priority to be given to the development of effective revenue sharing and revenue collection 
arrangements; initiation of an extensive programme of technical assistance to build institutions and to 
train personnel (World Bank to establish and manage a Technical Assistance Trust Fund ($31.6m 
pledged) to finance teclinical assistance, training and feasibility studies over the coming 12-18 months- 
UN agencies including UNDP and other multilateral and bilateral programmes and agencies will provide 
technical and financial assistance to support institution-building); promotion of longer term goals, public 
and private investment to lay foundation of sustainable growth of PISGA areas (donors wiU carry out 
their assistance projects within the framework of a five year programme of public investment in physical 
and social infrastructui e and productive capacity-World Bank to take a leading role in mobilising 
programmes and supporting public development); the encouragement of trade and private investment 
through export financing programmes and investment incentives; the need to develop the PISGA areas in 
regional terms, to identify regional infrastructure projects that could facilitate economic integiation of 
the PISGA aieas and its neighboui's; emphasise fr-eer regional trade .*'*^
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4.6 The Final Stages of the Interim Phase-Protocol Concerning The Redeployment in
Hebron
Although the Interim Agreement of September 28 1995 set out the aiTangements to apply in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip tlii'oughout the transitional period, pending implementation of permanent 
status arrangements, the issue of Hebron's status remained unresolved until January 15 1997. This was 
despite liaving reached prior agreement for a redeployment of Israeli militaiy forces in the city and a 
transfer of civil powers and responsibilities in the city to the Palestinian Council witliin the terms of the 
'Guidelines for Hebron', done as Ai ticle VII of Annexe I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and 
Security Arrangements of the Interim Agreement. The Interim Agreement, through Article VII 
deliniated two aieas in Hebron, H-1 and H-2. In H-1, according to Article VII.2. the Palestinian police 
would operate freely and would assume responsibilities similai* to those in other cities in the West Bank, 
and where all civil powers and responsibilities would be transferred to the Council. H-2, according to 
Article VII.4. was the area of the city of Hebron from which Israeli military forces would not be 
redeploying and where Israel would retain all powers and responsibilities for internal security and public 
order. However in H-2 all civil powers and responsibilities would be transferred to the Palestinians 
except for those relating to Israelis and theii* property wliich would continue to be exercised by the 
Israeli Military Government. Furthermore, Article VIL3. clearly states that, 'According to the DoP,
Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for overall secuiity of Israelis for the purpose of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order', meaning that the interpretation may be diawn that 
Israel retains both powers and responsibilities for not only Israelis physical and geograpliic security 
within the areas accorded as under Israeli territorial jurisdiction, but also that through this, Israel retains 
the power to maintain secuiity and public order which may be interpreted to mean that Israel may 
forestall attacks or react to attacks by any and all necessary means, including reentering areas previously 
redeployed from.*'** It is witliin this context that the point must be reemphasised that Israeli military 
forces are being pledged to conduct a redeployment, not a withdrawal. Furthermore, this redeployment
tis being carried out under the terms of the interim phase, which may or may not be renegotiated in the ]
final status discussions, as nothing in the Interim Agreement 'shall prejudice or preempt the outcome of |
the negotiations on the permanent status to be conducted pursuant to the DoP. Neither Party shall be |
deemed, by virtue of having entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing |
rights, claims or positions.'*'*^
According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, although Article VII sets out that the Palestinians were 
to assume municipal and civilian responsibilities tlnoughout the entiie city, the original composition of 
the Article was formulated in such a 'general manner' as to necessitate a clear 'need for frirther 
amplification before any actual redeployment could take place'. Postponement and delay was effected 
not only by the wave of suicide bombings but also by the 'egregious violation of the DoP and the Interim 
Agreement by elements of the Palestinian police who opened fii'e, without provocation, on IDF and 
Border Police units as well as Israeli civilians' following the September 24th tunnel incident. Thus, while 
the Interim Agreement recognised the presence of Israeli residents in Hebron and stated that Hebron
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would not become a divided city, it did not specifically outline the modalities for safeguarding these 
Israelis' secmity,*®® However, tins reasoning must be seen in the context of Israeli domestic political 
considerations, not only with reference to the suicide bombings of spring 1996 and the responses by 
former PM Peres in light of the upcoming Israeli general election, but also since the election of 
Netanyahu as PM bringing with it a concomitant realignment of Israel's national priorities. The new 
government's priorities put Israel at odds with the stated intentions and commitments of the previously 
concluded Israeli-Palestinian agreements. For example, the new government's stated its' desiie to 
oppose a Palestinian state, ensui e the existence, secuiity and development of Jewish settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and to maintain Jerusalem's status as the eternal and undivided capital of Israel.*®* 
Therefore Hebron, for the new government, signified an existential cause célèbre. Hebron represented, 
whether or not the new government would not only agree to abide by existing, internationally approved 
agreements, but also whether it would be seen to be endorsing the land-for-peace principle it had vilified 
in opposition.
Dui'ing the election campaign and during the interregnum, Likud's Netanyaliu outlined the 
policies and ideology which would form the basis of liis negotiating stance. Netanyahu promising that 
Zionism, as 'the liberation movement of the Jewish people, and its fulfilment' would be 'at the top of the 
list of priorities of the Government of Israel'. Thus immigration would be increased and settlements 
'strengthened', whilst Israel would 'enable the Palestinians to manage their lives fireely, within the 
framework of self-government'. However, 'foreign affaii s, defence, and matters which requiie 
coordination', would 'remain the responsibility of the State of Israel', and to tliis end Likud opposed 'the 
establishment of an independent Palestinian state'. There would 'be no infi ingement of Israel's use of the 
'vital water resources in Judea and Samaria' and a united and undivided Jerusalem would remain as the 
capital of Israel. The Jordan River would constitute Israel's 'eastern' and 'permanent border' between 
Israel and Jordan, allowing Jordan to 'become a partner in the final arrangement between Israel and 
Palestinians', and the policy of ensuring for seven million Israelis within the decade would be 'a national 
undertaking'.*®  ^ With Netanyahu's 'victory' address on June 2nd, the June 16th publication of the new 
government's policy guidelines, and the new PM's inauguial address on June 18th, Netanyaliu delivered a 
comprehensive outline of liis vision of peace with the Palestinians. He stated that his new government 
would 'act on the premise that the right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel is eternal and 
indisputable, that the State of Israel is the State of the Jewish people', and 'whose main goal is the 
ingathering and integration of the Jewish people'. The government would act to 'thwart any attempt to 
undermine the unity of Jerusalem', would prevent 'any action which is counter to Israel's exclusive 
sovereignty' and would reinforce the status of Jerusalem 'as the eternal capital of the Jewish people', 'one 
city, whole and undivided' to 'remain forever under Israel's sovereignty'. The government would 
'propose to the Palestinians an arrangement' whereby they would 'be able to conduct theii* lives freely 
witliin the framework of self-government' while simultaneously opposing not only 'the establisliment of a 
Palestinian state or any foreign sovereignty west of the Jordan River' but also 'the right of return of Arab 
populations to any part of the Land of Israel west of the Jordan River'. The government would 'insist on
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ensuring the existence and security of Jewish settlements and their affinity with' Israel, would continue to 
'bear full responsibility for the Jewish settlements and their residents' and would exercise its right to use 
the IDF and security forces to act against the thieat of terrorism everywhere',*®® Netanyahu forther 
believed that Israel had fulfilled its land-for-peace requirements and obligations by returning the Siuai to 
Egypt in 1979. Netanyahu felt that Palestinian autonomy should relate to, and incorporate, most of the 
Palestinian population, and that wliile the PISGA should have control over devolved aspects of national 
life, it should not presume or assume sovereignty. Netanyahu's vision also included the belief that 
closures should be lifted only when Israel's secuiity was guaranteed, that the self-rule aiea should not be 
physically separated fi'om Israel, that peace with Israel's Arab neighbours by the year 2000 was unlikely 
and that agreement on Jerusalem was impossible.*®'* Netanyahu reacted to harsh Arab criticism of liis 
post-election statements, saying he was 'neither impressed nor bothered'. His attitude to conducting 
continuing negotiations with Ai’afat and the Palestinians was summed up by his desiie that he would only 
meet Arafat 'when I decide it is vital'.*®®
In keeping with Likud's policy of demonising the PLO as terrorists, Netanyaliu made no 
reference to Arafat or the PLO/PISGA in his victory speech of June 2nd, referring only to 'the 
Palestinians'.*®® While Likud's Roni Milo and Faisal Husseini held a get-acquainted meeting on June 
11th, prior to the resumption of Israeli-PISGA security contacts on July 26th*®^ , Netanyahu officially 
authorised adviser Dore Gold to initiate contact with the PISGA to confirm Netanyahu's interest in 
continuing negotiations, and to meet Arafat in Gaza on June 27tli.*®* However in response to 
Netanyahu's indifference to a meeting, Ai’afat refixsed to meet Gold on July 16th, having Abbas meet liini 
instead.*®^  FM Levy met Arafat on July 23rd at Erez, however on August 12th Arafat refiised to meet 
Defence Minister Mordechai until Netanyahu agreed to meet with him.*®® Regarding the continuity of 
Israel-PISGA relations, Israel announced on August 5th the setting up of negotiating teams for the 
expected talks on outstanding issues, due to resume in several weeks. With the Higher Joint 
Israeli-Palestinian Civilian Committee resuming meeting in Jerusalem on August 13th, Israel and the 
PISGA agreed the next day to reactivate all joint liaison committees which follow up implementation of 
the peace accords. Tliis was except for the Palestinian-Israeli Steering and Monitoring Committee, the 
highest oversight body, which was delayed due to complaints by FM Levy and DM Mordechai over the 
use of unofficial advisers and channels by Netanyahu to conduct negotiations with the PISGA. These 
inter-cabinet power-struggles led Levy to boycott a cabinet meeting on August 9th and to issue a threat 
to resign unless he received greater control over the negotiations with the PISGA.*®* However, 
Netanyahu appointed his personal attorney Yitzhak Molho as special envoy to Arafat in charge of 
ongoing contacts with the PISGA and despatched him to meet Arafat in Ramallah on August 29th with 
the remit of holding daily contacts with PISGA officials. Molho travelled to Gaza at least twice a week, 
but was external to the official Israeli negotiating team.*®^
With Netanyahu's election, instances of settlement expansion and settler provocation in the 
occupied territories increased dramatically. In Hebron settlers occupied Palestinian-owned properties on 
May 30th and on June 5th.*®® Near Nablus, settlers illegally confiscated land for the Karyut settlement
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on July 19th.*®'* Settlement expansion plans were submitted, for 50,000 houses in East Jerusalem on 
June 5th, for 4-5 United Kibbutz movement presettlements on July 17th, for 2,000 housing units and
3.000 hotel units between Ma'ale Adumim and Pisgat Ze'ev doubling Ma'ale Adumim's population to
40.000 on July 18th, and for 200 units in Sliilo on August 4th.*®® The new government, meanwMe, 
approved and began a number of building projects. For example, on June 10th construction began on 
the expansion of Rachel's Tomb near Betlilehem, at Hazayit Hill near Efrat, and on July 16th 6,000 units 
were planned for imminent construction on Har Homa. Plans for infrastructuial highways and bridges to 
tighten Israeli links to the occupied territories were announced by Infiastructuie Minister Sharon on July 
29th, and in the first official move to expand settlements, approval for 298 mobile homes in Jewish 
settlements for public and educational use was given on August 12th. On August 15th the IDF 
presented a review for 300 miles of roads in the West Bank to link settlements with Palestinian lands 
being confiscated to complete the project.*®® Palestinian homes were bulldozed to make way for bypass 
roads, near Hebron on August 6th and in Jerusalem and Ramallah on August 12th.*®^  Evidence that the 
new government was taking a more pro-settler line was provided by the unanimous cabinet decision 
giving approved for the amendment of legislation to facilitate settlement expansion by the lifting of 
building restrictions on August 2nd,*®* and by allowing the police to escort hundreds of Temple Mount 
Faithful to pray in the al-Aqsa Mosque courtyard on July 25th. *®^ On August 12th, Netanyahu said he 
did not believe the Interim Agreement proliibited Jews fi’om building settlements on occupied land, and 
Interior Minister Suissa announced that $5m would be reallocated fiom local government to settlements 
to help settlers pay expenses resulting fiom the agreement.*^®
With Netanyahu meeting IDF and Defence Ministry officials to discuss the issues of Hebron and 
security on June 21st, DM Mordechai was tasked with designing an alternative plan to the existing one. 
He presented an initial plan on August 15th, which, reclassified the Jewish sections of Hebron as Ar ea B, 
expanded Jewish settlements in the city by increasing IDF observer points and troops, limited the number 
PISGA security forces and their patrol ranges, created a security corridor linking Hebron and Kiiyat 
Arba, provided the IDF with the right to hot pursuit and slowed the redeployment timetable.*^*
However, the new administration did not discuss tlris new plan with the PISGA, as the PISGA 
denounced any changes to previous agreement as unacceptable and contrary to the peace process. The 
IDF recommended firlfilling the original commitments on June 24th, and indeed both the IDF and Shin 
Bet recommended that Mordechai go firrther on July 2nd, arguing that he pursue a political settlement 
because although the closure measur es were a good short term measure, they would ultimately create 
serious long term security problems if continued indefinitely.*^^
According to Article V.3.b.(8) further redeployments from Area C, and the transfer of internal 
security responsibility to the Palestinian police in Areas B and C, would commence six months from the 
inauguration of the PISGA Council, i.e. September 7th. However no progress was reached either in 
successfully concluding the next stages of redeployment, or in negotiating agreement for firrther 
redeployment.*^® This was particularly true of the redeployment concerning Hebron, which according to 
Article VII. l.b., was supposed to be completed by the end of March 1996.*^ '* Israel and the PISGA
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formally asked Norway on August 11th to renew the mandate of the Temporary International Presence 
in the City of Hebron (TIPH) for another month, having already renegotiated the TIPH on May 9th 
which superseded the guidelines for Hebron outlined in Ar ticle VII of the Interim Agreement. There 
were only 32 TIPH observers in Hebron by August and the foil complement of observers from other 
countries were not due to take up their posts until further IDF redeployment.*^®
The policy of closure of the occupied territories, initiated in late February, was repeatedly 
tightened and eased depending on cir cumstance thr oughout the summer months. The IDF cited 
warnings of hundreds of hiuninent attacks which convinced them to cancel any measures aimed at easing 
the imposed closure, and in the first breach of the Interim Agreement's security agreements, the IDF 
entered Dura village near’ Hebron on May 18th, in Area B under PISGA control, ordering PISGA police 
to remain at their’ bases, and ar rested nine Palestinians, including two relatives of Preventive Secur ity 
Forces (PSF) head Colonel Jibril Rajub.*^ ® The IDF also increased patrols in Hebron and randomly 
searched Palestinians. On June 3rd the IDF detained several PISGA policemen and searched their 
vehicles which resulted in a clash between troops and Palestinian residents.*^  ^ The IDF ignored PISGA 
Council members' VIP status on June 12th when they blocked twenty-two Gazan members from entering 
the West Bank to attend their weekly session in Nablus unless they agreed to be searched. When the 
PISGA threatened to cancel the session in protest, the IDF relented letting the Gazans through the next 
day. When the Civil Affairs Committee met on June 14th to discuss the incident, Israel demanded that 
council members submit to security checks. Peres defused the situation by returning VIP status to 
Sufyan Abu Zayida, Abd al-Rahman Hamad, and Intisar’ al-Wazfr, senior PISGA officials, and on June 
16, Peres granted sixty council members second-class VIP status permitting them to undergo 'less 
stringent' security checks.*^*
The DoP and subsequent agreements were intended to pur sue an Israeli-Palestinian relationship 
which transcended and reordered their’ past hostile interaction. The past policies of collective 
punishment, used aggressively by Israeli security forces during, most recently, the intifada were 
supposed to lead to cooperation and coordination. The corrosive and coercive effect of policies of, 
closur es, curfews, restrictions of a broad and general natur e preventing daily activity and individual acts 
of aggression and humiliation, only served to alienate Palestinians, imbumg them with a sense of rage 
and hatred for the Israelis. The peace process was meant to reorganise past policies and refocus on 
cooperative relationships. However, practical reality on the ground during the years following the DoP's 
signing showed little change. Closur es, curfews, house demolitions, economic sanctions, administrative 
detentions, expulsions and mass arrests continued. Plus ça Change?
Although neither the 1907 Hague Regulations nor the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, the 
main instruments of international law pertaining to the conduct of occupying powers, specifically 
mentions instruments of collective punishment such as cur fews, house demolitions, economic sanctions, 
administrative detentions, expulsions and mass arrests, there are clear provisions for what is and is not 
permitted. The general criterion is that the occupying power has both the right to ensure the security of 
its own forces and the obligation to respect the interests of the occupied civilian population. These two
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considerations must be balanced, 'and not determined by one to the exclusion of the other, lest they lose 
their validity under international law.'*’  ^ Whilst permitting secur ity operations to apprehend those 
suspected of armed resistance, any actions which are aimed at punishing or deterring an uncooperative 
civilian population, either to deter fiitme acts of resistance or as an instrument of retribution is 
specifically and explicitly prohibited. Article 50 of the Hague Regulations states that 'No general 
penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of 
individuals for which they cannot be regar ded as jointly and severally responsible' Article 33 of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention states 'Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of 
terrorism are prohibited. Pillage is prohibited. Reprisals against protected persons and their property are 
prohibited.' Articles 55-57, and 59-63 cover the mandatory provision of basic necessities to the general 
population, for example, occupying powers should ensiu'e the normal supply and distribution of 
foodstuffs, medical supplies etc.**® In an official commentary to the Convention, Jean Pictet stated that 
'It must be emphasised that imder no circumstances may the occupation authorities invoke reasons of 
security to justify the general suspension of all humanitarian activities m an occupied territory.'*** The 
IDF can declare a certain area a 'closed military zone according to Regulation 125 of the Emergency 
(Defence) Regulations of 1945, and Section 90 of the Order Concerning Defence Regulations (Judea 
and Samaria) (No. 378), 1970.**^  Therefore any such impositions of collective punishments, despite the 
rationale of security as a mitigating factor, become less acceptable the longer their intensity and duration 
hamper and limit the functioning of public life. Whilst cui fews and closures are used around the world 
as exceptional and temporaiy measui es, the continued use of collective punishments tln oughout the 
Israeli occupation since 1967 shows no sign of let up, or even of success. The continued opposition to 
Israeli occupation has persisted in spite of such, and as a result of them, rather than opposition having 
been extinguishing as intended by the Israelis.
An interesting featme of the imposition of collective action against the Palestinian population, 
particularly that part of it living under PISGA control, was the difference between the reality of everyday 
life and the relationsliip that was inferred by the vaiious agieements concluded since the DoP. While the 
secui ity provisions were designed to ensure the safety of Israelis, the Palestinians were expected to 
assume greater autonomy and control over then lives and territory. For example, Ai ticle VIII of the 
DoP on 'Public Order and Security' stated that, 'In order to guarantee public order and internal security 
for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, 
while Israel will continue to cariy the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the 
responsibility for overall secuiity of Israelis for the purpose of safeguai'ding their internal security and 
public order.'**® The Interim Agreement reiterated and developed this article. Article XII, provided for 
the 'Arrangements for Security and Public Order', Article XIII, provided for 'Security', Annex I, provided 
for the 'Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements' (particularly Article I, the 
'Redeployment of Israeli Military Forces and Transfer of Responsibilities' and Aiticle II, the 'Security 
Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence'). These items provided for the PISGA to assume 
the powers and responsibilities for 'public order and internal secur ity', that upon the inaugui ation of the
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PISGA Council, 'the unity and integrity of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip' 
would 'be maintained and respected', that all 'Palestinian people residing in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip' would 'be accountable to the Palestinian Council only' and that any 'secuiity measures which 
become effective commensurate with the redeployment of the Israeli militaiy forces' would 'not 
undermine' nor would 'they prejudice' the 'moral and physical dignity of the Palestinian people in the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip.'**'* Therefore, what seems to have been agreed was that the Palestinians 
would wage security actions against those inside the aieas under its juiisdiction whilst the Israelis would 
ensure the safety of then own citizens and the settlements in the occupied territories. Specifically overt 
acts to guarantee such security by effectively sealing and confining the Palestinians into separate ghettos 
does not seem to have been addressed by the Oslo accords.
Despite best intenstions, secuiity related actions by the IDF and the PSF continued to cause 
disruption and affected the chances of an agreement on Hebron being reached. On August 1st whüe the 
Israeli border police arrested the Hebron police chief, thousands of Palestinians protesting in Nablus the 
death in PISGA custody of Mahmud Jumayil prompted the IDF to declare Nablus a closed military 
zone.**® Since redeploying fi’om Area A, the IDF by declaring a closed military zone teclinicaUy put 
these areas off limits to Israelis, but in practice the measui e resulted in the effective sealing off of the 
designated area, closing it to everyone. The IDF frequently declared closed military zones citing security 
purposes, mostly in response to attacks on Israelis. The IDF declared closed military zones in, Nablus 
May 15-16, 26-31, and August 1st**®, Ramallah May 16th and July 20th** ,^ Janin May 26-31***, Jericho 
July 26-27** ,^ Qalqilya July 24th*^°, and Betlilehem August lOth.*^ * Curfews were imposed on,
Biddiyya June 16-July Ist*^ ,^ Hebron July lOth*^ ®, Nablus 19th*^ '* and Sammu' mid-June-July 5th. Israel 
blocked entry of $3.5m worth of mutton to the PISGA on June 28th, the 10,500 sheep had been 
slaughtered dui’ing the Hajj and donated by Saudi Aiabia to help feed Palestinians under closuie, but the 
meat rotted at the crossing point while awaiting IDF 'security checks' and was destroyed on August 
14th.*^ ® The IDF also closed two West Bank mosques after discovering 'inflammatory leaflets' on their 
premises and raided al-lbrahimi Cultui al Centre in Hebron on July 1st, confiscating computers, disks, 
and papers and detained the centre's director, Hijazi al-Shuyukhi, for questioning regar ding the 
distribution of pro-Fatali 'Strike Forces of the Popular Committees for Palestinian National Solidarity' 
leaflets calling for the renewal of the intifada.*^ ® In mitigation and in understanding of the Israeli actions, 
it must be remembered that a heightened state of insecurity caused by rutliless terrorism within Israel's 
Green Line existed during the summer of 1996. Insecurity was allied with the emotional escalation of 
political life stimulated and created by the fight for power and the right to determine policy witliin the 
near fiitui e through the medium of the general election. Israeli sensitivities to Palestinian suffering were 
therefore otherwise muted or indifferent. However, one must measure at what cost to the peace process 
and future negotiations these actions were undertaken, in that the measui es of collective punishment may 
have only exacerbated an already difficult situation, furthering resentment and fostermg discord between 
the extremists in both communities.
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Initial pessimism that the change of government would impede the peace process seemed borne 
out by the perception that the negotiations had entered a period of stalemate, with no breakthrough on 
substantive issues being made and little or no progress being reported. In order to resume negotiations, 
Netanyahu suggested on August 14th that UN special coordinator Teije Lai’sen initiate secret talks the 
following day. These talks, between Israel, represented by Dore Gold, and the PISGA, represented by 
Mahmud Abbas, aimed at identifying points of disagreement between the two. Lai’sen briefed US special 
envoy Dennis Ross and President Mubarak's adviser Osama al-Baz on their progress.’^ *’ After foui' days 
of talks, the PISGA and Israel agreed on September 3rd to a vaguely worded statement signed by 
Larsen, which laid out a framework for continuing negotiations and defining several matters as 
exceptional to be discussed by the Palestinian-Israeli Steering and Monitormg Committee (PISMC), i.e. 
Hebron, fixrther redeployment, Rafali airport, prisoners, safe passage and economic issues.*®* PISGA 
Local Government Minister Saeb Erekat and IDF Lt. Gen. Dan Shomi’on were appointed on August 
19th to head the committee. However, it was only on September 9th that the first PISMC meeting was 
held since the May 29th Israeli elections.*®® At the first Arafat-Netanyahu summit at Erez on September 
4th, Netanyahu announced his willingness to negotiate a final peace agreement, improve Palestinian 
economic conditions and allow 50,000 Palestinians Israeli work permits.^ ®® However, despite these 
positive sentiments, on September 24th Netanyahu personally ordered the completion of the excavation 
of a controversial 500-yai’d archaeological tunnel spanning the HaKotel and abutting the Temple Moixnt, 
to provide access for Israelis to the HaKotel alongside the al-Aqsa compound. Begun in 1984, the tunnel 
was intended to reinforce the Israeli claim that sole sovereignty over Jerusalem rested with Israel. This 
act provoked a furious response from Palestinians, who clashed with Israeli security forces m and around 
the Temple Mount. In response to the Israeli action, Palestinian leaders called for strikes and 
demonstrations, with Ai'afat caUing the tunnel incident a crime against both Jerusalem's religious status 
quo and the Oslo accords.^ ®*
With the PISGA calling for a general strike on September 25th, the issue provoked the most 
violent Israeli-Palestinian clashes since the height of the intifada and especially since the peace process 
began, with the IDF, PISGA security forces and citizens exchanging rubber bullets, stun grenades, rocks, 
bottles and live ammunition. The IDF and the PSF engaged in a ferocious firefight in Ramallali, with 
fixrther clashes in Bethlehem and Jerusalem. With Ramallah declared a closed military zone, the rest of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were sealed off by the IDF.^ ®^  However with the continuing 
bloodshed, many worried that not only Israel-PISGA relations were spiralling out of control, but that as 
the violence spread so too did the fear that a wider Middle East conflagration may erupt as a result of 
the insensitive, arrogant and ill-conceived txxnnel decision. As clashes spread throughout the West Bank 
and Gaza on September 26th, so too did the death toll. Heavy fighting was reported at Erez, Rafali, and 
Joseph's Tomb in Nablus, with attacks on Jewish settlements in Gaza forcing the brief evacuation of 
Netzarhn. With Netanyahu on a European tour and FM Levy in the US, actmg PM Mo she Katzav and 
DM Mordechai reacted to the crisis by declaring a state of emergency, and by sending Merkava tanks to 
take up positions on Aiea A borders, and ordering Cobra helicopters north along the Jerusalem road to
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Ramallah. The helicopters were reported as having fired on civilians.^ ®® The death toll rose to 55 by 
September 26th (44 Palestinians/11 Israelis), with many hundieds wounded. Violent confr ontations 
brought the tlneat of a renewed intifada ever closer. Ma'aiiv commentators felt that 'It was not the 
tunnel-opening alone that led to the outbreak of rioting in the territories, but the accumulation of 
fr’ustration from what appeared on the surface to be a complete deadlock in the peace process.' One 
solution suggested to break the impasse, apart from closing the tunnel, which would repair the serious 
damage done, was by negotiating 'a quick agreement on redeployment in Hebron and rapid removal of 
Israeli forces from the city, as initial proof that the peace process exists.'^ ®'* Cutting short liis European 
tour, Netanyahu returned to a growing political storm, as the senior members of Shin Bet held an 
emergency meeting, reportedly fririons with Netanyahu, critical of his decision-making performance and 
for ignoring their warnings and recommendations against the tunnel opening, and then doing so without 
theii" coordination. IDF Cliief of Staff Shahak and DM Mordechai were also reportedly not informed in 
advance of the opening. Clear divisions of opinion over the issue existed within the inner cabinet, 
exposing the potential for discord even there, as Agriculture Minister Eitan called for tanks to be moved 
into Area A, and Tourism Minister (and Deputy PM) Katzav called for an immediate halt to Israel- 
PISGA negotiations. However DM Mordechai offered the notion of a compromise over the tunnel.^ ®® 
Meanwhile Egypt, Israel, the PISGA and the US officials met to discuss the possibilities for a 
Netanyahu-Arafat summit. Arafat responded to the suggestion by intimating his acceptance would be 
conditional on Netanyahu making a contrite gesture such as closing the tunnel. Netanyahu refrised saying 
that to do so would imply that Palestinian protests could be seen to gain benefits.^ ®®
On September 27th Netanyahu deployed some 6,000 police throughout Israel and some 4,000 in 
East Jerusalem, however this did not hinder the continuation of the violence. While Israeli Arabs 
observed a general strike, PISGA police cordoned off Balata, Erez, Janin, and Ramallali to prevent 
further clashes, and although the offending tunnel was closed for the beginning of Succoth, more fierce 
clashes erupted throughout the occupied territories particularly in Rafah and Tulkarm where IDF 
helicopters fired on the crowds. None were so dramatic as the rioting wliich caused more deaths in the 
Old City as Palestinians and Israeli forces clashed within the Al-Aqsa compound.^®’ With the death toll 
rising to 67 (53 Palestinians/14 Israelis) Netanyahu accused Ai'afat of deliberately and cynically using the 
incident to inflame passions and blamed him as the sole instigator of the violence, refusing the 
assessment of senior Israeli security cliief s that the clashes were as a result of Palestinian frustration at 
the lack of progress in the peace process.^®* Judging by the reaction of interested parties, even including 
Israel's fr iends, few agreed with Netanyahu's assessment of the situation. The Washington Post 
commented 'No one even slightly familiar with the immense volatility of the Jerusalem issue could have 
imagined that Israel would on its own make a significant change on the groimd, on the edge of a site 
sacred to Muslims as well as Jews, without triggering an emaged Palestinian response.'^ ®® Igor Mann,
La Stampa's respected Middle East commentator wrote that Netanyahu has conducted an insensitive, 
irresponsible policy. He promised the Israeli people 'peace and security' and this is the result.^ *®
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Intense diplomatie efforts from many sides aimed at both defusing the situation and persuading 
Netanyahu and Arafat to meet to negotiate a way tlu'ough the crisis. While Russian and Middle Eastern 
pronouncements mainly accused Netanyahu of stalling the peace process, and even though Western 
politicians and media blamed Netanyahu for provoking a new intifada, Western diplomatic efforts aimed 
at mediating a conciliatory Arafat-Netanyahu meeting. However Netanyahu told US special envoy 
Dennis Ross that any concessions that he would be seen to make would merely encourage the 
Palestinians to commit further violence, causing his government to faU because of defections from 
hardline members opposed to accommodation. The United Nations met in a special session to discuss 
the crisis, with the Security Council beginning a debate on a possible resolution critical of Israel's 
actions, despite US and Israeli protests. Whilst heads of EU member states. President Cliirac,
Chancellor Kohl and PM Major all sent messages appealing for calm, the US engaged in a blitz of 
telephone diplomacy to Jerusalem, Amman, Gaza, and Cafro aimed at rescuing the peace process.^** 
Although scattered clashes occur on September 28th, no deaths nor injuries were reported, as the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution regaining the tunnel incident and the recent violence. Though not 
specifically mentioning the tunnel, the resolution called for the 'reversal of all acts which have resulted in 
the aggravation of the situation.A lthough the resolution passed 14-0, with 1 last minute abstention 
(USA), Israel reopened the tunnel on September 29th, banned Palestinians from travelling between West 
Bank villages, towns and cities and warned that the IDF would reenter population centres in Area A to 
disarm the PSF if they filed on IDF forces. Tanks remained on the Aiea A borders while more IDF 
checkpoints were set up along West Bank roads. As the death toll rose to 70, Ai'afat and Netanyahu 
agreed to a summit meeting in Wasliington DC called by President Clinton to discuss the recent violence 
and the future of the peace process.^*® The summit meeting called by Clinton could be interpreted in a 
number of ways. As a sincere move to resuscitate a dying peace process which had been of special 
interest to the US since 1991. As a cynical attempt to sidestep the condemnation of the UN and to 
sideline both the UN and the EU from becoming more involved in the diplomatic efforts of the peace 
process To be seen to be acting in a statesmanlike fashion five weeks from the US presidential election, 
and/or to navigate a path of least resistance for Israel.
In Washington DC on October 1st, the US held sepaiate meetings with PISGA, Israeli and 
Jordanian delegations, which produced a brief joint meeting and then a three hour private Netanyahu- 
Arafat meeting. As EU foreign ministers announced in Luxembourg their strongest condemnation of 
Israel since 1980 and the death toll rose to 75, Israel refused to set a fiim date, both for closing the 
tunnel and for a withdrawal and redeployment from Hebron.^*'* Although Ai'afat and Netanyaliu failed to 
resolve their acute differences, both agreed the next day to hold nonstop intensive talks until a new 
understanding on Hebron redeployment was reached, starting on October 6th. Meanwhile in 
anticipation of possible failure in Washington, the IDF positioned troops, heavy weapons, tanks, 
helicopters, and sniper squads on the Aiea A border zones. In Jerusalem, 50,000 Israelis marched in 
support of Netanyahu.^*®
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Prior to the round of intensive PISMC talks, Israel’s ministerial forum on Hebron security 
resumed discussions on August 18th, with some members favouring adherence to the Interim Agreement 
in its entirety and others calling for a civilian partition of the city in addition to the security par tition 
outlined in the agreement. Inhastructuie Minister Sharon presented a Hebron redeployment plan on 
September 4th. The plan called for, an expansion of the area to be transferred to PISGA authority which 
decreased the number of Palestinians left under Israeli control from 17,000 to 3,000, the linking of the 
Jewish enclave to the Tomb of the Patriar chs and Khyat Ar ba, the erection of a wall between the Jewish 
and Arab sections and the allowance of the PISGA to increase its police presence in Hebron witliin 6 
months if security was maintained.^ A month later DM Mordechai presented Arafat with another new 
Hebron redeployment plan which requested that the Interim Agreement provisions regarding Hebron be 
reopened. Arafat refused, but agreed to turn the matter over to the PISMC. Netanyaliu stated on 
October 4th that if the PISGA accepted these new secur ity demands, Israel would be more inclined to 
make concessions elsewhere m the West Bank, but the PISGA refused because it considered such 
demands an unacceptable precedent, instead insisting that Israel implement the existing Hebron 
agreements signed by the previous government.^*’
After the Washington summit, the PISMC opened the new round of talks at Erez on October 
6th, attended by Secretary Christopher and special envoy Ross. Israel again insisted that the Hebron 
agreement be renegotiated and demanded more stringent security measures. These included, total 
security control over both Palestinian (HI) and Jewish (H2) areas, new 900-foot-wide IDF-only buffer 
zones in what is now Area B, IDF control of the hills suiTOunding the Jewish areas, a ban on Palestinian 
transportation within 1-2 km of Jewish areas and increased restrictions on the PISGA pohce, such as 
limited areas of operation and the carrying of sidearms rather than rifles. Ten days later, Israel added to 
its demand for a redefinition of the HI and H2 zones, demanding Israeli control of city zoning and 
planning, wliich could be used to expand settlements in and aiound Hebron.’** The US attempted to 
mediate a compromise course, hoping to convince both sides to achieve progress by making adjustments 
to the existing accord, rather than attempting to renegotiate a new agreement, however the main sticking 
points in the talks remained, hot pursuit, a PISGA demand to reopen al-Shuhada Street to Palestinian 
traffic, movement of joint patrols and the type of aims to be carried by the PISGA police.’*^ Talks were 
divided into three simultaneous subcommittees, regarding, Hebron, secmity (including Rafah airport and 
closure), and economics.” * Although according to the Interim Agreement, a fiirther Israeli troop rede­
ployment from Area C and the transfer of internal security to the PISGA police in Ar eas B and C was 
scheduled to begin on September 7th 1996, no meetings had been held to identify wliich ar eas would be 
affected. However, on October 7th, Netanyaliu suggested to the Knesset that once the Hebron issue 
was resolved, Israel and the PISGA could move directly to final status talks, skipping clauses of the Oslo 
accords that had not been implemented, including furlher redeployment. The PISGA denounced the 
suggestion.
Security issues continued to impede conciliation. Following from the September 24-28 clashes, 
the IDF issued on September 30th new open-fire orders for the West Bank and Gaza, allowing soldiers
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to use concentrated fire with any type of weapon toward any Palestinian—armed or not—who 
approached within 900 feet. On October 7th the PISGA and Israel decided to set up a hot line between 
their field commanders to quickly solve conflicts between security forces, and Netanyahu demanded that 
Arafat punish any policeman who shot at IDF troops during clashes. Ar'afat issued the next day a 
'permanent order' to the PISGA police not to fire at the IDF.” * Despite such cooperation, Israel's High 
Court ruled on November 14th that Shin Bet could use physical force while questioning Palestinians 
suspected of having knowledge of planned anti-Israeli attacks.” ’
Daily PISMC meetings continued until October 10th, without progress, when at that meeting, 
Israel and the PISGA decided to move talks to Taba and Eilat, away from the media. Between October 
10-14, continuous 'preparatory talks' took place, with orre official security meeting held on October 
13th.’”  Resuming in Eilat, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, on October 15th, PISMC sessions and private 
high-level meetings took place, involving combinations of Netanyahu, David Levy, Dan Shomi on, Dore 
Gold, Yitzhak Molho, Arafat, Abbas, Saeb Erekat, PISGA Information Minister Yasir 'Abd Rabbu,
Terje Larsen, Denrris Ross, and US ambassador Martin Indyk. Dialogue between Netanyahu and Arafat 
was indirect and mediated by US special envoy Ross.” '* The sides continued to meet on an almost daily 
basis, with Israel and the PISGA claiming, counter claiming, and denying that agreement was near. Both 
sides accused the other of reopening discussions on aspects that had been agreed. For example, on 
October 18 th at Taba, the Israelis aimounced that progress had been made on the issues of hot pursuit 
and buffer zone issues between Areas A and B iti Hebron. The next day the PISGA claimed that Israel 
had backed down. On October 21st the PISGA team walked out of the talks on Hebron security 
arrangements, but Dennis Ross persuaded the sides to resume, saying a few hours later that the talks 
were 'in the midst of the most promising discussions to date’.” ^
On October 23rd, the PISMC issued a formal joint paper, compiling a list of 15 points of 
contention wliich had not been able to be resolved during the previous tln ee weeks of negotiations, 
including hot pursuit, the opening of al-Shuhada Street, the type of weapons PISGA police would be 
authorised to cany, and the movement of joint patrols.”  ^Though the subcommittees continued to meet 
for several more days, substantive negotiations continued behind the scenes between Arafat and 
Netanyahu via Ross shuttling between Gaza and Jerusalem. At the October 25th PISMC session, Ai'afat 
demanded that Netanyahu include a written commitment to fiirther redeployment and open Rafah airport 
as part of a revised Hebron deal.’”  The same day the Israelis released a list of 10 of the 'most egregious 
PLO violations of the Oslo accords', wliich covered such issues as, failure to change the PLO Covenant, 
incitement to violence against Israel, opening fir e on Israelis, failure to confiscate illegal arms and disarm 
and disband militias, failure to extradite suspected terrorists to Israel, opening PISGA offices in 
Jerusalem, recruiting terrorists to serve in the PISGA police, exceeding the limit on the number of 
PISGA police, abuse of human rights and the rule of law and conduct of foreign relations.” * At Ross's 
request, IDF Cliief of Staff Shaliak joined the security talks to upgrade the level of talks and to include 
an Israeli negotiator respected by the PISGA. However on November 1st, Israel removed its chief
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Hebron negotiator for civilian af&irs, Maj. Gen. Oren Shahor, for 'improper conduct' in meeting 
privately with PISGA leaders and passing information to the Labour Party during visits with Peres.
Talks reached an acrimonious impasse on October 28th due to the reopening of issues previously 
thought finalised, despite an agreement on the issue of hot pui suit, prompting Ross to return to 
Washington to consult Secretary Christopher.”  ^ To break the stalemate, the US submitted on 
November 5th a document proposing solutions to the remaining security-related disagreements on the 
Hebron arrangement. The PISGA responded by sending a formal letter to Israel, with copies to the EU, 
the US, Russia, and Ar ab states, accusing Israel of deliberately delaying the resumption of 
committee-level negotiations.” * Despite this international activity, meaningful negotiations obviously 
took a less central importance as the US election took place on November 5th, bringing with it Secretary 
Christopher's resignation two days later.
On November 12th, Israel and the PISGA agreed to raise the level of the Hebron talks in a bid to 
complete negotiations, with Shahak and Abbas chosen to lead discussions. They held their first meeting 
the same night at US Ambassador Indyk's liome.’ ’^ The next day, Netanyaliu cancelled a visit to the US 
to personally take charge of the Hebron negotiations. He agreed initially to an oral assui ance, then 
subsequently acceded to the PISGA demand that Israel include a written pledge to honoui* all its 
agreements with the PISGA. This written pledge would be attached to any subsequent Hebron 
agreement as long as the PISGA upheld all of its commitments.’”
Despite the impasse in negotiations, consti uction of Hebron's joint District Coordination Office 
began on November 4th. IDF officials said that military preparations for redeployment were viitually 
complete on November 13th. Additional Israeli police officers were drafted in to deal with any settler 
resistance, new bunkers were placed at strategic jimctions around the Jewish enclave in the centre of the 
city and the remaining three IDF posts were vacated on November 16th. Although Israel placed Hebron 
settlement leader and Kach member Noam Federman in administrative detention for two months on 
November 10th, as part of a plan to round up 20-30 militant settlers before redeployment to reduce the 
chance of violence during the transfer of powers, a number of worrying events provided evidence that 
internal divisions existed within senior Israeli echelons regar ding both government policy and its 
personalities. For example, on November 3rd Infrastructure Minister Sharon unveiled Iris plan to build 2 
new settlements in the West Bank that would double the number of existing Jewish settlers,” '* and on 
November 16th Shin Bet announced that it had earlier ordered troops to appear without weapons when 
Netanyahu visited an army base because of rising distrust of the PM among top army commanders, upset 
at being left out of crucial security decisions,’^^
Israeli-PISGA negotiations on Hebron resumed in Jericho on November 17th, although Dore 
Gold, Mahmoud Abbas, and Yasir Abed Rabbu, had met the previous day to discuss a memorandum of 
understanding or pledges concerning aspects of the Interim Agreement that had not been implemented 
that PM Netanyahu considered extending to Ar'afat as par t of a Hebron deal.’^^  However, it appeared 
that the new govermnent was also repositioning itself for domestic purposes, as former PM Peres, Arafat 
and the Labour Party were forced to deny rumours on November 18th, that Peres had advised Ai'afat
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that it would be to his advantage to hold up the signing of a Hebron protocol. Peres blamed Netanyahu 
and liis office for promoting the story” ’, and on November 20th Israel released a 14-page report alleging 
major violations of the Oslo accords by the PISGA, accusing PISGA leaders of deliberately stirring up 
the riots that followed the tumiel opening.’ *^ On November 21st, Israel and the PISGA held an 
expanded round of talks on Hebron in Jerusalem, in which the two sides discussed the possibility of 
another Netanyahu-Arafat summit, but the parties formd themselves in a dispute over the Rafah airport 
project, namely that Israel demanded that the PISGA demolish the already completed airport terminal 
building and buüd it elsewhere.’^^  Following the weekly PISGA, EA and PLO Executive Committee 
meetings on November 22nd, Palestinian leaders advocated 'popular confrontation' with Israeli 
bulldozers every time they appeared on Palestinian land, urged Palestinians to reclaim confiscated land in 
the West Bank and Gaza and vowed political and financial support for such Palestinian resistance in the 
face of the growing political storm over the perceived and revealed Israeli government policy of 
expanding Israeli settlements. Arafat sent Netanyahu a letter on November 25th urging him to halt 
Israeli settlement expansion, however, Netanyahu responded stating that he would be pressing ahead 
with settlement plans.’'*** Although Hebron talks resumed the next day, the PISGA announced that it 
would boycott all multilateral talks except those on refugees, in protest at Israel's alleged lack of 
progress in the bilateral negotiations and its refusal to implement existing agreements.’'**
In what amounted to a dismissal of the new government's insistence that any Hebron agreement 
must include their security demands of'hot pursuit', Israeli jur ists confirmed on November 27th that the 
existing Oslo accords provided Israel with overriding powers and responsibihties for security in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip. This ruling thus permitted and justified any Israeli hot pursuit rights and also 
guaranteed that Israel had the authority under the agreements to reenter any PISGA area previously 
redeployed from. Therefore Israel agreed to drop its demand for written guar antees fiom the PISGA for 
Israeli hot pursuit rights in Hebron, a controversial issue which had long held up progress in the Hebron 
negotiations.’'*’
Shadowing the Hebron talks was mounting international pressure on Israel over the settlements 
issue. Former close military partner South Africa, called on Israel to withdraw from Hebron, to show 
that it intended to comply with the existing agreements and to refiain fr om provocative actions such as 
the tunnel incident.’'*’ The EU-Arab Parliamentary Dialogue held an executive meeting on November 
29th in advance of its first full session in 8 years, on November 30-December 1st. The 14 executive 
delegates agreed to lobby for the postponement of the ratification of the Euro-Mediterranean agreement 
between Europe and Israel in order to send a signal to Israel that they were unliappy with its current 
peace policies, and at the full session in Amman, representatives from 33 nations issued a declaration 
urging Israel to fulfil its commitments to the Oslo accords.’'*'* Wliile settlers, Palestinians and the IDF 
clashed in Hebron, the Arab League held an emergency session on Israeli settlement activity in Cairo on 
December 1st. The Ar ab League warned Israel that expanding settlements would endanger 
peacemaking, however, despite stating that existing settlements should be dismantled, the Arab League 
stopped short of Syria's demand that Arab states should suspend relations with Israel.’'*^ While 54
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member-states attended the convening of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe on 
December 2nd in Lisbon, Netanyahu not only met US Vice-President Gore and President Cliirac, but he 
reiterated Ms intention that Israel would expand settlement construction in the West Bank. In Damascus 
Iranian FM Ali Akbax* Velayati arrived to discuss bilateral relations, and discussed with FM al-Shara 
measures to be adopted in case of an Israeli attack on Syria, causing Israel to express concern over the 
visit.”  ^ The fallout from the stalled peace process initiated IDF deputy cMef of staff Matan Vilnai to 
state on December 26th that the 'working estimate for 1997 is that we can find ouiselves in a military 
confrontation with Syria' with the probability of war no longer low.” ’
Netanyahu announced on December 4th, that the PISGA and Israeli negotiating teams had 
exhausted their work, and that he and Arafat should hold a bilateral summit meeting to conclude the 
details of the outstanding Hebron negotiations. Arafat responded Ms willingness to conclude the terms 
of an Israeli redeployment from Hebron. In the spirit of cooperation, Israel and the PISGA agreed to set 
up a 'hot line' to improve communications between the Internal Security Mimstry and the PSF in case of 
emergencies,’'** and PISGA negotiators announced on December 6th Arafat and Netanyahu's willingness 
that a 3-way summit between Egypt, Israel and the PISGA may meet to discuss a deal on Hebron, 
though no date was set.’'*^ Despite these improvements, they remained cosmetic, for the next day the 
PISGA demanded of Israel the provision of, dates for further redeployment in the West Bank, the 
release of prisoners along with a concluded Hebron protocol, the opening of al-Shuhada Street and the 
central market m Hebron. The PISGA also demanded Israel eliminate the term 'hot puisuit' fiom any 
Hebron deal and allow PISGA police m Hebron Joint Patrols to carry the same weapons as the IDF.’ *^* 
The negotiations remained hostage to the settlement issue and the men of violence. On 
December 11th as DM Mordechai briefed Jordaman Information Mimster Marwan Mu'asher in Tel Aviv 
on negotiations with the PISGA, receiving in return a warning that Israeli expansion of settlements 
would raise fears of a military conflict, 2 settlers were killed m a PFLP drive-by shooting near Ramallah. 
Although the murders were claimed as a response to Israel's plans to build 132 houses in East Jerusalem 
and were condemned by the PISGA, the PISGA believed that such murders would only serve as a 
pretext for the Israelis to fiu'ther delay negotiations.” * In response to the murders, EU special envoy 
Miguel Angel Moratinos met with FM Levy the next day and agreed to set up a 'red phone' between 
Moratinos, Israel and Arab leaders to discuss misunderstandings in emergencies. While the Arab League 
issued a statement strongly condemning Israel's settlement activities, PM Netanyaliu vowed at the 
funeral for the two settlers to 'deepen' Jewish settlements on the West Bank, wliilst in Kiryat Gat an 
Israeli settler allegedly shot and killed a Gazan worker to avenge the 2 settlers.” ’ On December 13 th 
the Israeli cabinet reinstated large subsidies, including tax breaks and busmess grants, for West Bank 
settlers despite the reaction from the US wMch described the development as 'troubling', and as one 
which 'clearly complicates the peace process.'’ ’^ In Gaza, some 15,000 Palestinians attended an anti­
settlement demonstration called by Hamas and approved by the PISGA, at wMch Hamas spokesman 
Mahmud Zalihar announced that Hamas would soon open political offices in Gaza with West Bank
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offices planned, with the PISGA's permission, as a transitional step for 'greater participation in public 
life'.’”
In an open letter to PM Netanyahu eight high-ranking former US officials wrote about then 
concern about Israeli settlements. The letter was precipitated by Netanyahu's policies which were 
deemed by Zbigniew Brzezinski as 'inimical to the peace process and even dangerous'. Madrid peace 
process architect James Baker, Brzezinski (ex-National Security Adviser), Frank Carlucci (ex-National 
Security Adviser), Lawrence Eaglebui'ger (ex-Secretary of State), Richar d Fairbanks (ex-Middle East 
Peace Negotiator), Brent Scowcroft (ex-National Security Adviser), Robert Strauss (ex-Middle East 
Peace Negotiator), and Cyrus Vance (ex-Secretary of State), wrote expressing their concern 'that 
unilateral actions, such as the expansion of settlements, would be strongly counterproductive to the goal 
of a negotiated solution and, if carried forward, could halt progress made by the peace process over the 
last two decades' and therefore ur ged Netanyahu 'not to take unilateral actions that would preclude a 
meaningful negotiated settlement and a comprehensive and lasting peace'.’”  In mormting international 
pressure over the settlement issue, the EU criticised the decision to reinstate state subsidised benefits to 
settlers. The decision also dr ew criticism fi orn President Clinton who stated Iris disapproval of both 
reinstating benefits and plans to expand settlements in the West Bank. British PM Major warned Israel 
not to inflame tensions by not expanding settlements.’ *^' In response, Netanyahu phoned Arafat to ease 
tensions over the settlement issue. Arafat and Yitzhak Molho then met on December 15th in the first 
high level PISGA-Israeli contact in weeks.’ ’^ Israel-PISGA talks on Hebron resumed the next day, and 
Molho met with Saeb Erekat in Jerusalem in a further effort to defuse tensions over the settler benefits 
issue. However, the Israeli government publicly rejected President Clinton's comments on settlements 
saying that they were unhelpful during a period of Israeh-PISGA impasse, and vowed that government 
policy would continue to strengthen the settlements.’ *^ December 19th was a busy day for a number of 
events. Netanyaliu held discussions with Levy, Mordechai, Shar on and defence officials regarding a 
document submitted by US ambassador Indyk. The document constituted a compromise on Hebron, it 
incorporated understandings previously reached between Israel and the PISGA, and included clauses 
relating to the continued implementation of the Interim Agreement and an Israeli commitment to a 
timetable for a military redeployment.’^^  Elsewhere Secretary Christopher announced that US special 
envoy Dennis Ross would return to the Middle East to 'reenergise' the stalled negotiations, claiming that 
Israel had made some unspecified concessions and therefore it was time for the PISGA to reciprocate, a 
claim which drew denials from the PISGA that Israel had made any concessions.’ *^* Israel expressed 
concern that the PISGA would expand the Gaza port beyond the agreed plans to create a commercial, 
rather than fishing port, in which case Israel would have no control over entering and departing crafi.’ *^ 
FM Levy met King Hussein and PM Kabariti in Jordan to discuss bilateral relations and the peace 
process.’*'’ The YESHA settlers' council ended a 3-day convention at which they announced 3 'red lines' 
wliich, if crossed would put an end to their support for Netanyahu and would stimulate action on then 
part against him. Their 'red lines' were, calling a halt to construction of housing units in East Jerusalem
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and Hebron, the implementation of fiirther redeployments from area C and not allowing for 'extensive 
and comprehensive' settlement.’ ’^
As Ross arrived in Israel to meet with Netanyahu and later with Ar afat in Gaza on December 
21st, a scuffle between settlers and Palestinian cliildren escalated into a melee in Hebron involving 
hundreds of settlers and Palestinians, which when IDF soldiers intervened led to strong riot control 
measures being employed.’ '^* As Ross offered some unspecified ideas for bridging the gaps between the 
two sides during intensive talks with Israeli and PISGA negotiators on December 22nd, DM Mordechai 
amiounced that Israel would implement further redeployment immediately after a Hebron deal was 
reached if Arafat promised to wage an uncompromising war against terrorism'.’^^  Tensions in Hebron 
increased when an Israeli military court in Lod sentenced two Palestinians to two consecutive life 
sentences each for driving suicide bombers to the scenes of the February/Mar ch bombings, two 
firebombs were tlrrown at a Jewish settlement and despite causing no injuries, the IDF imposed a curfew 
on Hebron, rounded up 100 Palestinians and forced the closure of Palestinian stores prompting a riot.’^^  
Attempting to ease the pressirr e, Ross met again with Netanyahu and Arafat, and arranged for each of 
them to be briefed separately on the status of the talks by a joint delegation of PISGA and Israeli 
negotiators which included Abbas and MoUio.’ ’^ Intensive diplomatic measures led to the longest face- 
to-face Arafat-Netanyahu meeting at Erez on December 24th to discuss the problem of final status issues 
preventing a Hebron deal. Meanwhile DM Mordechai met President Mubarak in Hurghada to discuss 
the progress of the Israel-PISGA talks, and in Hebron the IDF lifted the curfew on Hebron and 
permitted the Islamic University, closed since March, to reopen.’ *^
While Ross returned for Washington, Israeli-PISGA negotiations on Hebron continued, and in 
anticipation of the resumption of final status talks, Netanyahu's inner cabinet began to debate the 
government's plan for a permanent arrangement with the PISGA. However in Hebron, the IDF and the 
Israeli police had to block and arrest 20 settlers as they attempted to seize two vacant houses in the Arab 
section of town, whilst three firebombs were thrown by Palestinians at an IDF position in the city 
centre.’^^  Israeli-PISGA negotiators continued talks, and announced on December 27th that they hoped 
to finalise a Hebron deal by New Year's Day and complete the military redeployment by January 5th. 
However debate continued over the issues of, security control of the Tomb of the Patriarchs/al-Ibrahimi 
Mosque, al-Shuhada Street, the type of weapons to be used by the PISGA police, the buffer zone 
between H-1 and H-2 areas and restrictions on Jewish construction.” * Ross returned to the Middle East 
on December 30th and gave Netanyahu a letter from President Clinton which expressed respect for 
Netanyahu's decision to move forwar*d on an agreement despite his har d-line views, and invited him to 
visit Washington DC soon. As Amnon Shahak and Mahmoud Abbas held intensive negotiations in 
Jerusalem,” * Netanyahu agreed to submit any Hebron deal to the cabinet for approval under pressure 
from FM Levy, as seven of the eighteen members stated they would veto any agreement or abstain, with 
a fiu'ther two unsur e as to their intentions.” ’
Israel-PISGA negotiations on Hebron continued on December 31st with the PISGA demanding 
of Israel a commitment to complete further redeployment by autumn 1998 as set out in the Interim
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Agreement. This prompted Ross to meet Netanyahu and Arafat separately. For the second time in a 
week, Jewish settlers broke into the central market ar ea in Hebron to claim it as Jewish property, 
however the Israeli police arrested fifteen and ejected them from the site.” ’ Worse was to come. Off- 
duty IDF soldier Noam Friedman, intending in his own words to kill 'Israel-haters' sat in the middle of 
the Hebron marketplace and opened fire on innocent passers by, wounding seven. His action 
precipitated clashes between settlers and Palestinians, with nine Palestinians injured as a result of the IDF 
attempts to break up the protests, which resulted in a curfew being placed on the city. A planned 
meeting between Arafat and Netanyahu was postponed, however negotiations resumed at US 
ambassador Indyk's home with President Clinton personally phoning Arafat to encourage him to 
conclude an agreement before the situation in Hebron got any worse.’”  In response to the murderous 
attack by Friedman, the PISGA hardened its position on the Hebron deal, demanding of Israel to 
withdraw its troops fi*om rural West Bank villages as well. However, Internal Security Minister 
Kahalani warned that 'the Jews in Hebron must be protected. They are in great danger, despite Noam 
Friedman's shooting spree', and although Israeli police detained IDF soldier Yuval Jibli on suspicion of 
complicity with Friedman's plans to attack the Hebron market, the IDF reinforced its presence in the 
city.”  ^ On Januar y 3rd Netanyaliu moved to appease liis right-wing cabinet colleagues in advance of a 
vote on a Hebron deal by saying that he would not give the PISGA a timetable for further redeployment 
but would rather only give a date on which redeployment would begin, because ten of the eighteen 
cabinet members had announced that they were considering vetoing or abstaining fi om a vote on a 
Hebron deal. Tliis drew criticism fiorn the PISGA wliich responded that it would not sign a deal without 
a timetable.” *
After meeting secretly through the night of January 4-5th at Erez, Arafat and Netanyahu 
announced that they were close to solidifying a Hebron deal. A US diplomatic team member stated that 
the lower level negotiations had reached the end of their* utility and that if an agreement was to be 
attained then the leaders had to conclude an agreement. Netanyahu continued to play up with the 
Americans his fear of losing his cabinet majority over the Hebron issue in order to stave off PISGA 
demands.’”  On January 6th Ross spent the day shuttling between Netanyahu in Jerusalem and Ar afat in 
Bethlehem, in an attempt to bridge the gap on the issue of further redeployment, as Israel stated that it 
wanted to postpone the third and final stage of redeployment fi*om the West Bank until spring 1999. All 
the parties however cited Janaury 10th, the beginning of Ramadan, as their target date for concluding an 
agreement on Hebron.” *
As a deal drew near*er, the end-game manoeuvr ing intensified. Israeli ambassador to the US 
Ben-Elissar accused the Egyptians on January 7th of encouraging the PISGA to stall on a Hebron deal 
and of pressing other Arab states not to normalise relations with Israel. Meantime Israel eased the 
closure on the occupied territories by increasing fi*om 3,420 to 4,520 the number of Palestinian 
merchants permitted into Israel, by aUowmg 250 Gazan merchants into the West Bank and vice versa, by 
increasing fi*om 150 to 200 the number of Gazan PISGA officials allowed into the West Bank, and by 
admitting 50 Gazan lorries into Israel.”  ^ As a compromise to Israel's proposal to delay further
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redeployment to 1999, Netanyahu suggested on January 8th, delaying completion of further 
redeployment until May 1998, however this proposal was rejected by Ar afat, who stated that imder the 
terms of tlie Interim Agreement, all thr ee stages of further redeployment were due to be completed by 
September 1997,’*** Two pipe bombs exploded in Tel Aviv on January 9th wounding thirteen Israelis. 
When no one took responsibility, Netanyahu broke off a meeting with Ross to state that if the bombing 
proved to have been staged from the PISGA areas, he would not only suspend negotiations, but would 
also respond with 'great severity'. However Israeli police announced that the bombs were small, 
unsophisticated and that they had been unable to determine a motive for the attack.’**
In a round of international diplomacy on January 11, President Mubarak met with Arafat and 
Ross separately in Cairo to discuss the Israeli-PISGA talks, with Arafat then returning to Gaza to meet 
with his EA. King Hussein phoned President Mubar ak, Netanyaliu and Christopher to discuss the 
Israeli-PISGA negotiations.’*’ The next day King Hussein travelled to Gaza and Israel to try and break 
the deadlock in the Israeli-PISGA talks, and as a result, Ross who had planned to return home because 
no agreement had seemed forthcoming decided to stay on. After an evening of talks, Arafat and 
Netanyahu agreed to a compromise on the issue of fur ther redeployment suggested by Hussein, wliich 
opened the way for a deal on Hebron to be signed.’*’ In Jerusalem the following day, Israeli and PISGA 
negotiators reviewed drafts of a possible Hebron protocol in order to work out the final details, although 
both sides stated that no more substantive differences remained between them. Netanyahu told his 
cabinet colleagues that the main achievement of the Hebron protocol draft, as it stood, was that most of 
the West Bank territory would remain under Israel's control even after further redeployment was 
completed, as Israel would be able to determine the amount of land that would be returned under the 
three stages of redeployment.’*'* On January 14th after several hours of talks between Arafat and 
Netanyahu at Erez, the Hebron Protocol was initialed by Dan Shomron and Saeb Erekat at Erez at 0230 
local thne, on January 15th, though not officially signed imtil the 17th in Jerusalem, with an attached US 
Note for the Record' and an 'Agreed Minute'. Letters of Assurance to Arafat and Netanyahu from 
Christopher were also exchanged.’*^  On the 28th in Jerusalem, Erekat and Molho exchanged lists of 
their delegations assigned to the eight joint subcommittees that would simultaneously continue 
discussions on the issues for negotiation. Each subcommittee was to dr aw up a protocol on the 
implementation of the Interim Agreement articles specific to its topic. FM Levy was appointed the 
ceremonial post of head of the Israeli side of the Israeli-Palestinian Steering and Monitoring Committee, 
while cabinet secretary Dani Nave was to act as chief negotiator opposite Erekat. Then-Finance 
Minister Dan Meridor was appointed head of the economic subcommittee opposite PISGA Planning 
Minister Nabü Shaath.’**'
As the Hebron agreement was being resolved, YESHA settlers' council held an emergency 
session to discuss the Hebron protocol on January 14th, and resolved to star t treating Netanyahu's 
government as a political foe.’*’ Also on the same day, in a portent of the futur e, the IDF began the 
forced transfer of 3,000 Bedouin from their homes near Jahalin in the West Bank in preparation for the 
expansion of Ma'ale Adumim settlement. Some forty-five Bedouin families had lived on the site for forty
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years but were being sent to a site outside of Jerusalem near the municipal rubbish dump as alternative 
housing, to Hve in twenty-nine shipping-freight containers without running water or electricity.’**
The Significance of the Hebron Protocol
What makes the Hebron Protocol of paiticulai* interest and significance is the fact that it was the 
first negotiated agreement concluded between the PLO and a Likud-led coalition government of Israel. 
Through this agreement, it may be inferred, that the Likud-led right wing of the Israel polity accepted 
both the PLO as a negotiating partner and the peace process. However, before such a conclusion may 
be drawn, an analysis of the Hebron agreement by no means undermmes, or means an end to, the 
revisionist Zionist dreams of'Greater Israel', with an equivalent assumption, that by concluding such an 
agreement, a Palestinian state is more likely than not.
According to Article VII. Lb. of Annex I of the Interim Agreement, Israel was to a have 
completed its redeployment fiom Hebron by Mar ch 28 1996. However tliis timetable was suspended by 
then-PM Peres following the February/March suicide bombings. Negotiations aimed at implementing 
the 'Guidelines for Hebron' (Article VII of Amiexe I of the Interim Agreement) resumed after a 10- 
month delay caused by the political ftnore and violence over the suicide bombings of Februaiy/Mai’ch, 
the Israeli election, and the September tunnel incident. Those involved in the resumed talks at various 
times included, the PLO's Mahmoud Abbas, PISGA Information Minister Yasir Abed Rabbu, PISGA 
Local Government Minister Erekat, PM Netanyaliu's adviser Dore Gold, PM Netanyahu's personal 
lawyer Yitzhak Molho, Cabinet Secretary Dani Nave and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Shomron.’*^  The 
talks centred on the issue of the Israel redeployment fi om Hebron. The talks included other unftilfiUed 
clauses of the Interim Agreement, such as, the reaffirmation of the commitment to implement the Interim 
Agreement on the basis of reciprocity, Israeli imdertakings on, the first phase of redeployment, prisoner 
release issues, outstanding Interim Agreement issues to be negotiated and the resumption of peimanent 
status negotiations, and Palestinian undertakings on, revising the PLO Charter, fighting terror and 
preventing violence, the size of the PISGA police and PISGA activities in Jerusalem.
Talks reconvened in October 1996, reached an impasse on November 18th and stopped 
altogether at the end of November. Netanyahu and Ai'afat agreed that the only way to resolve the 
remaining issues was by bilateral summit meetings at Erez, and despite that Arafat almost walked out of 
the talks twice in disageement over proposed control of the Tomb of the Patriarchs/al-Ibrahimi Mosque, 
sufficient progress was made that a final draft of the Hebron protocol was completed by January 2nd 
1997. At Erez, Arafat had insisted that, due to the difficulties in securing Netanyahu’s pledge to 
implement the Hebron redeployment, side letters should be included with the Hebron protocol, to 
provide assurances, not only on the Hebron redeployment, but also on, the resumption of final status 
talks, further redeployment and any outstanding issues from the Interim Agreement. Palestinian 
insistence on having these letters of assurance tied to the Hebron protocol, linking the Hebron deal with 
all other outstanding issues, meant that the actual signing of the Hebron protocol was delayed further. 
The final differences were overcome by intense shuttle diplomacy led by Ross who acted as intermediary 
for Ai'afat and Netanyahu, and tlii'ough the good offices of King Hussein, whose special visit to Gaza
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and Israel on January 12th to offer a crucial compromise proposal on further redeployment, enabled the 
last remaining issue of contention to be overcome.
The Hebron agreement constitutes the teclmical modalities of implementing the guidelines for the 
redeployment of Israeli Militaiy Forces in Hebron to be car ried out in accordance with the Interim 
Agreement and the Hebron protocol. The redeployment constitutes the 'fiill implementation of the 
provisions of the Interim Agreement with regard to the city of Hebron unless otherwise provided for in 
Article VII of Annexe T.’ °^ The Hebron Protocol was accompanied by the US-drafted Note For the 
Record, attached Agreed Minute, and Secretary Clrr istopher's letters of assur ance to Arafat and 
Netanyahu, which although not officially part of the deal were considered crucial by both sides.” *
An integral part of the Hebron deal was the attached Note for the Record, an official addendum 
to the Hebron Protocol, written by Ross, outlining as it did the reaffrrmation of both leaders of their 
commitment to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity, and within the context of 
the Note for the Record conveyed their concerns, obligations and undertakings to each other on this 
matter. The need for the note stemmed from Palestinian fears that Israel would fail to implement the 
further provisions of the Interim Agreement once the pressure of Hebron had subsided, thus the 
Palestinians felt it was necessary to insist upon a formal linkage between the signing of the Hebron 
protocol and other Interim Agreement issues. The note listed the unfulfilled Interim Agreement 
requirements either as issues that one or other side was responsible for implementing, or as issues for 
negotiation, despite having been afready addressed within the remit of the Interim Agreement. On the 
Israeli side, by reaffirming its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with 
the Interim Agreement, their issues for implementation covered; 1. Further Redeployment Phases (the 
first phase to be carried out during the first week of March), 2. Prisoner Release Issues (to be dealt with 
in accordance with the Interim Agreement's provisions and procedures, including Annexe VII), whereas 
then issues for negotiation covered; Outstanding Interim Agreement Issues (Negotiations on outstanding 
issues to be conducted in parallel: a. safe passage, b. Gaza Airport, c. Gaza Port, d. Passages, e. 
Economic, financial, civilian and security issues, f. People-to-people), Permanent status Negotiations (to 
be implemented within 2 months after implementation of the Hebron Protocol). The Palestinians 
committed themselves to implementing immediately measuies in paiallel and in accordance with those 
previously agreed within the terms of the Interim Agreement, namely: 1. Completing the process of 
revising the Palestinian National Charter; 2. Fighting Ten or and Preventing Violence, by; a. 
Strengthening security cooperation, b. Preventing incitement and hostile propaganda, as specified in 
Article XXII of the Interim Agreement, c. Combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations 
and infrastructure, d. Apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists, e. Requests for transfer of 
suspects and defendants to be acted upon in accordance with Article II.7.f. of Annexe IV of the Interim 
Agreement, f. Confiscation of illegal fii earms; 3. Size of the Palestinian police force to be pur suant with 
the Interim Agreement; 4. Exercise of Palestinian governmental activity, and location of government 
offices, will be as specified witlrin the Intermi Agreement.’ ’^ The interesting feature of this attached 
Note, is that it commits either side to a process of reciprocity, meaning that if one or other side fails to
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deliver on its stated intentions, the other can call a halt to its own implementation of the agreement.
Thus if one side deems the other to have failed to implement its stated obligations and the other sides' 
interpretation of such, then the agreement becomes hostage to perceived violations of the agreement 
rather than remaining focused on the issues of implementing and progressing the process.
Though not officially part of the Hebron Protocol, the attached letters of assurances were 
however necessary to its approval. Although not officially part of the Hebron protocol, Secretary 
Christopher's letters, one to Netanyahu and one to Ar'afat, were integral to concluding the deal and were 
car'efully negotiated with both sides. The US letter to Netanyahu, the only one made public, was 
noteworthy particularly for setting the timetable for firrther withdrawals and for the controversy 
surrounding its reference to 'US views on Israel's process of redeploying its forces [and] designating 
specified military locations', widely interpreted to mean US recognition of Israel's right to unilaterally 
decide the extent of further redeployments.’ ’^ In addition, on behalf of the President of the EU Council 
of Ministers, Dutch FM Hans van Mierlo, presented a 'Letter of Assurances to President Arafat' on 
January 15th, but it was not made public until February 2nd. It was first mentioned by Arafat at a joint 
press conference held at the Hague with Dutch PM Vim Kok and FM van Mierlo. According to a 
clar ification by van Mierlo, the letter had been requested by Ar afat and ultimately agreed to by the Israeli 
government, which asked that it be kept secret. According to EU Middle East peace coordinator Miguel 
Moratinos, the letter, drafted after the consultations with the US, helped to convince Arafat to conclude 
the Hebron Protocol.’ '^*
Probably the most important provision of both the Note for the Record and the letters of 
assurances concerned the issue of fiirther redeployment. Linkage of redeployment to a Hebron 
agreement was raised as a PISGA demand that Israel provide dates for a timetable of redeployment on 
December 7th, but Netanyahu initially reacted on December 19th by refusing to adliere to any set 
timetable. On December 31st the PISGA fiu'ther demanded that redeployment fiom riual areas be 
completed by September 1997, as originally envisaged in the Interim Agreement. By January 3rd 
Netanyahu agreed tliat he would give only the date for the start of the first of the three stages of 
intended further redeployment, without fiu'ther commitment on the other dates. Following the Aiafat- 
Netanyaliu summit at Erez on Janaury 5th, Israel stated the following day, that it wanted to postpone the 
final stage of redeployment until spring 1999, just before final status talks are scheduled to conclude. On 
Janaury 8th Netanyahu presented a compromise that would delay the completion of all stages until May 
1998, however both options were rejected by the PISGA. In order to break the deadlock, King Hussein 
presented a proposal on Januai-y 12th, accepted by both sides, wliich set the dates for the stai't of the fii'st 
two stages of redeployment as February 28 1997 and October 31 1997, but only set 'mid-1998' for the 
completion of the third stage. Despite King Hussein's initiative, the Note for the Record requir ed Israel 
only to begin the first stage of further redeployment by the first week of March 1997. Secretary 
Christopher's letter of assur ances stipulated that aU tluee stages should be completed by mid-1998, 
whereas in Ross' letter to the Israeli cabinet, the US interpretation of mid-1998 is clar ified as being by 
the end of August 1998. The Note also allows for Israel to suspend fiu'ther redeployment if it deems the
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PISGA to have not fulfilled its responsibilities and obligations, and since the Note does not include on 
the list of issues to be negotiated, the issue of further redeployment, this amounted to allowing Israel to 
choose how, where and when it would redeploy.’ ’^
The main provisions of the Hebron Protocol covered the Security Arrangements Regarding 
Redeployment in Hebron and the Civil Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron, and also 
provided for the reduction and prevention of provocation and friction, to ensure free access of peoples, 
goods and vehicles and the normalisation of relations.
The secur ity terms provided for a number of arrangements. Israel military forces were to 
redeploy from some 80% of Hebron within 10 days of the protocol, as opposed to 85% as agreed within 
the Interim Agreement. The responsibility for internal security and public order in H-2, the commercial 
and religious centre of the city which includes 400 Israeli settlers and 20,000 Palestinians, would remain 
Israeli. Israel would continue to exercise responsibility for the overall security of Israelis throughout 
Hebron, and was provided with all the powers to take the necessary steps to meet its security 
responsibilities enabling Israeli security forces to conduct security activity within areas of Palestinian 
jurisdiction. .Toint Mobile Units and Joint Patrols are to operate in ar eas of particular sensitivity, with a 
Joint Coordination Centre headed by a senior officer from both sides to coordinate joint security 
measures. Access to special areas of particular sensitivity in H-1 located close to H-2 will be limited by 
the Palestinian police, including restricting the four designated Palestinian police 16-member rapid 
response teams armed with rifles without prior Israeli approval. The Jewish holy sites in H-1, The Cave 
of Othniel Ben Knaz, Elonei Mamre, Eshel Avrahara, Mayaan Sarah, will be protected by Palestinian 
police with free, unimpeded and secure access for Israelis ensured with visits to be accompanied by a 
Joint Mobile Unit.”  ^ Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to honour' the relevant security provisions 
of the Interim Agreement, including the provisions regarding, the Arrangements for Security and Public 
Order (Article XII of the Interim Agreement), the Prevention of Hostile Acts (Ai'ticle XV of the Interim 
Agreement), the Security Policy for the Prevention of Terrorism and Violence (Article II of Annexe I of 
the Interim Agreement), the Guidelines for Hebron (Article VII of the Interim Agreement) and the Rules 
of Conduct in Mutual Security Matters (Article XI of Annexe I of the Interim Agreement).’ ’^
The terms of the civil arrangements provided for a number understandings. The transfer of the 
remaining 12 spheres of civü powers and responsibilities not yet transferred was to be done concurrently 
with the beginning of the redeployment. However, those powers and responsibilities not transferred to 
the Palestinians in H-2, that is those relating to Israehs and theii' property will continue to be exercised 
by the Israeli Military Government. In order to prevent fiiction resulting fiom constmction activity, 
agreement was reached with regard to planning, zoning and building, to preserve the historic character 
of the city including outlining a number of provisions covering proposed construction of buildings over 2 
metres/3 metres, and for non-residential and non-commercial use to be implemented through prior 
coordination with the District Civil Liaison Office. The Municipality, responsible for infiastructure and 
transportation, will provide continued and effective semces to the Israelis in H-2, such as traffic 
management, water, sewage, electricity and communications, agreeing to ensure requiied work for
235
Israelis as a top priority if Israel covers the costs. No more than 50 unarmed plainclothed municipal 
inspectors would be allowed access to H-2 to ensure the enforcement of laws and regulations covering 
the Palestinian population, the inspectors would be able to call upon Israeli police if necessary.
Municipal services to all residents of Hebron would be provided regularly and continuously, at the same 
cost and quality, without discrimination.’ *^
In Gaza, the PISGA, EA and the PLO Executive Committee ratified the protocol on January 
15th. However, five fiom twenty-two EA members voted against ratification and many PISGA 
members complained. They were distressed they were not asked for their approval prior to its signing, 
merely asked for their consent to a fait accompli, as they were only mitially shown excerpts of the 
agreements for approval, and that the fiiU text annexes and maps that they eventually received, were in 
English only.’^^  After 13 houi’s of debate, the Israeli cabmet endorsed the protocol by a vote of eleven to 
seven on January 16th. The cabinet, agreed to 'act to maintam all the conditions and requirements 
necessary for the existence, security and consolidation of the Jewish community in Hebron', confirmed 
that 'details of the further stages of the redeployment in Judea and Samaria' would 'be determined by the 
Government of Israel', and reiterated that a fundamental condition for the continuation of the peace 
process with the Palestinians was 'the mutual fulfihnent of the obligations of both sides'. Those voting 
against were, Benjamin Begin, Yuli Edelstein, Rafael Eitan, Zevulun Hammer, Yitzhak Levy, Limor 
Livnat and Ariel Sharon. On the adoption of the decision. Begin announced his resignation fiom the 
government.’** Halfway through the cabinet debate, Netanyaliu had to call a recess amid confusion 
surrounding US guarantees which resulted fiom an Israeli TV broadcast which quoted an unidentified 
US official saying that under the terms of the protocol, the extent of additional redeployments would be 
negotiated and that Israel could no longer unilaterally decide how much of the West Bank it was going 
to transfer to the PISGA. At the request of the Israeli cabinet, Ross composed a letter of clarification 
addressed to Cabmet Secretary Dani Nave, which stated that
'the term 'mid-1998' ...was originally proposed by King Hussein and is intended to refer to a 
bridging period between May 1998 and September 1998. In the context of the US proposal, it 
was proposed to use the term 'the last part of 1998' to indicate the final date for tlie further 
redeployments. In the course of the negotiations ...it was agreed on various occasions that the 
term 'mid-1998' will cover a time-fiame in the middle of the year and will not indicate a precise 
date. During the negotiations, the speakers specified the months of June, July and August to 
illustrate how the term will be implemented on the ground.'’***
Netanyahu was also reassur ed by US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk, that it was 'clear in the 
agreement' that Israel would specify the military locations, so that any 'amount Israel hands over' would 
be 'Israel's decision'.’*’ Furthermore State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns issued on January 
15th a 'Statement on Further Redeployments' in Washington DC as a result of the confusion. Burns 
claimed that not only was the reported statement attributed to a State Department spokesman 
'erroneous', but that the only relevant US comments on the issue were, the Note for the Record which 
makes clear’ that 'fur ther redeployment phases are issues for implementation by Israel rather than issues
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for negotiation with the Palestinians', and the letters of assurance provided to both parties which 'refer to 
the process of further redeployments as an Israeli responsibility which includes its designating specified 
military locations'.’**’
With Knesset approval for the Hebron agreement, the IDF began redeploying from Hebron the 
same day.’”  PISGA police began entering Hebron on January 15th, setting up its rapid response teams 
by January 21st, with the two Joint Mobile Units and two Joint Patrols commencing operations on 
February 1st.’”  The IDF began the phased reopening of al-Shuliada Street on February 3rd, allowing 
ambulances and taxis access but not to private vehicles, and fully reopened the city's central market in H- 
2. However, Jewish settlers entered the market and scuffled with Palestinians claiming that the market 
posed a secirrity risk to the settlers.’**®
Wliat tentative conclusions can we dr aw from the Hebron Protocol, and of what significance on 
the final status negotiations are these conclusions? Palestinian critics of the deal contend that Israel has 
had officially sanctioned and legitimised by the PISGA, the extension of Israeli jurisdiction over settlers 
and their settlements, in retiun for a partial redeployment, a commitment to resume negotiations on 
unresolved Interim Agreement issues, and to undertake final status talks. Israel, with US support, thus 
retains control over the scope and timetable of futiue redeployment phases. Despite PISGA 
reassurances that the Hebron Protocol is part of the interim phase of the peace process, and is therefore 
transitional by definition, the protocol illustrates a powerful vision of the extent to wliich friture, final 
status negotiations will play out. In essence what is being agreed to under the protocol, is that Israel is 
laying the groundwork for not only the permanent division of Hebron, but is laying claim to not only 
jurisdiction over the settlers and their settlements, but also sovereignty over them, and access to them.
In a subtle change of emphasis, the original terms of reference, UN resolutions 242 and 338 are being 
superseded by a more pragmatic modus vivendi which could well predetermine final status issues by 
creating precedents, whereby Israel will lay claim to annexing large amounts of the occupied 
territories.’*’
The Hebron Protocol culminated intense diplomatic efforts by the US to contrive to reinvigorate 
the peace process, which was in danger of collapsing following Rabin's assassination, Netanyaliu's 
election and the tunnel incident. However, the Hebron Protocol does not constitute a new agreement, it 
is a deal to implement parts of the previously agreed Interim Agreement. It also incorporated, due to the 
political atmosphere, a statement of intent to continue to pur sue and implement the peace process. What 
constituted the crux of the disagreement over the Hebron negotiations was Netanyahu's desir e to treat 
Hebron as a separate, interim phase issue, which had previously been articulated witliin the terms of the 
Interim Agreement, whereas the PISGA wished to see a deal on Hebron as the linchpin linking interim 
and final status arrangements, thus providing the peace process with continuity. The Palestinians knew 
that if the peace process collapsed, autonomy within their unconnected bantustaris, would be the most 
they could achieve. In order to link, Hebron, the implementation of other unresolved interim period 
issues (prisoner release, Gaza airport and seaport, and safe passages between the autonomous areas), an 
Israeli commitment on a timetable for further redeployment, and final status negotiations, the
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Palestinians sought to achieve a deal over Hebron which would incorporate these issues and thus 
provide a public statement of intent by the Israeli government that the peace process was still viable. For 
the Palestinians, a deal on Hebron represented not only an agreement to implement the Interim 
Agreement, thus linking the new Israeli government with the old peace policy, but also an acceptance by 
the previously rejectionist Likud, of a new approach to the DoP's implicit land-for-peace formula.
Despite Likud protestations that the Oslo agreements needed modifications and renegotiation, to 
incorporate their positions on settlers/settlements, 'hot pur suit' and their preference for entering into final 
status talks immediately after redeploying fi om Hebron whilst controlling some 90% of the West Bank 
and Gaza, the significance of the eventual deal on Hebron, was that it brought the new Likud-led 
government into the Oslo version of the peace process, the process that had originally begun under 
Likud at Madrid.
Essentially, both sides have historically deflected criticism by opponents of the peace process by 
maintaining that any potential uncertainties would be dealt with through negotiations. 'Uncertainties' 
referred to the potential establishment of a Palestinian state. For the Israelis, negotiations would ensure 
this would not happen, whereas the Palestinians sought tliis goal thiough participation in the negotiating 
process. The DoP was viewed by both sides as basically an agreement to preempt or precede such an 
outcome, by creating facts on the ground. Thus for the new Likud government, the Hebron Protocol 
represented an opportunity to redefine the trend which Ihiked the entiie Israeli negotiating position from 
Madrid through to Hebron, that is, opposition to a Palestinian state. In this task they were substantially 
aided by the US administration. Principally, the Likud redefinition amounted to cir cumventing the basic 
terms of reference of the entire peace process, namely the implementation of UN resolution 242. In an 
intelligent reorientation of its hostility to the peace process which characterised its period in opposition, 
the new Likud negotiating strategy deftly chose to close the route to Palestinian sovereignty thr ough the 
negotiating process than through outright repudiation of the entir e peace process. By appearing to the 
international community, and particularly the US administration, that is was willing to engage the US- 
insphed peace process, the Israeli government ensured US cooperation rather than hostility, thus 
allowing it greater acceptance for its policy of challenging the final creation of a Palestinian state. Tliis 
reorientation of Likud's strategy not only means that those policymakers involved have learned the 
lessons of past Likud mistakes vis-a-vis the Likud, the US and the peace process, but that they have 
learned to deflect the Palestinians' dr eams effectively whilst retaining US support. In a fiirther twist, the 
Likud strategy has also seen the prospect of a domestic political and ideological reconciliation between 
the mainstream Zionist parties. Labour leader Peres declar ed on Jannuary 15th, that the Hebron 
Protocol signified 'the end of a deep ideological rift that ...divided the Israeli people from the very day of 
its creation.' This rift, between those who believed Israel should control all of'biblical Israel' and those 
who believed that Israel should contr ol lands with a Jewish majority and for secmity reasons, had been 
healed. Peres believed that the 'idea of keeping all of the land [regardless] of its demographic division is 
over.' Peres's statements to the contrary, this does not mean that Israeli control over most of the existing 
occupied territories will not continue, or will not become ensliriried through final status negotiations.’***
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For Israeli domestic considerations, the internal divisions created by the peace process have, through the 
Hebron Protocol been redefined. By engaging the peace process the Likud has found common cause 
with those domestic opponents who in their large numbers oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, and 
who believe that Israel should retain sovereignty over settlers, settlements and lands deemed necessary 
for security purposes. In this way, the Hebron Protocol, by extending de facto recognition of the Israeli 
presence in the occupied territories, not only did much to undermine the authority, legitimacy and 
acceptance of UN resolution 242, but also served to reunite Israel and its principal ally, the US, as well 
as mainstream Israeli Zionism. Whether the coalition of shar ed interests survives final status 
negotiations is debatable, it is however nonetheless impressive that the Likud negotiating strategy was 
able to acliieve so much despite domestic political scandals (the Deri-Baron affair) and international 
concern about Israeli intentions and goodwill.
Following the violence provoked by the tunnel incident, the US was faced with the possibility of 
a complete collapse of its peace process. President Clinton convened a summit in Washington with 
Netanyaliu, Arafat and King Hussein. Ross was tasked with getting the Israelis and Palestinians to 
resume negotiations and conclude an agreement on redeployment fi*om Hebron. The initiative to resume 
Israeli-PISGA negotiations began in October in Taba, with Ross and his deputy, Aaron Miller attending. 
This proved to be an important point in the negotiating process, as it indicated, both, Likud engagement 
in negotiations with the Palestinians witliin the DoP and Interim Agreement fi*amework, and a more 
direct US role in Israeli-PISGA talks, including discussing details and offering compromise suggestions. 
The PISGA were keen to open up the negotiating process since Netanyahu's election, to gain comfort 
jfrom either increasing pressure on Israel fi*om the international community, or to ensuie the US, resistant 
to widening involvement in the peace process, acted as a more balanced, guarantor for further progress. 
Despite Palestinian desire for greater US involvement in the process, US officials claimed Netanyahu 
was the first to approach them with the suggestion of then becoming more engaged, and indeed despite 
their initial wariness at Netanyahu's election, soon realised his pragmatism, to reaffirm the US-Israeli 
relationship rather than persist in his antagonism to the US-inspiied process, to deal with the existing 
accords, and to 'adopt a new negotiating strategy based on meticulously intricate and legalistic mastery 
of the terms of the agreement he had' previously 'rejected'. Netanyahu cleverly embraced the US 
process, which allowed him to gain greater control over it, without having to alter his stated intentions 
of denying Palestinian sovereignty, and maintaining as fiill control over the occupied territories as 
possible.’**^ Such manoeuvring allowed the US and the Israelis, close allies at the best of times, to 
cooperate and coordinate on issues of agreement rather than descend into confrontation and contention. 
Israel and the US shared the same vision of the peace process generally, and their priorities reflected 
this, namely; integrating Israel into the Middle East, maintaining the primacy of Israeli security concerns, 
and ensuring that the Hebron deal would provide secmity arrangements that would outlive the 
transitional phase. Although the US negotiators agreed with the Palestinians on the principle of linkage, 
particularly with regard to the Hebron redeployment and the non-implementation of the remaining 
interim arrangements, Palestinians negotiators and officials from Ai’afat down believed that the US team
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members were not only personally biased in Israel's favour, but were using the US pre-election period to 
manipulate a deal satisfactory to the Israelis. Wliat the Palestinians seemed reluctant to accept was that 
the US administration, from the highest levels, was not going to attempt an even-handed approach, as 
US political interests were best served by ensuring an expeditious, pro-Israel agreement, which appeared 
to commit Israel to continuing with further negotiations. US insistence and pressure that Arafat accept 
Israeli proposals wliich did not include a specified timetable for fiirther redeployment were however 
offset by Arab, Middle Eastern and international support, encouraged by Egypt, for the PISGA to 
refuse. Thus the ebb and flow of negotiations passed on to issues of contention regarding the Hebron 
par t of the deal. After having reached agreement on most Hebron issues by the beginning of January, 
the outstanding issues remained that of the timetable for further redeployments and an Israeli 
commitment to begin final status negotiations. Agreement was ultimately brokered by King Hussein, 
who persuaded Netanyahu and Ai'afat to agree a compromise. King Hussein was able to convince, the 
Palestinians that he was not waiting in the wings to resume his previous responsibilities, and the Israelis 
that he would not replace the Palestinians as principal interlocutor.
Despite the repeated reaffii'ination in each of the Israel-PLO negotiated agreements, 'that the 
negotiations on the permanent status, ...will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338' and 'that the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East 
peace process is' to lead 'to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 And 338', 
a fundamental flaw of the DoP is its lack of linkage within the terms of reference to define the 
relationship between the UN resolutions, the applicability of international law and the interim period.” * 
Because the interim period deals with a phased, limited and pre-determined transfer of powers and 
responsibilities for territorial and administrative jurisdictions, the status of the occupied territories during 
the interim phase is not bound by the same intentions as that of the final status, therefore dui mg the 
interim phase, the status of the 'occupied' territories becomes that of'disputed* territories, inferring the 
inapplicability of international law during the interim phase and allowing for any interpretations of what 
will constitute 'disputed' territory, and what may be created as a result. Thus despite claims that 
agreements done during the interim phase are merely transitional, the important point is tliat by acceding 
to negotiating demands dur ing the interim phase without clear legal reference on which to press claims, 
legitimate rights become negotiable, with the possibility of becoming non-redeemable. For example, by 
accepting Israeli control over Israeli settlers and settlements outwith Palestinian jurisdiction during the 
interim phase, the Palestinians have allowed the Israelis to establish their claims to a division of territorial 
and administrative jurisdictions, and thus by implication sovereignty, thr oughout the West Bank and 
Gaza. Thus whilst the Hebron Protocol may be a transitional agreement, designed to prevent friction 
between the two sides, in reality, it is more likely that it represents an example of Israel's strategic vision 
to remain m possession of'occupied' territory.
In his statement to the Knesset on the Hebron Protocol on January 16th, Netanyahu affirmed,
'We are not leaving Hebron, we are not redeploying from Hebron', 'We do not want to remove the 
Jewish cornmmiity from Hebron', and 'We want to preserve and consolidate it'. Stating that the new
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government had 'inherited a difficult reality' and 'difficult agreements', which 'comprised written texts' 
and worse, an accompanying 'oral law', Netanyaliu clarified his fimdamentals, that he was 'committed to 
the written agreements' but that he repudiated any verbal understandings and promises reached between 
the previous government and the PISGA, saying 'We are not committed to the 'oral law". Such 
agreement was seen by Netanyahu as 'an uncontrolled dash to the '67 lines' whereby he castigated the 
previous administration for pursuing an agreement which 'would have produced negative results' for 
Israel, 'withdrawal to the '67 lines, or almost; the establishment of a Palestinian state; and even the 
division of Jerusalem.' Wliilst 'committed, of course to the wiitten agreements' Netanyahu stated that 
Israel's new 'goals are different', 'to maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth 
necessary for the defence of the State, to insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land, and to propose 
to the Palestinians a suitable airangement for self-rule but without the sovereign powers wliich pose a 
threat to Israel.' Netanyahu outlined thiee fiuidaniental principles wliich guided the Israelis through the 
course of negotiations, 'both on Hebron and on the agreements to follow Hebron', namely; 1.
'reciprocity', 2. 'the implementation of the redeployments will be an Israeli decision', and 3. 'the time 
firame'.
Netanyahu's understanding of the 'principle of reciprocity' is that it is 'a basic principle for the 
continuation of the process of the permanent status negotiations' which formed 'an integral part of the 
agreement' in which 'both sides agreed on a list of mutual imdertakings' which in turn ensured that 'the 
fulfilment of the understandings of one side will be dependent upon the fulfilment by the other side.'
Thus the Hebron agreement, represented 'An agreement in which both sides accept the mutual 
commitment to fulfil obligations’. Such a principle was thus anchored and formalised within the Oslo 
agreements for the first time according to Netanyaliu. Whilst this principle may seem even handed, in 
practical terms it represents another example of Israeli ability to determine the course of the 
negotiations. As 'peace with security' is the new government's mantra, it does not stretch the 
imagination to assume that, subjective interpretation notwithstanding, reciprocity can lead to Israel 
unilaterally determining, on a pretext, that the PISGA has not fulfilled various obligations and thus 
forfeits fuilher Israeli compliance. Such an interpretation, wliilst subjective, may indeed provide Israel 
with the necessary legitimacy to control the pace and extent of fluther negotiations, and indeed the 
ultimate outcome of the final status negotiations.
The second principle clarified that Israel received agreement that the implementation of further 
'redeployments will be an Israeli decision that wiU not be a matter for negotiation'. Thus, tliis 'decision 
must comply with Israel's security considerations, as Israel sees fit'. Israel will also 'define the security 
zones', and 'will determine the nature and scope of the three redeployments-not only the first and second, 
but also the third.' Netanyahu reiterated that his interpretation and imderstanding of the agreement 
reached with the Palestinians was shared by the US, which he believed was a 'very important distinction'. 
For Netanyaliu this interpretation meant that Israel would 'be able to define, according to its own 
understanding, the security needs of the State of Israel and to carry out the fiirther redeployments 
according to tliis understanding.'
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The third principle, the time frame, Netanyahu stated, does not stand alone, rather it allowed 
Israel 'room for manoeuvre, room to test reality, room to test reciprocity in the fulfilment of the 
agreement.' Thus, Netanyahu commended the agreement to the Knesset because he believed that what 
had been negotiated allowed Israel, 'the time, the ability and the fr eedom for pohtical manoeuvre' to 
'conduct the negotiations, carefully, responsibly, with discretion' in order to achieve the 'goals of 
preserving Jerusalem, preserving the security depth, preserving Israel's ability to defend itself and to 
negotiate 'a suitable arrangement with the Palestinians'.’**
However, in analysing the significance of the Hebron Protocol, it seems that the Israeli 
interpretation of the agreements is borne out by, not only a similar understanding stated by US officials, 
but also the appended US documents, Ross's 'Note for the Record' and Clrristopher's 'Letter of 
Assurance to Israel'.’*’ US assui'ances and the agreements done did indeed establish the principle of 
'linkage', between the interim agreements done to date, pending interim airangements, further 
redeployments and the final status negotiations. Whilst the 'linkage' principle was of great importance to 
the Palestinians, to ensure the new Likud government's engagement in the peace process, the principle 
also worked to the Israelis advantage. Issues which had been previously ignored by the Labour 
government, such as the expansion of the PISGA police force beyond thefr agreed limits as set out in the 
Interim Agreement and the location of PISGA offices in Jerusalem, included in the 'Note for the Record' 
as items 3 and 4 under Palestinian responsibilities, could now be used to undermine further progress by 
Israeli demands to link past undertakings, present responsibilities with future redeployments by sticking 
to the letter of the agreements rather than the spirit.’*’ Thus the US involvement seems to underline and 
endorse the Israeli interpretation that the timing of fiirther redeployments, the determining of Palestinian 
obligations and commitments, and the definition and extent of military locations, will be unilaterally 
determined by the Israelis without recourse to further negotiations. In this sense, the Hebron Protocol 
seems to practically repudiate the general understanding of UN resolution 242, with the blessing of the 
US, and therefore may indeed reinterpret the original principal terms of reference for the peace process, 
namely the land-for-peace formula, to be replaced by the primary principle of maintaining Israeli security 
considerations. Thus the itnpoitance of the Hebron Protocol witliin the peace process, is that it offers 
the Israelis the opportunity to determine the futme scope, extent and pace of the Israeli-Palestinian 
endeavour, with US approval and endorsement. The US has basically assured Israel that the 
determination of, further redeployments, the implementation of pending interim agreement arrangements, 
the size of militar y locations, and the progress of final status negotiations, will be unilaterally decided by 
Israel without recour se, or subject to fiu'ther negotiations. Despite Palestinian insistence that the Hebron 
agreement falls within the interim period and therefore, that any agreements concluded ruider this period 
are of a transitional natiue, in reality, the Hebron agreement allows Israel the advantage to reinterpret a 
new vision of Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The Hebron Protocol may be deemed to amount to a repudiation of the original terms of 
reference for both the Madrid peace process and the Oslo accords and indeed and the basis on wliich the 
existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements have been concluded, namely UN resolutions 242 and 338. The
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appended US assurances to the Hebron Protocol, combined with US official statements, seem to 
guarantee Israel's security as the paramount objective of the peace process, and lead one to the 
conclusion that the US has reordered its position on the original terms of reference agreed by the DoP, 
that is the implementation of UN resolutions 242 and 338, that is the land-for-peace formula. Instead, 
US assurances seem to be underlining the interpretation that US policy is now motivated to ensuring the 
recognition of Israeli security considerations as the basis for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, whilst 
undermining the validity and applicability of international law and UN resolutions. Ensuring Israel's 
security seems to have become not only the prime motivating factor for the new Israeli government, but 
also seems to have become the principal term of reference for the remaining Israeli-PLO negotiations, 
and therefore the primaiy principle by which the negotiations will be measured. Christopher stated in his 
'Letter of Assur ance' addressed to Netanyahu, that 'I have impressed upon Chairman Arafat the 
imperative need for the PISGA to make every effort to ensur e public order and internal security within 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip', stressing 'to him that effectively carrying out this major responsibility 
will be a critical foimdation for completing implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as the 
peace process as a whole.' Christopher fiirther stated that he had advised Ar afat of'US views on Israel's 
process of redeploying its forces, designating specified military locations and transferring additional 
powers and responsibilities' to the PISGA, within the context of the above. Furthermore Christopher 
stressed to Netanyahu that he could 'be assiued the United States' commitment to Israel's security' was 
'ironclad and constitutes the fimdamental cornerstone of our special relationship', that the 'key element in 
OUT' approach to peace, including the negotiation and implementation of agreements between Israel and 
its Arab partners, has always been a recognition of Israel's security requir ements', and that the 'hallmark 
of US policy remains oiu* commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the secmity needs that 
Israel identifies.'’*'*
Reciprocity
The primacy of the principle of Israeli security was further enshrined by the continued US and 
Israeli usage of the 'principle of reciprocity', referred to by Netanyahu, in his speech to the Knesset, as 'a 
basic principle for the continuation of the process of the permanent status negotiations'.’ *^ This 
interpretation was further underlined by Dennis Ross's Note for the Record' wliich stated under the 
heading 'Mutual Understandings', that 'the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement the 
Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity', and by Secretary Christopher's 'Letter of Assurance' in 
which he assured Netanyahu, that 'it remains the policy of the US to support and promote full 
implementation of the Interim Agreement in all of its parts', and that the US intended to continue its . 
'efforts to help ensure that all outstanding commitments are carried out by both parties in a cooperative 
spirit and on the basis of reciprocity.'’*® While the US language sounded benign and even handed, in 
reality the US effectively underlined the interpretation that Israel's continued commitments and 
obligations to the peace process were dependant on the PISGA's ability to ensuie Israel's, and Israelis' 
security. Backing up this interpretation was the fact that Israel would be the sole arbiter of the PISGA's 
performance. Although the impasse in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was essentially brokered by
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the US, with help from King Hussein, there was no mechanism set up, nor were there any guidelines set 
out, with wliich to fafrly and independently adjudicate disputatious interpretations of what constituted 
acceptable conduct by the PISGA in relation to Israel's security considerations. Israel's security 
considerations were to be entir ely, and unilaterally determined by Israel, therefore, the future of the 
peace process rests with Israel, and its determination of such. If one accepted that Israel's ability to 
determine in what areas, and to what extent, to fiirther redeploy within the context of PISGA 
compliance with Israeh-determined security considerations was valid, then Israel retained the power to 
determine, not only the extent, scope and timing of fiu'ther redeployments, but also the entir e progress of 
the peace process. This interpretation was publicly posted by the Israeli Foreign Ministry's position 
paper, 'Further Redeployments: The Next Stage of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, Legal 
Aspects', which stated imder the heading 'Conditions for Implementation of Fiuther Redeployment 
Provisions', that the
'commitment to effect fiirther redeployment is described, in both the Declaration of Principles 
and the Interim Agreement, as being 'commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for 
public order and internal security by the Palestinian police'. The intention of tliis provision is to 
ensui e that, in a situation in which the Palestinian side is incapable or unwilling to enforce its 
security responsibility, Israel will not be obliged to endanger itself by transferring additional 
territory to the Palestinian jmisdiction. In other words, the fiirther redeployments are expressly 
stated to be a mutual obligation: only if the Palestinian side proves itself capable and willing to 
comply with its secur ity responsibilities is Israel obliged to transfer additional areas of the West 
Bank to Palestinian jurisdiction.'
Furthermore, concerning the nature of'redeployment', the same source stated that
'Neither the DoP nor the Interim Agreement contains a definition of the terms 'redeployment' or 
'further redeployment'. However, the use of the term 'redeployment' must be distinguished fiom 
'withdrawal', as used for example in the context of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza 
Strip and Jericho Area. Unlike 'withdrawal', wliich required the removal of the majority of forces 
from the areas in question, 'redeployment' relates only to the location of the forces; it places no 
restriction on the number of forces and militar y equipment or the possibility of introducing 
further forces and equipment if necessary.'
Regarding the extent and provisions of further redeployments, both the DoP and Interim Agreement 
were not specific. In relation to the first two redeployments there was no indication of the areas 
concerned, merely the fact that Israel was left to determine the extent 'in what areas and to what extent 
to redeploy'. Regarding the third stage of redeployment. Article XI.2 of the Interim Agreement provided 
that: 'The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territoi'y, except for issues that will be 
negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Council in a phased manner, to be completed witliin eighteen months fr om the inaugui ation of the 
Council, as specified below.' Once again it is instructive to point out the Foreign Ministry's 
interpretation that.
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'It should be noted that the provision refers to 'West Bank and Gaza Strip territory'; the omission 
of the definite article (e.g. 'the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip') is deliberate and 
clearly intended to leave open the possibility that there will be areas of the West Bank, in 
addition to those connected with the permanent status issues, which will not fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Council. This is in contrast to the Gaza-Jericho arrangements which referred to 
'withdrawal fiom the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area' (see, for example, DoP Articles V and VI), 
and so required withdrawal from the entire area except for those areas connected with the 
permanent status issues.'
In conclusion, the position paper stated that the fiirther redeployment provisions of the DoP and Interim 
Agreement provided that the 'redeployments aie to be effected alongside, and aie dependent upon, the 
Palestinian police proving itself capable of exercising its secur ity responsibilities.' Therefore the 'extent of 
the fii'st two stages of the redeployment is left to be determined by Israel, while at the conclusion of the 
tliird and final phase the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council is to cover some, but not necessarily aU, 
West Bank and Gaza Strip territory.' In those areas in wliich redeployment takes place, 'permanent status 
issues - among them settlements, military locations and borders - will remain under Israeli jurisdiction, as 
will other ai eas requii ed for the exercise of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.' 
Following the completion of the redeployment process, Israeli forces 'will have redeployed to specified 
military locations to be determined by Israel'. However, the Interim Agreement 'places no restriction on 
the number of forces in these ai eas, or their ability to move outside these ar eas while fulfilling security 
responsibilities in accordance with the Agieement.'’*’
Reciprocity in this sense means effectively an Israeli veto over the peace process. The principle, 
and the inference of its meaning, were however ironically one-sided, because the Palestinians had no 
desiie, nor advantage to gain, in halting the peace process as it stood. Mutual security guarantees were 
not incorporated within the terms of Hebron Protocol, thus whilst 'Palestinian Responsibilities' in the 
'Note for the Record' were outlined in Point 2 as: 'Fighting terror and preventing violence', committing 
the Palestinians to; a. strengthening security cooperation; b. preventing incitement and hostile 
propaganda; c. combat systematically and effectively terrorist organisations and infiastructur e;, d. 
apprehension, prosecution and punishment of terrorists; e. transfer suspects and defendants to Israel 
jurisdiction; and f. confiscation of illegal firearms, similar obligations and commitments ar e not expected 
or required of the Israelis. Therefore Israel was neither obligated to halt 'practices that contravene 
international conventions, such as the expropriation of lands and house demolitions', settlement 
construction, deportations, imposition of collective punishments, and other human rights violations, nor 
expected to constrain armed settlers, Jewish terrorists, or hateful propaganda in the Israeli media.’** The 
only Palestinian trump remaining was to refuse to sign a final status agreement, however Israel's 
determination to create facts on the ground diuing the negotiations process may well negate the 
necessity for the Israelis to need to conclude a final status agreement. The interpretation that Israel 
retained sole responsibility for determining fiuther redeployments, and thus retained power over the 
nature of the peace process, was borne out by Joel Singer, who advised Meir Einstein of Kol Israel, that
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'The Oslo Agreement and the Interim Agreement detennine that aU three phases of the redeployment are 
based on unilateral Israeli decisions,' Israel, having decided to redeploy some of its forces, had therefore 
at least formally acted in accordance with the agreement, however Singer pointed out that 'as to the 
extent of the redeployment, that is a political issue, not a legal one', as the 'agreement left it up to Israel 
to decide on the three phases of redeployment'. Singer outlined that the 'only criterion set down by the 
agreement is tliat by the end of the third phase Israel should redeploy into specified locations, into the 
Israeli settlements and into certain 'yellow areas" however 'the agreement does not state what the 
proportion between the three phases should be', despite that during the negotiations the 'Palestinians 
indeed wanted the agreement to state that redeployment would be carried out in proportional, equally 
sized phases'. Singer reiterated the point that, ultimately, redeployment 'was left up to a unilateral Israeli 
decision', and 'the question of percentages - both how much of the territory would ultimately remain 
under Israel's control, and how much would be transferred to the Palestinians ...remained subject to 
unilateral Israeli decision' which again meant that the 'extent of the redeployments is of course subject to 
political considerations'.
Why then did the Palestinians conclude such an agreement, and how does their interpretation fit 
with the overall peace process? The Palestinian leadership seems to have been driven by the paramount 
priority to sustain the peace process despite the seeming advantages provided in the Hebron agreement 
in Israel's favour. By persisting with the peace process, the Palestinian leadership seemed to hope that 
by prolonging their involvement with theft peace 'partners', new dynamics would arise in the Palestinians' 
favour as a result of continued negotiations, leading to the Palestinians' desfte to see, an end to Israeli j
occupation and the ftilfiJment of theft ultimate objective of a sovereign Palestine. However, such i
calculations seem to be measured more by hope, than by the design of the concluded agreements. j
Despite PISGA denials to the conti*ary, and in spite of the validity of Israel's interpretation of the new |
dynamics of the peace process and its reinterpretation of the terms of reference backed by the US, the j
Palestinian leadership seems to derive theft positive outlook more from over-optimistic assumption, |
rather than in a close reading of the agreements and offering in evidence, substantive provisions from the i
agreements concluded, as the authority with which to substantiate theft interpretation of the progress of j
the peace process. In Ms statement to the Knesset on the Hebron Protocol, Netanyahu stated the Israeli |
position unequivocally, 'We are committed ...to the written agreements' of the peace process, 'We have !
demonstrated today that we are fulfilling oui' commitments', 'But our goals are different' from the 
previous government in that 'We are using the time interval in the agreement to acMeve oui' goals, to i
maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth necessary for the defence of the state, to ;
insist on the right of Jews to settle in theft land, and to propose to the Palestinians a suitable arrangement j
for self-rule but without the sovereign powers wMch might pose a threat to the State of Israel'.’”  j
Palestinian critics of the Hebron deal, such as Edwar d Said, contend that the Palestiman I
leadersMp accepted a formula for Israeli-Palestiman coexistence, which amounted to the Palestinians j
having acceded to the Israeli determination of theft status as autonomy without sovereignty. Said j
contends that the Palestinian leadersMp, even mcluding 'quite a few ...with long Mstories in progressive Î
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politics', has been seduced by 'a few material advantages (a car*, an office, a position, a VIP designation)' 
into accepting 'this appalling situation'. Said asked for an answer to their silence and cooperation with 
such agreements which deny Palestinians 'specified sovereignty and real self-determination', and which 
allow Israel to retain control over settlements, settlers, external security, borders, the economy, water, 
military locations, and maintain effective jurisdictional sovereignty over at least 73% of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip during the interim period.” * Sovereignty denied is sovereignty retained. Said offered 'a 
series of unflattering rationales' in possible explanation for the continuation of the peace policy: 1. 'so 
long as the peace process guarantees the centrality of the PLO and its leader, then more or less anytliing 
goes'; 2. having been 'so outmanoeuvred, outgunned, and outsmarted by Israel, you feel you have no 
chance but to go on, trying to brazen it out vis-a-vis your own people with a lot of hopeful but ultimately 
misleading speeches and promises'; 3. following 'the tactic of making more concessions, accepting all the 
humiliating Israeli conditions in the wishful fantasy that some day either you'll stop having to make 
concessions or the Israelis will give you a few things back'; and 4. politics is 'a dirty business', and the 
Israelis are the Palestinians' 'partners in crime'.” ’ The evidence suggests that the PISGA leadership and 
its apparatus, transformed the PLO 'fi'om a national liberation movement to a police force in the Israeli 
context', and can be thus deemed to be subcontractors for the Israeli secmity establisliment in its war 
against militant Palestinian nationalism, without having to contend with the attendant human rights 
obligations and observance which various Israeli security operatives maintain constrains Israel's freedom 
and licence to operate punitively with impunity.” ’
Said points liis disillusiomnent with the peace process, not to the insecurity of what may be 
achieved by deferring dreams in the hope that they will be realised in the fullness of time, but rather to 
the daily indignities which is the reahty of life facing ordinary Palestinians. For those who support the 
integrity and stated intentions of the peace process, the dilemma in supporting its continuation is that 
Arafat's regime is corrupt, abusive of human rights and wholly dependant on Israel for its continued 
pohtical and economic existence, that Israel's new government not only imposes cohective punishments 
on the occupied population it controls, but also that Israel now seems to have both an asymmetrical 
structmal power imbalance in its favom* and an asymmetrical pohtical advantage in the determination of 
the futm e status of the Israeh-Palestinian relationsliip. Azmi Bishara MK has assessed the new dynamic 
of Israeh-Palestinian relations as 'the imbalance of power and the inequahty in the commitments on 
paper' which means that the future of the peace process 'depends on the intentions of the Israeh 
government'. The Israeh-Palestinian relationship is one of'imbalance and dependency', with the 
objective 'to perpetuate the peace process rather than to arrive at a just peace'.” '* Indeed, Ha'aretz 
quoted a former legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry effectively stating that the peace process aUows 
Israel to claim that: 'We control electric power, water resources, telecommunications, etc. We control 
everything. There ai e a number of natives who serve as middle men. Wliat could suit oui' purposes 
better?' The same source advised the Israeh cabinet to carefiiUy read the Oslo agreements, adding that 
'If you read it, you not only whl accept it, you wifl become its enthusiastic supporters. The power 
imbalance between us and the Palestinians never served our interests better in the past, not even before
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the i n t i f a d a . A l l  this has been achieved with American willingness, connivance and indulgence, and 
with the 'passivity and collective silence' of those who suffer, and who are yet to suffer because of the 
indifference to the inequities, injustices, frustrations, desperation and tensions of those whose future is 
being abandoned.^^^
Final Status Talks
In anticipation of the resumption of final status talks, a number of senior Israeli officials, 
including Gold, Meridor, Nave and Netanyaliu policy adviser David Bar Ilan, began on November 26th 
re-examining the Labour government-PISGA (Beilin-Abbas) talks on a blueprint for a peace accord/final 
status scenario as a possible basis for continuing negotiations with the PISGA.^^  ^ However on January 
22nd in Cairo, Arafat stated that after the interim period, the PISGA could unilaterally declare a 
Palestinian state, without Israeli permission, which prompted Netanyaliu to respond the next day that if 
Ai’afat were to declare a Palestinian state unilaterally, he would order the retaking of Ai'ea B.^ ^^  Tlnough 
the terms of the Hebron Protocol, by linking further Israeli military redeployment to PISGA compliance 
with the terms of the agreements, by the Israelis retaining control over the timing and extent of fiirther 
redeployment, and by having the completion date of the redeployment phase almost parallel that of the 
final date of the permanent status negotiations, the Israelis have effectively negated the likeliliood of a 
Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence. This is because, no Palestinian state, prior to a 
substantial redeployment, could be established because until the agreed fiirther redeployment phases are 
fully completed, it would not be viable or defensible, and also because the Israelis, knowing world 
opinion would count against their use of a full-scale military operation to reenter PISGA ai eas, have 
linked redeployment to permanent status discussions in such a way as to shadow the PISGA's future 
progress rather than be stipulated as either preconditions of such, or be binding on good behaviour 
through afready concluded agreements.
A document of understandings intended to map out the common ground between the major 
Israeli parties in preparation for final status talks with the PISGA was negotiated over three months of 
discussions by a group of Likud and Labour legislators, led by Michael Eytan MK, head of Likud's 
parliamentaiy faction and Yossi Beilin MK, former government minister and principal ai chitect of the 
Oslo channel.^^  ^ Other signatories included Haim Ramon, Shlomo Ben-Ami of Labour', and Eliezer 
Zandberg, Zeev Boim, Yehuda Lankri and Meir Sheetrit of Likud. The document, entitled 'National 
Agreement Regarding the Negotiations on the Permanent Settlement with the Palestinians', was not 
approved by either party, with the PM's office stating that the document was a private initiative that in 
no way obligated the government.^^^
Following the Hebron Protocol, Israel remains in direct control of 73% of the West Bank (Area 
C), and exercises overall security responsibilities for the remaining 27%. In Gaza Israel retains direct 
control over 40% of the land. It has been Netanyahu's stated intention to cede as little of'Eretz Yisrael' 
to 'foreign sovereignty', not only for ideological and existential reasons but particulai'ly with regard to 
bargaining over final status arrangements, to be completed by May 1999. Publication of the Beilin- 
Eytan agreement, helped reinforce the new Israeli negotiating agenda, having been widely interpreted as
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being somewhat less visionary regarding the Israeli-PISGA final status airangement than that envisaged 
in the Beilin-Abbas agreements just prior to Rabin's assassination. As such, it represents an attempt at 
repairing the Israeli domestic political consensus so rudely ruptured by Rabin's murder. Having 
attempted peace with the Palestinians with the resultant costs to the Israeli polity, it was only natuial that 
Israeli politicians would seek to rebuild a more inclusive and hegemonic national consensus which would 
hold during the final status negotiations. Thus, the Beilin-Eytan document may well become the basis 
for assuring cross-party support and consensus within the Knesset as Israel enters into talks on the 
permanent arrangements. However, to conclude that this document is a negotiating blueprint wliich will 
reflect the final status outcome, is however to forget that the primary focus of this document has much 
more to do with healing domestic, political rifts, than in assuming it has the status of a negotiating text.
If viewed in terms of being no more than the latest expression of Zionist/nationalist consensus then the 
document adheres more to previous policy prescriptions such as the Allon Plan, than of the Beilin-Abbas 
document. Whilst Beilin-Abbas called for the Israeli withdrawal fi*om 94% of the West Bank with a 
capital in Abu Dis and the Palestinian flag flying over al-Aqsa, the Allon Plan envisaged Israel annexing 
some 40% of the West Bank, 50% of Gaza, and the establishment of an autonomous fi-amework for the 
inhabitants of the occupied territories.^^ ^ The document's strong defence of the 150+ settlements and the 
150,000+ settlers, and the explicit support of the permanent maintenance of all Israeli settlements under 
Israeli sovereignty within the terms of the envisaged futme, peimanent arrangement, points to this 
conclusion. The non-specific descriptive language of the document, referring to 'Jews and Aiubs in the 
Land of Israel' suggests that the Israeli consensus agreed witliin the document owes more to the desire 
to heal wounds within Israel than to worry too much about Palestinian sensitivities about the rights to 
self-determination and statehood. Any deference to the Palestinian hopes is contained in the 
indeterminate term, 'Palestinian entity', which the Israelis have agreed to disagree over, Beilin referring 
to a 'state, Eytan as 'enlarged autonomy'. However the main tluust of the document is the agreement in 
limiting ceding Israeli occupation and sovereign powers and retaining strategic and defensive capabilities 
far beyond those between two normal sovereign entities. Not only does the document expect 
extraterritorial powers and responsibilities for Israel, the futur e of the settlements and the settlers' rights 
anywhere in the 'Western Land of Israel' must be preserved as one of the basic security requirements 
regarding any future permanent status talks. The settlers and the settlements are regarded as integral to 
Israel, wlrich will either have fiill sovereignty extended over them, or will be ensured safe and secure 
access passages under sovereign Israeli control. The contrast with the Beilin-Abbas document which 
had envisaged some 100 settlements coming under Palestinian sovereignty could not be more marked. 
Rather than represent a break from the past, in the form of the Beilin-Abbas document, the Beilin-Eytan 
document represents a fink with the more accepted, traditional Zionist national consensus, and thus has 
more to do with reconstructing the Zionist, nationalist polity, severely damaged by the peace process.^^  ^
Labour and Likud have few ideological differences on nationalist/Zionist issues, in practice both follow 
pragmatic and practical approaches with regaid to the occupied territories. Both parties are driven by 
the same ideological nationalist/religious imperative, to conquer the land, to Judaise it, to settle in it, and
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to prepare it both for further settlement and for the coming of the Chosen One. Secular sensitivities 
aside, the reason for the whole Zionist enterprise was to establish a Jewish homeland, an idea, which 
although was initiated within the ideology of 19th centuiy Eur opean nationalism and self-determination, 
stems from an ancient religious covenant between a people and then God. Thus the parties main 
differences really lie in the domestic arena, particularly with regard to the character and extent of 
synagogue and state relations. Regarding the Zionist/Jewish nature of the State of Israel there is 
surprising similarity between the actions of one and the commitment of the other. Labour* occupied the 
territory, built and developed the first settlements, deported Palestinians, imposed blanket and selective 
closures, curfews, collective punishments, detained and tortured Palestinians without due process, and 
demolished homes. Neither really wants to see a Palestinian state established. The debate between the 
two has never really centred on the ill effects that the policies of occupation and repression have 
wrought on the Israeli body politic, although these issues have been raised, however the real crux of the 
debate has been on the practical issue of security, whether or not retaining some or all of the occupied 
territories is in Israel's long-term best interests. Whether arguments are justified by religion or 
pragmatism, the consensus exists that Israel should retain occupied territory, what divides the two 
parties is to what extent territories should be annexed and what to do with the Palestinians as a people. 
Labour wishes to provide the Palestinians with of some of the rights that Israelis demand for themselves, 
whereas Likud has either wished to ignore the Palestinians or hoped that they would just somehow 
disappear.
The delay in the fuither redeployment timetable is not really much of a cause for great concern if 
seen in the light of the practice of the peace process to date. Originally agreed timetables have gone 
awry since the first deadline was missed in 1993. As long as Rabin's attitude that no date was sacred is 
borne in mind, then one way or another, as long as the will and the confidence to achieve an agreement 
eventually, is present, then timetables should be regai ded merely as signposts. What is of concern dui ing 
the further redeployment phases, is the fact that they are not subject to further negotiations. Israel, alone 
is responsible for determining the territorial extent, the timing and the location of the further 
redeployments. Israel therefore has a wide and unchallenged latitude for interpreting the conclusion of 
the phases of redeployment. In this sense, the US involvement in aiding the brokerage of the Hebron 
Protocol was significant. Netanyahu achieved, for the duration of the interim period at least, the ability 
to unilaterally determine Israel's secuiity needs in the occupied territories, which under Likud have 
always been expressed territorially. Thus fin*ther redeployment fr om occupied territories will be assessed 
on a determination that territoi*y provides secm'ity, rather than agreement with the Palestinians per se. 
Whilst Christopher reiterated the traditional US view that final status should reflect Israel's needs for 
secure and defensible borders which should be detemiined through direct negotiations with Israel's 
neighbours, however, Ross stated that 'Borders and fuither redeployment aie not necessarily 
synonymous'. In an attempt to allay international concerns over the settlements issue, Israel received 
criticism from former high-ranking US officials, the State Department and President Clinton. 
Christopher's 'Letter of Assurance' to Arafat, wliilst not publicly released, is believed to contain a US
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commitment to the Palestinians that Israel would indeed M61 its pledges and obligations to redeploy. 
However Palestinians contend the right of the Israelis to unilaterally determine the extent and modalities 
of their redeployment, insisting that they would not allow Netanyahu to impose the phases and localities 
of redeployment on them without then influence, the way Rabin had previously done. However FM 
Levy acknowledged this Palestinian fear in an interview with al-Sharq al-Awsat on 22/01, when he 
stated 'The prime minister said that under the original agreement Israel is the one to decide the area of 
the land needed to protect its own security. Security is the main thing. But tliis does not mean that the 
Palestinians will respond by saying yes to everytliing we tell them. There is give and take. If we succeed 
together in securing suitable conditions for peace, without violence and with more trust between the 
parties and tangible relations of peace, everytliing will be easy, and you will find us all looking for means 
to bring us closer to one another.'
The Palestinians believe that Israel should redeploy fi om all but some 10% of the West Bank by 
the end of the third phase of redeployment, those areas remaining being the settlements, whereas the US 
is reported as believing that Israel should cede some 10% of Area C to the PISGA as part of the first 
phase. However, in prepaiation for these issues, on 10/02 the Israeli cabinet began discussions to 
determine fi’oni which areas of the West Bank the IDF would redeploy in each of the thi ee agreed 
stages, with various security branches making representations of various options. The IDF Planning 
Branch submitted to the cabinet for discussion, a 'vital interests map' of the West Bank. The maps under 
review had been initially prepar ed at Rabin's request dur ing the Taba talks prior to the Interim 
Agreement. According to the IDF map, the PISGA would control up to 45% of the West Bank by the 
third phase. Gaza is not included in this scenario and therefore presumably excluded from fiirther 
redeployment phases. The IDF map outlines three blocs of non-contiguous Palestinian-controlled 
territory, separ ated by Jewish settlements and areas to remain under Israeli control, such as the Jordan 
Valley. The map includes border adjustments, meaning annexations, along the Green Line as well as 
including additional areas planned for the development and growth of existing settlements. The IDF plan 
includes transferring 5% of Area B to Area A status after the first phase, with remainder of Area B 
attaining Area A status following the second phase. This would give the PISGA powers and 
responsibilities covering some 30% of the West Bank. It is then in the thiid and final phase that Israel 
would cede territory fi*om Area On February 10th, the IDF presented an analysis of Israel's 
requirements in the final status to the cabinet. The IDF outlined these as, a permanent presence of the 
IDF in settlement blocs in the northern West Bank and the Jerusalem region, the control of major east- 
west and north-south West Bank arteries, and the control of the Jordan Valley and the border with 
Jordan. Based on these estimates, Netanyahu's adviser David Bar Ilan interpreted the issue of final 
redeployment on January 15th to mean that Israel would probably retain 51.8% of West Bank land after 
final redeployment under a permanent airangement, whereas A*afat had interpreted on December 19th 
the luither redeployment schedule as laid out under the Interim Agreement to mean that Israel would be 
obligated to redeploy fi om no less than 80% of the West Bank.^ *^^  After the meeting FM Levy 
emphasised that Israel would not hold talks on further redeployment with the PISGA, stating that 'This is
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a decision that only we will make ...We are not obligated to hold any discussions or negotiations with 
anyone', and Netanyahu reportedly urged his ministerial colleagues not to talk in terms of percentages, as 
doing so would only 'serve the interests of the Palestinians'.^^^
4.7 Conclusion
Having analysed tins chapter through the lens of items 1 and 4 of the RICEMAN FORMULA, 
i.e. resolution and empowerment, we can now offer some conclusions as to how successful the further 
negotiated agreements have been in combiihng to prépai e the foundation of the interim phase of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process as laid down within the terms of the DoP. Thus we can conclude, that 
the further agreements have allowed for the transfer and exercise of powers and responsibilities to the 
Palestinians and provided for greater levels of sovereignty to be attained by the Palestinians. The further 
agreements set out to provide for a sustainable preventative security regime involving reciprocal and 
cooperative rights and obligations based on shared goals and principles of justice, economic 
interdependence, collective secuiity and a sense of shared community, in order to achieve an equitable 
and lasting settlement which masters existing inherent asymmetrical power inequalities. If we take as an 
indicative example the issue of economic interdependence for our conclusion, we will be able to assess 
the relative merits of the negotiated fiirther transitional interim self-government arrangements on the 
basis of how successful the peace process has been m delivering real and practical benefits to those who 
are supposed to be the beneficiaries of the enthe enterprise, namely the Israeli and Palestinian general 
publics.
For the proponents of peace, who have argued that economic interdependence and integration 
between Israel and the Palestinians will provide for an 'economy of peace', events during the period of 
the negotiations have confounded their optimism.^ *^" Mass imemployment, extended periods of closuie 
either of paits or of the whole West Bank and Gaza Strip, endemic and systemic structui al and 
infrastructural weaknesses, and a wholly unhealthy dependent economic relationship has countered the 
notion that economic prosperity could allow difficult political decisions to prosper. In essence, the idea 
that economic activity would so involve, energise and preoccupy the majority of the Palestinian 
population thus buying them off and dissuading them fr om involvement in political agitation has not been 
borne out by the evidence of the past years. Hungry people, whose hope for their and their childrens' 
future turns to despair, make for angry people. Many people can cope with a denial of their national 
aspirations and di eams of a perfect world, as long as then personal cfrcumstances are financially 
ameliorated in compensation. However when externally imposed economic cfrcumstances are so severe 
as to be oppressive, people tend to view the political system that sustains their straitened lives with eyes 
that see succoui* in radical solutions. The tenet that the denial of rights and the legitimacy of a peoples' 
struggle could at least be assuaged by a flourishing economy has, despite the infusion of vast amounts of 
foreign aid, failed, because the Israeli preoccupation with its secuiity fears with the resultant cost being 
declining Palestinian living standards, have perversely led to an increase in Israel's vulnerability to further 
attacks because the economic conditions necessaiy to contain Palestinian violence have failed to
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materialise, precisely because Israel's security fears have fuelled actions which have directly led to a 
worsening of Palestinians' economic conditions.
The Pai'is Protocol on Economic Relations promised to lay the groundwork for strengthening the 
Palestinian economic base and extending to the Palestinians autonomy in the economic decision-making 
process in accordance with its own development plan, and the rights to pursue its own economic 
priorities.^^  ^ This aspect of the peace process was included because of the acceptance of the principle 
that 'national sovereignty in economic decision-making is an important prerequisite to political 
independence.'^^^ However the reality has been continued and compounded dominance of the Palestinian 
economic sector by the Israeli economy, ensuring that Palestinian ability to determine economic policy is 
severely limited and that the interdependence of the two economies is balanced most favourably for the 
Israelis.
Israel has severely reduced Palestinian access, in terms of goods and persons, to the Israeli 
economy, citing security concerns for their actions. Israel has cut Palestinians working in Israel from 
116,000 to 29,500 between 1993-96, resulting in severe Palestinian unemployment, as between 33% and 
50% of male employment was dependent on employment in the Israeli sector.^^  ^ Estimates of Palestinian 
unemployment in 1995-96 vaiy between official and unofficial calculations, ranging between 31% to 
74% in Gaza, and between 13% and 50% in the West Bank.^ '*® These figures also hide the 
underemployment of the workforce, and the underdevelopment of the economy, brought about by 
frequent closuies, collective punishments, curfews and secuiity actions. The fiaiancial costs of closuie 
alone, according to PISGA estimates, run approximately at $6m per day during periods of full closure. 
These costs far outweigh donor assistance. The costs of closure are generally borne by individuals, 
families and small businesses, whereas donor assistance is disbursed to the PISGA, its mstitutions, and 
earmai'ked projects. Long term damage done to personal financial circumstances and small to medium 
busmesses is difficult to assess, however donor assistance is not forthcomiig ii  tins aiea. Closures also 
ensures structural damage as a result of reduced foreign and expatriate investments and delays to 
infrastructural development projects. These policies resulted in September 1996, of a PISGA budget 
deficit of some 40% of the annual budget, primarily as a result of reduced tax receipts. '^* ^
Businesses need access to laboui* and capital, however restrictions in the JGree movement of 
labour even within the occupied territories, in raising venture capital, and in business planning 
capabilities, severely limit the prospects of economic growth. Israel not only restricts Palestinians from 
employment in Israel, it also restricts the free movement of goods and persons between the vaiious 
PISGA-controUed communities, isolating local economies, making the planning and development of an 
integrated economy almost impossible. This is particularly true with regard to the position of Jerusalem, 
access to wlnich has been tightly controlled, ensuring that Palestinian labourers, contractors and 
entrepreneui's aie excluded from access to the Jerusalem maiket, with the corresponding knock on 
effects on small businesses and seh-employment opportunities. By restricting employment options,
Israel ensures that incomes are overall reduced, meaning that spending power is also reduced, fiirther 
hurting local businesses. This 'multiplier effect-a cycle of fewer jobs and less income', threatens the very
253
survival of the Palestinian economy. "^^  ^ PISGA policy-makers and the international donor community are 
imable or unwilling to address tliis political problem wlnich afflicts the Palestinian economy, and 
adversely affects fiscal planning and economic development. Wlnen skilled and educated Palestinians aie 
forced to accept employment in jobs which do not utilise theii* skills and training, then support for the 
continuation of this particular peace process will be set back. Under-utilised ordinary people with no 
meaningful role in a stalled project of national reconstruction, wiU increasingly find the process of state- 
building to be hollow. The 'feefing of abandonment is palpable', according to a recent polls, 68.5% of 
those describing themselves as 'not well-to-do' responded that they were pessimistic about their future, 
29.4% responded that they did not trust any political movement, with 20.5% not trusting any of their 
leaders. '^*  ^ Thus the power Israel exerts in unilaterally destabalising the extremely fragile, nascent 
Palestinian economy highlights the structural economic asymmetrical power relationship. Therefore, by 
any indicators, the relative position of the Palestinian economy post-DoP as opposed to pre-DoP, is 
undoubtedly worse.
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Chapter Five; The Effectiveness of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self- 
Government Arrangements as a Means of Conflict Resolution
'God does not change the blessings
He has bestowed on men until they change what is in their hearts.
God hears all and knows all...
The basest creatures in the sight of God are the faithless who will not believe; 
those who time after time violate their treaties with you and have no tear o f God.
If you capture them in battle discriminate between them and those that follow them, 
so that their followers may take warning...
If they incline to peace, 
make peace with them.
And put your trust in God.
He hears all and knows all.' — Qu'ran: Sura 8, Al-Anfal, verses 53-61
5.1 Introduction
Before the signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Airangements 
(DoP), Israel and the PLO were enemies engaged in a mainly low-intensity, though sometimes high- 
intensity, inter-etlinic, existential conflict. Neither side officially recognised the other, and both sought 
effectively to deligitimise and destroy the other. As argued witliin tliis thesis, the intention of the DoP 
was to 'put an end to decades of confr ontation and conflict, recognise' each other's 'mutual legitimate and 
political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a 
just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation tlirough the agreed political 
process.' The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the Middle East peace process was to 
establish an autonomous Palestinian authority within a transitional period which will lead to 'a permanent 
settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338', and that the 'negotiations on the 
permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.'^
How effective the DoP has been in achieving its stated objectives to date is very much open to 
interpretation, and dependent on the positive or negative light in wliich events are viewed. With the 
negotiation of the Hebron Protocol, the formal agreements covering the transitional interim period, the 
conflict management stages of institutionalisation, empowerment and administration, were concluded. 
Negotiations for concluding a permanent settlement are still ongoing, so the conflict resolution process 
is still under construction. Whilst it is important for political purposes to view the DoP in an optimistic 
spirit, it is also important that the emphasis of any analysis be constructive, concentrating the evaluation 
of the DoP more closely on the pessimistic and destructive causal elements of the process, as these are 
the areas which are more likely to produce a deterioration and repudiation of the peace process and a 
resumption of remorseless conflict.
Previously, in Chapter One, we asked a number of questions relating to the difficulties in 
acliieving durable negotiated settlements. These questions were: What are the critical criteria for 
measuring the success or failure of an attempt at conflict resolution? Wliat ai*e the dynamic structural 
processes, and changed systemic/functional power relationsliips set in train by the DoP to reach a post­
conflict settlement? What are the expectations raised by the DoP? How do we define the basic 
objectives, strategic objectives and prerequisites of the parties to the agreement? Is the DoP a device to
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contain, control, limit, manage or resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? In essence, how do we grade 
the test?
The problem with defining success or failui'e is 'one of infinite regress'. Success is inherently 
relative because 'some processes never manage to get the par ties into dialogue, let alone to agree to a 
cessation of fighting. Others reach dialogue but fail to find a possible agreement. Still others ...achieve 
agreement only to see it repudiated. StiU others break down in the implementation stage and the process 
ends in recrimination and accusation of bad faith.Linking success/failm*e indicators to different phases 
of the peace-building process 'avoids the problem of defining the concept in terms of an unrealised, and 
possibly unattainable, end point'.'  ^However, this does not fuUy resolve our definitional paradox of 
evaluating a peace process which does not result in a peaceful settlement. Do we thus quantify success in 
nnniinalist terms being the establishment of negotiations, the conclusion of a limited formal agreement, 
or the maintenance of a cessation of hostilities agi eement? Should more developed and sopliisticated 
criteria be incorporated? There are no easy answers.
To define and measure the success/failui*e parameters with which to understand and evaluate the 
political process of the bilateral asymmetrical Israeli-Palestinian national-subnational conflict within the 
context of the Madi id international multinational conflict resolution fr amework, we have to evaluate the 
political process in the absence of a definitive system wliich offers a simple quantifiable valuation. We 
shall instead judge the success of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process using the set of theoretical 
assumptions as laid out by the RICEMAN FORMULA as to whether or not there has been a marked 
improvement between Israeli-Palestinian relations existing post-Oslo, compared with the environment 
pre-Oslo. Improvement will be the qualifying variable by which to measure relations between the parties 
as they progress fr om conflict to definitive peace.
In order to assess and evaluate the DoP, the subsequent agreements done, and the peace process 
in general against its stated goals, the intention of the theoretical section of this work was to apply a set 
of standards in order that we may best detennine the effectiveness of the DoP as an example of a means 
of conflict resolution. Thus, having examined the process in the subsequent chapters, we wHl now apply 
the RICEMAN FORMULA. To recap, the formula covers: (1) Resolution: development of a 
sustainable preventative security regime involving a reciprocal and cooperative positive peace agreement 
based on shared goals and principles of justice, economic interdependence, collective security and sense 
of shared community, and an equitable and lasting settlement which masters inherent asymmetrical 
power inequalities; (2) Institutionalisation: implementation of a recognised, binding and agi eed legal 
fr-amework setting out specific commitments and obligations, within an enforceable conflict prevention 
regime; (3) Confidence-building: provision of channels for dispute resolution, crisis prevention, 
reconcihation, conflict deterrence and reduction, foundation of political institutions to diffuse political 
instability and human rights abuses, economic uncertainty, and ensure compliance and verification of a 
mutual secuiity environment; (4) Empowerment: powers and responsibilities exercised and levels of 
sovereignty attained; (5) Mediation: sustained support and political direction fi*om third parties which 
nuiture and advance the peace process; procedures wliich enable for peacefiil change, including 
procedural mechanisms which allow for the review of settlement terms, the raising of grievances, for
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adjustments to the settlement as new realities are created, and which anticipates and monitors potential 
areas of fliture conflict^; (6) Administration: bureaucratic regime developed to conduct, manage, 
regulate and supervise conflict resolution institution; (7) Negotiation: systems employed to facilitate 
deal-making process.
5.2 RICEMAN FORMULA: Resolution
From the evidence analysed in the preceding chapters we can draw two principal conclusions. 
Firstly, the foxmdation of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DoP), that is a 'permanent settlement' to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, is based primarily 
on UN Security Council Resolution 242 and is designed to lead to the implementation of Security 
Council Resolutions 242. In a practical sense the reality of acliieving such a state is open to widely 
differing interpretations and therefore an agreed compromise will be difficult to determine. Secondly, 
because of the ffist conclusion, the principal objective of the DoP, a 'just, lasting and comprehensive 
peace settlement' leading to tlie resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict via 'historic reconciliation 
thi'ough the agreed pohtical process' will be that much harder to accomplish.^
Drawn from the evidence provided it is important that we understand a usable, comprehensive 
and realistic definition of what we mean by conflict resolution within the current international system, in 
order that we may use it to measure not only the effectiveness of the DoP at achieving a state of 
resolved conflict, but also by which we can measure the DoP against its own stated goals. To evaluate 
the DoP, resolution shall be imderstood to be a state in which conflicting parties agree to cease all 
politically motivated and national-goal oriented hostile acts toward one another, and contract to coexist 
benignly, witli mutual respect, refrain from malevolent acts aimed at the disruption of the internal affairs 
to the detriment of the other party in the pursuit of national goals, and allow for the free movement of 
peoples, goods, services and ideas, within an agreed institutional framework based on justice and respect 
for human rights. Thus depending whether or not the DoP produces a peace settlement wliich, when 
analysed, conforms to these above criteria providing a just, lasting and comprehensive peace, can it be 
deemed a success or failure.
Despite the ambiguities contained in the initial arrangements, and the secrecy in concluding the 
agreement to proceed as partners in a process of peace-building, the DoP lias brought about certain 
irreversible facts, costs and benefits. The political act of mutual recognition can not be reversed. Both 
sides conceded to the other the total fulfilment of their national goals, i.e., complete victory over the 
other. Neither can claim to refiise to negotiate fiirther with the other and return to the exclusivity of the 
militaiy option; it would be too costly politically. For the Palestinians, the DoP allows the PLO a pre­
eminent place as Israel's negotiating partner to determine the future of the occupied territories, thus 
imdermining any friture role as such for Jordan. The DoP also effectively precludes Israel fr om denying 
the most basic of Palestinian rights. It also provides a base to establish an internationally approved PLO 
presence witliin the occupied tenitories, fr om wliich to build a new political relationsliip with the 
Palestinian people and the Israeli government. The DoP represents for the Israelis an end to the desire 
to circumvent the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and the negation of the
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illusion that there were alternative Palestinian actors who could be dealt with who would not raise the 
issues of Palestinian statehood and compensation for 1948 and 1967 refugees. It provides for the denial 
of the assertion that Israel was never really intent in pursuing a meaningful peace with the Palestinians, 
demonstrating an Israeli willingness to negotiate an alternative to military occupation and repression and 
regional isolation. By pursuing the goal of peace witli the Palestinians in order to ultimately make peace 
with the Arab world, the DoP accords in the international ai ena the prospect of the diplomatic benefit of 
lessening regional tensions, destroying the figment of inter-Arab political solidarity aimed at isolating 
Israel, and provides for new regional economic and political relationships. The DoP provides an 
opportunity to build new political relationships, and to establish a new consensus, within both Israeli and 
Palestinian polities, and between the Israeli and Palestinian political leaderships.
Both sides have to judge the DoP by the politically most important criterion, namely, that of to 
what extent the DoP has advanced and achieved the paificipants' specific national interests, and whether 
or not the principles laid out in the negotiations still contain the necessaiy criteria to fulfil such national 
objectives, and that the DoP remains the most significant and viable vehicle for effecting a mutually 
acceptable modus vivendi.
Objectives
However, the essential contradiction and inherent flaw of the DoP which separates both sides is 
what constitutes the objective of the entire enterprise. There is no shared vision, despite the stated 
intentions outlined in the agreement. The Palestinians see the DoP as the instrument by which Israel 
would withdraw to its pre-1967 borders, allowing for the establisliment of a sovereign Palestinian state 
on the territories vacated. The Israelis see the DoP as allowing them to legitimate the expansion of their 
post-1967 borders, including the unilateral unification and annexation of Jerusalem. The DoP has never 
been able to bridge the inherent contradictions dividing both parties; however, it was an attempt to 
negotiate a compromise, tlii'ough a process of confidence building. For many the spii it of hope in 
building confidence between enemies outlined in the DoP was as important as the letter of the agreement 
in tiying to stimulate a new relationship between the Israelis and Palestinians. It is this aspect of 
confidence building in the future, enshrined in the DoP, which has underlined the basic acceptance by 
wider public opinion. However such acceptance can only be sustained if those who support it believe 
that it will bring a just, equitable, and lasting settlement. Without justice and fairness the DoP's promises 
loses theii* allure. For Palestinians who have had to endure the abandomnent of their dreams of the 
reunification of historic Palestine incorporating a bi-ethnic political and cultural structure, the failure to 
compensate theii* loss with at least a state which includes the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, 
heralds ’the end of any viable sense of Palestine.'^
Both sides have the option to pursue either a 'full' peace or a 'partial' peace during the final status 
negotiations. A 'fiill' peace would be a conflict resolution regime wliich brought the conflict to an end 
'by an agreement in which both sides relinquish all fui ther claims against each other in return for what 
they get in the agreement.'^ A 'partial' peace would be 'an agreement to end particular forms of conflict 
for the time being, even though one or both sides insists that it does not accept the current working 
arrangements as just or permanent, and reserves the right to make every effort to change them, except
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for the particular kinds of conflict that they agree to forego in the partial peace agreement.' Either 
approach is entirely compatible with the terms of the DoP, as the distinction between either 'fiiU' or 
'partial' peace 'was not strongly articulated in the discussions related to Oslo'.  ^ Indeed there ai e 
considerable and contradictory implications concerning negotiating either scenario.
The autonomy negotiations represent a series of significant transitions of Israeli and Palestinian 
society, political, economic and social. To determine whether the accords have been a success or a 
failure, it must therefore be determined that Israeli and Palestinian society has been transformed from 
occupation to autonomy, fi*om wai* to a just and sustainable peace, fiom financial instability and external 
dependency to independent indigenous economic planning and development, fiom military 
administration to legislative and judicial accountability, fiom militaiy orders to pluralistic democracy, 
from traditional tribal structures and repressive societal controls to individual empowerment thiough the 
guai’antee of basic rights and freedoms. With Israel controlling some 70% of the occupied territories 
after concluding all the foimal interim agreements, the reality seems to provide for partial autonomy and 
paitial occupation; however, incorporated agreements to disagree are inadequate and not really sufficient 
to provide for a permanent solution in the longer term.'^
Flaws
Has the entire peace process been manipulated for partisan ends? Undoubtedly. Basically, when 
evaluating the peace process, none of the participants is without reproach by the standards set by then 
own spokesmen and women, namely the pursuit of peace with justice for a just peace, based on the goal 
of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation thi ough an agreed 
political process leading to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. All 
concerned fall somewhat short of achieving these objectives. However, in defence of all concerned, they 
all remain engaged, at least technically, within the peace process despite political upheavals which have 
given grave concern for the continuation of the peace process. On several occasions, the peace process 
was in pieces, awaiting repair. Before berating the obvious breaches of the spirit, if not the letter of the 
agreements done to date, one must wonder whether or not the original goals, objectives and dreams 
were impossibly high and therefore never able to be attained. For despite all the flaws of this peace 
process, the US, Russia, the European Union, Norway, and many other members of the international 
community have involved themselves in this undertaking, investing time, money and prestige, in spite of 
pressing national and domestic considerations. The international community, which when pressed for 
financial contributions, provided several biftion US dollars of aid. Would that Bosnia, Angola, East 
Timor, Somalia, and Cambodia have been able to generate such international cooperation, generosity, 
time, effort and collectiveness of purpose. The international community, and the US in particular, was 
imder no obligation to become involved in a difficult peace process, particularly if they had no intention 
of having the process succeed. In terms of realpohtik, the US had little option but to become engaged as 
a leading player in determining the ftitui e of the Middle East, because of its strategic interests in 
maintaining close relations with Arab oil-producing states, and because of the domestic political pressui e 
on any US administration fr om the powerfiil influence of the Jewish lobby. For example, Warren 
Christopher flew to the Middle East some 30 times during his tenure of office, whilst in contrast he
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visited China only once/^ It is not a perfect world, and the peace process has had to exist within an 
imperfect world order.
Wliilst this is no way absolves the participants for abdicating theii* responsibilities and falling 
short of achieving liigh ideals and goals, what the peace process has managed to achieve is to afford the 
Palestinians and Israelis the opportunity to negotiate directly their shared fritures, in light of mutual 
public acknowledgement of each others existence. Such a process lias midenniiied mutual hostility and 
repudiation to the extent that the peace process has reached a point of no return, in that the possibility of 
outright conflict based on zero-simi considerations has been so diminished, as to have at least been 
regarded as having been resolved. As an existential conflict, the DoP tlirough mutual recognition, has at 
least removed the negation of the rival's legitimacy as an integral point of conflict. The DoP provides for 
the implementation of a recognised, bindmg and agreed legal fr amework setting out specific 
commitments and obligations, within an enforceable conflict prevention regime. What the DoP has not 
done so far is resolve the conflict on a pennanent basis. The DoP has not developed a sustainable 
preventative secuiity regime involving a reciprocal and cooperative positive peace agreement based on 
shared goals and principles of justice, economic interdependence, collective secuiity and sense of shared 
community, and an equitable and lasting settlement which masters inlierent asymmetrical power 
inequalities. There is much still to be detemiined.
The good intentions stated by the original principals who initiated the Middle East peace process 
have been diluted by various factors, such as violent events, changes in personnel, and changes in the 
direction of political imperatives. Such a diminution of original intentions was bound to occur when the 
process of conflict resolution and political reorientation was intended to be manipulated over a number 
of years, particularly when such a process is forced to incorporate so many changes to the variables 
detennining a final outcome. Whilst the original, laudable fimdamental principles remain as ultimate 
objectives and guiding policies within the ongoing peace process, the nature of an undetermined and 
flexible negotiating strategy wliich is bound to be so obviously influenced by external factors has been 
transformed by hard-bargaining tlirough a political process beyond that of the initial euphoria which 
greeted the announcement of Israeli-Palestinian rapprochement, to become a high-stakes pohtical poker 
game, with land, powers, responsibiUties, and sovereignty as bargaining cliips.
The Israeh government has used, and is using, all its power, intelhgence, wit, determination, 
cumiing, and fr iendships to achieve the best possible resolution for Israel. The Israeli government, of 
whatever shade, is negotiating on behalf of the Israeh piibhc. Their remit and desire is fuehed by their 
partisan constituency, thus Israeh negotiators are driven by what they beheve wiU be regarded as fair and 
equitable by the Israeh pubhc, and not by the mternational community or the Palestinians. Nothing less 
would be expected by the Israeh electorate. If the Palestinians feel the aiTangements are unfair and 
inequitable, then their grievance is ultimately with their own leaders and negotiators for not achieving 
better results. Undoubtedly the asymmetrical nature of the Israeli-Palestinian power relationship means 
that the Palestinians wih always be at a disadvantage in terms of institutional power. However, the 
Palestinian people's representatives are theirs to choose and unmake, and in the final analysis, if the 
Palestinians feel that the DoP has meant that their desires for sovereignty and statehood have been
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outmanoeuwed, then the fault lies with those chosen to lead the Palestinian people, and not with those 
chosen by others to lead others. Naked terrorism such as that employed by the suicide bombers will not 
sway the Israeli or American publics to sanction the renegotiation of alternatives. After all 'Israel is not, 
as many Aiabs delude themselves into believing, an obsequious monkey whose organ-grmder is the 
United States. Indeed, to believe that it is an act of political ignorance, wishftil thinking and self- 
deception.'^^ Only a new non-violent intifada with a publicly endorsed leadersliip will have the slightest 
hope of stimulating pressure on Israel to conclude a settlement viewed as fair, equitable and just by the 
Palestinian public. It is in tliis context that Israeli negotiators must be most aware of the obligations that 
come with enjoying such an asymmetrical power imbalance witliin the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. 
Whilst concluding a settlement which is deemed fair and just by one side, and rejected by the majority of 
the public opinion of the other as unfaii*, will merely persist with the interim phase. For the Israelis, and 
the right in particular', the prophetic warning is clear*, for the ftitur e well-being and secur ity of Israel is 
not so much based on the settlements, on a biblical commandment to settle the land, nor even on a 
militarily strong Israel. Israel's future secur ity is midemiined, not by the establishment of a Palestinian 
state, but by the emphatic denial of such a state. A permanent settlement has to remove the main 
injustices and indignities between the two communities despite theft power variances, or else the regime 
installed to negotiate the permanent arrangements will not survive the lifetime of the personalities 
imposed to conclude such arTangements. Peace is not an indivisible commodity: there are nrinimum 
requirements that must be ftilftlled in order that both sides may live with the settlement. Peace has its 
'objective terms, conditions, and prerequisites, and unless these are recognised and fulfilled, any 
negotiating process or agreement is not only doomed to fail, but may even produce entirely contrary 
results.'*^
Palestine Exists?
It can be tentatively concluded that in a sense Palestine has existed sftice 13th September 1993. 
According to international law, there are four basic criteria constituting sovereignty: 1. a recognised and 
defined sovereign territory (unlike Israel, through the DoP, effective territorial limits have defined 
Palestine as the portion of historical Palestine occupied by Israel since 1967, ['the two sides view the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the 
ftiterftn period,']*"* Whilst sovereignty over Jerusalem is explicitly contested within the DoP, sovereignty 
over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank by the state of Palestine, fti the form of a Palestinian body is not. 
Israel has never formally annexed any occupied territory other than extending the municipal boundaries 
of Jerusalem, Jordan renoimced all administrative and legal claims to the West Bank in July 1988, and 
Egypt only administered the Gaza Strip. Since November 1988, when Palestine was proclaimed, the only 
body asserting sovereignty over the occupied territories, discountftig the joint claim over Jerusalem, has 
been the state of Palestine); 2. a permanent population; 3. an ability by the political apparatus to 
discharge international and conventional obligations (as evidenced by the establisliment of diplomatic 
relations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and many sovereign states and attempts to gain 
membership in international organisations); 4. the maintenance of territorial integrity and public order 
(fi*om 20th January 1996 a democratically elected Palestinian executive and legislature was to exercise
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effective control over a significant portion of Palestinian territory incorporating the majority of the 
Palestinian population).’^  Statehood is not an issue of the 'permanent status' negotiations. According to 
Article V.3. of the DoP regarding permanent status negotiations, issues shall include: 'Jerusalem, 
refugees, settlements, secuiity airangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbours, 
and other issues of common interest'.’*^ The article refers to 'security arrangements', 'borders' and 
'relations and cooperation with other neighbours' which would constitute eventual inter-national 
agreements, thus the acceptance by Israel of Palestinian sovereignty is implicit in the terms of the DoP. 
Whilst Israel remains the occupying power, the DoP's enshiinement in Aiticle I of UNSCRs 242 and 
338, which explicitly precludes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by wai* and serves as the 
basis of the permanent status settlement, means that the entire process could be construed as being about 
the detail of establishing a sovereign entity which can serve mutually inclusive Israeli and Palestinian 
interests, and not about whether there will be an independent Palestine as this is alieady implied. In this 
sense, tlie signing of the DoP does not imply a Palestinian acceptance of Israeli occupation but an Israeli 
acceptance of Palestinian sovereignty; however, 'Neither party shall be deemed, by vfttue of having 
entered into this Agreement, to have renounced or waived any of its existing rights, claims or 
positions.'*^
Ownership of land is more than just a final status issue to be negotiated without close regard to 
the emotions of histoiy. To a people without land, whose experience in Diaspora was that land, the very 
basis of power and status was denied them, forever leaving the mark of the outsider, and to a people 
who lost or had their land stolen, their land being the very basis of theii* society, its wealth, power and its 
identity, the very point of land ownership / land under occupation is, and will be veiy central to the 
resolving of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israeli citizens now own property in East Jerusalem, the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, land acquired tlirough war and occupied therefore illegally, in contravention of the 
Geneva Convention. Zionism is in essence the political determination of a biblical commandment to 
restore Jews to their ancient homeland, and for many in the modern era, the fulfilment of the Balfom* 
Declaration of 1917 is interpreted by some Zionists to mean the whole of mandatory Palestine.’* The 
land of Palestine whether in whole or in part, as understood by either side, has variously been mled by 
Ottomans, British, Jordanians and Egyptians as well as Israelis. Thus Palestine has never existed as a 
political entity ruled solely by Palestinians. Therefore gaining territory to exercise political authority, or 
the gaining of political sovereignty is tantamount to the fiilfilment of not only Palestinian self- 
determination but also of Palestinian nationalism.
The entire history of the Palestinian national struggle had to the date of 15th November 1988 not 
accepted the policy or consequences of the abandonment of the pursuit of all of Mandatory Palestine 
within and under the control of a Palestinian/Arab government. The policy of rejection of the Jewish 
state, or the hope that it would wither away, has stillborn the pursuit of Palestinian national self 
determination over areas of Palestine, then under Arab control, namely the West Bank and Gaza prior to 
1967. The 1967 defeat and the subsequent years of serious erosion of Palestinian culture and political 
identity has had such an effect that the decision to negotiate with the Israelis to form some, or any, 
Palestinian polity, however imperfect, has been particularly strong, especially taking account of the
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intifada and its outpoui'ing of Palestinian bile at theft position. However, it may be argued that making 
strategic concessions on the veiy notion of what constitutes Palestine plays into the Israelis' hands 
tactically in the sense that Israel could never cow the Palestinians inside whilst there remained a 
significant outside; neither would deal at the other's expense. However, the Oslo accords basically 
manoeuwe the PLO into the position of being a local leadersliip that the Israelis can deal with as they ai e 
accepted and endorsed by such a significant constituency of the Palestinians both inside and out, that the 
end result is what Israel has been searching for aU these years, namely a way to overcome the outside 
objections and the insiders' determination not to be collaborators.
Despite the success of the peace process in suiwiving many grave difficulties since 1993, any 
assessment of the political realities wliich exist between the two communities since the agreement's 
signing would have to accept that Israel exercises gieater and more far-reaching power and control over 
the Palestinian people in the occupied territories than they have since June 1967. The DoP was intended 
to create a new Israeli-Palestinian dynamic which would be characterised, during the interim phase at 
least, by tangible improvements fti personal and national secuiity, economic prosperity, and by political 
benefits in the form of an acknowledgement of the aspiration of national rights of existence, self- 
determination and fieedom. Eager populations warmly welcomed and embraced the initial notion that a 
negotiated settlement would lead to the end of the cycle of violence, repression and occupation. The 
incremental and transitional nature of the DoP intended to build confidence between old enemies. For 
the Palestinians, autonomy, however limited, was considered a better option tlian continued occupation. 
The inherent asymmetrical power relationship was rationalised as redeemable tlnough a process of 
cooperation and the accrual of performance-related benefits. Initial difficulties were considered the 
result of a combination of inexperience, individual impropriety and incompetence, inlierited structural 
and economic inequality, continued Israeli restrictions, and a slow response fi-om the international donor 
community. For the Israelis, the DoP represented a practical policy wliich allowed them to publicly 
embrace the PLO without having to accept the PLO's agenda. The DoP amounted to the practical 
accordance of a process of a devolution of local powers and responsibilities without having to sacrifice 
real power or sovereignty over the occupied tenitories.
Israeli Control
The PA's inability to confront Israeli hegemonic designs over the occupied territories has led the 
Palestinian public to regai d the furtherance of the DoP process with fear if not disdain. Israel's continued 
policy of closure of the occupied territories has so adversely affected the Palestinian population 
economically, that the DoP's stated intention of providing economic prosperity and an improvement in 
the quality of life has proven hollow. The marginalisation of the militant Palestinian opposition, through 
theft non-participation in the political process, and the intense PA campaign against them, has 
highlighted the PA's role witliin the new Israeli-Palestinian partnership. For the Palestinians, the DoP 
demonstrates the new balance of power between the PLO and Israel. The establishment of the peace 
process has led to the institutionalisation of the reality that Palestinian fortunes remain hostage to the 
Israeli-Palestinian imbalance of power relationship. The Palestinians have only fuU devolved powers and 
responsibilities for some 3% of the West Bank tenitory (Area A). Area B covers 27% of the West Bank,
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where the PA only exercises limited civil and security powers, with Israel retaining powers and 
responsibilities for secuiity matters, which Israel is free to define. Ar ea C comprises some 70 % of the 
West Bank, covering Israeli settlements, military locations, arterial roads and junctions, water resour ces, 
borders and ar eas surrounding Palestinian-controlled municipal and village boundaries. Ar ea C is a 
’contiguous whole that both surrounds Areas A and B in their entirety and parcels them into isolated 
enclaves.' Restrictions on further settlement building in Area C do not apply. Furthermore, jurisdiction 
over the settlements has been transferred from the Israeli Civil Administration of the Israeh Mihtary 
Government (IMG) to Israel's state pubhc administration, integrating the settlements into the existing 
state machinery. Some 60 % of the Gaza Strip is classified as Area A, with most of the remainder 
classed as Area C. Gaza is surrounded on three sides by an electrified razor-wire fence, with the entry 
and exit of goods and persons strictly controhed at a series of Israeh and PA checkpoints.’^  Israel is stih 
allowed under the DoP to continue with mass arrests, coUective punisliments, house demohtions, 
prolonged cur fews and closures, land expropriations, and any other measur es deemed necessary m 
pursuit of Israeh security requirements. Israel stih retains administrative responsibihty and the power of 
approval for the registration of Palestinian birih certificates, ID cards, driving hcenses, passports, etc. 
through the IMG, although such procedures are conducted by PA officials, rather than directly with the 
IMG. Closure has ensured that East Jerusalem has been ah but separated from the rest of the West Bank. 
East Jerusalem and its annexed environs comprise rouglily some 20 % of the West Bank territory, with 
Palestinians requir ing Israeh permits to enter or pass tlirough. With permits hard to come by, and heavy 
penalties for violators, Jerusalem is effectively restricted fr om Palestinian access. Senior Israeli mihtary 
and intelhgence officials maintain that no suicide bomber ever apphed for an entry permit for Israel, and 
no Palestinian with a vahd work permit has been convicted of a terrorist offence. These officers see the 
pohcy of closme as a coimterproductive pohtical response to a mihtary problem.^” The insistence in 
combating a security problem with a pohtical strategy ensur es an economic consequence of endemic 
unemployment, widespread poverty, PA deficit financing, emergency aid programmes depleting vital 
employment generation programmes, and the setting back of real economic developmental initiatives. 
These pohcies engender the corresponding pohtical desire within the Palestinian community to strike at 
Israel, ensuring a vicious spiral.
Initial support for the DoP among Palestinians came from the simphstic desire that events would 
somehow develop dynamically in favour of Palestinian aspirations. The improvements in the quality of 
life for the majority of the population, which are supposed to be an intended featui'e of the DoP, 
providing for its continued support, have not materiahsed. Combined with the perception that the 
Palestinians' representative is no longer capable of ensuring an equitable outcome, and that the 
Palestinian opposition offers even less of a viable alternative strategy, pessimism with the peace process 
and the Palestinian leadership is boimd to grow. The PA regime has bolstered its central position 
domestically as Israel's central paitner through autocratic measures. The PA's development as a 
somewhat corrupt regime, severely restricted by Israeli military orders and without proper democratic 
checks and balances on the executive by the legislature and judiciary, and with sometimes scant regard 
for due process, is bound to become more resisted by growing popular frustration and cynicism.^’ The
272
bantustanisation of the West Bank and the probable fi'ustration of Palestinian aspirations of self- 
determination is bound to lead to popular disillusionment, resentment and a ’shaking off of the 
construction of such an attempt at benevolent occupation.
Resolution?
Evaluating the Israeli-Palestinian political situation post-DoP, as opposed to pre-DoP is rather 
complicated. The Israelis have undoubtedly benefited fiom the DoP in that then status as occupiers is 
obscured, and Israel’s claims over the occupied territories are internationally legitimated. Israel has 
contracted out its security undertakings to a relatively pliant Palestinian entity, without compromising 
jurisdictional and sovereignty prerogatives. The Israelis have conducted a negotiating strategy of 
incredible dimensions via the DoP, and the peace process produced fiom it. The litany of past Israeli 
politicians prior to the DoP was always that the PLO were terrorists, and that no Palestinian interlocutor 
of sufficient stature existed to negotiate with. The sticking point for the Israelis was always then deshe 
to separate the Palestinians in the occupied territories ifom the external Palestinians, the PLO, and the 
interested Arab world, because of their greater ability to remain steadfast and resolute on negotiating 
principles such as; Jerusalem, refugees, the right of return, and statehood. However, if a negotiating 
strategy could allow recognition of the PLO and bring a retuim of the PLO leadersliip to the occupied 
territories, without compromising Israel’s vis-a-vis the above, then Israel could always manage to bring 
about the one aspect which had always alluded them, negotiating with Palestinian representatives fi om 
the occupied territories without preconditions and external interference. By incorporating the PLO into 
the humdrum of responsibility for daily local government of parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, by 
removing the external focus of Palestinian aspirations, by uiidermining the pmity of the Palestinian 
national struggle by getting its hands dirty having to maintain law and order, the Israelis have managed 
to contrive their pre-DoP negotiating position, namely, negotiating with Palestinian representatives fiom 
the occupied territories wliilst having made minimal concessions on such issues as, settlements, land 
expropriations, security, Jerusalem, borders, water, and Palestinian statehood. The self-emasculation of 
the PLO, by negating the PLO Covenant, by ensuring the irrelevance of the PNC, and by sidelining 
Palestinian opposition within the PLO, means that as the DoP peace process is between Israel and the 
PLO, Arafat is effectively the PLO. Even were he opposed by the Palestinian legislative council, he 
retains room to outmanoeuvre all opposition by dint of the fact that technically and legally, the DoP 
ensures only the PLO has the authority to conduct negotiations on behalf of the Palestinian people. A 
thorough reassessment of the peace process has been avoided to date, despite large segments of both 
populations registering theii* opposition to the continuation of the DoP. However, opposition takes many 
forms, and most is not benign. Palestinian demands for a fimdamental reconsideration of the DoP are 
bound to grow as it slowly emerges that the interim, transitional phase is likely to endure longer than 
that anticipated within the terms of the agieements done. The Palestinians aie in the precaiious position 
in the final status negotiations o f more than likely not being able to realise their dieams of a sovereign 
state, yet fearful of losing what they have achieved to date, the establishment of a Palestinian 
autonomous entity for the first time in liistory.
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5.3 RICEMAN FORMULA; Institutionalisation
The DoP sets out to acliieve the goal of an agreed, recognised and legally binding conflict 
resolution framework, which sets out specific commitments and obligations within an enforceable 
conflict prevention regime. Therefore, has a buieaucratic regime been initiated by the DoP to 
institutionalise the conduct, management, regulation and supervision of such a framework?
The DoP is regarded by some as an interpreter's nightmare, a patchwork of old Israeli and US 
drafts, incomplete procedural suggestions, deliberate ambiguities and obfuscations.^^ The seventeen 
articles and four annexes of the DoP indicate that they are firmly intended to lead to some final political 
settlement. The document was painstakingly drafted and covers, at least in outline, the most sensitive 
concerns of both sides. The DoP is a bilateral agreement which is an historic agreement in the sense that 
the Palestinians became full partners, with the Israelis, in the regional quest for peace. The destiny for 
both sides was to deal with the DoP realistically, to overcome its limitations and by inference overcome 
the weaknesses and flaws that continue to divide them. The dilemma for the participants is how they will 
move forward constrained by the limits of the DoP and by their own histories.
The most striking aspect of the DoP is that it deals with proceduies and timetables for the 
implementation of Israeli militaiy redeployment and Palestinian self-government. It is a living document 
which seeks to maximise developing confidence building measures. It is a studied example of a carrot 
and stick approach to diplomacy, the more that is achieved the more that can be achieved. Yitzhak Rabin 
described the DoP, not as a peace agreement, but more of a huge step in the direction of peace, an 
agreement on establisliing an arrangement for an interim period.^  ^ The DoP was intended as just a 
stepping stone along the road to peace, graduality being the guiding principle of the agreement which 
would allow Gaza and Jericho to become the first experiments in peace.
The DoP recognises the Palestinians as a people, within a framework of legitimate rights and 
reciprocal political rights, but there is a clear evasion of anything relating to land, other than that relating 
to the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. The recognition of Israel, by the PLO, also implies shared 
sovereignty, on any part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, indeed the DoP assures Israeli sovereignty 
over tlie authority of the Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority duiing the interim period. '^^
The ultimate challenge to the accord remains the negotiations which will determine the final 
status of the two parties living arrangements. Irredentism will continue to shadow the process but above 
all, the two sides will have to guard against the psychological barriers wliich remain as an obstacle and a 
challenge to be overcome. These barriers for the Israelis will be the two extremes of previously accepted 
conventional wisdom, namely - 1, that military force and its use can solve what is essentially a political 
problem - and 2, that the incantation that a peace treaty must be the harbinger and thus the foundation 
that will guarantee indefinite peace, can in no way guarantee indefinite peace. There has never been a 
peace agreement in history which takes the form of an unbroken, inviolable, eternal covenant. Wars 
generally have a habit of being between parties wliich were legally at peace. However, for the optimistic, 
the DoP does not underestimate the practical complexities involved in negotiating and implementing the 
arrangements it envisages, as it states in its preamble, it is predicated on the conviction that 'it is time to 
put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict'.^^
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Thus we can conclude, that the DoP has achieved the goal of agreeing a conflict resolution 
framework, which sets out specific commitments and obligations witliin a conflict prevention regime. 
However, the inherent structinal asymmetrical power imbalance robs the agreement of balance and the 
natine of the state=non-state bilateral agreement ensures that the DoP's international and legal 
foundations remain dubious, or at least open to wide interpretation. The DoP does not provide 
sufficiently for an enforceable conflict prevention regime in that such a regime is not defined and 
enforcement of what constitutes a conflict prevention regime is left open to the interpretation of the 
parties, wliich in an asymmetrical structure, in practical terms means the higher power party. The DoP, 
as a bilateral agreement does not incorporate tliird party mediation to offset the inherent structuial 
asymmetrical power imbalance, nor does it allow for international assistance which enables peaceful 
change, including procedural mechanisms which allow for the review of settlement terms, the raising of 
grievances, for adjustments to the settlement as new realities are created and which anticipate and 
monitor potential areas of ftrtme conflict. The DoP does allow for international support and political 
direction fr om third paities aimed at nurturing and advancing the peace process through economic 
assistance, however such an international economic assistance programme is based on international 
goodwill and the willingness of the United States to provide political, economic and diplomatic 
assistance. The international community and particularly the US may be morally bound to offer 
assistance in the building of a conflict resolution regime in the Middle East, but they are not legally 
bound by the DoP. The peace process provided for by the DoP depends for its continued survival on the 
fragility of public confidence, on developing and advancing its terms, conditions and provisions, and on 
building on its foundations. The DoP is akin to a builder’s blueprints for developing a new community. 
The DoP is more than an aitist's impression, but the practicalities of making real the plans means that the 
dynamic forging the peace process needs much more work before it can be deemed complete.
5.4 RICEMAN FORMULA: Confidence-building
Yitzhak Rabin stated in his inaugural speech to the Knesset as Prime Minister that an ill- 
considered peace agreement which ultimately initiated friture conflict was unacceptable. He said that 
’When it comes to secuiity, we will concede notliing. From oui* standpoint, secuiity takes preference 
even over peace.' However he continued, 'It is our duty, to ourselves and to our children, to see the new 
world as it is now-to discern its dangers, explore its prospects and to do everything possible so the State 
of Israel will fit into this world whose face is changing.' Such a situation required Israeli leaders to 'give 
further thought to the ui'gent need to end the Aiab-Israeli conflict and live in peace with our Aiab 
neighbours.'^^ In a speech at Tel Aviv University, Rabin stated that, 'I believe that we ai e on a path of no 
return... to reach peace, even if it takes another year or two years, ...I tlnnk that the reality of the 
international situation, the regional situation, the genuine need of nations and countries, is to arrive at a 
resolution of the dispute.'^^
The DoP thus set out to achieve the provision of channels for dispute resolution, crisis 
prevention, reconciliation, conflict deterrence and reduction, foundation of political institutions to diffuse 
political instability and human rights abuses, economic uncertainty, and ensui e compliance and
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verification of a mutual security envii'onment. By building confidence between the PLO and Israel that a 
deal could be negotiated, Rabin sought to provide a fi-amework which formalised channels for 
reconciliation, for conflict deterrence, to ensuie a mutual security environment and to build a mutual 
future. From realising that political compromise with the Palestinians was not possible without dealing 
with the PLO, it was a short journey to realising that by not dealing with the PLO in the immediate 
future, the rise of absolutist, Islamic fundamentalism would result. Compromise was possible with the 
PLO by building confidence through negotiating a mutually perceived future via the Oslo backchannel. 
However, compromise was not an option to be considered with Hamas and Islamic Jiliad. Rabin believed 
that
'Our struggle against murderous Islamic terror is also meant to awaken the world which is lying 
[in] slumber. We call on all nations and aU people to devote then attention to the great danger 
inherent in Islamic fundamentalism. That is the real and serious danger which thieatens the peace 
of the world in the forthcoming years. The danger of death is at our doorstep. And just as the 
state of Israel was the first to perceive the Iraqi nuclear threat, so today we stand in the line of 
fire against the danger of fundamentalist Islam.
Israeli and PLO concern about the potential threat of extremist Islam provided both sides with a mutual 
enemy. The DoP was conceived, developed, negotiated and concluded with such a threat in mind, fi'om 
both sets of negotiators. The Oslo backchannel provided the necessary environment in which to conceive 
a working arrangement upon wliich to build. The facilitation of the process was nurtured by sensitive 
intermediaries - the Norwegians. In an atmosphere of cordiality, confidence in one another could be 
fostered and developed.
However, one of the biggest reservations that has been voiced about the Israeli-Palestinian 
agreement was that it offered no guarantees that the parties would apply it in full or negotiate in good 
faith when postponed issues were raised. There were several points that were cause for Palestinian 
concern. The first, and most important, was that the agreement failed to 'address Israel's illegal claim to 
the occupied territories.'^^ Israel had always maintained that it was not an 'occupier,' but that it was in the 
occupied territories by right, with Israel's claim expressed fiom the beginning though its confiscation of 
land, establishment of settlements, annexation of Jerusalem and adoption of a conduct dedicated to 
implementing a political programme that considered all of Palestine as Israeli territory.^® Palestinian 
critics have argued that there was notliing in the DoP that indicated that Israel had renounced any part of 
its claim over Palestine, indeed rather than confronting the issue, the DoP evaded it. Thus, the major 
weakness of the DoP was that there was notliing in the agreement that indicated if settlement activity 
would stop. By not challenging or objecting to this claim, the Palestinians were in essence condoning it, 
and though Palestinian silence Israel could spuriously claim Palestinian acquiescence as an abandonment 
of their right to an independent state over the entirety of the occupied territories. In such a way, the 
status of the territories was being bluiTed fi'om being recognisably 'occupied' to becoming 'disputed'. 
Further flaws of the DoP include the 'tacit acceptance of two separate entities in the Palestinian 
territories - two separate administrations, two separate judicial systems - indiiectly a kind of apartheid', 
wliich by allowing or even by deferring to this situation, the Palestinians were conceding sometliing that
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was illegally established.^* Palestinian acceptance of the terms of the DoP meant that Palestinians would 
have no one to blame for fiituie happenings but themselves, for by agreeing to be bound by the DoP the 
Palestinians had helped to confer legitimacy on their occupation by Israel. Wliile the DoP enumerates 
such issues as Jemsalem, settlements, borders, to be deferred, there is no mention in the DoP of any 
withdrawal beyond that of the interim period, indeed a complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories was never mentioned for the final status negotiations. It has been claimed that tliis was implied 
in the DoP's reference to UN Security Council Resolution 242, which includes withdiawal, but m reality 
when dealing with state interests there can be no reliance on things implied, especially since Israel had 
repeatedly made it very clear that it had no intention of withdrawing outside the occupied territories.
Such a conclusion is drawn by citing that the DoP is plirased in generalities that leave room for wide 
interpretations, and does not make specific provision for a complete withdrawal from the occupied 
territories, even as a final status issue. For Palestinian critics, the final confirmation that the agreement 
was, and would remain, inherently imbalanced and unjust was that Israel would always have the 
unilateral power of veto.^^
Despite such constraints, the Palestinians have had to come to terms with the cold new realities 
of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The di eam of defeating Israel and the temptation to continue the struggle 
by inflaming the intifada had to be resisted, particularly while negotiating a new relationship with the 
Israelis. The rhetoric of traditional objectives was, and is, incompatible with the technicalities of 
brokering an agreement, especially one which is part of a process wliich relies so heavily on mutual 
confidence for continued life. The question many Israelis asked was, could the Palestinians with thefr 
history of internal schisms, militant factionalism and lack of collective sovereign existence prove their 
bona fides and earn Israeli trust and confidence in a mere five years? The bottom line of the DoP 
remains, that as the higher power party, Israel can always dispense with the process of negotiations if 
Israeli doubts about Palestinian intentions persist. As Rabm put it at the opening of the special Knesset 
debate on the Israel-PLO agreements, 'in any event, the might of the IDF - the best army m the world - is 
available for our use.'^  ^Within such an atmosphere of perceived inequality and questionable political 
faith, building confidence and mutual trust, has always, and will continue to be a fragile undertaking.
5.5 RICEMAN FORMULA: Empowerment
The DoP provided a blueprint for the transfer and exercise of powers and responsibilities to the 
Palestinians and the levels of sovereignty to be attained by the Palestinians; prepared the establishment of 
a nominal cease-fiie of hostilities agreement; instituted a mutual recognition pact; stated the paities' 
intent to transfer specified territorial enclaves to Palestinian authority; provided for the inauguration of 
an autonomous self-governing Palestinian entity with the prospect of elections to such an autonomous 
legislative body combined with the devolution of additional civil powers and responsibilities; airanged 
for the withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli militaiy forces fr om specified locations and population 
centres; founded a framework for the resolution of disputes and Israeli-Palestinian public order and 
security cooperation; offered a plan for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in bilateral and regional economic 
and development programmes, and prepared for fruther negotiations on unresolvable issues within the
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framework of a pennanent status aiTangement covering: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security 
arrangements, borders, and foreign relations. Fundamentally, the DoP empowers the Palestinians 
through the transfer and exercise of powers and responsibilities and the levels of sovereignty to be 
attained. In contrast, the DoP empowers the Israelis in a subtler but more ubiquitous form. The DoP 
recognises, enshi ines and conforms to the asymmetrical Israeli-Palestinian balance of power relationship 
in Israel's favour. Israel is thus empowered by the agi eement as the superior of the two parties.
A rolling process of considerable substantive negotiations was intended to follow from the initial 
agreement because of the inlierent contradictions, ambiguities and material differences in interpretation 
contained within the limitations of the original document. Subsequent, sequential documents had to be 
negotiated to formulate further interim arrangements ready for implementation in order that the process 
begun by the DoP could proceed. Further agreements were needed to provide for a sustainable 
preventative security regime involving reciprocal and cooperative rights and obligations based on shared 
goals and principles of justice, economic interdependence, collective security and sense of shared 
community, in order to achieve an equitable and lasting settlement which would master the existing 
inherent asymmetrical power inequalities.
We can now offer some conclusions as to how successful the fuither negotiated agreements have 
been in combining to prepare the foundation of the interim phase of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
as laid down witliin the teims of the DoP. The fiirther agreements have allowed for the transfer and 
exercise of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinians and provided for greater levels of sovereignty 
to be attained by the Palestinians. The frirther agreements set out to provide for a sustainable 
preventative security regime involving reciprocal and cooperative rights and obligations based on shared 
goals and principles of justice, economic interdependence, collective security and a sense of shared 
community, in order to achieve an equitable and lasting settlement which masters existing inherent 
asymmetrical power inequalities.
Taking the issue of economic interdependence as indicative for our conclusion, we can assess the 
relative merits of the negotiated further transitional interim self-government arrangements on the basis of 
how successful the peace process has been in delivering real and practical benefits to those who aie 
supposed to be the beneficiaiies of tlie entire enterprise, namely the Israeli and Palestinian general 
publics. For the proponents of peace, who have argued that economic interdependence and integration 
between Israel and the Palestinians will provide for an 'economy of peace', events during the period of 
the negotiations have confounded their optimism. '^* Mass unemployment, extended periods of closure 
either of parts or of the whole West Bank and Gaza Strip, endemic and systemic structm al and 
infrastructural weaknesses, and a wholly unhealthy dependent economic relationship has countered the 
notion that economic prosperity could allow difficult political decisions to prosper. In essence, the idea 
that economic activity would so involve, energise and preoccupy the majority of the Palestinian 
population thus buying them off and dissuading them fr om involvement in political agitation has not been 
borne out by the evidence of the past years. Himgry people, whose hope for theii* and their childrens' 
friture turns to despaii*, make for angiy people. Many people can cope with a denial of their national 
aspirations and dreams of a perfect world, as long as then personal cfrcumstances are financially
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ameliorated in compensation. However when externally imposed economic chcimistances are so severe 
as to be oppressive, people tend to view the political system that sustains then straitened lives with eyes 
that see succoin in radical solutions. The tenet that the denial of rights and the legitimacy of a peoples’ 
struggle could at least be assuaged by a flourishing economy has, despite the inflision of vast amounts of 
foreign aid, failed, because the Israeli preoccupation with its security fears with the resultant cost being 
declining Palestinian living standards, have perversely led to an increase in Israel's vulnerability to further 
attacks because the economic conditions necessaiy to contain Palestinian violence have failed to 
materialise, precisely because Israel's security fears have flielled actions wliich have diiectly led to a 
worsening of Palestinians' economic conditions.
The Paris Protocol on Economic Relations promised to lay the groundwork for strengthening the 
Palestinian economic base and extending to the Palestinians autonomy in the economic decision-making 
process in accordance with its own development plan, and the rights to puisne its own economic 
priorities/^ This aspect of the peace process was included because of the acceptance of the principle that 
'national sovereignty in economic decision-making is an important prerequisite to political 
independence.*^  ^However the reality has been continued and compounded dominance of the Palestinian 
economic sector by the Israeli economy, ensuring that Palestinian ability to determine economic policy is 
severely limited and that the interdependence of the two economies is balanced most favourably for the 
Israelis.
Israel has severely reduced Palestinian access, in terms of goods and persons, to the Israeli 
economy, citing secuiity concerns for theii* actions. Israel has cut Palestinians working in Israel resulting 
in severe Palestinian unemployment. Frequent closures, collective punishments, curfews and secuiity 
actions have also ensured the imderemployment of the workforce and the miderdevelopment of the 
economy. The financial costs of closure alone far outweigh donor assistance. The costs of closure ai e 
generally borne by individuals, families and small businesses, whereas donor assistance is disbursed to 
the PISGA, its institutions, and earmarked projects. Long term damage done to personal financial 
circumstances and small to medium businesses is difficult to assess, however donor assistance is not 
forthcoming in this area. Closures also ensures structural damage as a result of reduced foreign and |
expatriate investments and delays to infiastructural development projects. |
Businesses need access to labour and capital, however restrictions in the fi*ee movement of {
laboui* even witliin the occupied territories, in raising venture capital, and in business planning j
capabilities, severely limit the prospects of economic growth. Israel not only restricts Palestinians fi'om ;
employment in Israel, it also restricts the fr ee movement of goods and persons between the various !
PISGA-controiled communities, isolating local economies, making the planning and development of an |
integrated economy almost impossible. This is particularly true with regard to the position of Jerusalem, |
access to which has been tiglitly controlled, ensuring that Palestinian labourers, contractors and i
entrepreneurs are excluded fi'om access to the Jerusalem market, with the corresponding knock on j
effects on small businesses and self-employment oppoi'tunities. By restricting employment options, Israel i
ensures that incomes are overall reduced, meaning that spending power is also reduced, further hurting i
local businesses. Tliis 'multiplier effect-a cycle of fewer jobs and less income', threatens the ver*y survival I
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of the Palestinian economy/® PISGA policy-makers and the international donor community are unable 
or imwiiling to address this political problem which afflicts the Palestinian economy, and adversely 
affects fiscal planning and economic development. Wlien skilled and educated Palestinians are forced to 
accept employment in jobs which do not utilise theii* skills and training, then support for the continuation 
of tliis particular peace process will be set back. Under-utilised ordinary people with no meaningful role 
in a stalled project of national reconstruction, will increasingly find the process of state-building to be 
hollow. The 'feehng of abandonment is palpable', according to a recent polls, 68.5% of those describing 
themselves as 'not well-to-do' responded that they were pessimistic about their fiiture, 29.4% responded 
that they did not trust any political movement, with 20.5% not trusting any of theii* leaders.^^ Thus the 
power Israel exerts in unilaterally destabalising the extremely fragile, nascent Palestinian economy 
highlights the structural economic asymmetrical power relationship. Therefore, by any indicators, the 
relative position of the Palestinian economy post-DoP as opposed to pre-DoP, is undoubtedly worse.
5.6 RICEMAN FORMULA: Mediation
The DoP, as a bilateral agreement between two very unequal opponents, is inherently 
flawed in its structural makeup. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process has no inbuilt mechanism to 
redress or resolve the asymmetrical natuie of the power relationship. Wliilst mechanisms and provisions 
exist witliin the DoP for channels for dispute resolution, crisis prevention, reconciliation, conflict 
deterrence and reduction, the foundation of political institutions to diffiise political instability, human 
rights abuses, economic uncertainty, to ensure compliance and verification of a mutual security 
envii'onment and ensure the implementation of agreed airangements between the Israelis and 
Palestinians, there are no mechanisms to provide sustained support and political direction from interested 
third parties and extra-territorial mediators, such as the UN the US or the EU, to nurture and advance 
the peace process. There aie no procedural mechanisms winch allow for third-party review of settlement 
terms, for the raising of grievances to external arbitration, for incorporating adjustments to the 
settlement as new international realities are created, and wliich anticipate and monitor potential areas of 
fiituie conflict. There is no ability to refer disputes to higher authorities such as the UN, and indeed there 
is not even a dispute-resolution role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for the sponsors of, or other 
interested parties to, the Madrid peace process. The DoP effectively locks out any international, 
independent action aimed at peacemaking, peacekeeping and guaranteeing the Israeli-Palestinian 
agreements. The DoP represents a unique agreement in that it is the only conflict resolution process 
where a bilateral asymmetrical agreement made between two totally unequal parties has attempted to 
deliver a lasting peace without the aid and succour of international guarantees and guarantors. Without 
built-in mechanisms within the peace process to ensure fairness and justice between two so obviously 
unequal partners in the construction and delivery of an equitable peace process, the public perception 
that a process is fair, just and that the intent of either protagonist is also benign, is fai' more important in 
the absence of external mediators and international guai antors of either sides' bona fides. Thus political 
and public actions and reactions are all the more critical for the survival of such a process, ensuring the 
process is a highly volatile, uncertain and explosive one.
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5.7 RICEMAN FORMULA: Administration
The DoP intended to develop the foundation of political institutions to diffuse political instability 
and human rights abuses, economic uncertainty, to ensure compliance and verification within a mutual 
secuiity envii'onment and to provide a sustainable preventative security regime with a view to 
implementing an internationally recognised, binding and agieed legal fi-amework setting out specific 
commitments and obligations within an enforceable conflict prevention regime. While the DoP deals with 
the provisions for the administration of a conflict resolution fi-amework, such as the procedures and 
timetables for the implementation of Israeli military redeployment and Palestinian self-government, it is a 
living document which seeks to maximise and develop confidence building measures. The buieaucratic 
regime that is intended, by the DoP, to develop a conflict resolution framework, needs further 
agreements to ensuie its progress, evolution and promotion. Indeed, the foundations have been laid to 
promote Palestinian autonomous life, to provide representative government, to establish the requisite 
institutions for the operation of civil society and to further Israeli-Palestinian security cooperation. 
However, the peace process provided for by the DoP depends for its continued survival on the fragility 
and uncertainty of the political arena and in that sense the administrative regime which is intended to 
conduct, manage, regulate and supervise the institution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resolution 
framework is incomplete and hostage to the fortimes of political imperatives.
5.8 RICEMAN FORMULA: Negotiation
Before the DoP neither side officially recognised each other. The negotiating system and 
teclmiques employed by the Israelis and Palestinians, although initially secret, aimed to reach a deal that 
could be built on and improved. Contentious issues wliich could not be agreed upon were side-stepped 
to be dealt with in the future. The DoP was meant as a first important step - to break the barrier of past 
conflict and ensure mutual recognition.
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the DoP established a nominal agreement for a cease­
fire of hostilities, instituted a mutual recognition pact, transferred specified territorial enclaves of Gaza 
and Jericho to Palestinian authority, provided for the inauguration of an autonomous self-governing 
Palestinian entity with the prospect of elections to such an autonomous legislative body combined with 
the devolution of additional civil powers and responsibilities, arranged for the withdrawal and 
redeployment of Israeli military forces from specified locations and population centres, founded a 
framework for the resolution of disputes and Israeli-Palestinian public order and security cooperation 
and offered a plan for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in bilateral and regional economic and development 
programmes. It also prepared for fiirther negotiations on uni esolvable issues within the framework of a 
permanent status arrangement covermg Jerusalem, refiigees, settlements, security arrangements, 
borders and foreign relations. A rolling process of considerable substantive negotiations followed fr om 
the initial DoP because of the inherent contradictions, ambiguities, and material differences in 
interpretation contained within the limitations of the original document. Subsequent sequential
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documents had to be negotiated to formulate further interim aiTangements ready for implementation in 
order that the process begun by the DoP could proceed.
The DoP as a document represents an agreement to pursue a living legacy, to undertake a 
process whose final outcome is not determined in advance. The DoP is not a symmetrical agreement 
outlining mutual obligations on a quid pro quo basis, rather it is an agreement to agiee to further the 
basic interests of both sides. For the Israelis, the DoP provides a reliable, legitimate interlocutor and the 
ability to transfer responsibility for a large proportion of the Palestinian population, if not of the territory 
they inhabit. For the Palestinians, the DoP provides for the establisliment of a legitimated political and 
moral authority with the mandate to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people to pui*sue Palestinian 
national interests. However, differences of interpretation not only separate the principal participants but 
also underline disagreements within both sides' domestic political and public opinion. Negotiations for 
concluding a comprehensive and final settlement are still ongoing, so the conflict resolution process is 
still imder construction.
5.9 Further Research in the Field
Research analysing the implications and the utility of the Israeli-Palestinian DoP for conflict 
resolution in general and as a comprehensive fi-amework for peace-making is rather limited. Such 
analytical work that exists in the field tends to focus on certain component aspects or parts of the peace 
process, such as the role of international mediation, economic interdependency, borders, power and 
threat perception, conflict intensity in asymmetric intergroup conflict.
As this study has found, there is no one existing fi-amework which captures its essence, as the 
changing nature of the political realities has forced a constant realignment and reassessment of the 
structural configurations. Rather than dismiss the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as a unique and 
therefore unusable formula for peace-making, one fundamental remains, negotiations, however 
imperfect, are more to be desired than renewed or continued conflict.
The secretly negotiated Israeli-Palestinian peace process broke down and tlnough bairiers of 
seemingly intractable conflict. This peace process offered a path to peace wliich had eluded all previous 
attempts to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The formula of finding common ground and 
common cause while agreeing to disagree on outstanding fijndamentals allowed a process of peace­
building to be noui'ished and to grow. By seeking out points of agreement and trusting in the dynamics 
of time the process boldly attempted to initiate and promote an atmosphere of hope and willingness to 
construct a new relationship, based on cooperation, not conflict.
Considering further research in the field of Israeli-Palestinian peace-making, it is very difficult to 
know where to begin, precisely because of the liighly politicised and unfinished nature of this particular 
process. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is about conflicting legitimacy, over claim to the same land, to 
the same water, to the same ah. Making sense of an existential conflict has been, and will continue to be, 
most difficult. As an example of theoretical peace modelling, the Israeli-Palestinian process has probably 
more political detractors than intellectual advocates. Prescriptions range fiom scrapping the entire 
process as fimdamentally flawed to fine-tuning and finessing the progress already made. As a general.
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transferable, utilitarian model for peace-making, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process provides some 
genuinely positive and negative standards, and liigMghts some veiy interesting and significant featui'es 
worthy of fiirther examination.
The main criticisms include:
1. The DoP has not resolved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on a permanent basis.
2. The DoP has not developed a sustainable preventative secui ity regime involving a reciprocal and 
cooperative positive peace agreement based on shared goals and principles of justice, economic 
interdependence, collective security and sense of shaied community, and an equitable and lasting 
settlement which masters inherent asymmetrical power inequalities.
3. The dynamics forging the peace process need much more work before it can be deemed complete.
4. The DoP offers no guaiantees that the parties would apply it in full or negotiate in good faith when 
postponed issues were raised.
5. The DoP is plirased in generalities that leave room for wide interpretations and does not make specific 
provisions for guidance past the interim phase.
6. The DoP is, and will remain, inlierently imbalanced and unjust because one party, Israel, would always 
have the unilateral power of veto.
7. Mass unemployment, extended periods of closme, endemic and systemic economic structural and 
infiastructural weaknesses, and a wholly unhealthy dependent economic relationship has countered the 
notion that economic interdependence and integration between Israel and the Palestinians will provide 
for an 'economy of peace' and confounded the optimism that economic prosperity could allow difficult 
political decisions to prosper.
8. The DoP, as a bilateral agreement between two very unequal opponents, is inherently flawed in its 
structural makeup - the peace process has no inbuilt mechanism to rediess or resolve the asymmetrical 
natuie of the power relationship - there are no mechanisms to provide sustained support and political 
direction fi-om interested third parties and extra-territorial mediators, such as the UN the US or the EU, 
to nurture and advance the peace process - there are no procedural mechanisms wliich allow for third- 
party review of settlement terms, for the raising of grievances to external arbitration, for incorporating 
adjustments to the settlement as new international realities are created, and wliich anticipate and monitor 
potential areas of future conflict - there is no ability to refer disputes to liigher authorities such as the 
UN, and indeed there is not even a dispute-resolution role in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process for the 
sponsors of, or other interested parties to, the Madrid peace process - and the DoP effectively locks out 
any international, independent action aimed at peacemaking, peacekeeping and guaranteeing the Israeli- 
Palestinian agreements.
9. The buieaucratic regime that is intended, by the DoP, to develop a conflict resolution fi-amework, 
needs further agreements to ensure its progress, evolution and promotion.
10. Negotiations for concluding a comprehensive and final settlement are still ongoing, so the conflict 
resolution process is still under construction.
The mam positives include:
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1. The DoP instituted a mutual recognition pact which afforded the Palestinians and Israelis the 
opportunity to negotiate directly their shai ed futures, in light of mutual public acknowledgement of each 
others existence.
2. The DoP provides for the implementation of a recognised, binding and agreed legal framework setting 
out specific commitments and obligations, within an enforceable conflict prevention regime.
3. The DoP established a nominal agreement for a cease-fii e of hostilities.
4. The DoP transferred specified tenitorial enclaves to Palestinian authority.
5. The DoP provided for the inauguration of an autonomous self-governing Palestinian entity with the 
prospect of elections to such an autonomous legislative body combined with the devolution of additional 
civil powers and responsibilities.
6. The DoP arranged for the withdrawal and redeployment of Israeli militaiy forces fr om specified 
locations and population centres, founded a framework for the resolution of disputes and Israeli- 
Palestinian public order and security cooperation.
7. The DoP offered a plan for Israeli-Palestinian cooperation in bilateral and regional economic and 
development programmes.
8. The DoP prepared for further negotiations on uniesolvable issues within the fr amework of a 
permanent status arrangement covering Jerusalem, refiigees, settlements, secmity arrangements, 
borders and foreign relations.
The fundamental flaw of the Israeli-Palestinian pai'ticulai* peace process is that it has no inbuilt 
mechanism to redress or resolve the asymmetrical natuie of the power relationsliip. There aie no 
mechanisms to provide sustained support and political direction from an extra-territorial mediator, such 
as the UN, to nurture and advance the peace process. There are no procedural mechanisms wliich allow 
for a third-party review of settlement terms, for the raising of grievances to external arbitration, for 
incorporating adjustments to the settlement as new international realities are created, and wliich 
anticipate and monitor potential areas of fiiture conflict. There is no ability to refer disputes to a liigher 
authority, such as the UN. The DoP does not include a dispute-resolution role for any external party in 
the peace process, and effectively locks out any international, independent action aimed at peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and guaranteeing the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Only with such a flaw remedied, 
could the Israeli-Palestinian peace-making example be then recommended as a conflict resolution model 
for use in other settings of inter-ethnic, existential conflict.
5.10 The Future of the Peace Process
Israeli prime minister Netanyahu's years in office have been marred by violence, allegations of 
political corruption, and a deterioration in Israel's foreign relations, and in Israeli-Palestinian relations in 
particular. Netanyahu's government piu'sued a more inflexible and ideological path with regard to its 
peace policy, through settlement construction, expropriation of land, closures, and collective security 
punishments, frrespective of the detrimental impact such actions would have on its principal Arab peace 
partners, Egypt, Jordan, the Palestinians, or even on Israel's glowing economic and political relations 
with peripheral Ai*ab states, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Qatar and Oman. By undermining relations with
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the Palestinians, Egypt and Jordan, Netanyahu undermined the very foundations of Israel's peace 
strategy by discouraging any enthusiasm for compromise with Israel among the moderate advocates of 
pursuing peaceful policies. King Hussein was so incandescent with anger following the breaking ground 
of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement, that he wi'ote a public letter of condemnation to Netanyahu, as 
Jordanian public opinion turned against the Israel-Jordan peace treaty. Egypt became increasingly critical 
of Israel, as Israel's policies in the West Bank undercut President Mubarak's efforts in the peace process. 
Egypt has been an important and strategic ally in brokering Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. However 
Mubarak felt compelled to join with Syria in initiating Aiab moves to isolate Israel in the Arab world 
following the violence sparked by the Jerusalem tunnel incident, and the announcement of the Jabal Abu 
Ghneim project. Arab-Israeli relations were publicly frosty. Israel's relations with her principal trading 
partners, the EU, also deteriorated in light of Netanyahu's settlement policy, wliich the EU views as 
detrimental to building confidence in the peace process.
Israel's relations with its primaiy ally, the US became strained to the extent that the new US 
Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright chose not to visit Israel until Netanyahu proved 'more willing to 
move towards peace', preferring to travel to the Middle East 'only if she could accomplish something 
substantial.Albright eventually made her maiden visit to the region on 10th September 1997 in 
response to deteriorating Israeli-Palestinian relations and to deflect criticism of neglecting the peace 
process. Albright had intended to visit 'to focus on the broader political initiative' once 'progress on 
security issues' had been made.'** However, because no progress at all had been made and both 
Netanyahu and Arafat descended into mutual distrust and antipathy, unwilling to entertain compromise, 
handicapped by extremist political constituencies and unable to negotiate in good faith, Albright's visit 
was deemed necessary by President Clinton to save the peace process and restore confidence in it.'*^  
Albright had been expected to upbraid Netanyahu to prove Israel's good faith by freezing settlement 
construction, and demand liis adherence to the Oslo accords by unblocking tens of millions of dollai s in 
tax revenues owed by Israel to the PA, and by lessening the policies of closure on tlie PA areas. 
However, in light of the July and September suicide attacks, Albright's 50-hour visit was dominated by 
Israel's determination to fight Islamic terrorism, demanding of Arafat to take action against Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad,'*^  Albright blamed both sides for the crisis describing it as 'neither inevitable nor 
accidental', and criticised Netanyahu and Ai'afat for failing to live up to 'theii* full obligations as partners 
in peace', however, Netanyahu's dfrector of communications and policy planning David Bar-Ilan, 
reiterated Israel's position on settlement activity, stating that 'we cannot freeze settlements any more than 
we can freeze life.''*'*
Netanyahu previously responded to US pressure regarding his peace policies in September 1996, 
saying that:
'regardless of the fact that our relationship with the US is of the first rank of Israel's strategic 
assets, it is not the supreme asset. The supreme asset is our security, those tilings that are sacred 
to us like Jerusalem. If a regime should arise in the US and say 'You must give in on all this in 
exchange for relations with the US,' I will not give in.''*^
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Even Israel's relations with US Jewry have become strained because of Netanyahu's backing for the 
attempt by the Israeli Orthodox religious establisliment to outlaw non-Orthodox conversions to Judaism 
which has brought conflict between the US Reform and Conservative religious communities/^
Israel's 'political isolation is not a natui al reaction of the anti-semitic international community but 
a direct function of Likud policy'/^ Netanyahu's vision of the peace process was allegedly deliberately 
leaked to the Israeli press, with Ze'ev Schiff, Ha'aretz’s higlily respected and well connected military 
correspondent being the first to print Netanyahu's 'Allon-plus' map. The higlilights of the 'AUon-Plus 
Plan' include: Israel will govern aieas of the West Bank east of the Green Line up to the crests of the 
first hills; the Jordan Valley and its western slopes will remain in Israeli hands for a distance of 15km 
fi'om the Jordan River, or further south from the Dead Sea westward to the desert; the Palestinians will 
control the northwest shore of the Dead Sea, and a coiTidor from Ramallah to Jericho; Greater 
Jerusalem will expand to Ma'ale Adumim and Kfar Adumim on the east towai'ds the Etzion Bloc in the 
south and towards Bethel in the north; the corridor connecting Israel's western hills to Jerusalem will be 
widened fi om two sides, fiom the Etzion Bloc in the south up to Beit Horon in the north; the Jewish 
settlements near Nablus and Jenin will either remain in the Palestinian zone or be evacuated; the 
Palestinians will have a secure passageway fi om the West Bank to the Gaza Strip, in accordance with 
the DoP, plus three additional corridors from parts of the West Bank to Tulkarm, Qalqilya and Jericho; 
in addition to the existing Jerusalem-Dead Sea road, Israel will have four secuie east-west passageways, 
winch will cross the West Bank to the Jordan Valley and the Dead Sea; and in Jerusalem, there will be a 
'functional solution' for the Holy sites.'*®
Since assuming office Netanyahu has repeatedly indicated his desiie to proceed directly to final 
status negotiations without completing the obligations of redeployment as laid down in the interim 
arrangements. The main reasoning seems to be that the less territory redeployed from in the interim 
phase, the stronger the Israelis’ hand in the bargaining over the permanent settlement. During his visit to 
the White House on 13th February 1997, Netanyahu presented to President Clinton maps prepared by 
Israeli military experts, and had two military advisors explain how Israel's security concerns dictated the 
drawing of the maps. Described as 'Allon-plus', these maps represent Netanyahu's strategic visions of 
what he hopes to achieve in final status talks. The 'Allon-Plus Plan' divides the c.40% of the occupied 
territories that Israel will cede to Palestinian jurisdiction, into five isolated enclaves. According to the 
'Allon-plus' plan, Netanyahu aims to conclude a final settlement whilst retammg over 50% of West Bank 
territory, consisting of Greater Jerusalem and tlie retention of most of Area C designated territory. Israel 
will hand over Area B to complement Aiea A already done, where the majority of the Palestinian 
population lives. However Israel will retain full control over Area C. The maps do not outline the 
powers and responsibilities the Palestinians wül assume for Ar ea B, this point is subject to fiirther 
negotiation. The suggestion may be that Israel may offer fidl sovereignty over Gaza in return for 
agreement to pai tial sovereignty in the West Bank.'*  ^ Palestinian officials have rejected the Netanyahu 
proposals outright, clinging to their hopes in unofficial promises made them by fomier PM Peres, which 
envisaged the return of some 90% of the West Bank. Netanyahu's intention to publicise liis intentions 
may be analysed as playing to Israeli domestic, and international opinion, rather than in attemptiug to
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recruit the Palestiniaus, in order to emphasise the difference between the Likud and Laboui*, and to 
impress that only Netanyaliu's Likud is capable of delivering a settlement wliich is acceptable to a 
sceptical Israeli public. This is rather iionic in that, even by outlining the 'Allon-plus' agenda, Likud is 
adopting the more pragmatic approach to an Israeli-Palestinian political settlement wliich has 
traditionally been the preserve of Labour. Indeed even the name of the plan endorses the 1970s Labour 
vision of an Israeli-Palestinian compromise, which died when Likud came to power in 1977. As each 
party has worked to neutralise the peace policies of the other, Netanyahu's acceptance of the Oslo 
accords may be deemed to be an abandonment of an absolutist programme in favour of a tactical and 
pragmatic minimalist position, in order to minimise the ideological damage of the DoP, in essence 
'Allon-plus means Oslo-minus'.^** A Ha'aretz editorial argued that this new plan amoimted to a 
repudiation of the Likud's Greater Israel ideology and an acceptance of'the principle of'Land for Peace' 
and is working within the framework of Oslo.'^* However, for the Palestinians, tliis plan represents more 
likely that Israel's political establishment will move more closely together in favour of such a settlement 
and that sharp ideological differences will dissipate, meaning that the Palestinians will face a more united 
and determined negotiating par tner, domestically str engthened with a less divisive vision of the fritur e. 
Tliis was all the more likely scenar io since the election of Ehud Barak, portrayed as tough on security 
issues, as Labour party leader on 3rd June 1997. The national security-conscious Barak was the only 
Labour cabinet minister to refrain fr om voting for the Oslo accords,^^ and he openly admitted on 20th 
July 1997 that Arafat and the Palestinians represented number tln ee on liis list of priorities of regional 
relations, behind Egypt and Jordan.
On 15th July 1997 a UN Special General Assembly session met to consider Israel's settlement 
policy. By a vote of 131 to tlnee (Israel, US, and Micronesia) the UN increased the pressure of its 
'Emergency' session of 25th April 1997, when 134 voted for a resolution that condemned settlement 
activity as illegal and a hindrance to the peace process. The 25th April binding resolution confrimed the 
applicability of the Geneva Convention to the occupied territories, reaffirmed the applicability of 
international law in the occupied territories, and demanded of member states to comply m the 'cessation 
of aU forms of assistance and support for illegal Israeli activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including Jerusalem, in particular settlement activities'. '^* The 15th July resolution represents the General 
Assembly's displeasure with Israel's refusal to cooperate witli the Secretary-General's special 
representative, following the representative's report on administrative harassment of Palestinians in East 
Jerusalem. The resolution also expanded fr om the 25th April resolution's focus on settlement activity, to 
call upon Israel to reverse all its illegal actions against East Jerusalem residents. The resolution further 
called on member states to halt any support for Israeli settlements by companies or individuals, and 
called for a ban on the import of any goods produced in settlements including in Jerusalem. The 
resolution further asked the Secretary-General to host a conference of the High Contracting Par ties of 
the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians on how to enforce the convention. The UN 
resolution represents an incremental approach of a fr amework of collective measures, in a continuation 
from previous actions which allows for frirther action in the future. With even the EU member states 
voting in favour* of the resolution, Israel and the US found themselves in isolation. However the Israeli
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political establishment indignantly rejected the resolution and cast 'slurs on the motivation of the world 
community for harbouiing such sentiments' by claiming the UN was 'ignoring wars and suffering, to 
preoccupy itself with two or tliree bulldozers preparing housing for young couples'. Israel's leaders 
preferred to liide behind the immunity offered by the US's continued support at the UN rather than 
reflect on the reason for the erosion of Israel's international standing.^^
Thus any signs of US-Israel strains must not be overemphasised. The US still maintains a staunch 
commitment to Israel in deflecting criticism and calls for international condemnation, particular ly at the 
UN. Immediately prior to the Mahane Yehuda market suicide bombing of 30th July 1997 the US 
administration attempted to engage both sides in secret negotiations in order to finesse a deal, with 
President Clinton having Thomas Pickering, under secretary of state for political affairs and number 
tlnee at State, become involved, meeting with Saeb Erekat and Uzi Ai*ad in Washington in mid-July 
1997.^  ^However the US was unable to concoct a formula which was mutually favourable. Whilst 
appearing to be somewhat vague on possible progress in the peace process, and being seen as adopting a 
rather strong pro-Israel bias, the US has assiduously guarded its position as principal international broker 
ensuring neither the UN nor the EU has a meaningfid political role witliin the process. US initiatives 
liave been deemed by some critics as amounting to little more than 'interference to contain the situation 
whenever the Palestinian territories seem to be on the verge of an explosion.
This situation ensured that Arafat was left internationally isolated and facing mounting domestic 
discontent. Arafat was reported to have decided that the peace process would remain fr ozen until new 
Israeli elections, after having concluded that he could expect no effective support fr om the Americans, 
the Europeans nor the Arab world, in pressing Israel to abide by its obligations and commitments. 
Arafat's position is precarious and at times contradictory. On the one hand he must avoid sacrificing 
frirther concessions and internal discontent, whilst on the other surviving intact for possibly up to tliree 
yeai’s. Arafat cannot defend liis domestic position without being seen embaiking on a path of 
confrontation with the Israelis and the US, but such a confrontation may well bring liis downfall as his 
position is so dependent on Israeli and American acceptance. Arafat's dilemma is to be seen to be 
encouraging and leading Palestinian resistance wliilst appearing to be clamping down on violent 
Palestinian agitators for Israel's benefit. If Ai'afat disappoints an increasingly disillusioned Palestinian 
public, he will pave the way for Islamist, Jordanian, or more likely, an increasingly impatient Fatah 
leadership to cultivate an alternative leadership. Arafat has traditionally used local Fatah cadres, 
represented by the Fatah Higher Committee, to assert control over the population and channel mass 
protests. However, Fatah cadres are responding that Arafat can no longer automatically guarantee liis 
command of the Fatah masses whilst corruption within his administration persists and no substantive 
gains are made in the peace process. Prior to the Mahane Yehuda bombing, Arafat was engaged in an 
initiative to restore credibility to the flagging peace process. Saeb Erekat was dispatched to Washington 
where he announced that the US was prepaiing a new imitative to calm rising Palestinian discontent. The 
initiative was based on a 'pause, or temporary fr'eeze, on settlement construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim in 
return for Palestinian agieement to jump-start the final status negotiations'. In return the PA would be 
required by the US to show 'resolve to prevent violence'. Such a request for 'a pause' in settlement
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construction is significant for two reasons. Fii'stly, the initiative undermines the original Palestinian 
demand for the Jabal Abu Ghneim project to be cancelled. Secondly, the focus on Jabal Abu Ghneim 
means that the more ambitious Israeli plans for annexing 12,500 dunams fiom five Palestinian villages 
(Abu Dis, Bethany, A-Toui*, Anata, and Hizme) for the massive Adumim settlement bloc is suiprisingly 
ignored. The 'new master plan for Ma'ale Adumim is much more dangerous than Jabal Abu Ghneim, 
because it lays the foundations for Greater Jerusalem' which will split the West Bank into two 
disconnected pai ts, and 'it totally ignores the Ai ab natui e of East Jerusalem, and thus isolates the 
neighbourhoods inside Greater Jerusalem, sepai atmg them fi'om each other and fi'om the rest of the West 
Bank.' On completion of this major annexation, Ma'ale Adumim and Jerusalem wül probably be united 
under one administrative authority, ensuring that territorial continuity and political unity will make it 
inevitable tliat the entiie area wül be aUocated to Israel in any final agreement. Rabin announced this 
Labour plan in 1994, and as long as the lands remained confiscated, they may have been recovered 
during the interim phase, however once the lands are annexed, they wül no longer be subject to the 
interim phase, as they wül be regarded as relating to Ma'ale Adumim settlement, and therefore being a 
subject of the final status talks. The PA has remained süent over this issue: indeed, it seems to liave 
already reached a secret understanding with Israel on tliis matter. The PA's outrage over Jabal Abu 
Ghneim makes little sense if they are prepared to accept the Ma'ale Adumim annexation, for it effectively 
precludes a Palestinian political presence in East Jerusalem after final status negotiations. Thus, with the 
suspected construction of a new Legislative Councü buüding in Abu Dis, it seems that the PA has 
accepted Abu Dis as theii' alternative capital, despite denials. In light of tliis master plan which will 
prevent geographical continuity of any fiitui e Palestinian state and which denies Palestinian access to 
East Jerusalem as a capital, the PA's outrage over Jabal Abu Ghneim seems like 'an attempt to deflect the 
people's attention fi'om the PA's abject surrender'.^®
Regai'ding the fiitui e of the peace process, its forwai'd momentum has been effectively stalled for 
a long time now. Breakdowns in the continuation of the process, and in mutual cooperation and 
goodwiU had been precipitated by renewed Jewish settlement construction, with media attention focused 
in particular at Jabal Abu Ghneim (Har Homa). The General Security Service waiiied Netanyaliu that a 
breakdown in Israeli-Palestinian secuiity cooperation, precipitated by the Jerusalem tunnel incident and 
the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement crisis, would mean that Israeli internal security could not be guaranteed 
without Palestinian aid. PA-Hamas relations oscülated between stability and repression since the 
February-Marcli 1996 suicide bombings. The PA is obligated to appeal* to be fighting Hamas 'terrorism' 
for the Israelis whüst having to negotiate a modus operandi within the Palestinian community. On the 
one hand, the PA conducts raids against Hamas, such as the successful 14th July 1997 raid on a Bayt 
Sailin' Hamas 'bomb factoi'y', in order to increase its 'red lines' in fighting terrorism against Israeli targets 
profile with the Israelis, whüst appearing to be sustaining Palestinian nationalist aspirations. However 
Fatah elements have also been involved in anti-Israeli armed attacks wliich undermines the logic of a PA- 
Hamas political divide. Hamas recovers its popularity as repressive Israeli measines bite deep, and the 
PA appear as willing Israeli helpers. On 19th July 1997 some 20,000 people took to the streets of 
Hebron in a pro-Hamas demonstration, and on the political firont Hamas has been making important
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gains in recent union elections. Hamas seemed to be adopting a wait-and-see posture to the collapsing 
peace process, but the Maliane Yehuda market suicide bombing of 30th July 1997 and the Ben-Yehuda 
Street suicide bombing of 4th September 1997, propelled Hamas back to centre stage.
The Likud-led government's words and deeds since assuming power did little to insphe 
confidence in their intentions towards the peace process, such as invigorating the settlement building 
programme in the occupied territories and clarifying that it would not concede to Palestinian demands 
over Jerusalem, nor would it countenance a sovereign Palestinian state. Ai‘afat had few weapons or allies 
with wliich to oppose Israeli power and unilateral actions. The US, co-sponsor of the Madrid peace 
process, teclinically locked out of involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process by the DoP, has 
however the moral power and authority, if not the will, to exert presstu e on Israel to maintain its good 
faith with regard to furthering the peace process. However the US has been almost negligent in this 
regard, failing to redress the inequitable nature of the Israeli-Palestinian relationsliip. President Clinton is 
one of the most pro-Israel cliief executives of recent times and Congress has displayed hawkishly pro- 
Israel views, such as enacting the unilateral, and provocative, decision to move the US embassy in Israel 
from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, despite international condemnation of such a move in advance of a 
permanent settlement being concluded.^^ With the Mahane Yehuda market and Ben-Yehuda Street 
suicide bombings, the entire peace process was postponed, if not abandoned.^** The Likud-led 
government took the intransigent stance of demanding secmity before peace while enacting 
cormtermeasmes against the Palestinian population which create the conditions for midermining the very 
secmity Israel craves. Israel made umeasonable and impossible security demands of Ar*afat whilst 
imposing a secmity clampdown and closme policy which ensmed a massive breach of trust between the 
Palestinians and their leaders, and between the Palestinians and the Israelis. Effectively, Israel wanted 
Arafat to crush Iris own people without regard to due process of legal norms and observance of basic 
human rights. The peace process is now worsening peoples lives, not improving them. Israeli-Palestinian 
political terrorism and acts of appalling violence are a 'ghastly memorial to political blindness'.^* Violence 
and ten orism are the inevitable consequences of failed political policies. Peace 'has proved an illusion, 
largely because, since June 1996, secmity was seen as its essential precondition rather than its 
consequence.'^^ Yet, 'ir ony of ir onies', it was the Netanyahu govermnent which drew the immediate 
benefits fr om the Mahane Yehuda bombing, because it needed to 'make no disgraceful concessions to the 
Palestinians', instead it could harden its own demands knowing that Mr. Arafat could not 'resist the 
damage to his own position', and it knew that the US had, 'once more, been forced into line' by having to 
condemn terrorist action. Therefore concessions fr om Israel, perhaps the only way to revive the peace 
process, could no longer be required, for coimtering terrorism must always be the 'greater imperative' 
than the pmsuit of peace.^^
Yossi Beilin, quoted in the Jerusalem daily Kol Ha'ir, reviewed the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process following the 1996 Israeli election, thus:
'What is Oslo? Oslo amounts to the separation of the intermediate arrangement from the 
permanent one. For many yeais the Palestinians said, 'We'll agree to the intemiediate stage, on 
condition that we know in advance what the final result will be. Otherwise you wiU bog us down
\ " ' A
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in the intermediate ...The Palestinians held to this position until, as a result of weakness 
...they finally agreed to what they had always refiised before. The result is Oslo. That's all it 
amounts to. Apart fiom mutual recognition and so on, it boils down to a separation between the 
intermediate and the permanent airangements. And look what's happened. Here's the Likud back 
in power, and they can tell Arafat, 'Sorry, that's all you get. Yes the intermediate arrangements 
we'll keep. Anytliing beyond that is Disneyland. Such is oui* opinion. Wliat's yours? You want a 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital? Fine! Let's sit down and talk for two hundred 
years' It's the Shamii* system. No preconditions!' '^*
Thus, if the Israeli-Palestinian DoP was intended to achieve a state in wliich conflicting parties agree to; 
cease all politically motivated and national-goal oriented hostile acts towai’d one another, and contract 
to; coexist benignly, with mutual respect, refiam fi om malevolent acts aimed at the disruption of the 
internal affaii's to the detriment of the other paily in the pursuit of national-goals, and allow for the fiee 
movement of peoples, goods, services and ideas, within an agreed institutional framework based on 
justice and respect for human rights, as a means of conflict resolution, then, as yet the diagnosis must be 
in the negative, and the prognosis for acliieving such a state is not good.
Writing on the peace process during the term of a Likud-led Israeh administration it is somewhat 
difficult not to feel pessimistic as regards the long term health of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
However, in order that a negative interpretation should not offer too many hostages to fortune as 
regards predicting the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the course of international diplomacy, it 
is incumbent in terms of balance and breadth that a positive caveat be added regarding important sub­
themes and alternative developments which surround the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Despite the 
above noted deficiencies, the DoP has led to some positive changes in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, 
and has resulted in a degree of Palestinian autonomy and the creation of significant Palestinian 
institutions, a situation wliich could only be reversed by hostilities. Despite the frustrations of the DoP 
and its incomplete status, the DoP does at least allow for the future by its very existence, and by 
providing the option for rejuvenating the peace process, probably under a different Israeli administration. 
No peace process is set in concrete: there will always remain the possibility that reforms of policy by 
either party and changes in political circumstances will lead to more fr uitful efforts at resolving the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is one of many under the umbrella of the 
Madrid structuie. It is therefore possible that progress in other areas may help stimulate progress in a 
seemingly stalled Israeli-Palestinian process. Fui thermore, the international diplomatic context wiU 
change, bringing with it new diplomatic efforts and new realities to be defined and dealt with. There are 
many interested parties to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process who may take a greater interest and more 
participative position with regard to making constructive and effective contributions than they have to 
date, such as the European Union and the Arab states. It is in tliis context that one cannot discount the 
possibility of alternative developments and of new peace efforts reviving and creatively influencing the 
Israeli-Palestinian relationsliip and the wider Middle East peace process. After all, Norway's key role in 
brokering the Oslo accords was instrumental yet a complete suiprise to many analysts. In the final
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analysis, the DoP offers the only pragmatic and peaceful alternative to violence for Israeli-Palestinian 
relations.
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